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Summary 
Contrary to the idea that there are fundamental differences between the 
work of Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin, the thesis shows that 
there exists a profound similarity in the direction of their projects, by 
exploring how they took up Kant's critical legacy concerning the 
temporality of language: the belonging together of language and time. 
The ground of Kant's system and of the necessity of systematicity - the 
three-fold synthesis which 'generates' time under the direction of 
conceptuality - is elucidated via the Second Analogy and the Critique of 
Teleological Judgment. It is argued that Kant's understanding of language 
and time remains fixed within a circular justification of Newtonian 
Science, which prevented him from taking up the critical resources of his 
treatment of teleological concepts and applying it to his idea of the 
critical system itself. Heidegger's and Benjamin's work may be understood 
as taking up the hermeneutic circularity of Kant's philosophical system, 
though freeing it from its appeal to a limited time determination. They 
both develop notions of a more originary temporality in conjunction with 
a linguistic phenomenology. They further allow this more critical 
thinking of language and time to reflexively fall back on the writing of 
philosophy itself. Their understanding of the temporality of language is 
explored through the way 'translation' focuses, in each case, a thinking 
of tradition and of linguistic works. The thesis rejects attempts to 
separate Heidegger's early work from his later approach, and further 
rejects a tendency to focus on Benjamin's style of writing in isolation 
from its theoretical basis. The thesis concludes by arguing that the 
work of both Heidegger and Benjamin points to a rethinking of Kant's 
legacy of the necessity of system, in terms of system as the inescapable 
belonging together of language and time. 
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Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations have been used; full references are given in 
the bibliography. 
Ak Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, Academy edition. 
AÜ Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers 
BPP Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
CJ Critique of Judgment 
CPR Critique of Pure Reason 
GA Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 
GS Benjamin's Gesammelte Schriften 
HCT History of the Concept of Time 
KPM Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
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OGTD Origin of German Tragic Drama 
SH Schriften Hamanns 
TT The Task of the Translator 
V&A Vorträge und Aufsätze 
WL The Way to Language 
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INTRODUCTION 
If all experience occurs in time and all theorization about experience 
occurs in language, then the very inclusiveness of the subjects language 
and time entails that any work of philosophy must implicitly involve 
notions of both language and time. Traditional philosophical terms such 
as experience or notion will also carry implicit assumptions, though 
perhaps multiple or ambiguous, about language and time; assumptions 
carried over from the philosophical discourses which specified them as 
philosophical terms. Thus theorization or philosophizing explicitly about 
language and time cannot escape the circle of the assumptions made about 
language and time in the very terminology used to discuss them. This 
will be true in any attempt to determine the relation between language 
and time. Indeed the use of the word relation already suggests that they 
are two independently existing entities which only subsequently interact 
with each other. The phrase the temporality of language will be used to 
mark the question of the belonging-together of language and time, since 
the word 'of' is suitably ambiguous between subjective and objective 
genitive. That is, ambiguous between the 'notion' of time determined by 
language and the 'notion' of time determining language (the word notion 
being marked as problematic due to the need to question its linguist- 
temporal assumptions). 
It is in the work of Kant that the question of how language and time 
are co-ordinated, is first systematically treated. The three-fold synthesis 
of apperception 'generates' time for Kant, and yet it does so under the 
direction of conceptuality. The consequences of this co-ordination are 
not, however, worked through by Kant because of his declared aim to 
render a transcendental justification for Newtonian science, and thus a 
Newtonian view of conceptuality and temporality. In particular, Kant does 
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not take adequate account of the consequences of his perceived link 
between language and time for the possibility of system and the writing a 
systematic philosophy, nor for the nature of system as a legacy. l In the 
treatment of his project as both system and legacy Kant did not allow his 
thinking of language and time to reflexively fall back on, and question, 
the systematization of language and time. 
The work of Heidegger and Benjamin will be explored in the way they 
take up the Kantian legacy of a thinking of the temporality of language. 
This is not to suggest that their work consists of a true 'return to 
Kant', since for them the nature of legacy itself also must be questioned. 
For Heidegger, this questioning will take the form of a 'destruction' of 
the tradition of metaphysics; for Benjamin, it will be through an under- 
standing of the philosophical work as 'doctrine'. Nor will the attempt be 
made to trace a line of lineage back from Heidegger and Benjamin to Kant, 
through the 150 years of diverse post-Kantian philosophies which sep- 
arate them. While this may be an important project, it would precisely 
prejudge the question of the nature of philosophical tradition itself, a 
question which is again central for Heidegger and Benjamin. Nor, 
however, will the attempt be made to stage a confrontation between their 
work, to decide which of them is most true to the 'spirit' or 'letter'2 of 
Kant's work, as if such terms did not already hold a particular 
determination of the temporality of language in relation to a philosophical 
work. 
Rather, the thesis will show that the work of each of Heidegger and 
Benjamin, though in very different ways, is a 'taking up' of the Kantian 
'legacy' of the question of the temporality of language, and a working 
through of the reflexivity of such a questioning in terms of the 
linguistic work and its traditionality. Kant's work is thus a common 
'origin' for Heidegger and Benjamin, but where the nature of this origin 
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is rethought, in each case, from out of a thinking through of the 
temporality of language. A circularity, therefore, obtains in each case 
between the taking up of Kant's legacy of the temporality of language 
and the rethinking of what 'taking up' and 'legacy' mean in the light of 
the temporality of language. The work of both Heidegger and Benjamin 
can thus be regarded as the unfolding of the circularity which lies 
already in Kant's work, but not laid out. 
Heidegger's and Benjamin's thinking are often regarded as being in 
opposition to each other, and Benjamin's hostility toward Heidegger's 
work is well known. 3 This hostility may also be found in the scholarly 
literature on Benjamin, even to the extent (though perhaps paradoxically) 
of accusing Heidegger of plagarizing Benjamin's writings. 4 The 
differences between their styles of thinking and terminologies, their 
literary and philosophical interests, not to mention their political 
involvements, are indeed striking, but by reading their work in terms of 
a common 'origin', the ground is thereby laid for a productive dialogue, 
breaking their work out of the insularity of the respective camps or 
schools of thought. 5 This thesis is a necessary prolegomena to such a 
productive dialogue, which will not be undertaken in detail here. Rather, 
by allowing Kent's legacy to become visible in their work as a whole, the 
proximity of their projects will be made to cast light on the significance 
of that legacy itself. 
Chapter 1 will show how the co-ordination of language and time is 
constructed in Kant's work and how this thought may be seen to fracture 
his attempts to remain with a justification of Newtonian conceptuality and 
temporality. Chapters 2 and 3, treating Heidegger and Benjamin respect- 
ively, show how for each of them, their work as a 'whole' constitutes a 
way of thinking out of, but never leaving, the circularity of Kant's 
project. Chapters 4 and 5 treat the way Heidegger and Benjamin, 
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respectively, understand translation and how translation becomes, for 
each, a focus for rethinking the nature of a linguistic work and the way 
it is 'handed on', in relation to the temporality of language explored in 
the earlier chapter. Chapter 6, the conclusion, will review the proximity 
which has been seen to arise between their work in the previous 
chapters, and explore the significance of this proximity for a thinking 
through of the temporality of language which Kant's work brings to 
light. In particular, it will be possible to return to the question of 
systematicity, in order to ascertain what light is cast by the rethinking 
of the temporality of language by Heidegger and Benjamin. 
Notes 
1. 'Aber was ist denn das, wird man fragen, für ein Schatz, den wir der 
Nachkommenschaft, (... I zu hinterlassen gedenken? '. Kants gesammelte 
Schriften, 22 vols, ed. by the Königlich Preußischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1942), vol I: Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft, Bxxiv; translated as Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman 
Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, (1929), 1989), Bxxiv: 'But, it will be asked, 
what sort of a treasure is this that we propose to bequeath to 
posterity? ' References to the first Critique will be given in the form 
CPR followed by the standard A/B numbering. 
References to English translations will be given for all the works 
refered to in the thesis, where they are available. However, the 
translations given will often have been modified to yield uniformity and 
to give a more 'word for word' rendition of the German. 
2. This distinction, taken up from Fichte's 'On the Spirit and the Letter 
in Philosophy' (Sämmtliche Werke, ed. by J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1965), VIII, pp. 270-300; translated by Elizabeth Rubenstein in 
German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, 
Schopenhauer, Hegel, ed. by David Simpson (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 74-93), was commonly used by Neo- 
Kantian writers in debates over who was the true inheritor of Kant's 
work. 
3. Benjamin himself, in a letter of 1930, wrote that he expected sparks 
to fly from the clash of his philosophy with Heidegger's. He writes: 
'J'attends quelque scintillements de 1'entre-choc de nos deux manieres, tres 
differentes, d'envisager l'histoire. ' (Walter Benjamin: Briefe, ed. by 
Gerschom Scholem and Theodor Adorno, 2 vols (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1966), 11,506). Whilst no mention of Benjamin has come to light in 
Heidegger's work or letters, Benjamin mention's Heidegger's work several 
times, all of them extremely negative. The first concerns Heidegger's 
trial lecture at Freiburg, 'Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft' 
1915, which was published in 1916. Benjamin wrote that he considered it 
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'Eine furchtbare Arbeit' (Briefe I, 129) and goes on to write, 'daß nämlich 
nicht nur das, was der Verfasser über die historische Zeit sagt (und was 
ich beurteilen kann) Unsinn ist, sondern auch seine Ausfuhrungen über 
die mechanische Zeit schief sind, wie ich vermute. ' (I, 130) ('that what the 
author says about historical time (and what I am able to judge) is 
nonsense, but also his expositions on mechanical time are crooked, as I 
suspect. ') 
In 1920, concerning Heideggers Habilitationsschrift on Duns Scotus, 
which Benjamin seems to have read while he himself was researching the 
Scholastic view of language, he wrote: 'Es ist unglaublich, daß sich mit so 
einer Arbeit [... ] jemand habilitieren kann. Die nichtswürdige Kriecherei 
des Autors vor Rickert und Husserl macht die Lekture nicht angenehmer. ' 
(I, 246) C'It is unbelievable that anyone can qualify 1... ] with such a 
work. The author's undignified boot-licking of Rickert and Husserl does 
not make for pleasant reading. ') Ten years later, in the period from 
which the first quotation above is taken, Benjamin seemed to be planning 
a decisive confrontation with Heidegger's work. In another letter of 
1930, Benjamin" inentions a planned reading group on Heidegger's work, 
which, however, never took place: 'Es bestand hier der Plan, in einer 
ganz engen kritischen Lesegemeinschaft unter Führung von Brecht und 
mir im Sommer, den Heidegger zu zertrummern. ' (I1,514) ('There was a 
plan to destroy Heidegger, in an closed critical reading group under the 
leadership of Brecht and myself, in the summer. ') 
Then in 1938, after years of struggle and financial hardship in 
trying to find an audience for his work, and as the crisis in Germany 
deepened, it must have been with great sadness that Benjamin wrote the 
following from Denmark: 'Mir kommt hier etwas mehr linientreues 
Schrifttum vor Augen als in Paris und so geriet ich neulich an ein Heft 
der 'Internationalen Literatur' in dem ich, anläßlich eines Teils meiner 
Wahlverwandtschaftenarbeit als Gefolgsmann von Heidegger figuriere. ' (II, 
771) ('Literature towing the party line is more noticeable here than in 
Paris and so recently I came across an issue of 'Internationale Literatur' 
in which I figure as a follower of Heidegger, on account of my Elective 
Affinities essay. ') The reason for Benjamin's severe remarks on 
Heidegger's work, must obviously in part stem from Heidegger's Nazi 
affiliations. However, the early quotations cited above also indicate that 
Benjamin took a highly negative stance before the time of Heidegger's 
political involvements. The question of whether, or how, Benjamin 
misinterpreted Heidegger's work will not be part of this thesis, nor the 
question of the wider consequences, on an understanding the political 
aspects of their work, of finding profound similarities between them. 
4. Werner Fuld, Walter Benjamin, Zwischen den Stühlen: Eine Biographie 
(Munich: Carl Hanser, 1979). After a long quotation from the prologue to 
Benjamin's Origin of German Tragic Drama, Flud writes: 'Wesentliche 
Elemente der Sprachtheorie Benjamin's übernimmt Heidegger in seinem 1936 
in der Zeitschrift Das Innere Reich erschienenen Aufsatz "Hölderlin und 
das Wesen der Dichtung"; manche Sätze sind fast wörtliche Zitate. Das 
Ende dieses Textes Heideggers läßt sich übrigens als verschlüsselte Kritik 
an der nationalsozialistischen Gegenwart verstehen. ' (p76) The last 
sentence is perhaps of greater interest than the incredible claim Flud 
makes. The underlying reasoning is maybe as follows: Benjamin's work 
must be antithetical to Heidegger's because of their differing political 
affiliations; Benjamin's thinking is 'completely useless for the purposes of 
fascism'; in order, therefore, for Heidegger to take up Benjamin's ideas, 
Heidegger's essay must be part of a 'coded criticism' of National Socialism. 
Each of these three clauses would need to be questioned. What is clear, 
however, is the extent to which the political affiliations of Heidegger 
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and Benjamin are used to structure the perceived differences in their 
work. 
5. Comparative works of the kind 'Heidegger and X' are, of course, 
common. For example, George F. Sefler, Language and the World: A 
Methodological Synthesis Within the Writings of Martin Heidegger and 
Ludwig Wißtgenstein (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974). Seflers 
explicit method (xxii-xxxiii) is to compare the 'structure' of their work, 
but this turns out to mean little more than the 'results' of their 
thinking, for example, a rejection of representational theories of 
language. One of the aims of this thesis is to systematically lay the 
ground for a dialogue between Heidegger and Benjamin by investigating 
the way they took up a common legacy, the question of language and time, 
from Kant. Only through such a ground laying can a 'comparative' study 
be undertaken which is not simply a comparison of completed corpora, but 
a productive engagement, which itself hands on a legacy of questioning in 
the light of the present. 
CHAPTER 1: KANT AND THE CO-ORDINATION OF LANGUAGE AND TIME 
I. Introduction 
Kant's philosophy was revolutionary in placing time at the heart of 
knowledge via the deduction of the Categories and the Schematism. 
While Heidegger and Benjamin both wrote on Kant's work explicitly, this 
chapter will not take the standard form of proving direct lines of 
influence between Kant's work and theirs, as if to show that their work 
constitutes the true 'return to Kant'. 1 Such an approach would deny any 
importance to the hundred years of reflection and reaction to Kant's 
work which gave rise to the diverse forms of German Idealism and 
German Romanticism, as well as to the diverse forms of Neokantianism. 
This wide range of developments of Kant's legacy would have conditioned 
the historical situation in German academia with respect to Kant and it 
would be problematic to argue they had no influence upon Heidegger and 
Benjamin. It would, of course, be possible to trace a lineage of Kant's 
legacy back through these diverse post-Kantian philosophies, but such an 
approach would also precisely prejudge the question of the nature of a 
legacy in relation to a philosophical work, a question which will be seen 
to be central to both Heidegger and Benjamin. Rather, the form of this 
chapter will be to show how the question of the belonging together of 
language and time is raised in Kant's work and how its implications were 
only partially recognized by him. By following through the implications 
of the belonging together of language and time in relation to Kant's 
project it will be possible to demonstrate the complexity of issues which 
the works of Heidegger and Benjamin address. The question of the 
temporality of language can thus be approached in a way which does not 
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bias an investigation in favour of either Heidegger or Benjamin, nor does 
it allow their work to seem to spring up separately and ex nihilo, nor 
does it allow their confrontation to become a closed debate. 
There is, however, also a further, equally important reason for 
starting with Kant, which concerns a prevalent misunderstanding of their 
work. This reason is the need to counter a view, which, simply stated, 
asserts that experience is something which happens in time. This 
philosophical prejudice, (so termed because such a view prejudges that 
which is precisely at issue, that is, the nature of time), is often found 
mapped on to the work of both Heidegger and Benjamin. To give just 
two examples: In Benjamin's work, this prejudice is applied to the idea 
of the Messiah, so that it appears as if Benjamin understands the Messiah 
to arrive in some future time. In Heidegger's work, the covering or 
uncovering of Being is understood as happening in time, such that one 
may have a nostalgia for a time in which Being was uncovered. To 
prevent this misunderstanding from arising, and thus to appreciate 
particularly the profundity of both Heidegger's and Benjamin's thinking 
of time, one needs to look again at the idea played out in Kant's work 
that experience does not happen in time, but rather that experience and 
time spring forth together (or more precisely, in terms of Kant: 
generated together by the three-fold synthesis of conceptuality) and that 
neither is prior to the other. 
The investigation of language and time in Kant's work will be in 
three parts. The first (section II) will be concerned with how Kant sets 
up the inter-relation of language and time. In section III it will be 
argued that Kant draws back from a thesis of the temporality of language 
in his reconciliation of Newtonian physics with teleological conceptuality. 
The last section will be concerned with the implicit temporality which 
governs Kant's critical philosophy in terms of the assumptions he made 
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about language and time and how these assumptions condition the 
structure and form of Kant's systematic philosophy as such. 
11. The Critical Legacy 
At the time of his working on the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason2, Kant was conscious of the need to provide guidance on how its 
status as a legacy to philosophy was to be understood. In the preface to 
the second edition he writes: 
Aber was Ist denn das, wird man fragen, für ein Schatz, den 
wir der Nachkommenschaft, mit einer solchen durch Kritik 
geläuterten, dadurch aber auch in einen beharrlichen Zustand 
gebrachten Metaphysik, zu hinterlassen gedenken? (CPR Bxxiv) 
But, it will be asked, what sort of a treasure is this that we 
propose to bequeath to posterity? What is the value of the 
metaphysics that is alleged to be thus purified by critique and 
established once for all? 
Kant's answer, that the results of his critique are negative in nature, in 
that they limit the speculative employment of reason, must be held in 
conjunction with his assertions that the system he is proposing is not a 
fixed and dogmatic one, but rather one which will develop over time. The 
principle of this development arises from the system's own intrinsic - 
principles of organisation, its inner unity and coherence. It is in this 
regard that Kant often draws on the metaphor of the organism when he 
is describing the relation of the system as a whole to its parts. 
[ ... die reine spekulative Vernunft] in Ansehung der Erkenntinis- 
prinzipien eine ganz abgesonderte für sich bestehende Einheit 
ist, in welcher ein jedes Glied, wie in einem organisierten 
Körper, um aller anderen und alle um eines willen dasind. 
(CPR Bxxiii) 
[P]ure speculative reason, so far as the principles of its 
knowledge are concerned, is a quite separate self-subsistent 
unity, in which, as in an organised body, every member exists 
for every other, and all for . 
the sake of each. 
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In the second section of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled The 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method Chapter III (The Architectonic of Pure 
Reason), Kant further details this comparison to the extent of making the 
concept of a system and the concept of an organism structurally identical: 
Das Ganz ist also gegliedert (articulo) und nicht gehäuft 
(coacervatio); es kann zwar innerlich (per intus susceptionem), 
aber nicht äußerlich (per appositionem) wachsen, wie ein 
tierischer Körper. (CPR A833/B861) 
The whole (vis a vis the system] is thus organised (articulatio), 
and not aggregated (coacervatio). It may grow from within (per 
intus susceptionem), but not by external addition (per 
appositionem). It is thus like an animal body. 
Kant's characterization of the development of critical philosophy is 
circular in two related senses. First, the concept of the organism is one 
which requires its own transcendental justification within the critical 
system; Kant undertook this in the Critique of Judgement3, nine years 
after the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Secondly, the idea forming the organised unity of the critical system, 
which allows the animal metaphor to have relevance, is itself a critical 
element within the system. The system 'is possible only by means of an 
idea of the totality of the a priori knowledge yielded by the understand- 
ing' ('nur vermittelst einer Idee des Ganzen der Verstandeserkenntnis a 
priori [... ] möglich'; CPR A64/B89), and this idea of totality is further 
grounded, for Kant, in the transcendental unity of apperception. 
Given what was said above about the circularity implicit in philo- 
sophizing about language and time, the circularity involved in Kant's 
conception of critical philosophy and its progression through time is not 
to be regarded as a fault which could have been avoided. Rather, the 
thoroughness of Kant's critical investigation into conceptuality and time 
precisely brings to light the circularity of thinking language and time 
together in a systematic way. The value of Kant's legacy is therefore 
positive, and not merely negative, in that the project raises the question 
17 
of its own existence in time and thus its own status as legacy. It is 
this value which makes Kant's work so fundamental for understanding 
Heidegger and Benjamin. 
Heidegger's engagement with Kant spanned the length of his academic 
and teaching career: one of his earliest major publications was Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), and one of his last was Kant's Thesis 
About Being (1962). In the preface to the fourth edition of Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics (1973), Heidegger wrote with reference to the 
book's composition shortly after Being and Time 'Kant's text became a 
refuge, as I sought in Kant an advocate for the question of Being which 
I posed' ('Kants Text wurde eine Zuflucht, bei Kant einen Fürsprecher für 
die von mir gestellte Seinsfrage zu suchen'4). Heidegger specified 
further that it was the connection (Zusammenhang) in the Schematism 
between the problem of the Categories and the phenomenon of time, that 
he found Kant's support. 5 This connection will be explored below and 
Heidegger's general approach to the legacy of philosophical tradition will 
be investigated in Chapter 2. 
Benjamin's engagement with Kant resulted in only one finished essay 
explicitly treating the Kantian problematic: On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy. 6 This essay, along with other fragmentary notes, will be 
treated in detail in Chapter 3, where it will be shown that Benjamin's 
rejection of Neo-Kantianism stemmed directly from a consideration of both 
the link between language and time in Kant's critical philosophy and the 
nature of the philosophical legacy which Kant's work represented. 
Although after leaving academia, Benjamin never again engaged with 
Kant's work in a sustained way, the essay On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy gives the clearest insight into what gave rise to Benjamin's 
philosophical style of thinking. The importance which Kant's work had 
for Benjamin around the time he was writing the essay can be gauged 
from the following comment in a letter to Scholem dated 22 October 1917: 
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... bin ich des festen Glaubens, daß es sich im Sinne 
der 
Philosophie und damit der Lehre, zu der diese gehört, wenn sie 
sie nicht etwa sogar ausmacht, nie und nimmer um eine 
Erschütterung, einen Sturz des Kantischen Systems handeln 
kann sondern vielmehre um seine granitne Festlegung und 
universale Ausbildung. 1... 1 Einzig im Sinne Kants und Platos 
und wie ich glaube im Wege der Revision und Fortbildung Kants 
kann die Philosophie zur Lehre oder mindestens ihr einverleibt 
werden. (Briefe I, 150) 
I am of the certain belief that in the field of philosophy and 
hence of the doctrinal field to which philosophy belongs, indeed 
which it perhaps constitutes, there can never be a shattering, 
a collapse of the Kantian system, but only its ever more firm 
establishment and universal development. C... ] Only in the 
spirit of Kant and Plato and, in my opinion, along the path of 
revising and expanding Kant, can philosophy become doctrine or 
at least be incorporated into doctrine.? 
It is the predicted 'universal development' of the Kantian system which is 
sketched in On the Program of the Coming Philosophy. The kabbalistic 
overtones of Benjamin's idea of philosophy as 'doctrine' (Lehre) will be 
shown to arise from his consideration of the nature of tradition in terms 
of the temporality of a philosophical legacy. 
Kant's use of the animal metaphor for the legacy of his critical 
system, a metaphor based on the similarity of a relationship of 'parts' to 
'whole' (CPR A832/8860), suggests that there are no difficulties in moving 
from a material system to a linguistic one. Yet Kant nowhere in the 
First Critique critically thematizes language (die Sprache) as such. He 
does, however, consider language in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of Views, in the section On the Ability of Using Signs (Von dem 
Bezei ch n ungs vermbgen): 
Alle Sprache ist Bezeichnung der Gedanken, und umgekehrt die 
vorzüglichste Art der Gedankenbezeichnung ist die durch 
Sprache, dieses größte Mittel, sich selbst und andere zu 
verstehen. Denken ist Reden mit sich selbst C... ], folglich sich 
auch innerlich (durch reproductive Einbildungskraft) hören. 
(Ak VII, 192) 
All language is signification of thought and, on the other hand, 
the means par excellence of intellectual signification is 
language, the most important way we have of understanding 
ourselves and others. Thinking is talking with ourselves t... ], 
so it is also listening to ourselves inwardly (by reproductive 
imagination) (p65) 
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Given that Kant goes on to discuss the sign language of deaf people and 
states that it is 'hardly possible' (kaum mö glich) to conceive that they 
have, and think with, concepts, it would be relatively easy to attack 
deconstructively Kant's prioritizing of the voice. 9 In order to appreciate 
the profundity of Kant's linking of language and time, one must initially 
accept his link between a linguistic sign and a concept. In the same 
section as the quotation above, Kant differentiates symbols from 
characters in that the latter have no meaning in themselves, but rather 
'by association' (durch Beigesellung) lead to intuitions and, through these, 
to concepts (Anthropology p64; Ak VII, 191). Thus Kant can write: 
[D]aher das symbolische Erkenntnis nicht der intuitiven, sondern 
der discursiven entgegengesetzt werden muß, in welcher 
letzteren das Zeichen (charakter) den Begriff nur als Wächter 
(custos) begleitet, um ihn gelegentlich zu reproduzieren. 
(Ak VII, 191) 
Accordingly, the opposite of symbolic knowledge is not 
intuitive knowledge but discursive knowledge, in which the 
sign (character) accompanies the concept only as its guardian 
(custos), so that it can reproduce the concept when the 
occasion arises. (Anthropology p64) 
The word translated 'association'. Beigeseilung also has connotations of 
'being assigned to' in the sense of someone being assigned to someone 
else, in this case to guard them (Wachter from wachen, 'to keep watch'). 
This simple and close link of assignment between the sign and this 
concept, may, however, provide insight into Kant's understanding of the 
concept itself. Kant begins his section on the Bezeichnungsvermögen by 
defining the ability to use signs in terms of time: 
Das Vermögen der Erkenntis des Gegenwärtigen als Mittel der 
Verknüpfung der Vorstellung des Vorhergesehenen mit der des 
Vergangenen ist das Bezeichnungsvermögen. (Ak VII p191) 
The ability of knowledge of the present as the means for 
connecting ideas of foreseen events with those of past events 
is the ability of using signs. (Anthropology p64) 
If the ability to use signs is the ability of connecting (Verknüpfung, 
which can also mean 'knotting', 'tying together' of 'combining') the future 
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and past in the present, then what Kant is proposing here is an 
embryonic idea of the temporality of language (subjective genitive). Since 
Kant links the sign to the concept so closely, this idea of the temporality 
of the sign may be used to guide a pursuit of the link between 
conceptuality and time through the sections of Kant's 'Transcendental 
Analytic' and into the Critique of Judgment. The problems which Kant 
encounters in bringing together an understanding of conceptualization in 
the determination of time, with an understanding of time in the 
determination of conceptuality, will be seen to open the field of the 
temporality of language (in its objective and subjective genitives) - the 
field with which Heidegger and Benjamin are concerned. 
Kant's definition of 'concept' appears in the section entitled The 
Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept in the Transcendental Deduction of 
the first critique: 
[Der Begriff] aber ist seiner Form nach jederzeit etwas 
Allgemeines, and was zur Regel dient. (CPR A106) 
A concept is always, as regards its form, something universal 
which serves as a rule. 
The concept is a rule for the reproduction of a manifold of intuitions in 
so far as it represents their necessary reproduction together. lo The 
successively intuited manifold must be combined into a unity which 
carries with it an element of necessity. That is, the empirical 
apprehension of a stone in one's hand followed by an apprehension of a 
feeling of weight could never give rise to the necessity involved in the 
thinking of the stone as being itself heavy. For Kant, all necessity is 
grounded in a transcendental condition, in other words, introduced by the 
synthesis of the manifold and not found empirically amongst our 
intuitions. Yet if a manifold of intuitions is to be held together in a 
necessary unity, there must be a unified consciousness which can 'run 
through' and reproduce the succession of intuitions. 
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Also muß ein transzendentaler Grund der Einheit des 
Bewußtseins, in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen aller unserer 
Anschauungen, mithin auch der Begriffe der Objekte überhaupt, 
folglich auch aller Gegenstände der Erfahrung, angetroffen 
werden, ohne welchen es unmöglich wäre, zu unsern 
Anschauungen irgend einen Gegenstand zu denken: denn dieser 
ist nichts mehr, als das Etwas, davon der Begriff eine solche 
Notwendigkeit der Synthesis ausdruckt. (CPR A106) 
There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity 
of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our 
intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in 
general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground without 
which it would be impossible to think any object for our 
intuitions; for this object is no more than that something, the 
concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis. 
Kant is arguing that if we were to inspect our consciousness we 
would only find a flux of empirical inner appearances, without any 
necessary unity which would justify the positing of a unified 
consciousness. Therefore, this empirical apperception must itself be 
grounded in a transcendental unity of apperception. A unitary transcen- 
dental ego must be posited in order to account for the necessity we 
perceive in conceptualization. Since appearances are not things in 
themselves, this transcendental ground of the possibility of concepts is 
also the ground of the possibility of all objects of experience (and thus 
knowledge), in that both are synthetic unities of appearances involving 
necessity, and in that an object is 'that something, the concept of which 
expresses such a necessity of synthesis. ' 
In the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition, Kant separates 
out three forms of synthesis necessarily found in all knowledge, each 
grounded by the unity of apperception, though his cross-referencing 
between them makes clear that they are separated for heuristic reasons 
only, and that there is but one synthesis, which is three-fold. The first 
is the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition. All appearances belong to 
inner sense, the pure form of intuition of which is time, thus Kant 
writes that 'all our 'knowledge is thus finally subject to time' ('sind [... ] 
der Zeit unterworfen'; CPR A99). However, if the successive intuitions 
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were not 'run through, and held together' ('das Durchlaufen der Mannig- 
faltigkeit and denn die Zusammennehmung'; A99) the mind would be unable 
to distinguish time in the sequence of one impression after another, 
indeed there would be no perception of time at all. 11 Thus while time' as 
the pure form of intuition of inner sense had been treated separately by 
Kant in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the experience of time is only 
'generated' (cf A162/B202) through a synthesis of the apprehended 
intuitions. Such a synthesis presupposes that previous intuitions can be 
'held' on to, that is reproduced in order to be 'ordered, connected, and 
brought into relation' (A99). This necessity of reproduction for 
knowledge, Kant calls the Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination, 
though he acknowledges that it is 'inseparably bound up with' (A102) the 
synthesis of apprehension. If, however, the synthesis of reproduction 
did not operate according to rules, but was instead only arbitrary, 
experience would be merely a chaotic flux with no order. Yet since the 
rules for connecting and ordering appearances cannot be derived 
empirically either (since there can be no empirical perception of 
necessity) there must be a further synthesis which itself combines the 
manifold into rule bound unities; this Kant calls the Synthesis of 
Recognition in a Concept. The German word for concept, der Begriff 
(from begreifen, 'to comprehend'; related to greifen, 'to take hold of' or 
'to grasp'), suggests for Kant its role in 'holding' successions of 
intuition together in unities (A103). 
The Transcendental Deduction thus clearly demonstrates the link 
between the concept and the ordering of the manifold; but since this 
ordering is also the condition for the experience of time, as was shown 
above in relation to the synthesis of apprehension, Kant is also thus 
proposing that conceptualization is the condition of possibility for 
experience of time. It is possible, therefore, to understand the 
23 
Transcendental Deduction as a transcendental version of what Kant 
proposed in the Anthropology concerning the ability to use signs as the 
capability of combining the future and past in the present. The three- 
fold synthesis demonstrates the inter-dependence of the syntheses of 
apprehension (of present intuition), reproduction (of past intuition), and 
recognition (of a law bound unity, which thus prescribes that which 
necessarily follows from one appearance, for example the holding of a 
stone in one's hand, and which thus has a futural element). Whereas the 
assertion from the Anthropology assumes the giveness of the past and 
future aspects of time which the Bezeichnungsverm'bgen combines as 
knowledge of the present, the transcendental version demonstrates that 
the three aspects of time (past, present and future) are themselves 
grounded upon the three-fold synthesis which is the necessary condition 
of all knowledge. 
Heidegger in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics also understands 
the three modes of synthesis in terms of expressing the three-fold unity 
of time as 'present, having-been and future' (p121; GA 3,177). However, 
for Heidegger, this has a place in his rather 'violent' (Heidegger's word, 
p138) interpretation of Kant's emphasis on the imagination, in the first 
edition of the Transcendental Deduction, as pointing beyond time as a 
given ordered sequence of vows to 'original time': 
Diese Jetztfolge ist aber keineswegs die Zeit in Ihrer 
Ursprünglichkeit. Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft vielmehr 
läßt die Zeit als Jetztfolge entspringen and ist deshalb - als diese entspringenlassende - ursprüngliche Zeit. (GA 3,175-6) 
This sequence of nows is by no means time in its originality. 
The transcendental power of the imaginagion rather allows time 
as sequence of vows to spring forth, and as this letting- 
spring-forth it is therefore original time. (KPM pl20) 
While Heidegger's understanding of 'ursprünglich' time and ecstatic 
temporality will be discussed in Chapter 2, in order to show here that 
the 'violence' of Heidegger's interpretation is based on sound insight, it 
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is necessary to pursue further Kent's linking of time to conceptuality -a 
point which Heidegger does not consider at any length in his Kant book. 
As was shown, the three-fold synthesis, as conditioning the very 
possibility of conceptual knowledge, also gives rise to the experience of 
time. Kant is proposing that time is grounded in conceptual cognition, 
or in other words, he is putting forward a theory of the temporality of 
(belonging to, determined by; subjective genitive) the concept. However, 
by following further Kant's characterization of the general rules of the 
ordering of the manifold in conceptualization, that is, the pure concepts 
of the understanding, it will become clear that there is already an 
implicit temporality conditioning Kent's view of the concept - an implicit 
temporality of (determining, objective genitive) the concept. 
After dealing with the synthesis of recognition and the transcenden- 
tal unity of synthesis, in the Transcendental Deduction of the first 
edition, Kant goes on to consider further these general rules for the 
ordering and combination of the manifold. Since, as has been argued, the 
general rules for the synthesis cannot be empirically derived, they must 
be provided a priori by the understanding: 
Diese Gründe der Rekognition des Mannigfaltigen, so fern sie 
bloß die Form einer Erfahrung überhaupt angehen, sind nun 
jene Kategorien. (CPR A125) 
These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as 
they concern solely the form of an experience in general, are 
the categories. 
Individual empirical concepts are rules derived from experience which has 
been ordered by the categories; they are 'only special determinations of 
still higher laws, and the highest of these, under which the others all 
stand, issue a priori from the understanding itself' C'nur besondere 
Bestimmungen noch höherer Gesetze, unter denen die höchsten, (unter 
welchen andere alle stehen) a priori aus dem Verstande selbst herkommen', 
A126). Kant is able to list the twelve such categories by considering the 
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understanding in its pure synthesis, that is, the operation of the 
understanding when it is not involved in synthesizing the manifold, and 
thus which is demonstrated in the rules of logic. Kant is, therefore, able 
to justify his list of categories by reference to his list of the 'logical 
functions in all possible judgements' (A79/B105). He relies for this list 
on traditional grammar, which, by having progressed along a 'sure path' 
('sicheren Gang9 of enquiry, has rendered a 'closed and completed body of 
knowledge' (Bviii). The move from the table of judgments to the table of 
categories is justified in terms of the unity of the understanding and 
that it has the 'same function' in relation to the combining of 
representations in a judgment as in relation to the combining of 
intuitions in a representation (A79/B104-5). 12 
Immediately after the Transcendental Deduction, in the Schematism, 
Kant goes on to show what results when the categories are applied to 
appearances, or rather, to time as the formal condition of all appear- 
ances. 13 Since as was shown above, it is the combination of the manifold 
which first gives rise to the experience of time, the Schematism is thus 
concerned with the determination of time experience by the categories: 
Daher wird eine Anwendung der Kategorie auf Erscheinungen 
möglich sein, vermittelst der transcendentalen Zeitbestimmung, 
welche, als das Schema der Verstandesbegriffe, die Subsumtion 
der letzteren unter die erste vermittelt. (A139/B178) 
Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes 
possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, 
which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates 
the subsumption of the appearances under the category. (My 
emphasis) 
Kant is thus able to characterize the schemata of the pure concepts 
clearly as conditioning the experience of time: 
Die Schemata sind daher nichts als Zeitbestimmungen a priori 
nach Regeln, und diese gehen nach der Ordnung der Kategorien, 
auf Zeitreihe, den Zeitinhalt, die Zeitordnung, endlich den 
Zeitinbegriff in Ansehung aller möglichen Gegenstände. 
(A145/B184) 
The schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of 
time in accordance with rule. These rules relate in the order 
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of the categories to the time-series, the time-content, the time- 
order, and lastly to the scope of time in respect of all possible 
objects. 
In the section following the Schematism, The System of all Principles of 
Pure Understanding, Kant essentially details further the operation of the 
schemata, but this time understood as 'principles', the most general a 
priori determinations of experience, the 'universal rules of unity in the 
synthesis of appearances' (A156-7/B196). It is at this point that Kant's 
approach obtains its greatest justification; the principles thus obtained 
are in general agreement with the laws of Newtonian physics. 14 For both 
Heidegger and Benjamin, this complicity between the Kantian project of a 
critique of pure reason and Newtonian physics demonstrated that a 
certain narrow notion of experience was operating in Kant's system. 
Benjamin writes, for example, that 'it was an experience or a view of the 
world of the lowest order. ' 15 
The appeal to Newtonian physics brings to light, however, the 
circularity of Kant's method. 16 For Kant, all knowledge and thus all 
conceptual cognition is 'finally subject to time' (A98-99), the form of 
inner sense, but conversely time itself is determined with a view to the 
justification of Newtonian science and thus in relation to the 
conceptuality of Newtonian bodies. Kant himself acknowledges the 
inescapable circularity of such an approach; concerning the idea of a 
principle of pure understanding he writes: 'it has the peculiar character 
that it makes possible its own ground of proof, namely experience, and 
that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed' C'[... ] er die 
besondere Eigenschaft hat, daß er seinen Beweisgrund, nämlich Erfahrung, 
selbst zuerst möglich macht, and bei dieser immer vorausgesetzt werden 
muß. A737/B765). This circularity between time and conceptuality only 
becomes truly vicious if the time determination within Newtonian 
conceptuality is shown not to be universally applicable. Since for Kant 
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the a priori conditions of Newtonian conceptuality are also the conditions 
of possibility of objective experience as such, the existence of objective 
experiences which do not conform to the determination of time by 
Newtonian conceptuality would cast substantial doubt on Kant's 
transcendental analysis. On the one hand, Kant's method of justifying the 
determination of time by reference to Newtonian conceptuality would 
. appear viciously circular; on 
the other hand, outside of this closed 
conformity to Newtonian physics, the general inter-dependence of 
conceptuality and time would become visible. The next section, therfore, 
will be concerned with Kant's discovery that, indeed, not all concepts do 
conform to Newtonian conceptuality and temporality, and that this does 
indeed point to the wider circle of the inter-dependence of concept and 
time, and thus to the field of the temporality of language with which 
Heidegger and Benjamin will be concerned. 
III. Temporality and Teleology 
Amongst the principles of pure understanding, it the second Analogy 
which is at the heart of Kant's determination of time in relation to 
Newtonian conceptuality. (The full title of the Second Analogy is 
'Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Caus- 
ality'. ) It was on the question of causality, and the impossibility of 
obtaining the element of necessity between cause and effect from 
empirical experience, that Hume's scepticism cut most deeply for Kant. By 
grounding the three-fold synthesis of the manifold on one side in the 
transcendental unity of apperception, and on the other in the pure 
concept of causality (the schema of which is necessary succession of the 
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time-order), Kant could thereby validate Newtonian science transcen- 
dentally. 
Though the scholarly debate over the Second Analogy has reached no 
consensus over whether or not it solves the problem of causality for 
empiricism, what is important in this context is the relation between 
conceptuality and time-order determination. 17 Given that the three-fold 
synthesis combines the successive intuitions, thus making the experience 
of time possible, the question for Kant is how to allow for the 
possibility that on some occasions the intuitions need to be held together 
as successive intuitions of the same object, eg a house, while on other 
occasions they need to be held together as effect following a cause, that 
is, an event. In the case of an object, the order of the reproduction of 
the appearance of its different parts, under the one concept, has no 
necessary sequence. While in the case of an event, the order of the 
appearances, under its concept, must have a necessary sequence. 
Jede Apprehension einer Begebenheit ist also eine Wahrnehm- 
ung, welche auf eine andere folgt. Weil dieses aber bei aller 
Synthesis der Apprehension so beschaffen ist, wie ich oben an 
der Erscheinung eines Hauses gezeigt habe, so unterscheidet sie 
sich dadurch noch nicht von andern. (CPR A192/B237) 
Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception that 
follows upon another perception. But since, as I have above 
illustrated by reference to the appearance of a house, this 
likewise happens in all synthesis of apprehension, the 
apprehension of an event is not yet thereby distinguished from 
other apprehensions. 
The thrust of Kant's solution is essentially clear. Since the necessity 
involved in objective succession cannot be derived from the subjective 
succession of empirical appearances, objective succession must be 
transcendentally prior; this requirement is provided for by the schema of 
the category of causality. However, were it to apply to every series of 
intuitions, there would again be no difference between object and event. 
The difference lies in the rules which constitute the concepts of object 
and event. When a sequence of appearances is judged to be an event, the 
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concept involves a rule in accordance with which the appearances in 
their succession are determined by the preceding state. Particular events 
are thus determinations of the manifold in which their concepts stand 
under, and are thus determinations of, the higher, pure concept of 
causality. 18 When a sequence is judged to be an object, the rule of the 
concept is such that it holds the appearances together as a unity existing 
through time. It is then this unity which becomes subject to the 
category of causality. In the cases of both object and event, objects are 
given a position in time - either co-existent with other objects, or 
necessarily following upon the existence of the preceding state. 
Zu aller Erfahrung und deren Möglichkeit gehört Verstand, und 
das erste, was er dazu tut, ist nicht: daß er die Vorstellung 
der Gegenstände deutlich macht, sondern daß er die Vorstellung 
eines Gegenstandes überhaupt möglich macht. Dieses geschiehet 
nun dadurch, daß er die Zeitordnung auf die Erscheinungen and 
deren Dasein überträgt. (CPR A199/B245-6) 
Understanding is required for all experience and for its 
possibility. Its primary contribution does not consist in 
making the representation of objects distinct, but in making 
the representation of an object possible at all. This it does by 
carrying the time-order over into the appearances and their 
existence. 
This quotation makes it clear that, for Kant, every concept of an object 
carries with it a determination of time-order in accordance with the a 
priori determinations of time (the schemata) by the categories. In this 
way the concept of an object is given a transcendental guarantee of its 
place in a cause and effect nexus described by Newtonian mechanics. This 
is not to say that Kant has succeeded here in grounding empiricism 
transcendentally, since whether a sequence is judged to be an event or an 
object can only be decided by appeal to the appearances, that is - 
empirically: 
Soll also meine Wahrnehmung die Erkenntnis einer Begebenheit 
enhalten, da nämlich etwas wirklich geschieht; so muß sie ein 
empirisches Urteil sein, in welchem man sich denkt, daß die 
Folge bestimmt sei. (CPR A201/B246, my emphasis) 
If, then, my perception is to contain knowledge of an event, of 
something as actually happening, it must be an empirical 
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judgment in which we think the sequence as determined. (My 
emphasis) 
The existence of this circularity in Kant's justification of the 
conceptualization of object and event has lead some scholars to posit a 
certain Platonism in Kant's work19. It is argued that if the difference 
between objects and events can only be made by illegitimate appeal to 
empirical experience, then the concepts of all objects must exist prior to 
all experience. While this view has a certain attraction on the basis of a 
concern to give Kant's project a closed coherence, such a suggestion is 
radically opposed to the tenor of Kant's assertions that all knowledge is 
finally subject to time. A Platonic theory of concepts would suggest the 
opposite: that all knowledge is finally outside of time, in the sense of 
belonging to a realm separate from a realm of temporal occurance. The 
question of the atemporality of Platonic theories of language will be 
taken up later in the chapters on Heidegger's and Benjamin's theories of 
translation. The question will also arise in connection with the tension 
between the implicit and explicit connections between language and time 
in Kant's work which will be explored in section IV. In the present 
context, and in order to move towards this consideration, there is a more 
immediate problem in Kant's approach, concerning the possibility of 
objects and their concepts which do not conform to the Newtonian 
conceptualization of experience: the organism and the concept of the 
organism. 2° 
The question of the concept of an organism, and thus of the 
organism as an object of experience is treated at length in the second 
half of the Critique of Judgment, entitled the Critique of Teleological 
Judgment. There are essentially two related poles to the question of 
teleology for Kant. The first concerns the general purposiveness in 
nature as a whole; that is, the fact that the scientist expects particulars 
to be subsumable under empirical laws, empirical laws to be subsumable 
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under more general laws, these laws under higher laws, and so on, in a 
regular and seemingly intentional way. The second concerns the way the 
parts of an organism interact in such a way as to seem to presuppose 
the unity of the organism as their purpose. 
The purposiveness of nature as a whole, Kant calls the subjective 
finality of nature, and can be characterized as the way: 
die besondere empirischen Gesetze (... 1 nach einer solchen 
Einheit betrachtet werden müssen, als ob gleichfalls ein 
Verstand (wenn gleich nicht der unsrige) sie zum Behuf unserer 
Erkenntnisvermögen, um ein System der Erfahrung nach 
besonderen Naturgesetzen möglich zu machen, gegeben hätte. 
(Ak V, 180) 
particular empirical laws must be regarded [... 1 according to a 
unity such as they would have if an understanding (though it 
be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our 
cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of 
experience according to particular natural laws. (Critique of 
Judgment p19) 
The observation that nature operates 'as if' it had been designed by a 
grand architect, does not require the positing of such a metaphysical 
being. This would amount to ascribing intentionality to nature as a 
thing in itself, whereas nature, for Kant, 'is not given to us as 
organized' (CJ p51), but rather is made up of appearances constructed by 
our cognitive faculties. Empirical laws are determinations of the 
universal laws, or categories, which the understanding prescribes to 
nature in the synthesis of the manifold. The unity of nature is thus a 
result of the unity of apperception, and the idea of the purposiveness of 
nature is a critical principle of reason for the use of reflective 
judgment. 
This view is essentially repeating what Kant had already said in the 
First Critique concerning the third regulative idea of pure reason: 
Die dritte Idee der reinen Vernunft, welche eine bloß relative 
Supposition eines Wesens enthält, als der einigen und allgenug- 
samen Ursache aller kosmologischen Reihen, ist der Vernunft- 
begriff von Gott. [... ] Bleiben wir nur bei dieser Voraussetz- 
ung, als einem bloß regulativen Prinzip, so kann allenfalls 
daraus nicht weiter folgen, als daß, wo wir einen teleologischen 
Zusammenhang (nexus finalis) erwarteten, ein bloß mechanischer 
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oder physischer (nexus effectivus) angetroffen werde. 
(CPR A685/B713, A687/B715) 
The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative 
supposition of a being that is the sole and sufficient cause of 
all cosmological series, is the idea of God. C... ] And provided we 
restrict ourselves to a merely regulative use of this presuppo- 
sition, even error cannot do us any serious harm. For the 
worst that can happen would be that where we expected a 
teleological connection (nexus finelis), we find only a mechanical 
or physical connection (nexus effectivus). 
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant develops this notion of the regulative 
idea by drawing a distinction between determinant and reflective judgment 
(p18; Ak V. 179 ). Determinant judgment concerns the subsuming of 
particulars under the universal transcendental laws, and thus describes 
the operation of the understanding as detailed in the first Critique (CPR 
A69/B94). Reflective judgment concerns the movement from particulars to 
a more general law under which they may be subsumed, and it is this 
operation of the understanding which requires a law for its guidance. 
This law is the principle of the purposive unity of nature, a law which 
itself stems from the unity of apperception in the determinant judgment 
of the understanding. 
Yet the last sentence of the above quotation marks a problem which 
could not be addressed simply by repeating ideas already developed in the 
first Critique, and it is the problem the Critique of Teleological Judgment 
has to negotiate. The problem is this: if the manifold is synthesized 
according to category of causality, how then is it possible in the first 
place to observe a teleological connection, which then is subsequently 
found to be 'only' mechanical? Indeed, if it is possible to perceive a 
teleological connection, then this must show that the manifold has been 
synthesized according to a teleological principle. However, 'teleological 
connection' is given no place in the table of categories of the under- 
standing, but is rather said to be a regulative principle of reason. The 
question of the 'teleological connection' thus marks the question of 
33 
whether Kant is able to retain the strict distinction between determinant 
and reflective judgment, and, further, the distinction between under- 
standing and reason. 
The focus for the question of teleological connection is the organism 
and the concept of the organism. For Kant, an organism is not merely an 
aggregate of parts in the same way an object, such as a house, is 
constituted by its parts; but neither do the parts of an organism have a 
simple necessary time-order of cause and effect. Instead, the parts of an 
organism work together in a coordinated way, that is, as if their effect 
(the living organism) were presupposed as a cause of their coordination. 
Indeed, such objects are 'explicable (erklerbar] in this way alone' (CJ 33; 
Ak V, 383). Kant states the opposition he sees between mechanism and 
teleology with great clarity: 
Wenn wir nun ein Ganzes der Materie seiner Form nach als ein 
Product der Teile und ihrer Kräfte und Vermögen sich von 
selbst zu verbinden [... ] betrachten: so stellen wir uns eine 
mechaniche Erzeugungsart desselben vor. Aber es kommt auf 
soche Art kein Begriff von einem Ganzen als Zweck heraus, 
dessen innere Möglichkeit durchaus die Idee von einem Ganzen 
voraussetz, von der selbst die Beschaffenheit und Wirkungsart 
der Teile abhängt, wie wir uns doch einen organisirten Körper 
vorstellen müssen. (Ak V, 408) 
Now where we consider a material whole and regard it as in 
point of form a product resulting from the parts and their 
powers and capacities of self-integration t... ] what we represent 
to ourselves in this way is a mechanical generation of the 
whole. But from this view of the generation of a whole we 
can elicit no conception of a whole as end -a whole whose 
intrinsic possibility emphatically presupposes the idea of a 
whole as that upon which the very nature and action of the 
parts depend. Yet this is the representation which we must 
form of an organized body. (Critique of Teleological Judgment 
p65) 
Kant's analytic of teleological judgment in the concept of an organism 
remains the same as was developed in the first Critique: to recognise the 
teleological ordering of the parts does not mean the postulation of a 
grand architect of nature; we 'put the final causes into things, rather 
than, as it were, lifting them out of our perception of things'. 21 Kant 
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wants to maintain that teleology is only an heuristic principle, albeit a 
transcendental one. The deeper question of how it is possible to 
perceive something as organism when the understanding constructs objects 
as mechanically connected is not directly addressed by Kant. 22 It is this 
deeper question which causes Kant's attempted resolution of the 
opposition between mechanism and teleology (in the 'Dialectic of 
Teleological Judgment) to become fraught with contradictions. 23 On page 
66 (Ak V, 409), Kant asserts that we should simply 'estimate nature on 
two kinds of principles. The mechanical mode of explanation would not 
be excluded by the teleological as if the two principles contradicted one 
another. ' Yet just three pages later, he asserts that 'these two 
principles are not capable of being applied in conjunction to one and the 
same thing in nature' since, he goes on, 'each mode of explanation 
excludes the other' (p69; Ak V, 412). Teleological judgments are only 
heuristic for the investigation of nature which we 'may and should 
explain [... ] on mechanical lines' (p74; Ak V, 415), yet Kant asserts that 'it 
is utterly impossible [... ] to hope to understand the generation even of a 
blade of grass from mere mechanical causes' (p66; Ak V, 409. My 
emphases); and Kant further asserts that 'by the constitution of our 
understanding we must subordinate such mechanical grounds, one and all, 
to a teleological principle' (p73; Ak V, 415). 24 
The root of Kant's difficulties lies his idea that teleology and 
mechanism are 'two principles' (p66; Ak V, 409), forgetting that teleology 
is a principle of reason and mechanism a principle of the under- 
standing. 25 In The Antinomy of Pure Reason in the first Critique, the 
existence of entities posited by principles of pure reason, such as God or 
the free ego, could be relegated, though remaining transcendentally 
necessary, beyond the reality constructed by understanding to the 
noumenon. Whereas, in the case of teleology and mechanism, organisms as 
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entities posited by a principle of reason, populate reality all too 
obviously. In view of the impossibility of placing teleology in the 
noumenon, beyond the reality constructed by the understanding. Kant 
argues that both principles together point beyond reality to their 
reconciliation in a 'supersensible ground' (p71; Ak V, 413), which is the 
'cause of the world' (p67; Ak V. 410) and which bears 'some resemblance' 
(p65; Ak V, 409) to it. 26 
While the merging of understanding and reason, which is marked by 
Kant's phrase 'two principles', together with the problematic status of his 
metaphysical assertion of a ground of their reconciliation, both lie at the 
heart of German Idealism, there is yet a more general question arising 
from Kant's analysis of teleology and mechanism. It will be the question 
taken up by Heidegger and Benjamin, and which will separate them from 
German Idealism while explaining their closeness to this tradition of post- 
Kantian thought. It is the question of the belonging together of 
language and time itself. 
To see how this question arises in Kant's work, it is necessary to 
consider further his opposition of mechanism and teleology. Kant was 
deeply engaged with the science of his time and, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, was concerned to provide not only a transcendental justification 
of Newtonian physics, but also purify it of its appeals to 'occult' 
qualities, such as the 'impenetrability' of bodies, and 'occult' entities, such 
as the transcendentally real status of space and time. In an age when 
Aristotelian teleological explanations were being purged from science27, 
Kant wanted to assert that not only were teleological judgments 
heuristically necessary for the mechanical investigation of nature, but 
that 'we are obliged, despite those mechanical causes, to subordinate in 
the last resort to causality according to ends' (p74; Ak V, 415). Kant's 
problems with the mechanism-teleology opposition sprang from the way 
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the table of categories in the first Critique had been presented as closed 
and complete, and thus teleology could not then be added as a mode of the 
synthesis of the manifold without seriously jeopardizing the whole of the 
critical method advanced there. 
The solution to the opposition lies in the fact that there is no 
opposition. This is not to say that teleology can be included in a 
Newtonian table of categories (the categories, it must be remembered, via 
the Schematism give rise to the Principles of pure understanding and 
thus to universal laws of nature in line with Newtonian physics. ) 
Rather, there is no opposition because mechanism is itself teleological. 
The synthesis of recognition in the three-fold synthesis of the first 
Critique, concerns the role of concepts in the construction of experience; 
these concepts go on to play a part in mechanical explanations and 
investigations of nature. However, their role as characterized by Kant in 
the three-fold synthesis is a teleological one. Concepts order the 
manifold of appearances into wholes according to a presupposed idea of 
that whole. The manifold itself cannot give rise to the idea of such a 
whole, as this would simply be a version of transcendental realism. The 
ordering of parts in relation to a whole which one is incapable of 
'lifting out of our perception' (First Introduction p408; Ak XX, 220) is 
precisely how teleological judgment is understood by Kant. Thus, implicit 
in the first Critique, is an idea that all concepts are teleological. The 
difference between concepts used in (so called) mechanical explanation, 
such as the concepts of Newtonian bodies, and concepts used in (so called) 
teleological explanations, such as the concept of an organism, would turn 
on the degree to which the manifold is teleologically ordered. Since the 
three-fold synthesis is also the condition of the possiblity of experience 
as such, as well as the experience of time, the difference between (so 
called) mechanical concepts and (so called) teleological concepts turns on 
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the way time is generated differently in each type of concept, though the 
difference is to be thought not so much qualitatively, as quantitatively or 
quantumly. 28 The concept of a thing, taken as a Newtonian object, 
generates time as a series of unified, singular moments in which the 
thing stands as a whole, and in which it can be understood as taking 
part in events considered as necessary sequential orders of moments. The 
concept of a thing as a (so called) teleological object, such as an 
organism, generates time in a more 'stretched' fashion (Heidegger's term); 
that is, the thing stands in a longer temporal span than the singular 
moment, and in which it can be understood as ordering and regulating 
itself in a way which cannot be considered as a necessary sequence of 
moments. Newtonian object and organism are not opposed, rather, the 
stretch of time determined by the concept of each varies in each case. 
The Newtonian object and the organism, therefore, lie at different 
ends of a spectrum of the different ways time may be generated in the 
three-fold synthesis. One might, thus, expect that there are things which 
do not fall neatly one side or the other of a mechanism-teleology 
opposition. In the third Critique one does, indeed, find Kant giving 
examples of objects which are not organisms, yet do still require 
teleological judgment, and it is this fact which most clearly illustrates the 
way Kant could not separate mechanism and teleology, and further points 
to the teleology, and thus the temporality, of all concepts and all things. 
For example, on page 405 of the first introduction, Kant mentions 'crystal 
formations' as teleological products of nature, and on p425 he talks about 
the lens, of which one says that its 'purpose' is to refract light. This 
latter example is a good illustration of how the concept of an object 
prescribes what the object does (ie. refract light), such that if an object 
is found not do such, it can no longer be thought of under that concept. 
Charles Sherover in Heidegger, Kant and TimeZ9 briefly develops this 
point: 
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A concept is essentially a futural referent because it is pre- 
dictive and prescriptive. [... ] It sets out essential 'attributes' by 
which I may recognise and verify its relevance to an object 
before me. (p256) 
This view certainly ties in with one aspect of Kant's idea of the 
Bezeichnungsverm'gen in the Anthropology as 'the ability to know the 
present as the means for connecting ideas of foreseen events with those 
of past events' (my emphasis). However, Sherover has imposed upon Kant 
the priority which Heidegger puts on the future in his early work (a 
priority which will be explored in chapter 2). The idea of the predictive 
character of the concept, as predicting the future behavior of the object, 
also suggests the existence of time as a pre-given 'homogeneous' contin- 
uum (to use Benjamin's word) existing extrinsically to the predictions. 
The picture developed above of the teleology operating implicity in the 
three-fold synthesis does not place any special emphasis on the future, 
and further, since the three-fold synthesis itself generates time, the 
concept is seen to be inseparable from the generation of the temporality 
of its object. Kant's analysis has brought to light the way the concept 
determines time, that is the temporality of the concept (in subjective 
genitive); thus the teleological construction of experience in the three- 
fold synthesis concerns not simply the future of an object, but rather 
the way the past, present and future of an object are generated together. 
It may thus seem that the word teleology is inappropriate; indeed, the 
word temporality to describe the way a concept generates the time of its 
object, is to be prefered, since it avoids connotations of a presupposed 
futural emphasis. However, the Greek word Thos, while often translated 
correctly as 'goal' or 'end', also can mean 'performance', 'execution' or 
'coming to pass' since its verbal form rh)siv generally means 'to perform' 
or 'to execute'. The teleology of a concept may thus be understood as 
concerning the way a object 'comes to pass' or 'performs itself'. Given 
Weiland's Kantian reading of Aristotle's understanding of sk . or in The 
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Problem of Teleology30, where he argues that the heuristic function of 
teleology in Aristotle's method of investigation was misunderstood in 
Aristotelianism, which turned it into a fixed set of ends, it becomes 
possible to re-read the progress from Aristotelian science to Newtonian 
science in a new way. 31 
The idea of the progress into and of modern science is a key theme 
in the work of Heidegger and Benjamin; both saw Kent's explicit attempt 
to justify Newtonianism in the first Critique as supporting an impover- 
ished understanding of reality, yet both found in Kant the seeds of a 
more profound questioning of time and progress. Their work can thus 
be understood as re-activating the implicit questioning in Kant's work of 
the belonging together of time and conceptuality, or, as posed by the 
Anthropology, time and language. It is a questioning which, as was 
suggested above, can be traced back to Aristotle and, for Heidegger, to 
the Presocratic understanding of Xbyos. The radically different ways in 
which Heidegger and Benjamin took up this tradition of questioning will 
be explored in the chapters to come. 
The phrase tradition of questioning is itself capable of being read in 
the subjective and objective genitive. Both senses will be important for 
Heidegger and Benjamin, and the two thinkers are united in taking up the 
question of the way Kant's philosophy is a tradition, that is, the status 
of a legacy in relation to Kant's organic system. Just as for Kant, the 
organism could not be thought of as existing as a simple unity in its 
single moment of time, progressing along a continuum of such moments, so 
for Heidegger and Benjamin, Kant's system and other historical 
philosophical systems could not be thought of in this way either. To put 
this in another way, Kant's work raises the question of the temporality 
of language while also raising the question of the temporality of its 
answer. In this way, Kant's work represents a profound moment in the 
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thinking of language and time, and it is necessary to understand the 
convoluted issues it raises in order to be able to understand what lies at 
the heart of Heidegger's and Benjamin's work. The bringing together of 
Heidegger and Benjamin is by no means in order to show one approach to 
be better than the other; rather, it is that the belonging together of 
Heidegger and Benjamin in a tradition opened by Kant, may itself shed 
light on the belonging together of time and language. In particular, 
their work will be investigated in the way they reinstate the circularity 
of the temporality of language, beyond Kant's attempt to ground his 
project in a Newtonian temporality. The next section will now explore 
the tensions which form in Kant's system by this grounding, in order to 
lead into a consideration of the work of Heidegger and Benjamin. 
IV: The Temporality of Critique 
It was noted above in relation to Kant's Critique of Judgment that the 
question of teleological judgments has two different, though related, focii. 
One concerns the perception of nature as a purposive whole, and thus 
concerns the way the scientist expects his research to form an organised 
system of knowledge. It was shown that Kant essentially repeated his 
analysis from the first Critique by arguing that this form of judgment 
was a transcendental regulative idea of reason. The other focus was on 
individual teleological conceptions within the science, particularly on the 
organism, and it was here that Kant's critical approach to teleology ran 
into problems. It was argued above that the difficulties stemmed from the 
attempt to maintain a clear distinction between reason and understanding. 
Since, however, in Kant's conception, it is reason which is responsible 
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for the idea of the formal outer unity of a system of science, these 
difficulties can thus be understood as arising from Kant's attempt to 
maintain a clear distinction between the outside of a system and its parts 
inside. Just as in the case of science, the teleological form of the whole 
could not be held apart from a consideration of the teleological form of 
its parts, that is, all its concepts, so for Kant's critical system itself, a 
consideration of the teleological forms of its concepts must ensue. To 
put this another way, since Kant had raised the issue of the temporality 
of his system (as organism and legacy), the question of the temporality of 
its constituents must also be raised. The remainder of this chapter will 
consider the temporality of several key elements of Kant's critical system 
together with the temporality of the critical approach as such. In this 
way it will become clear how Kant's critical approach to language and 
time has consequences for the way philosophy itself is understood. 
The most fundamental element in Kant's system is the transcendental 
unity of apperception. Kant had posited a formal unity which would hold 
the three-fold synthesis together and thus explain the necessity which 
was perceived in the succession of momentary intuitions, a necessity 
which Hume had been forced to deny. Hume's scepticism had also attacked 
the idea of the self, since no idea of an abiding self could be found 
amongst the flux of impressions. Kant dealt with both problems at once 
by arguing that there must be a unitary self in order to even experience 
the flux of inner appearances; it must therefore be a transcendental 
condition of experience, that is a transcendental self underlying the 
empirical self. Kant thus writes: 'this pure original unchangable 
consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception' (CPR A107). Since 
the three-fold synthesis itself generates time and permanence in time, the 
positing of such an entity reveals a commitment to a pre-critical idea of 
objectivity and time at the heart of Kant's analysis. That is, the 
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transcendental self is conceived of as an object existing continually 
present in time, without considering how presence is itself generated in 
the synthesis of the manifold. 
The object-like status of the self is hidden by Kant's reference to it 
as a 'consciousness', yet if this aspect is emphasized, this only serves to 
set up an infinite regress since it is consciousness which needs to be 
grounded by transcendental apperception: 'There must, therefore, be a 
transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of 
the manifold' (A106). If the transcendental apperception is a 
consciousness, then it will require grounding by a further transcendental 
ground, and so on. Both Heidegger and Benjamin make explicit reference 
to the uncritical objectivity of the self at the heart of Kant's work. 32 
Kant's transcendental ego introduces an uncritical ground into the 
belonging together of language and time in the three-fold synthesis. The 
projects of Heidegger and Benjamin are attempts to think this belonging 
together beyond such a grounding. In order to appreciate the profundity 
of such a move, it will be useful to consider two very different reactions 
to Kant's work - those of Fichte and Hamman. Fichte was the first to 
take up the problem of the objectivity of the transcendental ego in Kant's 
work in terms of the infinite regress it seemed to set up: 
Denn dann wäre nach ihm die Möglichkeit alles Denkens bedingt 
durch ein anderes Denken, und durch das Denken dieses 
Denkens, und ich möchte wissen, wie wir je zu einem Denken 
gelangen sollten! (Sämmtliche Werke I, 476) 
The possibility of all thinking would be conditioned by another 
thinking, and by the thinking of this thinking, and I should 
like to know how we are ever to arrive at any thinking at all! 
(Science of Knowledge33 p49) 
Fichte's answer, however, is to step back from the problem of how the 
self is to be understood or conceptualized by making an idea of intuition 
of the self central. The intellectual intuition is 'the immediate 
consciousness that I act and what I enact' (Science of Knowledge p38; 'das 
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unmittelbare Bewußtsein, daß ich handle, and was ich handle', I, 463)). 
Through intellectual intuition, the self is found to be pure self-positing 
activity, 'thetic not synthetic' (p72). While this in one way avoids the 
problem of the self as an object whose thinking could only be made 
possible by appeal to a further transcendental ground of unity, in 
another way Fichte is more dogmatically empiricist than Kant since he 
needs an uncritical view of language and conceptuality which will allow 
him to describe what he finds through intellectual intuition. 34 Kant's 
three-fold synthesis in the first Critique was concerned to move away 
from the idea of a simple link between intuition and conceptualization in 
order to counter dogmatic empiricism. The appeal to intellectual intuition 
is a retreat from a reflexion upon the role of language in experience. 
Benjamin makes the point more generally that: 
für Fichte beruhte die Möglichkeit der Anschauung des Ich auf 
der Möglichkeit, in der absoluten Thesis die Reflexion 
einzubannen und zu fixieren. (Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in 
der deutschen Romantik GS 1.1, p32) 
for Fichte the possibility of the intuition of the 'I' rests on 
the possibility of enchanting and fixing reflexion in the 
absolute thesis. (The Concept of Art-Criticism in German 
Romanticism GS 1.1,32) 
In his lectures on the origin of language, Fichte defines language as 'the 
expression of our thoughts through arbitrary signs' in order to keep 
cognition and language entirely separate, and thus denying the critical 
thrust of Kant's view of the role of language in cognition. Thus Fichte 
may be understood as trying to counter the uncritical objectivity of the 
self at the heart of Kant's system whilst actually perpetuating the 
residues of an uncritical view of language in Kant's system which had 
allowed Kant to uncritically conceptualize the transcendental unity of 
apperception in the first place. The way the role of language in the 
construction of the critical system is not thematized by Kant even though 
language (as conceptualization) is thematized in the critical system, 
44 
indicates an absence of reflexivity which was thus perpetuated by Fichte. 
Benjamin understood the early German Romantics as taking up the issue 
of this 'fixing' of reflection, and his view will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, the question of the uncritical view of language underpinning 
the construction of Kant's system was taken up very soon after the 
publication of the first Critique, by Hamann. 35 
In his Review of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' and Metacritique of 
the Purism of Reason36, Hamann is particularly critical of the separation 
he perceived in Kant's work between understanding and intuition. Kant's 
emphasis on the a priori forms of the understanding, that is, on ' its 
functions prior to, and independent of, empirical experience, suggests to 
Hamann 'a gnostic hatred of matter or a mystic love of form' 
(Metacritique p215; SH p248). He ironically proposes that Kant's 
purifications of Reason had not gone far enough, and that to complete 
the project Kant would need to purify reason of language, which has 'no 
other credentials than tradition and usage. ' (p215; SH p246) Against this 
trajectory of the Kantian project, Hamann argues that it is conceptuality 
which links understanding and intuition: 
Worin besteht der formelle Unterschied der Begriffe a priori 
unf a posteriori? [... ] Sind prius und posterius, Analysis und 
Synthesis nicht natürliche correlate und zufällige opposite, 
beide aber, wie die Rezeptivität des Subjekts zum Prädikat, in 
der Spontaneität unserer Begriffe gegründet? (SH p239) 
What is the formal distinction between concepts a priori and 
concepts a posteriori"? [... 1 Are prius and posterius, analysis 
and synthesis not natural correlata, and accidental opposita, but 
both of them grounded, like the receptivity of the subject to 
the predicate, in the spontaneity of our concepts? (Review 
p209) 
For Hamann, then, the 'whole ability to think rests on language' 
(Metacritique p216; SH p249). Hamann develops this thesis in two 
directions. The first is a linguistic understanding of all experience, and 
it is a direction which Benjamin refers to in his essay On the Program 
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of the Coming Philosophy (p9; GS 11.1,168). Hamann's view of experience 
is essentially similar to that which Benjamin found in Kabbalah. 37 
Jede Erscheinung der Natur war ein Wort, das Zeichen, Sinnbild 
und Unterpfand einer neuen geheimen, unaussprechlichen, aber 
desto innigern Vereinigung, Mitteilung und Gemeinschaft 
göttlicher Energien und Ideen. Alles, was der Mensch am 
Anfange hörte, mit Augen sah, beschaute und seine Hände 
betasteten, war ein lebendiges Wort. (SH p222) 
Every phenomenon of nature was a word, the sign, image and 
pledge of a new union, communication and community of divine 
energies and ideas - secret, inexpressible, but all the more 
profound. Everything that man saw, heard, touched, was a 
living word. (The Knight of Rosenkreuz's Last Will about the 
Divine and Human Origin of Language p73) 
Benjamin's appeal to a similar kabbalistic understanding of experience in 
On Language As Such, and the Language of Man will be explored in 
Chapter 3. The second direction in which Hamann develops his thesis is 
towards a revised understanding of reason: 
Reason is language, logos t... I Yet these depths are still obscure 
to me; I still await an apocalyptic angel with a key to this 
abyss. (Letter to Herder, 18 August 1784, quoted in Smith 
p249) 
Heidegger uses this direction of Hamann's thought as the basis for one 
of his later essays entitled Language. Heidegger's later understanding of 
language will be discussed in Chapter 2. For both Benjamin and 
Heidegger, the idea that language cannot be separated from thought in 
order to act as the instrumental means of the latter's expression, is 
central. A more profound link between the three thinkers, however, is 
the way an emphasis upon language is concomitant with a renewed 
questioning of time, in relation to experience, and tradition, in relation 
to reason. Hamann, for example, writes the following, which is 
reminiscent of Kant's words in the Anthropology. 
What would the most exact and careful knowledge of the 
present be without a divine renewal of the past, without an 
inkling of the future. (A Flying Letter, quoted in Smith p235) 
And the correlative of this in relation to reason is an insight into the 
relation between reason and tradition: 
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All chatter about reason is pure wind: Language is its organ 
and criterion. [... ] Tradition is the second element. (Letter to 
Herder, 8 December 1783, quoted in Smith p245) 
Hamann may thus be understood as developing the consequences of Kant's 
critical linking of time and conceptuality for the possibility of the 
critical project as such, by turning Kant's critical insights on to the 
uncritical view of language and reason which underpinned the critical 
system. It is Kant's idea of the a priori which can be seen to shelter 
reason's execution of its own critique from the consequences of a 
profound linking of language and time. The idea of a priority is what 
structures the very method of transcendental criticism, in that it refers 
to that which is 'prior' to, and a condition of, empirical experience. 
Since the three-fold synthesis generates time, the a priori thus refers to 
something outside of time. The appeal to this atemporal condition of 
experience allows Kant to maintain that pure reason is itself unchanging, 
a view justified by an appeal to the way the table of logical judgments 
has remained unchanged since Aristotle. The idea of a priori understood 
in this way thus is concomitant with a view of reason as being distinct 
from the temporal appearance of tradition, or rather, the tradition which 
pertains to reason is understood as the preserving 'handing down' of an 
unchanging entity, its unchanging nature being guaranteed by the a 
priori which is the condition of possibility of time. It thus becomes 
clear that the idea of the a priori determines how a tradition of 
thinking is understood, that is, how philosophy itself is conceived. 
The idea of the a priori as refering to something 'prior' to 
experience, indicates that the idea of a priority itself involves a time 
determination. The model of time implicit in Kant's a priori, is time 
understood as isolatable moments, such that the earlier (the conditions of 
experience) stands independently of what follows later (that is, experience 
itself). This view of time in which the earlier stands separately from 
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the later, is the temporality pertaining to Newtonian objects. Since, as 
was shown above, Kant was unable to hold to this view of time for all 
objects of experience and instead a more complex view of the interaction 
of time and language was required, it thus becomes possible to apply this 
insight to the time determination metaphorically implicit in the a priori. 
Thus the a priori is not to be understood as the objectified isolation of 
the earlier and the later, but rather understood on a view of time 
stretching between them. The direct consequence of applying this critical 
view of the a priori to the position of reason, is that reason can no 
longer be held to exist in an atemporal realm distinct from the temporal 
appearance of tradition, instead they must be understood to be held 
together in a more complex way, such that the nature of the 'handing 
down' and the nature of reason (thus the nature of philosophy itself) are 
co-determined in a thorough-going understanding of the temporality of 
language. It is this project which is taken up by Heidegger and 
Benjamin. 
This chapter has shown that while the question of the belonging 
together of language and time was raised in Kant's work in relation to 
the three-fold synthesis of experience and the temporality of the critical 
system as a organic legacy, it has far reaching ramifications on every 
aspect of Kant's project as well as the understanding of philosophy as 
such. In the chapters which follow, the very different attempts by 
Heidegger and Benjamin to think the convolutions of language and time 
will be considered. Yet, in that they take up the same question raised by 
Kant, the different attempts, with their different styles and terminologies, 
different literary and philosophical interests, different political 
involvements, are themselves already convolved within the temporality of 
language. It is in considering the proximity between the projects of 
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Heidegger and Benjamin that the belonging together of language and time 
may be further illuminated. 
NOTES 
1. The phrase 'return to Kant' or 'back to Kant', introduced by Otto 
Liebmann (Kant und die Epigonen, 1865), became the clarion call for the 
Neo-Kantian schools. 
2. Kants gesammelte Schriften, 22 vols, ed. by the Königlich Preußischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1942), vol 1: 
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft; Translated as Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
by Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, (1929). 1989). References to 
the first Critique will be given in the form CPR followed by the standard 
A/B numbering. References to Kant's complete works will be in the form 
'Ak' followed by volume and page number. 
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. by James Creed Meredith 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). References to this work will be given 
in the form 'CJ' followed by the page number. References to Kritik der 
Urtheilskraft will be to Ak V. 
4. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by 
Richard Taft (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1990), iii. Translation of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik in Martin 
Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe ed Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1991), vol. 3, xiv. Further references to the 
English translation will be in the form 'KPM'; references to Heidegger's 
collected works will be given in the form 'GA' followed by volume and 
page number. 
S. In the period immediately before Heidegger started writing Being and 
Time he was increasingly drawn to Kant. In the middle of his lecture 
course Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21), WS 1925-26, 
Heidegger changed from lecturing on Aristotle to Kant. The lecture 
course of WS 1927-28 was given over entirely to Kant: Phänomenologische 
Interpretation von Kants 'Kritik der Reinen Vernunft' (GA 25). This turn 
toward Kant is well documented by Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of 
Heidegger's 'Being and Time' (Berkeley and London: University of 
California Press, 1993). Kisiel cites a letter written to Jaspers in 1925, 
concerning his Kant seminars where Heidegger remarks: 'The most beauti- 
ful part of it is that I am beginning actually to love Kant' (Kisiel p409). 
6. Walter Benjamin, On the Program of the Coming Philosophy, trans. 
Mark Ritter, in Benjamin, ed Gary Smith (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1989), ppl-12. Translation of 'Über das Programm der 
kommenden Philosophie', in Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 7 vole, 
ed. by Rolf Tiedmann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1977), II. 1, p157-171. Further references to the collected 
works will be in the form 'GS' followed by volume and page number. 
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in Critique of Judgment, trans Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987) pp385-441 (footnote 27, p408). The German is 
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hinein und heben sie nicht gleichsam aus ihrer Wahrnehmung heraus'. 
22. George Schrader, 'The Status of Teleological Judgment in the Critical 
Philosophy', Kant-Studien, 45 (1953-54), 204-235. Schrader presents a 
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52 
Barnes (London: Duckworth, 1975), I, 141-160 (141): 'The beginning of 
modern thought can be defined by the decay of belief in that universal 
teleological order. (... 1 But the teleological elements in modern mechanics 
have not been appreciated in their full significance. ' 
28. The term quantitatively is used here only in a suggestive way, to 
prevent a clear opposition between two forms of time reinscribing an 
opposition between mechanical and teleological concepts. The term does, 
however, have unwanted connotations of time as an additive sequence. A 
better term is quantumly, since Kant himself draws a distinction between 
time understood as quantitas and as quantum (Axioms of Intuition 
A163/B204). The former refers to the synthesised unity of time, the 
latter to time as a pure form of sensible intuition. This distinction 
explains why, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, time is a pure form of 
intuition and not a general concept (A31-32/B47): concepts are synthesized 
out of parts, while time as the pure form of intuition which 'underlies' 
synthesis is always 'one single time' (A32/B48). Kant's distinction between 
time as a pure form of intuition and time as generated in the three-fold 
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30. W. Wieland, 'The Problem of Teleology' in Articles on Aristotle, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, etc (London: Duckworth, 1975), vol. 1 (Science), ppl4l- 
160. 
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concerned precisely with this link between T&Xoc and X6yor.. If TEXor. is 
understood in the sense of 'coming to pass', thus stressing its temporal 
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ed. by J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), vol 1. Translated as 
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CHAPTER 2: HEIDEGGER AND THE EVENTUAL MEETING OF 
LANGUAGE AND TIME 
I. Method as Weg 
In pursuing the question of the belonging together of language and time 
in Heidegger's project, this chapter will present a trajectory through his 
work. Heidegger's analysis of time would seem to occur predominantly in 
his early works up to 1930, for example History of the Concept of Time 
(1925), Being and Time (1927), The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927) 
and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). The works focusing on 
language appear towards the end of his writing career in the 1950s, for 
example The Nature of Language (1958) and The Way to Language (1959). 1 
The question of language is not, however, absent from the earlier works, 
nor is the question of time absent from the later ones. 2 The question of 
the belonging together of language and time thus stretches across the 
whole of Heidegger's writings. Given the huge volume of Heidegger's 
corpus, an attempt to trace the variations in the relationship between 
language and time throughout the development of Heidegger's thought 
would be an enormous task, and certainly could not be completed in any 
detail in a single chapter. Since, however, the purpose of this chapter 
is to prepare the ground for an engagement between Heidegger and 
Benjamin on the question of language and time, this chapter will be 
concerned only to identify, in a more schematic way, the key moments in 
Heidegger's thinking of language and time. These key elements will be 
the basis for a more detailed analysis of translation and history in 
Chapter 4 and thus also for the engagement with Benjamin's thought. 
Given that the questions of language and time stretch across the 
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whole of Heidegger's work, it is first necessary to consider certain 
methodological questions concerning the approach to, and presentation of, 
this 'whole'. 3 Three related questions must be considered: first, is it 
necessary to take Heidegger's early works into account, instead of 
concentrating on his later, developed views on language and time? 
Secondly, how is the idea of 'development', in relation to the move from 
Heidegger's early work on time to his later work on language, to be 
understood? And thirdly, how, in general, is Heidegger's legacy to be 
approached, without implicity prejudging the question of its systematicity 
or unsystematicity (or anti-systematicity)? 
The first question, 'is it necessary to take Heidegger's early works 
into account', is answered in the affirmative by Heidegger himself in 
commenting on the distinction between Heidegger I (before the 'turn', die 
Kehre) to Heidegger II (after the 'turn'): 
Ihre Unterscheidung zwischen "Heidegger P und "Heidegger II" 
Ist allein unter der Bedingung berechtigt, daß stets beachtet 
wird: Nur von dem unter I Gedachten her wird zunächst das 
unter II zu Denkende zugänglich. Aber I wird nur möglich, 
wenn es in II enthalten ist. 
The distinction you make between "Heidegger I" and "Heidegger 
II" is justified only on the condition that this is kept 
constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has 
thought does one gain access to what is being thought under 
Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible 
only if it is contained in Heidegger 11.4 
In this quotation, Heidegger is describing a peculiar referentiality back 
and forth between his early and later work. This relatedness will be 
discussed in more detail below. 5 There are, though, other reasons apart 
from Heidegger's own view which can be suggested in support of the 
contention that the early work must not simply be considered as 
surpassed by the later. One reason is that present in the second 
question above: the nature of the 'development' of Heidegger's thinking 
must not be prejudged. The second reason is that the tensions which 
exist between the early Heidegger and the late Heidegger are themselves 
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illuminating for an assessment of Heidegger's project as a 'whole'. For 
example, the tensions between questioning and saying, and between 
remembering and forgetting. 
The project of fundamental ontology, as developed in Heidegger's 
early works is a questioning - 'what does it mean to be? ' - an essential 
part of which is the destruction of the tradition of Western ontology. 
This latter aspect is characterized in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics as a remembering. 
Die Endlichkeit des Daseins - das Seinsverständnis - liegt in 
der Vergessenheit. C... ] Der fundamentalontologishe Grundakt 
der Metaphysik des Daseins als der Grundlegung der Metaphysik 
Ist daher eine "Wiedererinnerung". (GA 3,233) 
The finitude of Dasein - the understanding of Being - lies in 
forgetfulness. C... ] The basic fundamental-ontological act of the 
metaphysics of Dasein as the laying of the ground for 
metaphysics is hence a "remembering again". (KPM p159) 
In the later work, however, the questioning would seem to come to an end 
in favour of Saying (die Sage); in Time and Being6 (1962) Heidegger 
rhetorically asks whether the question as to what das Ereignis is, ought 
not to be given up (verzichten). Questioning is not simply abandoned, 
though, in Heidegger's later work; rather Heidegger writes that question- 
ing forgets itself: 
Besinnung braucht es als ein Entsprechen, das sich in der 
Klarheit unablässigen Fragens an das Unerschöpfliche des 
Fragwürdigen vergißt, von dem her das Entsprechen im 
geeigneten Augenblick den Charakter des Fragens verliert und 
zum einfachen Sagen wird. (Wissenschaft und Besinnung (1955) 
in Vorträge und Aufsätze p70) 
Reflection is needed as a responding that forgets itself in the 
clarity of ceaseless questioning away at the inexhaustibleness 
of that which is worthy of questioning - of that out of which, 
in the moment properly its own, responding loses the character 
of questioning and becomes simply saying. (Science and 
Reflections p182) 
Reflection (die Besinnung) is the word Heidegger uses in the essay 
Science and Reflection to name the thinking of being in opposition to the 
fixed ontology by which a science proceeds. As the quotation makes 
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clear, the questioning approach of fundamental ontology is not simply to 
be left behind in a later, more poetic, work. There is, rather, a more 
complex relationship whereby saying arises from ceaseless questioning of 
being C'that which is worth of questioning', 'das Fragwürdige') and what 
it means to be. To concentrate upon Heidegger's later work in an 
exposition of the belonging together of language and time would be to 
divorce saying from questioning. And since questioning in fundamental 
ontology is guided by a temporal analysis, such an approach would 
overlook an implicit affirmation of the necessary connection of temporal 
analysis to the later work. If the question of the belonging together of 
language and time in the Heideggerian project is not to be prejudged, 
therefore, there is a need to initially hold together the seemingly diverse 
poles of Heidegger's work. In other words, Heidegger's corpus must be 
crossed with a "necessary speed", to take a term from Benjamin (Benjamin's 
theory of reading will be developed at length in chapter 3). Such a 
reading will be presented below. 
A further reason for approaching Heidegger's work with a certain 
"speed" relates again to the second question posed above concerning the 
'development' of Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger's work is very often 
presented 'developmentally' and with a tendency to break down his work 
into phases and stages, related in turn by turns and reversals. 8 
Heidegger himself used the term Kehre to describe the 'change' (Wendung) 
of his thought after the period of Being and Time, and despite his 
protestations to the contrary, it is often taken to indicate a change of 
standpoint or an abandonment of the issues in Being and Time. 9 The 
consequences of this approach are that Heidegger's work is regarded as a 
progression, wherein the early phases are surpassed, and also that the 
individual stages are treated as isolated systems of thought which may be 
judged according to their completeness or incompleteness. 
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A prevalent example of this approach is the one used by Herman 
Rapaport in Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Languagelo 
to structure his analysis of Heidegger: was the project of Being and 
Time, the radical temporal destruction of the metaphysical tradition, 
completed, or did Heidegger "hesitate" (p66) in his execution of the task? 
Such an approach ignores Heidegger's frequent assertions, beginning in 
Being and Time Itself (H22), that the metaphysical tradition cannot be 
simply 'shaken off' (Abschüttelung), and that 'one can in no way leave it 
behind like a no-longer believed and upheld doctrine. '11 Rapaport's 
approach also overlooks the question of systematicity itself, that is - to 
ask, concerning the project of Being and Time, whether or not it was 
completed - precludes the questioning of systematicity itself. As was 
shown in chapter 1, the idea of the system carries it own thesis of the 
temporality of language. The idea of a system as an organic whole was 
seen to require a prior concept which would account for an inter- 
dependence of parts which was not experienced as a chain of cause and 
effects. The quotation above seems to indicate that Heidegger thought 
that the parts 'Heidegger I' and 'Heidegger II' should be taken as inter- 
dependent in this way, and that they are thus connected via their common 
relationship to a 'whole'. It will be argued that Heidegger's work is not 
simply systematic in the way Kant sought to ground systematicity, but 
rather that the idea of 'whole' here itself points to a rethinking of 
system. It will be argued below that Heidegger's later work is involved 
in a destructive, questioning re-reading of his early work and thus that 
the relationship of the parts is circularly determined from within the 
project, as was shown to be the case for Kant's system. The early work 
is not thus simply left behind (as in a progressive, developmental model), 
nor can the parts be simply related in a static object-like whole (as 
would be the case if it were grounded in a Kantian subjectivity), rather 
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it will be argued that Heidegger's Denkweg is characterized by a complex 
reflexivity upon the language of its saying of, and the time of its 
incessant questioning of, that which guides thinking. 12 The questioning 
of systematicity in relation to the linguistic work will be investigated in 
chapters 4 and 5 on translation. It is here that the proximity of 
Heidegger's and Benjamin's thinking to Hegel's will need to be considered. 
Hegel's work will be understood in terms of its being 'the working out 
of a fundamental intention of Kant's problematic. ' 13 
There is one further way in which the systematicity of Heidegger's 
work is decided implicitly in advance, and this concerns the nature of the 
legacy of Heidegger's work to modern philosophy. The question of the 
legacy of Heidegger's thinking is then, the third methodological question 
posed above: how in general is Heidegger's work to be approached, as a 
whole, left to posterity? Just as Kant gave guidance on how his system 
was to be considered as a legacy, so too does Heidegger. He stressed 
repeatedly that he did not want his work thought of as a philosophical 
position, but rather as a path of thinking and reflection which had to be 
carried on incessantly. (For example, he writes in The Problem of a Non- 
objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Contemporary Theology that a 
'Heideggerian philosophy (... I does not exist. '14 And in a foreword to 
volume 1 of the Gesamtausgabe he stresses that his work must not be 
taken as completed. 15) Heidegger thus did not want his work to be taken 
as simply lying in the past and treated as an object for historical 
analysis; the understanding of legacy which this would involve would take 
his work to be closed and finished, handed on from a past which is 
similarly closed and finished. 
Yet if there is one philosopher who has done more to relegate 
Heidegger's project to a past from which we have moved on, it is Jacques 
Derrida. His comment that a metaphysics of presence finds its 
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profoundest support in Heidegger's work serves to relegate Heidegger's 
project to the tradition of metaphysics, which by implication the 
deconstructionist critic has moved beyond16. Whereas Heidegger's 
destructive engagement with the past texts of Western philosophy stems 
from an analysis of time in which the past is not simply a 'now' which 
no longer is, but rather very much is, though as having-been (this will 
be explained in more detail below), Derrida's deconstructive engagement 
serves to support an idea of time as linear progression, in which the 
critic exists in a moment of time which has progressed beyond that of 
the text being criticised. By distancing deconstruction from the projects 
of both Heidegger and Benjamin, Derrida gives his work a 'newness' and 
superiority which is implicated in the view of time as progression, 
characteristic of moderity. 
The following reading of Heidegger's legacy has several aims. First, 
to bring out the essential elements of Heidegger's thinking on language 
and time, in order to prepare for the later engagement with Benjamin. 
Secondly, to allow different points on Heidegger's path to resonate 
together in order to bring out the reflexivity of the incessant 
questioning, and questioning of questioning, and so on, which becomes 
Saying when questioning questions the appropriateness of questioning and 
thus necessarily, though momentarily forgets itself. While in order to 
emphasise this path of thinking the presentation of Heidegger's work is 
necessarily chronlogical, it must constantly be borne in mind that Saying 
does not succeed questioning in a chronological way, rather they belong 
together on his path and as his method (from µtOoSor, a 'following after' 
or 'pursuit', from µstä, 'after' and 6Sft, 'way' or 'path'), the temporal and 
teleological connotations of which must themselves be thought from within 
a thinking of the temporality of language. 
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II. The Project of Fundamental Ontology 
In chapter 1 it was shown that a clear circularity was involved in Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, a circularity which Kant himself acknowledged: 
the pure concepts of understanding were deduced (Deduktion in its older 
meaning has the sense of to justify, as before a court of law) by 
reference to Newtonian science, yet it was Newtonian science which the 
Critique sought to secure transcendentally. This circularity was shown 
to become vicious when it was demonstrated that there were certain 
experiences, those of organisms in particular, which did not fit into a 
Newtonian conceptuality and that the Critique functioned to circularly 
justify only a narrow range of experience. While acknowledging this 
limitation of Kant's project, Heidegger in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics sought to emphasize the essential thrust of Kant's work, 
which was to provide a metaphysics of metaphysics, or in other words, to 
provide the transcendental ground for any possible metaphysics. 
Die folgende Untersuchung stellt sich die Aufgabe, Kants Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft als eine Grundlegung der Metaphysik 
auszulegen, um so das Problem der Metaphysik als das einer 
Fundamentalontologie vor Augen zu stellen. (GA 3,1) 
The following investigation is devoted to the task of 
interpreting Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the 
ground for metaphysics and thus of placing the problem of 
metaphysics before us as one of fundamental ontology. (KPM pl) 
Fundamental ontology for Heidegger is thus the deepening of the project 
he finds in Kant: giving the formal conditions of any possible ontology. 
Heidegger will also want fundamental ontology to explain at the same time 
how it is that metaphysics haunts (Kant's word CPR Bxv; heimsuchen) 
human nature. Heidegger states this in a way which clearly shows the 
affinity between his project and Kant's, at the beginning of Being and 
Timms 
Die Seinsfrage zielt daher auf eine aprorische Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit nicht nur der Wissenschaften, die Seiendes als so 
und so Seiendes durchforschen und sich dabei je schon in einem 
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Seinverständnis bewegen, sondern auf die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit der vor den ontischen Wissenschaften liegenden und 
sie fundierenden Ontologien selbst. (Hil) 
The question of being aims therefore at ascertaining the a 
priori conditions not only for the possiblity of the sciences 
which examine entities of such and such a type, and, in so 
doing, already operate with an understanding of being, but also 
for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are 
prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their 
foundations. (H11) 
The name 'fundamental ontology' together with the usual captialisation 
of the word 'Being' in English serve to suggest that Heidegger is seeking 
to understand being as that which grounds the existence of the entities 
posited by an ontology. Such a suggestion would lead to an infinite 
regress, since it would be necessary to ask further what grounds the 
existence of being. Rather, fundamental ontology seeks to ask how the 
existence of the entities posited in an ontology is understood; the 
question of being is the question of what it means for these entities to 
be as grounds for things in the world, and what it means for these 
things to be in need of grounding, and further, what does to be mean in 
general given that for so long that which is has been determined in such 
a dual fashion. Kant had sought to underpin all knowledge and 
experience by showing how time was determined a priori by the pure 
logical judgements of the understanding. Following in this direction, 
fundamental ontology, as will be shown, is concerned to show how Being 
in general is understood through various determinations of time: the 
temporality of an entity, the temporality of an ontology and the 
temporality of the a priori which links them. That is, Heidegger wants 
to ascertain the proper nature of time, 'ursprünglich' time, which is thus 
capable of being determined in such diverse ways. 
Given the circularity implicit in Kant's approach, the initial problem 
for fundamental ontology is that it needs to start with an understanding 
of being. The question of being, and questioning in general, must be 
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guided in advance by an understanding of what it asks about. In terms 
of Kant's project, the understanding of experience which guided the 
Critique was too narrow and one sided in that it was limited to 
Newtonian science. 
Im Blick auf Kants Wesenbestimmung des Dings als Naturding 
können wir ermessen, daß Kant von vornherein die Frage nach 
der Dingheit der uns umgebenden Dinge nicht stellt. Diese 
Frage hat für ihn kein Gewicht. Sein Blick heftet sich 
sogleich auf das Ding als Gegenstand der mathematisch- 
physikalischen Wissenschaft. (GA 41,131) 
Looking at Kant's determination of the essence of the thing as 
natural thing, we can gauge that from the start Kant does not 
pose the question of the thingness of the things that surround 
us. This question has no weight for him. His view immediate- 
ly fixes itself on the object of mathematical-physical science. 
(What is a Thing? 17 p128) 
Science is only 'one way' (Science and Reflection p174) in which what is 
may be experienced. Heidegger is not concerned to try and avoid the 
circularity of Kant's approach, rather to start with a more broad 
understanding of how entities are experienced, in order to take account 
of the circularity of experience itself. 18 For Heidegger, this more broad 
understanding is found not in science, but in 'everydayness', the way one 
interacts with things in the world without ever thematising them, or 
ever considering them even as objects. The thingness of things in an 
everyday understanding is characterised by the way one uses things, 
negotiates one's way around things, and in general relates to them 
without ever considering them as objects. Thus Heidegger writes that 
when one considers how the Being of entities is understood in general, 
one learns that: 
Entsprechend und erst recht ist das Ding im Sinne des uns 
zunächst - vor aller Theorie und Wissenschaft - Begegnenden 
nur bestimmbar aus einem Zusammenhang, der vor aller und über 
aller Natur liegt. (GA 41,131) 
The thing, as encountered closest to us, before all theory and 
science, is adequately and first of all definable in a relational 
context which lies before and above all nature. (What is a 
Thing? p129) 
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And Heidegger gives the following description of such an everyday 
relation to things in The Basic Problems of Phenemonology. 
Wie zeigt sich das Seiende, wobei wir uns zunächst und zumeist 
aufhalten? Hier im Hörsaal sitzend, erfassen wir zwar nicht 
Wände - es sie denn, daß wir uns langweilen. Gleichwohl sind 
die Wände schon zugegeben, vordem wir sie als Objekte denken. 
1... ] Vielmehr ist primär gegeben - wenn auch nicht 
ausdrücklich und eigens bewußt - ein Dingzusammenhang. 
(GA 24,231-2) 
How do the beings with which we dwell show themselves to us 
primarily and for the most part? Sitting here in the 
auditorium, we do not in fact apprehend walls - not unless we 
are getting bored. Nevertheless, the walls are already present 
even before we think them as objects. 1... l What is primarily 
given instead - even if not in explicit and express 
consciousness - is a thing-contexture. (BPP p163) 
What Heidegger means by Dingzusammenhang is that things are not 
experienced in a senseless jumble, but rather one is able to find one's 
way around things and make use of things in a coherent way. However, 
how is this 'one', which 'experiences', to be understood? For Heidegger, 
what stood in the way of Kant's attempt to lay the ground for meta- 
physics was that he 'took over Descartes' position quite dogmatically' 19 
with regard to the subjectivity of the, subject. As was shown in chapter 
1, the transcendental ego was given an uncritical object-like status, which 
ultimately served to make possible the experience of objects by 
functioning as the unifying ground of the syntheses. To put this 
another way, the Newtonian conception of science which was to be 
justified, ultimately and circularly determined the nature of the self 
which was to make Newtonian science possible. Again, Heidegger is not 
proposing that this circularity is a fault which could be avoided, rather 
it is necessary to 'begin' with a view of the self which is broader, closer 
to the everyday experience of 'losing oneself' in one's activities. ('Begin' 
is in quotation marks because as will be shown, Heidegger will also be 
concerned to ask about the temporality of such the circularity. ) 
Heidegger names this self das Dasein, which is to be understood not as 
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'experiencing' a world which is essentially outside of it, but rather as 
always already being-in-the-world, such that its view of itself can be 
determined by the different ways it behaves, in the world: for example, 
lost in its activities, or thought of like an object. Heidegger writes in 
Being and Time: 
Nicht zu viel, sondern zu wenig wird für die Ontologie des 
Daseins "vorausgeht", wenn man von einem weltlosen Ich 
"ausgeht", um ihm dann ein Objekt und eine ontologisch 
grundlose Beziehung zu diesem zu verschaffen. Zu kurz tragt 
der Blick, wenn "das Leben" zum Problem gemacht und dann auch 
gelegentlich der Tod berücksichtigt wird. Künstlich dogmatisch 
beschnitten ist der themetische Gegenstand, wenn man sich 
"zunächst" auf ein "theoretisches Subjekt" beschränkt, um es 
dann "nach der praktischen Seite" in einer beigefügten "Ethik" 
zu ergänzen. (H316) 
If, in the ontology of Dasein, we 'take our departure' from a 
worldless "I" in order to provide this "I" with an object and an 
ontologically baseless relation to that Object, then we have 
'presupposed' not too much, but tdo little. If we make a 
problem of 'life', and then just occasionally have regard for 
death tdo, our view is tdo short-sighted. The object we have 
taken as our theme is artificially and dogmatically curtailed if 
'in the first instance' we restrict ourselves to a 'theoretical 
subject', in order that we may then round it out 'on the 
practical side' by tacking on an 'ethic'. (H316) 
Dasein, as the entity which can ask 'what is the meaning of being? ' and 
which is thus concerned with being, is the thematic object of Being and 
Time when it is understood more broadly than a worldless subjectivity 
and rather is understood as always already 'outside' of itself in the world 
such that its concern with being is a concern with its own being-in-the- 
world. Dasein can relate to entities in the world in various ways, of 
which science is one. In each of the different ways, the being of the 
entities (the way the entities are) is determined differently, but these 
different ways are only possible because Dasein has an a priori 
understanding or comportment towards being. Dasein, that is, ek-sists 
(Greek ExaT(xaiS, 'standing outside'); it exists as stepping out of itself 
towards beings, the being of which can be variously determined, and 
always is determined before any experience of beings (BPP p11; GA 3,14). 
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It is thus the existence of Dasein which fundamental ontology seeks to 
analyse, and, following on from Kant's temporal analysis, Dasein's concern 
with beings will be found to be constituted by its comportment towards 
the past, present and future, such that a determination of Being is 
always a determination of the unity of these temporal comportments, or as 
Heidegger puts it, being is always a projection upon ek-static (ecstatic) 
temporality. 
However, just as Kant's transcendental analysis was guided in advance 
by the nature of entities found in Newtonian science, while in turn the 
transcendental analysis served to censure Reason's improper ways of 
thinking, it may be argued that Heidegger's own analysis of the everyday- 
ness of Dasein's non-objectifying concern with the world, has been guided 
in advance by what he wanted to show, ie. that Dasein exists as an 
ecstatic temporality which is prior to its determination into a series of 
objectified now points. And conversely, it could be argued that 
Heidegger's depiction of ecstatic temporality as the proper, ursprünglich 
time of Dasein, would seem to a circular argument for a view of the 
proper way of being in the world. These objections are in no way 
avoided by Heidegger. With regard to the first objection, the circular 
nature of Heidegger's project, he maintains, rather, that it cannot be 
avoided. (The second objection will be considered in section III below. ) 
The circularity between the everyday way of coming across entities, the 
analysis of Dasein's being-in-the-world, and the temporal analysis of 
Dasein's existence, form an essential part of fundamental ontology - its 
hermeneutical circle. An attempt to avoid this circularity or to ignore it 
would be to subscribe to a philosophy of immediate intuition of the 
nature of what is, such as was shown to be present in Fichte's science 
of knowledge, in the sense of immediate intuition of the self as pure 
activity. 
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Fundamental ontology is not alone in being involved in circularity. 
One purpose of the extensive analysis of Dasein's factical everyday 
existence is to show how all mode's of understanding, whether they be 
particular sciences or metaphysical ontologies are guided in advance by an 
understanding, though perhaps vague and unthematised, of the area in 
which the entities they are questioning after lie. Or as Heidegger puts 
it at the beginning of Being and Time 'Every questioning is a seeking. 
Every seeking takes its direction beforehand from out of what is sought' 
('Jedes Fragen ist ein Suchen. Jedes Suchen hat sein vorgängiges Geleit 
aus dem Gesuchten her. ' H5) What will be seen to be distinctive about 
the hermeneutic circle of fundamental ontology, is that it questions the 
time determination present in the circularity of questioning, and thus the 
temporality of its own hermeneutic circling. The purpose of fundamental 
ontology, understood explicitly as a resonance between the questioning 
and what is questioned after (that is, as a hermeneutic circle), is 
precisely to illuminate that time and place (the Da) in which the entity 
which is the question, and the entity which is the questioned, circle each 
other. All questioning, scientific and philosophical, is a factual 
possibility of Dasein, not least that questioning after the meaning of 
being. Thus when (as was quoted above) Heidegger claims that 
fundamental ontology is to provide the a priori conditions for any 
ontology, this means that the being of the ontological question itself Cie 
'What is the meaning of being? '), that is, its essential circularity, must 
itself be included reflexively within the project. Heidegger states this as 
follows: 
Die existential Analytik ihrerseits 1... 1 Ist letztlich existenziell, 
d. h. ontisch verwurzelt. Nur wenn das philosophischforchende 
Fragen selbst als Seinsmöglichkeit des je existierenden Daseins 
existenziell ergriffen ist, besteht die Möglichkeit einer 
Erschließung der Existenzialität der Existenz und damit die 
Möglichkeit der Inangriffnahme einer zureichend fundierten 
ontologischen Problematik überhaupt. (H. 13) 
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The existential analytic, on its part, is ultimately existentielly, 
that is, ontically rooted. Only if the questioning of 
philosophical research is itself seized upon in an existentiell 
manner as a possibility of the being of each existing Dasein, 
does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of 
existence and thus the possibility of undertaking an adequately 
founded ontological problematic. (H. 13) 
Thus it is only by bringing to light the circularity of questioning, and 
proceeding by reflecting upon that circularity in a way which must itself 
be acknowledged to involve circularity, that the project of fundamental 
ontology can disclose Dasein's proper existence. This explains why, in 
the quotation above from Being and Time H. 315-6, the words 'point of 
departure' and 'in the first instance' were within quotation marks; there 
can be no simple beginning to a project of fundamental ontology. No 
experience may be taken as a simple starting point, since (even if 
'experience' were not itself a problematic concept), Kant's work has 
already served to show that 'experience is in itself a circular happening 
through which what lies within the circle becomes exposed (eröffnet]' 
(What is a Thing? p242). Fundamental ontology must, therefore, remain 
watchful and questioning of any starting point which may be implicitly 
introduced to begin the questioning, and rather must attempt to speak 
from within its circularity: 
Die Bemühung muß vielmehr darauf zielen, ursprünglich und 
ganz in diesen "Kreis" zu springen, um sich schon im Ansatz 
der Daseinsanalyse den vollen Blick auf das zirkelhafte Sein des 
Daseins zu sichern. (H. 315) 
The endeavour must rather aim to leap into the 'circle', 
primordially and wholly, in order even at the start of the 
analysis of Dasein, to secure for itself the full view of 
Dasein's circular Being. (H. 315) 
Thus far, the exposition of Heidegger's project has been mostly 
formal or methodological. The reason for this is that what Heidegger 
actually 'says' from within the circularity of fundamental ontology is more 
problematic, and indeed Heidegger himself acknowledges that what he says 
must be flawed, if the methodology of fundamental ontology is taken 
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seriously20. Since Dasein, in its everyday existence, deals with entities 
or beings, it is always possible for an element of a fundamental ontology 
to be given an entity-like status without the question being asked 
concerning how the being of this entity is understood. In Kant's case, 
the being of the transcendental ego was not considered, with the result 
that it took on an object-like status in reflection of the Newtonian 
objects of experience it made possible. Since there must always already 
be an understanding of being, in order for there to be any comportment 
towards that which is (beings), and since being is always the being of 
that which is, it is always possible for being itself to be objectified and 
thus for beings to be understood as modifications of, or diverse 
appearances of, some other supreme entity or entities. Heidegger writes 
that 'it is in the objectification of being as such that the basic act 
constitutive of ontology as a science is performed' (BPP p281). C'In der 
Vergegenständlichung des Seins als solchen vollzieht sich der Grundakt, 
in dem sich die Ontologie als Wissenschaft konstituiert, ' GA 3,398. ) 
Thus in the historical philosophical ontologies of the nature of existence, 
the questioning of the meaning of being is suspended with regard to the 
being of the entities which are understood to ground or underlie 
existence. 
In the case of fundamental ontology, since Dasein is both the 
questioner and the questioned, it is not possible to step out of the 
hermeneutic circle in order to view with transparency the elements which 
need to be questioned further, and thus any 'saying' from within the 
circle must instead become a legacy for continued questioning and 
'destruction' just as in the case of the philosophical ontologies of 
Western philosophical tradition. Heidegger writes, for example, at the 
end of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
Am Ende müssen diese Fehlinterpretationen vollzogen werden, 
damit das Dasein durch ihre Korrektur hindurch den Weg zu 
den eigentlichen Phänomenen gewinnt. Ohne daß wir es wissen. 
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wo die Fehlinterpretation liegt, können wir ruhig überzeugt 
sein, daß sich auch in der temporalen Interpretation des Seins 
als solchen eine Fehlinterpretation verbirgt, und wiederum 
keine beliebige. Es wäre wider den Sinn des Philosophierens 
und jeder Wissenschaft, wollten wir nicht verstehen, daß mit 
dem wirklich Gesehenen und dem echt Ausgelegten eine grund- 
sätzliche Unwahrheit zusammenwohnt. (GA 3,459) 
In the end, these faulty interpretations must be made, so that 
Dasein may reach the path to the proper phenomena by corr- 
ecting them. Without our knowing where the faulty inter- 
pretation lies, we can be quietly persuaded that there is also a 
faulty interpretation concealed within the Temporal interpret- 
ation of being as such, and again no arbitrary one. It would 
run counter to the sense of philosophizing and of every 
science if we were not willing to understand that a fundamen- 
tal untruth dwells with what is actually seen and genuinely 
interpreted. (BPP 322) 
It is this insight into the untruth which accompanies truth, which was to 
lead on to Heidegger's thinking of the truth of being as un-concealment 
[Un-verborgenheit]. While this is an indication that Heidegger's work, 
after the period of Being and Time, arose from a continuing of the 
reflexive questioning implicit in fundamental ontology, there is a still 
more profound question which needs to be explored: what is the place of 
language in fundamental ontology, given that a work of fundamental 
ontology such as Being and Time is linguistic? And further what is 
language? 
Reflections such as these concerned Heidegger in his later work. 
The idea, used above, of a 'saying' from within the hermeneutic circle, 
mixing as it does terminology from the early and late Heidegger, brings 
to light the reflexivity between 'Heidegger I' and 'Heidegger II': the 
question of the nature of language can only be asked with profundity 
from out of the method of fundamental ontology, where the circularity of 
the being of the subject (who 'uses' language) and the being of entities 
(which are 'signified by' language) is questioned; yet because the project 
is linguistic, and the questioning of the nature of language constitutes 
Heidegger's later work, the early work must be considered as contained 
within the later. In order to reach the point at which the question of 
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the being of language may be broadened from its narrow circular deter- 
mination (the subject uses language to signify entities), it is first 
necessary to consider what is said from within the hermeneutic circle of 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology, that is, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's 
circularity as ecstatically temporal. 
III. Phenomenology and Temporality 
Within the hermeneutic structure of Being and Time Heidegger endeavors 
to portray a thoroughgoing phenomenological account of Dasein's 
involvement with beings which can then be interpreted as original 
(ursprünglich) temporality. The choice of phenomenology as a 'starting 
point' has been guided in advance by the ultimate temporal analysis, and 
the temporal understanding of phenomenology thus obtained at the end of 
Being and Time will need to be the basis of a more radical phenomenology 
of being, and thus of the being of the beings treated phenomenologically 
at the 'starting point'. Thus again the 'remarkable "relatedness backward 
and forward"' C'eine merkwürdige "Ruck- oder Vorbezogenheit, " H8) in the 
question of the meaning of being cannot be avoided. However, the choice 
of time as the horizon for the interpretation of phenomenology seems at 
first arbitary. Given the hermeneutic circle there can, of course, be no 
appeal to a direct intuition of the original nature of Dasein's 
phenomenological way of existing. Rather, within the context of Being 
and Time the problematic of time arises precisely from the need to 
consider the temporal language which the circularity of fundamental 
ontology uses: the asking after what is 'original', 'fundamental', or how 
Dasein 'always already' is. The appeal to temporal terminology in other 
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ontologies, such as Kant's a priori, serves as a clue to the unquestioned 
place of time in the historical questioning of being. 
As was shown in chapter 1, the ground of Kant's ontology was 
provided by an entity, the transcendental ego, the presence through time 
of which was left uncriticised, and for Heidegger this failure is part of 
a general tendency in the history of philosophy to understand being by 
reference to the stable presence of something through time. Just as 
Aristotle's philosophical term oüvia ('essence') meant 'one's own property' 
before its philosophical coinage, so too did the German Wesen ('essence') 
mean similarly, 'estate' or 'homestead', thus with connotations of stable 
presence around about one. Thus the place of the problematic of time in 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology is justified by the need to question the 
understanding of being as presentness (Anwesenheit; NB das Anwesen 
means 'estate' also). As will be discussed below, being as presentness has 
a place in the hermeneutic circle ultimately because of the temporality of 
the circle itself, that is, its inability to make a stand over against the 
philosophical tradition as something in the past, thus again a reflexivity 
or circularity is present. Heidegger writes, for example, later: 
Woher nehmen wir aber das Recht zur Kennzeichnung des Seins 
als Anwesen? Die Frage kommt zu spät. Denn diese Prägung 
des Seins hat sich längst ohne unser Zutun oder gar Verdienst 
entschieden. Demnach sind wir in die Kennzeichnung des Seins 
als Anwesen gebunden. (Zeit und-Sein p6) 
But what gives us the right to characterize being as presence? 
This question comes too late. For this character of being has 
long since been decided without our contribution, let alone 
merit. Thus we are bound to the characterization of Being as 
presence. (Time and Being p6) 
In order, then, to move towards a thorough-going interpretation of 
time in relation to the questioning of being (via a temporal interpretation 
of the Dasein who is concerned with being), the 'starting point' must be 
one which has not been narrowed to a view of entities in terms of 
appearances or modifications of something which is uncritically 
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understood as present through time. This 'starting point' is phenomen- 
ology. The phenomena with which Dasein has dealings are not understood 
as appearances of something else, such as a thing-in-itself, but rather as 
simply that which they show themselves to be. Neither are they simply 
present in an objective way before and independent of Dasein's 
involvement with them, rather they show themselves in that Dasein's 
intentionality has always already comported itself towards them as the 
world in which it is involved. As was mentioned above, Dasein is 
understood as always already outside of itself, it transcends the world in 
the sense of a 'stepping over' the world in order to allow beings to 
show themselves within the horizon which the transcending opens: 'For 
the Dasein there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk 
about an inside, ' BPP p66 ('Für das Dasein gibt es kein Draußen, weshalb 
es auch widersinnig ist, von einem Innen zu reden' GA 3,93). The 
directednes of Dasein's intentionality and that towards which it is 
directed belong together in a phenomenological account of being-in-the- 
world. 
The term 'phenomena' means thus 'that which shows itself in itself' 
(H28) and not as an 'appearance', which must be understood as an 
announcing of something (or reference to something) through something 
which shows itself, and which thus presupposes the concept of 
phenomena. This does not mean, however, that phenomenology wants to be 
a philosophy of intuition or a philosophy of the immediate (HCT p88). 21 
Rather, the way that-which-is shows itself, depends on Dasein's 
comportment towards it. 
Seiendes kann sich nun in verschiedener Weise, je nach der 
Zugangsart zu ihm, von ihm selbst her zeigen. (H28) 
Now that-which-is can show itself from itself in many ways, 
according in each case to the kind of access to it. 
In the introduction, Heidegger understands this comportment towards 
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phenomena as precisely the ) 6yoc of phenomenology. A6yoc is understood 
as the 'letting-be-seen' (Sehenlassen) which in particular sciences 
determines the general way phenomena show themselves and are under- 
stood. Thus within the idea of phenomenology there is the mutual 
relationship of that which shows itself from itself and that which lets 
it 
be seen in the way it shows itself. 22 Phenomenology thus already 
embraces what Heidegger called in relation to Kant 'the circular nature of 
experience'. However, this is not to say that the Dasein 'experiences' 
phenomena in this way, as if its intentional comportments were like 
spokes radiating from a transcendental ego. It must be remembered that 
Dasein is its transcendence, as already outside of itself in the world 
which shows itself in one meaningful way or another. Dasein's 
understanding of itself can only ever be a reflection of its comportment 
towards the world: 
Alltäglich versteht man sich und seine Existenz aus dem, was 
man betreibt und besorgt. C... 1 In unmittelbarem leidenschaft- 
lichen Ausgegenbensein an die Welt selbst scheint das eigene 
Selbst des Daseins aus den Dingen wider. (GA 3,227) 
In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence 
by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care 
of. (... l As the Dasein gives itself over immediately and 
passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected back 
to it from things. (BPP p159) 
In Part I, Division I of Being and Time, which will not be explored in 
detail, Heidegger attempts a thorough-going description of Dasain's 
comportment towards the world. This could be understood as an 
elucidation of the ). öyos of a phenomenology of Dasein's everyday way of 
being, yet language only has a small place in the description where it is 
discussed predominantly as 'discourse' (die Rede). Instead. Heidegger talks 
of Dasein as always already being involved in a world of 'Significance' 
(Bedeutsamkeit), which Heidegger calls the 'Care' structure. These terms 
refer to the meaningful contexture of involvements and range of 
possibilities which constitute Dasein's world in its everyday use and 
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negotiation of entities. It appears thus that the 16yoS of everydayness, 
as the concernful letting be seen of that with which Dasein is concerned 
in an everyday sort of way, is understood pre-linguistically. 
Das Bedeutungsganze der Verständlichkeit kommt zu Wort. Den 
Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu. Nicht aber werden Wörterdinge 
mit Bedeutungen versehen. (H161) 
The totality-of-Significations of understandability is put into 
words. To Significations, words accrue. But word-things do 
not get supplied with significations. 
Before exploring this view of language in more detail it will be necessary 
to characterize briefly how Dasein's existence in a world of Significance 
is temporally interpreted. 
The Signification context of Dasein's being in the world is shown in 
Part 1, Division I of Being and Time to be constituted by three essential 
elements: Understanding, State-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) and Falling 
(Verfallen); Part 1, Division 2 shows how they have particular emphases 
towards the past, present and future. Understanding is the way Dasein 
comports itself toward different possiblities of its involvements by 
projecting a potential way of being. Understanding as potentiality for 
being is thus essentially futural because in understanding Dasein comes 
towards itself (expectant of a possibility) from out of its current way of 
being. 
State-of-mind is the way Dasein finds itself to be in a world it has 
not chosen; it is thus grounded primarily in a comportment towards the 
past (Gewesenheit, 'having-been-ness') since Dasein finds itself in a world 
which already has been. In Heidegger's words, Dasein 'constantly is 
having been' ('ständig gewesen ist', H340). 
Falling is the way Dasein comports itself towards the entities with 
which it is concerned and is able to fix on their need to be present to 
hand (Vorhandensein). Falling is thus is grounded in making-present 
(Gegenwärtigen). In an extreme case future possibilities of being are 
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given up, thrownness is forgotten, and Dasein improperly ('inauthenti- 
cally') understands itself, and being in general, in terms of present at 
hand objects. 
Heidegger emphasizes that these three components of Dasein's being 
in the world, Understanding, State-of-mind, and Falling are not separate 
comportments, but rather mutually determine each other in a complex way. 
Neither do the dimensions of time on which they are based follow each 
other in a sequence such that the future is later than having-been, or 
such that having-been is earlier than the present. Rather, they must be 
thought of as unified in Dasein's ecstatic comportment towards the world, 
and as so unified, constituting the Significance structure of being in the 
world. Dasein thus exists as the unity of its comportments towards the 
'then, when... ', the 'on the former occasion, when... ' and the 'now that... ' 
(H407) ('dann, wann... ', 'damals, als... ', 'jetzt, da... '). 
Since Dasein's intentional comportments are, as was shown above, to 
be understood phenomenologically as letting phenomena show themselves, 
Dasein cannot be understood as comporting itself to pre-existing 
dimensions of time. Rather time must be understood from out of the 
unity of Dasein's comportments as a unity of expecting, retaining and 
making present, in its transcendence. In other words, the temporal 
dimensions of time must be understood as Dasein's temporal comportments. 
Time is outside of itself, indeed it is the original 'outside of itself' 
(Exatoctix6v, which Heidegger translates as das Aus-sich-heraustreten, 
H329). Dasein exists as the unity of its ecstatic temporal comportments; 
the being of Dasein is constituted by its ecstatic temporality and as such 
must be understood as 'stretched along' between its expecting and 
retaining. 
Time understood as a series of now points comes about when, in 
Falling, Dasein's involvement with objects present at hand leads it to 
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interpret its comportment towards the future as a 'not-yet-now' and its 
comportment towards its having-been as a 'no-longer-now'. Time is 
homogenized23 into a linear, infinite series of now points which are 
thought of as being at a standstill within time; 'Everything that occurs 
rolls out of an infinite future into an irretrievable past' (CT p18). When 
the 'now' is thought more properly from out of Dasein's ecstatic 
temporality, it is seen that 'now' names something which is always the 
same, yet also always other than itself: 'being-now is always being-other' 
(BPP 248) ('das Jetztsein ist je Anderssein' GA 3,350). This 'otherness' 
(Andersheit) can be understood from out of ecstatic temporality as the 
stretchedness of a now towards its 'no-longer' and 'not yet': 
Im Jetzt als sochem liegt schon die Verweisung auf das Nicht- 
mehr und Noch-nicht. Es hat in sich selbst die Dimension, die 
Erstreckung nach einem Noch-nicht und Nicht-mehr. Das Jetzt 
hat aufgrund dieses Dimensionsgehaltes in sich den Character 
eines Überganges. (GA 3,352) 
In the now as such there is already present a reference to the 
no-longer and the not-yet. It has the dimension within itself; 
it stretches itself toward a not-yet and a no-longer. I... I 
Because of this dimensional content the now has within itself 
the character of a transition. (BPP 248) 
Rather than time being understood as a series of isolated now points, 
where the transition between each being would need to be understood as 
the handing on of the object like contents of the now, the now itself is 
transition, a span stretched out towards what is to be and what has been. 
This span determined as a time-point thus only is a specific determination 
of time's dimensionality, and the span may be considered differently in 
different contexts: 'The scope of the dimension of a now varies; now in 
this hour, now in this second' (BPP 249). 
Time interpreted as ecstatic temporality is original (ursprünglich) 
time, where the word 'original' must itself be understood from out of 
ecstatic temporality.. The constitutive act of ontology is the finding of 
some 'original' entity in the sense of it being prior to, and thus 
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grounding, the existence of the world. As was shown in chapter 1, 
Kent's a priori was not questioned as to its temporal connotations, with 
the result that experience of Newtonian objects and the a priori 
Newtonian categories could stand opposite each other, each reflecting and 
thus justifying the other, without the temporality of their circularity 
being properly thematised. Further, understanding and reason could be 
envisaged as two isolated realms, such that reason could investigate the 
transcendental operations of understanding in a way which did not 
implicate reason's own functioning. The 'originality' of ecstatic temp- 
orality must not be understood as introducing into fundamental ontology 
the temporal connotations of a Kantian 'a priori', rather it refers to the 
temporality of the hermeneutic circle of fundamental ontology itself. 24 
The questioning in fundamental ontology is guided in advance by what it 
asks after, that is, it reaches out toward that which it seeks and is thus 
futural; yet it is also determined by decisions made 'without our 
contribution, let alone merit', and thus stretches out towards the past. 
The hermeneutic circle is thus constituted by its ecstatic temporality. 25 
The dimensional 'now' of the hermeneutic circle, reaching out towards the 
past and future, must be the circle's coming to presence, its being 
written, its being spoken. What this means for an understanding of the 
nature of language, precisely the temporality of language, and indeed what 
'being spoken' or 'being written' mean here, was not pursued by 
Heidegger in Being and Time. This may be regarded as a failing of the 
project, only if the project is made to stand in isolation from its future 
as an incessant questioning. 
What is thus distinctive about Heidegger's conception of 
'hermeneutics' is thus not simply that he takes the circularity of Dasein's 
understanding (for example, as found in Kant's project) as the 'starting 
point' for his own hermeneutically circular project, but rather that 
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Heidegger's project is a questioning of the understanding of time 
involved in hermeneutic circularity itself. Thus it is not the case that 
ecstatic temporality is the 'conclusion' of Heidegger's hermeneutic 
fundamental ontology, but rather that the circularity of the project itself 
has an ecstatic temporality. Another way of putting this, would be to 
say that certain traditional hermeneutic projects have an unquestioned 
time determination (for example: 'belief is prior to understanding, but 
understanding is a prerequisite of believing', or the a priori of Kant's 
circularity), while the temporality of Heidegger's circle is precisely that 
understanding of time towards which the project moves within the circle. 
This is essentially why Heidegger's fundamental ontology can be called an 
authentic (eigentlich) analysis - the temporality of the circle is thought 
from that which is the circle's own (eigen): a consideration of the nature 
of time. Even writers who are sympathetic to Heidegger's emphasis of the 
hermeneutic circle, such as Jean-Luc Nancy in Le partage des voix26, do 
not seem to have appreciated that Heidegger's hermeneutic project is 
different because its circularity has an ecstatic temporality and not a 
temporality homogenized into now points such that the 'starting point' 
and the 'interpretation' have object-like, independent existence. 27 
Since hermeneutic projects are linguistic projects there will 
necessarily be a reciprocity or circularity between the temporality of the 
circle and the temporality of language (objective genitive). For example, 
within a traditional hermeneutic project, the time determination of the 
circle as a movement from now-point to now-point, and a view of words 
as signs for objects, mutually reinforce each other in a homogenized view 
of time. However, before proceding to consider Heidegger's under- 
standing of the nature of language in more detail, it will be necessary to 
consider briefly several problematic elements of the analysis of Dasein: 
authenticity, mineness and the Augenblick. Whilst Heidegger's well known 
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admission in the Letter on Humanism (that the third division of the first 
part of Being and Time, 'Time and Being', was held back because 'thinking 
failed in the adequate saying of this reversal [Kehrel, '28), refers to the 
problem of language, in the context of the essay it is, rather, a more 
guarded admission of the elements of a metaphysical subjectivity in the 
Dasein analytic. This would have meant that the reversal (to understand 
being out of ecstatic temporality) would have consisted of a reflection of 
these elements. More generally, to have conceived of 'Being and Time' and 
'Time and Being' in a single, finished, work where one is simply the 
reversal of the latter, would been to reduce the hermeneutic circle to a 
closed reflectivity, rather than 'a peculiar relatedness backwards and 
forwards' which plays incessantly within the whole: 
"Das Ganze" - dies sagt: der Sachverhalt von "Sein und Zeit", 
von "Zeit und Sein". Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt selbst. 
(Richardson p xix) 
"The whole" - this means: the matter in "Being and Time", in 
"Time and Being". The reversal plays in the matter itself. 
(It is worth noting that the word Heidegger uses here in this late essay 
Sachverhalt is related to the word which has been translated 'comport- 
ment': Verhalten, Verhaltung. The use of the word in the essay Time and 
Being (1962) in it resonance with the early work will be discussed below. ) 
Heidegger's frequent invocation of Dasein's authenticity and 
inauthenticity (Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit) would seem to be one 
of the most problematic elements of his analysis of Dasein, indeed as a 
methodological tool for moving between Dasein's everyday involvement in 
the world and its temporal analysis, it would seem to cast doubt on the 
entire project. 29 Yet Heidegger wants to maintain that 'inauthenticity' 
does not mean a lesser way of being than 'authenticity' and further that 
'the expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense' 
('diese Ausdrücke sind im strengen Wortsinne teminologisch gewahlt, ' H43). 
Heidegger also asserts on several occasions that the existential analysis 
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of Dasein is not prescriptive for Dasein's existentiell existence. (The 
German existenziell refers to the particular aims and intentions, Ziele, 
with which a particular Dasein may concern itself. ) 
Die existenziale Interpretation wird nie einen Machtspruch über 
existenzielle Möglichkeiten und Verbindlichkeiten übernehmen 
wollen. (H312) 
Existential interpretation will never seek to take over any 
authoritarian pronouncement as to those things which, from an 
existentiell point of view, are possible or binding. 
While this may be strictly true, it is still the case that Being and Time 
asserts a proper way of Dasein's regarding of its existentiell involve- 
ments, what ever they may be in its particular case. This culminates in 
the idea of Dasein's authentic historizing, that is, not abandoning itself 
to that which is past, nor aiming at progress from a past which has been 
left behind, but rather fetching-again, repeating (Widerholen, H385), the 
possibilities of its existence as having-been. A problem arises, however, 
in that to assert that this way of appropriating one's factical existence 
is itself an existentiell possibility for Dasein, Heidegger has to appeal to 
a voluntaristic conception of Dasein's subjectivity. 
The roots of this voluntaristic conception go back deeper into the 
existential analytic: Dasein can only 'pull itself together' (sich 
zusammenholen, H390) out of the homogenization of its time into a 'no- 
longer-now' and a 'not-yet-now' because in Dasein's anxiety (in the face 
of its own death) which brings it back to its thrownness, the ecstatic 
present can be 'held on to' C'ist C... ] gehalten, ' H344). Dasein's death is 
in each case mine ('C... ] der Tod je meiner ist, ' H425) because mineness 
(Jemeinigkeit) constitutes Dasein's being: 'C... ] Dasein überhaupt durch 
Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist. ' This quotation belongs to a sentence which 
has been refered to already, and reads in full: 
Die beiden Seinsmodi der Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit - 
diese Ausdrücke sind im strengen Wortsinne terminologisch 
gewälht - gründen darin, daß Dasein überhaupt durch 
Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist. (H43-4) 
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The modes of being, authenticity and inauthenticity - these 
expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense 
- are both grounded in the fact that Dasein as such is 
characterized by mineness. 
This appeal to 'grounding' is the root of Heidegger's problematic 
voluntarist conception of Dasein; mineness is understood as a foundational 
starting point rather than being understood phenomenologically. 
Heidegger could only claim to have access to such a ground by proposing 
a philosophy of immediate intuition, such as was shown in chapter 1 to 
operate in Fichte's science. To put in question the idea of a founding 
mineness, does not, however, somehow weaken or destroy the foundations 
of Heidegger's method of hermeneutic phenomenology, since this latter 
consists precisely in the questioning of proposed foundations and 
'starting points' (cf. above, the questioning of transcendental ego in 
Kant's fundamental ontology). 30 It is the concept of mineness, though, 
which allows Heidegger to step outside of the hermeneutic circle of 
phenomenology, to stand back and describe it, and thus put it to work as 
an existentiell possibility of one's historical existence. In a profound 
way, therefore, the problem of mineness is linked to the problem of 
bringing the hermeneutic circle to expression, and more generally, the 
question of the relation of language to the hermeneutic circle. The 
minimal space given over to the question of language in Being and Time 
is thus rooted in the way the concept of mineness had already allowed 
Heidegger to leap out of the hermeneutic circle to a stable ground from 
which language could be used to give a description of the circle. 
Before turning to consider language - how language is understood in 
relation to the ecstatic temporality of the hermeneutic circle, the 
temporality of language in its subjective and objective genitives - it is 
necessary to explore briefly the meaning of 'authenticity' (Eigentichkeit), 
a word which will be heard in a different way after Heidegger's 
questioning of the nature of language. 
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If the questioning of mineness as a ground for authenticity and 
inauthenticity does not, in fact, undermine the hermeneutic circle, then it 
still remains necessary to determine how authenticity and inauthenticity 
are used by Heidegger to structure the movement of the circle. Dasein's 
inauthentic mode of being is its falling into everydayness. Heidegger 
writes concerning Falling in Basic Problems. 
Was sich hier in einem theoretischen Gebeite der ausgebildeten 
Ontologie zeigt, ist eine allgemeine Bestimmung des Daseins 
selbst, daß es die Tendenz hat, aus den Dingen primär sich zu 
verstehen und den Begriff des Seins aus dem Vorhandenen zu 
schöpfen. (GA 3,384-5) 
What appears here in a theoretical field of developed ontology 
is a general determination of the Dasein itself, namely, that it 
has the tendency to understand itself primarily by way of 
things and to derive the concept of being from the present at 
hand. (BPP 272) 
Dasein's inauthenticity comes about when, because it primarily is involved 
with things, it understands itself and being in general in terms of 
things, without thus questioning the time determination involved. As has 
been argued in relation to Kant's Critique, such a move closes down the 
hermeneutic circle to a simply reflectivity between objects and what 
grounds them, which is also understood in an object-like way. Authen- 
ticity, then, refers to the re-opening of the hermeneutic circle, by 
allowing a questioning of time to determine the movement of the circle 
itself. Dasein understands itself authentically when it does not ground 
its understanding on something which stands, unquestioned, outside of a 
phenomenological approach, but rather understands itself in terms of that 
which is its ownmost - the hermeneutic circle of its existence. 
Die Voraufgabe einer "phänomenologischen" Sicherung des 
exemplarischen Seienden als Ausgang für die eigentliche 
Analytik ist immer schon aus dem Ziel dieser vorgezeichnet. 
C... 3 Phänomenologie des Daseins ist Hermeneutik. (H37) 
The prior task of 'phenomenologically' assuring that entity, 
which is to serve as example, as the point of departure for the 
authentic analysis, has always already been marked out by its 
finishing point. [... 1 The phenomenology of Dasein is a 
hermeneutic. (H37) 
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This quotation indicates that Dasein is authentic when it undestands 
itself from out of the circling of hermeneutical phenomenology, where 
even the time of this circling, the 'always already', must, as was shown 
above, be understood from out of the circle. No element must be posited 
lying outside of the circle, but rather each must be characteristic (sich 
eignen) of the circle, peculiar (eigen) to it in being proper (eigentlich) to 
the hermeneutic thinking of ecstatic temporality. It is thus that the 
word Eigentlichkeit may be taken to name this understanding of Dasein. 
The idea of Dasein understanding itself from out of the circle seems to 
imply, however, that an exteriorization is still required. This, then, is a 
reference to the yet unconsidered part of language in hermeneutic 
phenomenology. If the project requires a speaking from within the 
ecstatic circle, does what is said leave the circle in its being expressed? 
If this were so, this would suggest there could never be an 'authentic 
analysis' because in its linguistic nature an inauthentic element would be 
introduced. The place of language in Being and Time, and the question of 
understanding language in an authentic way will now be considered. 
IV. Language and Die Rede 
Just as Heidegger was concerned in the period of Being and Time to 
move away from thing-like conceptions of the subject in his use of the 
term Dasein, so also he was concerned to move away from conceptions of 
language which saw words as things present at hand for the use of a 
metaphysical subject. This view of language was a target for his 
criticism throughout all the periods of his writing, though the view he 
opposed to it, underwent change. In Basic Problems, after characterizing 
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a view of language in which an idea in the mind refers to a being 
outside the mind, he writes: 
Es entsteht das Problem: Wie kann der Vorstellungs- 
zusammenhang in der Seele mit den Dingen draußen über- 
einstimmen? Das pflegt man als das Problem der Wahrheit oder 
der Objectivität zu formulieren. Diese in sich grundverkehrte 
Fragestellung ist aber dadurch motiviert, daß die Aussage 
zunächst als Wörterfolge genommen wird. (GA 3,294) 
The problem arises, how can the ideational complex in the mind 
agree with the external things? This is customarily formulated 
as the problem of truth of objectivity. But this fundamentally 
wrongheaded approach to the question is motivated by the fact 
that assertion is taken first as verbal sequence. (BPP p206-7) 
In the view of assertion as verbal sequence there is the idea of words as 
things which may be put together in the mind of the speaker in order to 
be used to refer to things in the world. Against this view, Heidegger 
develops an initial phenomenological view of language: if Dasein is always 
already being in the world, then the different components of assertion 
(word, signification, that which is thought, that which is) must be 
determined in their phenomenological interconnection. 31 Words have 
'reference' only because something like entities have been unveiled by 
Dasein's ecstatic comportment towards the world with which it is 
concerned, and thus which already exists as a contexture of significance 
for Dasein. 
Es sind nicht zunächst Wörter da, die zu Zeichen für 
Bedeutungen gestempelt werden, sondern umgekehrt, aus dem 
sich selbst und die Welt verstehenden Dasein, d. h. aus einem 
schon enthüllten Bedeutungszusammenhang heraus wächst diesen 
Bedeutungen je ein Wort zu. Die Wörter können, wenn sie in 
dem gefaßt werden, was sie ihrem Wesen nach besagen, nie als 
freischwebende Dinge genommen werden. (GA 3,297) 
It is not the case that first there are the words, which are 
coined as signs for meanings, but just the reverse - it is from 
the Dasein which understands itself and the world, from a 
significance-contexture already unveiled, that a word accrues to 
each of these meanings. If words are grasped in terms of what 
they mean by their essential nature, they can never be taken as 
free-floating things. (BPP p208-9) 
At this stage the 'essential nature' of words is that they are Dasein's 
expressing itself as being in the world and occupying itself with beings. 
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There is a strong sense, therefore, that 'what is primary is being in the 
world, that is, concerned understanding and being in the context of 
meanings' (HCT p210). In other words, a sense of being-in-the-world as 
prior to language. 32 A sign theory of words thus is still present, albeit 
one where what is signified is understood not as a thing existing 
independently of Dasein, but rather understood phenomenologically as an 
aspect of Dasein's involvement in the world. Indeed, at one place in 
Being and Time, an idea of language is used to explain the change from 
understanding entities in the contexture of involvements in which they 
are used (what Heidegger calls 'ready to hand', zuhanden), to 
understanding them as objects existing independently of Dasein and 
outside its involvements Cie. present at hand, vorhanden). 
Das zuhandene Womit des Zutunhabens, der Verrichtung, wird 
zum ' Worüber' der aufzeigenden Aussage. (H 158) 
Something ready-to-hand with which we have to do or perform 
something, becomes an 'about which' of the assertion that 
points it out. (H158) 
It would thus seem that language is implicitly caught up in the 
process of Dasein's inauthentic understanding of its world and itself as 
two present at hand entities which stand apart from each other (the 
Woriiber' and the 'Aussage). Such a conclusion would cast doubt on the 
possibility of an 'authentic analysis' as such, given its linguistic nature. 
However, such a conclusion comes about by maintaining a sign relation 
between words and the significance structure of being in the world. 
This 'relation' itself needs to be subjected to phenomenological analysis, 
that is, the a priori of being-in-the-world in relation to language must 
be thought phenomenologically. 
Heidegger moves in this direction in Being and Time by making 
'discourse' (die Rede) equiprimordial with Dasein's being in the world. 
The idea of discourse allows Heidegger to be able to move from the 
existential analysis of being in the world to Dasein's factical use of 
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language, in an attempt to avoid introducing an objective sign-based 
separation between them. Given the minor place of a discussion of 
discourse in the existential analysis, it would seem that Heidegger had 
not seen at this stage the implications of making something like language 
primordial to Dasein. In particular this 'primordiality' is not adequately 
questioned in its temporal connotations, thus allowing it to function as a 
Kantian a priori 'grounding' the existentiell use of language, thus making 
possible the expressive use of language in assertion and, moreover, 
making possible the describing of the hermeneutic circle in fundamental 
ontology. Just as Kant had to maintain a distinction between 
understanding and that which was to describe it, reason, so Heidegger 
has to introduce a distinction between two ideas of language: 
Das ursprüngliche 'Als' der umsichtig verstehenden Auslegung 
(Ep)irlvs{(x) nennen wir das existenzial-hermeneutische 'Als' im 
Unterschied vom apophantischen 'Als' der Aussage. (H158) 
The primordial 'as' of an interpretation (Epµrlveta) which 
understands circumspectively we call the existential- 
hermeneutical 'as' in distinction from the apophantical 'as' of 
the assertion. (H158) 
The problematic nature of this distiction (Unterschied) is thrown into 
starker relief, when it is seen that when Heidegger came to write the 
introduction to Being and Time, the ). 6yoc of Dasein's hermeneutic 
phenomology is itself understood as &noq>atvccOat, letting something be 
seen from out of itself: 
Der ). 6yoS 18ßt etwas sehen (q>atveaOat), nämlich das, worüber 
die Rede ist. (H32) 
The 16yor, lets something be seen (gaivcoOat), namely, what the 
discourse is about. 
Phenomenology and discourse are thus apophantic and involved in a 
worüber, which was seen above to be characteristic of the objectifying 
tendency of existentiell assertion. 33 
A similar difficulty is found in section 34 of Being and Time ('Da- 
sein und Rede. Die Sprache'). Discourse is existentially equiprimordial 
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(gleichursprünglich) with state of mind and understanding and yet the 
latter two 'express' themselves as discourse - 'sprechen sich als Rede aus' 
(H161). Language, understood as an entity within the world, is the 
'expressedness of discourse' C'Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede', H161). 
It appears then that an idea of aussprechen, literally 'speaking out', not 
only works within the existential analysis of understanding, state-of-mind 
and discourse, but also to allow a movement between (implying a 
distinction between) the existential analysis and existentiell language. 
This idea of aussprechen is never thematized in Being and Time and at 
the precise place where one would expect discourse's a priori relation to 
language and its equiprimordiality with understanding and state-of-mind 
to be considered, section 68d 'The temporality of Discourse', Heidegger 
writes less than one page on discourse before returning to a discussion 
of the other aspects of Dasein's existential constitution. 34 
In the section on the temporality of discourse, Heidegger merely 
states that discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in any definite 
ecstasis, as was the case for understanding, state-of-mind and falling, 
though the making-present has a privileged constitutive function ('das 
Gegenwärtigen [hat] eine bevorzugte konstitutive Funktion, ' H349). 
Discourse is rather 'grounded' in the ecstatical unity of temporality. By 
making the unity of temporality into something which 'grounds', one is 
reminded both of the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant, and 
also the mineness which is the condition of possibility of Dasein's 
authentic temporality; both point to the residues of an uncriticised 
subjectivity who, in order to be able to describe what happens in the 
hermeneutic circle of ecstatic temporality, stands outside the circle and 
has language. 
A further reason which may be cited for the brevity of section 68d, 
is that, 'because in discourse one is talking about entities, ' the analysis 
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of the temporality of discourse can only take place in relation to the 
interpretation of being in the light of ecstatic temporality, that is, the 
projected third division of Being and Time: 'Time and Being'. Section 68d 
itself contains a footnote refering to this third division of the project, 
which was deleted in the later editions of Being and Time. In a sense, 
therefore, section 68d is the longest of the treatise because it asks for 
all Heidegger's later thinking on the truth of being and the nature of 
language to be read in its place. The project, therefore, turns itself 
inside-out at this point as the problematics of language and the truth of 
being can no longer be seen as contained within the existential analysis, 
but rather the existential analysis must be understood as contained in the 
later thinking. But further, the reversal can no longer be seen as 
completing a single, closed project because it was precisely an uncritic- 
ised distinction between Rede and language, where Rede is understood as 
the formal a priori condition of language, which allowed the fundamental 
ontology to be written. It is in the questioning of this a priori and the 
aussprechen which links discourse and language, that the incessant 
questioning which is proper to the hermeneutic circle continues, and that 
Heidegger's later work has its 'starting point'. 
V. The Appropriate Event of Language and Time 
In this final section, elements from Heidegger's later thinking will be 
presented in order to lay the ground for a more detailed discussion of 
the belonging together of language and time in chapter 4. In a sense, 
therefore, this section will attempt to draw closer to the eventual 
meeting of language and time which was announced by the title of the 
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chapter. In particular, it will move towards an interpretation of das 
Ereignis (often translated as 'the event of appropriation') as Heidegger's 
way of thinking language and time. That is, it does not so much name 
the event of an eventual meeting, or even the event of their always 
already belonging together, but rather names the way along which they 
are properly thought together - the saying of its time and the time of 
its saying. 35 
In relation to the project of Being and Time the temporality of the 
hermeneutic circle, in the sense of both the temporality of its movement 
and what guided the movement, was shown to be ecstatic temporality. 
However, this 'showing' of the authentic temporality of the hermeneutic 
circle happened by way of a closed reflectivity between Rede and language 
such that the expression (aussprechen) of the hermeneutic circle 
(objective genitive; Heidegger's writing the project of Being and Time) 
was made uncritically distinct from the view of language which operated 
'within' the circle (die Rede). Language was, therefore, not thought 
authentically (eigentlich), that is, in a sufficiently questioning 
hermeneutic way. Heidegger's later work is concerned with finding such 
a way of thinking -a way which is 'properly' (eigentlich) hermeneutical, 
'properly' questioning of its own time of saying (subjective and objective 
genitive). Of course, Heidegger speaks very little about time explicitly in 
his later work (the major exception being Time and Being, which will be 
discussed below). This is an indication that Heidegger remained satisfied 
in using the temporal analysis of Being and Time as the 'starting point' 
for his reflections upon the truth of being, in terms such as aletheia, 
Unverborgenheit and Wesen; that is, as a 'starting point' for the 
determination of being from the horizon of ecstatic temporality. When 
Heidegger again gives explicit detail of his understanding of time in the 
1962 essay Time and Being, his starting point is taken almost word for 
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word from various writings of the period of Being and Time (contrary to 
David Wood's opinion in a recent essay that 'when time reappears it is 
virtually unrecognisable'36). Heidegger's thinking of the truth of being 
will not be explored in detail at this point, in order to concentrate on 
his reflections upon language, and thus to move toward an understanding 
of Ereignis as a way of thinking which will be pursued further in 
chapter 4. 
As was shown above, the idea of Dasein became problematic when it 
was used to allow the project of fundamental ontology to be put to use 
as an existentiell way of being; that is, Dasein still involved elements of 
a voluntaristic subject. This voluntarism was shown not to be fatal to 
the analysis because it was based on an idea of 'grounding' the circle 
which would be questioned by hermeneutic temporal phenomenology itself. 
By the time Heidegger wrote What is a Thing? (1935-6), the term Dasein 
had been essentially replaced by the idea of the open (das Offene) as the 
'circular happening through which what lies within the circle is exposed 
(er'öi+fnetl, (What is a Thing? p242). Heidegger also calls this open the 
between (das Zwischen) which 'lies between the thing and man, which 
reaches out beyond things and back behind man' (p244). Instead of a 
thinking of the Da-sein which is 'in each case mine', Heidegger develops 
the Da as the place within which man and thing encounter each other. 
This place is the letting-show-themselves of beings in their coming to 
presence, and thus is understood from out of a phenomenological ecstatic 
temporality which has been questioned with regard to its grounding in 
the mineness of Dasein. As was described above, the entities which show 
themselves are not mere appearances (Erscheinen) of something else, 
rather, that-which-is 'seems' (scheinen) phenomenologically in one way or 
another. The being of that-which-is gets determined according to the 
way beings show themselves in the open. If being is understood by way 
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of particular beings, or particular determinations of being, this means a 
founding conception of being is introduced, instead of thinking properly 
about being in a phenomenological temporal way. The being of that which 
is, is lingering (Verweilung), presencing (Anwesung), thought of as an 
emergence (Hervorgang) and transition (Übergang), and not as simply 
persisting through infinite time (Basic Concepts37 p103-4/ GA 51,120-1). 
When being as such (without reference of beings) is thought of 
phenomenologically, it too seems to be in one way or another, depending 
on how it is questioned after. Being is only in one way or another, but 
equally it could be said that being is not at all. That which seems to be 
in one way or another is not, such that showing itself happens to it 
subsequently. Heidegger writes, for example, in The Principle of 
Reason38 (1955-56): 
Being has its own in self-revealing (Sein hat sein Eigenes in 
Sichentbergen). Being is not beforehand something for itself 
that only then brings about a self-revealing. Self-revealing is 
the property (Eigenschaft) of being. Being addresses us from 
out of this self-revealing and as this self-revealing. (p69) 
That which shows itself as being, precisely is not, and thus does not 
show itself. This is Heidegger's idea of the 'withdrawal' of being in its 
showing itself - the truth of being as un-concealment, that is, an 
unconcealment in which a concealment, and thus an untruth, also takes 
place. 
Wir erfahren das Menschentum jetzt in solchem Aufenthalt, in 
dem das Sein als Zuwurf die Unumgänglichkeit bekundet und 
darin seine Unantastbarkeit; wir erfahren einen Aufenthalt, in 
dem das Sein sich aber auch gleichsam in die Zerstörung seiner 
selbst preisgibt, wenn anders das Sein sogleich durch alles 
Vorstellen und Denken seiner zu einem Seienden wird. (GA 51, 
85) 
We now experience humanity in an abode where being shows its 
unemcompassability as what is cast toward us, and therein its 
inviolability. We experience an abode where also equally, 
however, being gives itself up in the destruction of itself, 
when being at once becomes a being through all representing 
and thinking of it. (Basic Concepts p71-72) 
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Heidegger's thinking of the being of beings as transition, and of being 
as such, as un-concealment, (that is, not as what 'goes over' in a 
transition, or as what is unconcealed in un-concealment), follow directly, 
however, from Being and Time: when being is considered in relation to 
beings it is thought in terms of time as presencing of beings which 
strive for permanant endurance; when being as such is considered, it is 
thought as withdrawing or giving itself up to be thought as a being. 
During the 1930s. Heidegger's views of language underwent 
considerable modification as the uncritical distinction between Rede and 
language was questioned. 39 The tension between Rede being 
equiprimordial with being-in-the-world, and Rede as expressing being in 
the world, is thought through phenomenologically in terms of language as 
the letting-show of world; that is, it is language with allows world to be. 
Die Sprache ist nicht nur ein Werkzeug, [... 1 sondern die 
Sprache gewährt überhaupt erst die Möglichkeit, inmitten der 
Offenheit von Seiendem zu stehen. Nur wo Sprache, da ist 
Welt. (H'ölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung GA 4,33-48) 
Language is not a mere tool, [... ] on the contrary, it is only 
language that affords the very possibility of standing in the 
openness of the existent. Only where there is language, is 
there world. (Kdlderlin and the Essence of Poetry40 (1936), 
p299) 
The ). 6yoc of phenomenology that was treated in the introduction to 
Being and Time no longer undergoes division into an existential Rede and 
an existentiell Sprache, but rather is understood simply as the nature of 
language. AöyoS is understood through Heidegger's interpretation of 
). tyety as a laying-before and a gathering up. 
Das ) eyety, legen, meint in seinem 'beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen' 
gerade dies, daß uns das Vorliegende anliegt und deshalb 
angeht. C ... ] Dem ). tyety liegt bei seinem gesammelt-vor-leigen- 
Lassen an dieser Geborgenheit des Vorliegenden im 
Unverborgenen. (Vorträge und Aufsätze p211) 
Atyety, to lay, by its 'letting-lie-together-before' means just 
this, that whatever lies before us involves us and therefore 
concerns us. [... 1 By letting things lie together before us. 
) tyety undertakes to secure what lies before us in 
unconcealment. (Logos41 p62-3) 
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A word is no longer thought of as something which accrues to 
Dasein's world which has been brought to light in its pre-linguistic 
phenomenological comportment, rather the word, as name, allows the entity 
to stand in the open42; it calls the entity into unconcealment. 
Nennen heißt: hervor-rufen. Das im Namen gesammelt Nieder- 
gelegte kommt durch solches Legen zum Vorliegen und 
Vorschein. Das vom ). itycty her gedachte Nennen (övoµa) Ist 
kein Ausdrücken einer Wortbedeutung, sondern ein vor-liegen- 
Lassen in dem Licht, worin etwas dadurch steht, daß as einen 
Namen hat. (Vorträge und Aufsätze p223) 
To name means to call forward. That which is gathered and 
laid down in the name, by means of such a laying, comes to 
light and comes to lie before us. The naming (övoµa), thought 
in terms of ). ysty, is not the expression of a word-meaning 
but rather a letting-lie-before in the light wherein something 
stands in such a way that it has a name. (Logos p73) 
These last two quotations are taken from Heidegger's translating 
interpretation of Heraclitus Fragment 50; the question as to why 
Heidegger turned to an engagement with Greek philosophy for an 
understanding of language will be considered in detail in chapter 4. In 
the introduction to Being and Time Heidegger clearly understood that the 
hermeneutic circle of the project of fundamental ontology, was not free- 
floating as an object in time, but was rather historical in its temporal 
existence. The question of the meaning of being was not, therefore, to 
be answered by a free-floating result (H19), but rather would always take 
place from the horizon of ecstatic temporality and thus be constituted by 
an engagement with, and fetching back of, the history of inquiry into the 
meaning of being. 43 After the period of Being and Time Heidegger saw 
with increasing clarity that the historicity of the hermeneutic circle was 
constituted by its language, and thus that language had to be understood 
in terms of its ecstatic temporality, that is, not as an entity present at 
hand which endured from moment to moment, but as itself stretching 
through time. To put this another way, language calls that which it 
names to presence, yet language also is in some sense; language calls 
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itself to presence in the saying of its historicity: poetry and translation. 
The question of the relation of being to language was first asked 
explictly in the collection of notes entitled Beitrage zur Philosophic 
Die erste wirkliche Frage, mit der zugleich alle Sprach- 
philosophie als solche (... l hinfällig wird, ist die nach dem 
Bezug der Sprache zum Seyn, eine Frage, die freilich in dieser 
Form noch gar nicht trifft, was sie fragt. Dieser Bezug läßt 
sich aber auf einem Wege verdeutlichen, der zugleich noch jenen 
Bereich in den Blick faßt, der in der bisherigen Betrachtung 
über die Sprache immer leitend war. (Beiträge zur Philosophie, 
GA 65,499) 
The first real question, with which equally all language 
philosophy as such [... ] becomes untenable, is that of the 
relation of language to beon, a question which clearly in this 
form does not hit upon what it asks. This relation is made 
clearer only on a way which, at the same time, holds that 
region in view, which was always guiding in the earlier 
considerations about language. 44 
The question of the 'relation' of language to being can too easily be 
understood as asking about two entities which exist in independence 
before their relation. It must rather ask about how they belong together 
from the horizon of temporality, and thus direct itself towards how 
language has been thought of in the past. Predominantly language has 
been thought of as a possession of man, and in such a way that the 
metaphysical determination of the nature of man has been reflected in the 
way language has been understood. 
Das leiblich-seelisch-geistige Wesen des Menschen wird in der 
Sprache wiedergefunden: der Sprach-(Wort)-Leib, die Sprach- 
Seele (Stimmung und Gefühlston und dergleichen) und der 
Sprach-Geist (das Gedachte-Vorgestellte) sind geläufige 
Bestimmungen aller Spachphilosophie. (Beiträge zur Philosophie, 
GA 65,502) 
The body-soul-spirit nature of the human is found again in 
language: the linguistic-(word)-body, the linguistic-soul (mood 
and emotional connotation and the like) and the linguistic-spirit 
(what is thought/represented) are common determinations in all 
language philosophy. 
Just as Being and Time questioned the metaphysical determination of the 
human being in Western philosophy to arrive at a temporal phenomenology 
of Dasein in terms of the unity of its comportments towards the present 
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(falling), past (state-of-mind) and future (understanding), so also language 
must be considered phenomenologically in its present (word), past (mood) 
and future (concept). And just as after the period of Being and Time, 
the subjectivity implicit in the project which had allowed the project to 
be written, was questioned, so also must the nature of language in which 
language is spoken about be questioned. The temporality of language 
(objective genitive, language understood from the horizon of ecstatic 
temporality) and the temporality of language (subjective genitive, its 
saying of the ecstatic unity of present, past and future) must circle each 
other hermeneutically. Since, for Heidegger, language's saying of the 
ecstatic unity of time happens in poetry (and also translation, though 
this 'and also' is misleading, as will be shown in chapter 4, because 
poetry is understood as a translation from one language into the same 
language; translation from one language to another being only a special 
case of this), the thinking of the temporality of language is the 
hermeneutic circling of phenomenology and poetry, of questioning and 
saying. Phenomenology allows poetry (language) to show itself in an 
ecstatically temporal way, poetry allows phenomenology (ecstatic 
temporality) to say itself in an ecstatically temporal way. 
This hermeneutic circling of phenomenology and poetry is named by 
Heidegger das Ereignis. The appropriate (eigentlich) analysis which was 
the hermeneutic circle of temporal phenomenology in Being and Time has, 
via the questioning of the language of its questioning, becomes the 
appropriate event (Ereignis) of phenomenology and poetry. 45 This change 
is nowhere better illustrated than by comparing Heidegger's analysis of a 
poem by Rilke in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (p172-3; GA 3,244- 
247) to his engagement with poetry in his later work. In The Basic 
Problems Heidegger uses a long quotation from Rilke's The Notebooks of 
Malte Laurids Brigge as an instance (Beleg) of his idea that entities are 
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not predominantly understood as present at hand objects which exist from 
moment to moment, but rather are for the most part understood within a 
context of meaningful involvements and associations which is world. 
Die Dichtung ist nicht anders als das elementare Zum-Wort- 
Kommen, d. h. Entdecktwerden der Existenz als des In-der-Welt- 
seins. (GA 3,244) 
Poetry is nothing but the elementary coming into words, that 
is, the becoming uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world. 
(p171-2) 
It is again clear that at this stage Heidegger thought of being-in-the- 
world as prior to language, such that it comes to words. Of more 
interest in this context, is the way poetry is subsumed within the project 
of fundamental ontology, such that Heidegger gives a phenomenological 
interpretation of poetry, or more precisely, gives a temporal phenomen- 
ology of poetry. In Heidegger's later work, poetry is understood as 
language's saying of itself as its ecstatically temporal existence and thus 
to continue thinking in a properly (i. e. ecstatically temporal) hermeneutic 
way, Heidegger develops, particularly through an engagement with 
Hölderlin, what may be called a poetic temporal phenomenology: the four- 
fold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities. The term 'poetic temporal 
phenomenology' is misunderstood, however, if it is held to suggest that 
poetry and phenomenology simply become a unity. It is, rather, that they 
are the Same, where 'Same' is understood as a belonging together in 
distinctness, and where the distinction is understood from out of ecstatic 
temporality and not as the separation of two objects. 
Das Dichten und das Denken begegnen sich nur dann und nur so 
lange im selben, als sie entschieden in der Verschiedenheit 
ihres Wesens bleiben. C... ] Das Selbe läßt sich nur sagen, wenn 
der Unterschied gedacht wird. [... ] Das Selbe versammelt das 
Unterschiedene in eine ursprüngliche Einigkeit. Das ' Gleiche 
hingegen zerstreut in die fade Einheit des nur einförmig Einen. 
('... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch..., in Vorträge und Aufsätze 
p193) 
Poetry and thinking meet each other in one and the same only 
when, and only as long as, they remain distinctly in the 
distinctness of their nature. C... ] The Same is said only if the 
difference is thought. C... ] The same gathers what is distinct 
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into an original being-at-one. The equal, on the contrary, 
disperses them into the dull unity of mere uniformity. 
('... Poetically Man Dwells... ' p218-9)46 
Heidegger's poetic temporal phenomenology follows the same circling, 
reflecting temporality of the earlier project of fundamental ontology. 
The 'remarkable relatedness backwards and forwards' has become the 
mirroring belonging together of the fourfold of earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals: 
Jedes der Vier spiegelt in seiner Weise das Wesen der übrigen 
wieder. 1... ] Das Spiegeln ereignet, jedes der Vier lichtend, 
deren eigenes Wesen in die einfältige Vereignung zueinander. 
E... ] Wir nennen das ereignende Spiegel-Spiel der Einheit von 
Erde und Himmel, Göttlichen und Sterblichen die Welt. 1... ] Das 
Spiegel-Spiel von Welt ist der Reigen des Ereignens. (Das Ding 
in Vorträge und Aufsätze p178-9) 
Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the 
others. [... 1 The mirroring - lightening each of the four - 
appropriates their own presencing into simple belonging to one 
another. [... 1 This appropriating mirror-play of the simple 
onefold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals, we call world. 
C... l The mirror-play of world is the round dance of 
appropriating. (The Thing p179-180) 
In Being and Time the circular existence of Dasein's being-in-the-world 
was thought authentically as the hermeneutic circle in which the 'starting 
point' mirrored the 'conclusion' (ecstatic temporality). and where the 
temporality of this reflexivity was also thought from out of authentic 
temporality. Here, world is thought as the mirror-play of its 
comportments (the directedness of world toward earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals) in which the nature of the mirroring is again thought from 
out of the circle itself - the mirroring is thought appropriately (eigenes, 
ereignen, Ereignen, Vereignung, Reigen). The project of phenomenology is 
thus still present, but its linguistic presence, its saying, with the verbal 
as well as conceptual associations between its words, has been thought 
from out of poetry as language's saying of its temporal existence. 
In the essays The Way to Language (Der Weg zur Sprache) and The 
Nature of Language Was Wesen der Sprache) Heidegger develops his 
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poetic temporal phenomenology through the idea of Saying (sagen, die 
Sage). In a similar way to his understanding of ), 6yoc,, Saying is 
understood to mean 'to show, to let appear, to let be seen and to let be 
heard' (WL p122; 'zeigen, erscheinen-, sehen- and hören-lassen' GA 12, 
241), and Heidegger's word for this is die Zeige ('showing', 'pointing out', 
'signaling'). This more phenomenological aspect of Saying is linked 
specifically to poetry in that speaking (sprechen) is always already a 
listening (Ffören) to language (WL 123; GA 12,243). In every speaking 
and thus every questioning, language must already have been granted 
(zugesprochen; Zuspruch, 'grant'. NL 71; GA 12,165); language is granted 
in that it speaks and its speaking is a Saying, a Showing: 
Die Sprache spricht. 1... ] Die spreche spricht, indem sie sagt, 
d. h. zeigt. (GA 12,243) 
Language speaks. E... ] Language speaks, in that it says, that is, 
shows. 
From the idea of the listening (Jfören) Heidegger returns to an eigentlich 
hermeneutics through the idea of belonging (gehbren): 
Wenn das Sprechen als Hören auf die Sprache sich die Sage 
sagen läßt, dann kann dieses Lassen sich nur er-geben, insofern 
und insonah unser eigenes Wesen in die Sage eingelassen ist. 
Wir hören sie nur, weil wir in sie gehören. (GA 12,244) 
If speaking, as listening to language, lets Saying be said to it, 
this letting can only arise in so far - and in so near - as our 
proper nature has been let into Saying. We hear Saying only 
because we belong within it. (WL p124) 
In contrast to Being and Time, ' the expression (audsprechen) of an 
authentic (eigentlich) phenomenal analysis can itself only be proper (eigen) 
if that speaking (sprechen) is itself a listening (Fldren) and thus a 
belonging (Gehören) to the Saying (Sagen) of its language, a Saying which 
is a Showing (Zeigen), and thus understood phenomenologically. Here 
again one sees a dense interplay of verbal and conceptual associations in 
Heidegger's expression of the belonging together of phenomenological 
thinking and poetry. This mode of expression makes it difficult to take 
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any single word out of the ring of associations which Heidegger weaves 
without privileging its 'meaning' above its 'sound' or 'look'. Heidegger 
also develops different vocabularies depending on what is being spoken 
about (the essays The Way to Language and The Nature of Language treat 
language specifically), that is, depending on the matter, die Sache, being 
considered. 47 There is thus a move from the systematicity of Being and 
Time to a certain multiplicity of reflections and approaches. Each essay 
may be regarded, in its treatment of the matter at hand, as an individual 
hermeneutic temporal-poetic circularity. There is no straightforward 
rejection of systematicity though, and this is indicated most clearly by 
the presence of an element which persists across Heidegger's later 
thought: das Ereignis. 
The words das Ereignis, ereignen and Ereignen appear in many of 
Heidegger's late essays, though his use of them is in each case within a 
dense ring of associated words which thus allows no simple 'definition'. 
For example, in The Thing which was quoted from above, ereignen is used 
in the expression of the mirror-play of the fourfold, and an associated 
form, sich ereignen (a common German expression for 'to occur' or 'to 
happen'), is used for the 'taking place' of world. ('Aus dem Spiegel-Spiel 
des Gerings des Ringen ereignet sich das Dingen des Dings', V&A p179; 
'Out of the mirror-play of the reel of the ringing the thinging of the 
thing takes place. ') 
In the essay The Way to Language, the word Ereignis is introduced 
after Heidegger has said that the moving force Was Regende) in the 
Showing of Saying is 'owning' Was Eignen) (WL p127; GA 12,246). 
Heidegger clarifies what he means by Eignen by writing that the Showing 
(Zeigen) brings what it points to into its own (sein Eigenes), from where 
it shows itself and abides (verweilen) according to its kind (nach seiner 
Art); the word is thus allowed to stand in its echoing of the eigentlich 
101 
temporality of phenomenology. A further series of associations follows: 
the bringing owning is the appropriating (das Ereignen); the appropriat- 
ing (das Ereigende48) is Ereignis itself, and nothing apart from it ('Das 
Ereigende ist das Ereignis selbst - und nichts außerdem. ' GA 12,247). 
Ereignis would seem to name, therefore, the movement of thorough-going, 
ecstatically temporal circling and self-circling poetic temporal phenomenol- 
ogy: the circling of poetry and phenomenology. 49 
Within the context of this essay on language, where Heidegger has 
developed an idea of Saying which is itself both a showing and a 
listening, he writes: 
Das in der Sage Waltende, das Ereignis, können wir nur so 
nennen, daß wir sagen: Es - das Ereignis - eignet. (... 1 Das 
Ereignis ist sagend. (GA 12, p 247,251) 
That which preveils in Saying, the appropriating event, we can 
only name when we say: It - the appropriating event - owns. 
C... ] The appropriating event is sayingly. 
The bringing of these two statements from The Way to Language together 
shows that within the essay and even within the complexity of 
Heidegger's discussion of both Sage and Ereignis a circularity takes 
place: Ereignis is present in Saying, but its presence is by way of 
saying. Ereignis, as the principle of an irreducible circling of 
phenomenology and poetry (in this context: showing and hearing), enters 
into a hermeneutic circle with the matter being discussed, and thus in 
proper phenomenological fashion, lets itself be thought from out of the 
matter itself. The occasionality and individuality of the later essays thus 
springs from Ereignis, as the thinking of the temporality of language. 
With this in mind, it is now necessary to consider what takes place when 
the matter (die Sache) to be thought is the Sachverhalt (cf. above, 
Verhalten is translated 'comporting') of temporal phenomenology itself: 
being / time in Heidegger's late essay Time and Being. 
There is surely a certain irony in play in the fact that, while a 
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fundamental problem in Being and Time was the minor role of language, 
and while a large part of Heidegger's later writings deal with language 
specifically, language would seem hardly to be mentioned at all in Time 
and Being. Apart from a brief discussion of the traditional grammatical 
understanding of the 'es' of the German idiomatic phrase 'es gibt', 
'language' appears in Heidegger's allusions to the language of the essay 
itself. 
Ein kleiner Wink für das Hören sei gegeben. Es gilt, nicht 
eine Reihe von Aussagesätzen anzuhören, sondern dem Gang des 
Zeigens zu folgen. (Zeit und Sein p2) 
Let me give a little hint on how to listen. The point is not to 
listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow the 
movement of showing. (Time and Being p2) 
In the period of Being and Time, as was shown above, propositions 
(Aussagen) were understood in relation to Dasein's falling, its objectifying 
understanding of being in terms of the present at hand. It would seem, 
then, that Heidegger's suspicion of propositional language, the object- 
ification of that which is spoken about, by the subject-predicate 
structure of the proposition, is simply repeated in Time and Being. 
However, between these two instances, Heidegger's view of language had, 
as has been considered, undergone considerable change. Language under- 
stood as the human being's way of crystallising the flux of becoming into 
objects in order to survive, and thus as a fundamental falsification (a 
view which may, for instance, be attributed to Nietzche), would be based 
on an uncritical distinction between being and becoming. Heidegger's 
reflection on language coming out of the temporal phenomenology of Being 
and Time led him to the idea of language being ecstatically temporal. 
Propositional language can thus be understood phenomenologically as being 
only a particular mode of the unity of language's temporality: a mode in 
which time is homogenized to now-points in which objects stand, and, as 
was shown in chapter 1 in relation to Kant's synthesis of recognition in 
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a concept, having a certain futural emphasis. Thus when Heidegger 
refers to the need to 'follow the movement of showing' he is alluding to 
the need to think of language from out of temporal phenomenology, that 
is, in its Saying as showing. This means that the lecture itself must be 
understood in its ecstatic existence: its comportment towards the past and 
in particular its echoing of Being and Time, its comportment towards the 
present, seen as the interplay of the audible and visual associations 
between the words, and also (and thus not only) its comportment towards 
the future in the understanding of its words as having conceptual 
meaning. Since for Heidegger, language's saying of its ecstatic 
temporality is poetry, his directive at the beginning of the essay must be 
heard as an appeal for the lecture to be taken as poetry. 
Given the density of the essay's 'word-plays' as well as allusions to 
his earlier work, it would be impractical to give a thorough-going 
exposition of Time and Being. It is, however, possible to point to 
elements of its hermeneutic circularity. 
Heidegger begins with a brief discussion of his understanding of 
being as an unconcealing in which being is not, and thus as a with- 
drawing. The different understandings of being through history is 
thought through the idea of being showing itself as a sending (Schicken) 
or gift (Geben) of the 'es gibt Sein'. Since being has always been 
thought as a determination of presence, the 'es' of the 'es gibt Sein' 
might suggest that 'time' is meant, thus Heidegger turns to consider time. 
His discussion of time repeats many of the elements of his early work, 
but it moves towards an understanding of the ecstatic comportments as a 
reaching (Reichen) which prevails in each dimension: present, past and 
future. The unity of the three dimensions consists in their interplay, 
their reaching towards each other. Time's own reaching is the fourth 
dimension of time, thus 'proper time is four-dimensional' (TB 16) ('Die 
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eigentliche Zeit ist vierdimensional, ' ZS 16). Time's proper 'reaching' 
(Reichen), which opens the other three dimensions, and thus the region 
(Bereich) where beings may show themselves, is also thought as the giving 
of the 'es gibt Zeit'. Heidegger is then in a position to relate the 
giving proper to being and the giving proper to time in the saying 
(Sagen), "'Es gibt Sein", "Es gibt Zeit"' (ZS 19): 
Beide, Sein sowohl wie Zeit, nannten wir Sachen. Das 'und' 
zwische beiden ließ ihre Beziehung zueinander im Unbestimmten. 
Nunmehr zeigt sich: Was beide Sachen zueinander gehören 
läßt, was beide Sachen nicht nur in ihr Eigenes bringt, sondern 
in ihr Zusammengehören verwahrt und darin hält, der Verhalt 
beider Sachen, der Sach-Verhalt, ist das Ereignis. Der Sach- 
Verhalt kommt nicht nachträglich als aufgestocktes Verhältnis 
zu Sein und Zeit hinzu. Der Sach-Verhalt ereignet erst Sein 
und Zeit aus ihrem Verhältnis in ihr Eigenes. (ZS p20) 
We have called both - being as well as time - matters. The 
'and' between their connection to each other indeterminate. 
What now shows itself, is that what lets both matters belong 
together, what not only brings both matters into their own, 
but maintains and holds them in their belonging together, their 
relation, the matter being related itself, is the appropriate 
event. The matter being related is not a relation superimposed 
retrospectively on being and time. The matter being related 
first appropriates being and time out of their relation in to 
what is appropriate. (TB p19) 
The most prominant ring of associations in this passage runs: halten, 
Verhalt, Sach-Verhalt, Verhältnis. (In the phrase 'the matter being 
related' as a translation for Sach-Verhalt, 'related' needs to be heard both 
in the sense of 'establishing association' and of 'tell' or 'narrate'. ) In 
the Saying ('Es gibt Sein', 'Es gibt Zeit'), the showing (zeigen) and the 
belonging (gehören), one hears echos of Heidegger's thinking of language. 
Ereignis is what lets being and time belong together in their relation 
(Sack-Verhalt, 'the matter being related, told'), but it is this relation 
which appropriates being and time out of their mere relation (Verhliltnis, 
'connection') into what is proper to them (ereignen, Eigenes). A 
circularity thus obtains such that the belonging together of being and 
time, must itself be thought from out of being properly understood and 
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time properly understood (where 'properly understood' would be a refer- 
ence to ecstatic hermeneutic phenomenology). 
Schicken von Sein beruht im lichtend-verbergenden Reichen des 
mehrfältigen Anwesens in den offenen Bereich des Zeit-Raumes. 
Das Reichen aber beruht in eins mit dem Schicken im Ereignen. 
Dieses, d. h. das Eigentümliche des Ereignisses, bestimmt auch den 
Sinn dessen, was hier das Beruhen genannt wird. (ZS p21) 
Sending of being lies in the opening-concealing reaching of 
manifold presence into the open realm of the time-space. 
Reaching, however, lies in one with the sending, in appropri- 
ating. This, that is the peculiar property of Appropriating, 
determines also the sense of what here is called lying. (TB 20) 
The proper understanding of being lies (beruhen, 'to be based', 'to rest 
on') in the proper understanding of time; the proper understanding of 
time lies together with the proper understanding of being; and 'lies' is 
thought from out of Ereignis. The circling stops when it is asked 'what 
Ereignis is, expecting an object which would ground the belong together 
of being and time. 50 Rather, it must be remembered that Ereignis is 
'sayingly': 
Was bleibt zu sagen? Nur dies: Das Ereignis ereignet. Damit 
sagen wir vom Selben her auf das Selbe zu das Selbe. (ZS p24) 
What remains to be said? Only this: the appropriate event 
appropriates. With this we say the same from out of the Same 
on towards the same. 
From the point of view of logic, Heidegger admits, it would seem nothing 
is being said. The use of the spatial/temporal prepositions ('von... her, 
'auf ... zu 5 is, rather, a reference to the ecstatic temporality of Saying, as 
was discussed above. Heidegger thus again appeals for the lecture to be 
heard as poetry, or rather as poetic temporal phenomenology. The word 
'Same' brings to mind the phenomenological belonging together of what is 
asked and that which is sought, the 'starting point' and the 
'interpretation'. The iteration of the word 'Same' indicates that the 
expression of the hermeneutic circle must itself be thought circularly 
from out of ecstatic' temporal phenomenology and thus its saying from out 
of the ecstatic temporality of poetry. Ereignis is the name for that way 
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of thinking in which the saying 'vom Selben her auf das Selbe zu das 
Selbe' is taken up as a 'clue for reflection' ('Anhalt für das Nachdenken', 
ZS p25). As this way of thinking, Ereignis can never finally be said, 
rather it exists only within the incessant circling of phenomenological 
questioning and poetry, where the circling is thought from out of the 
ecstatic temporality of poetic temporal phenomenology itself. Heidegger 
expresses this in three short paragraphs almost at the very end of the 
essay: 
Sein ohne das Seiende denken, heißt: Sein ohne Rücksicht auf 
die Metaphysik denken. Eine solche Rücksicht herrscht nun 
aber auch noch in der Absicht, die Metaphysick zu überwinden. 
Darum gilt es, vom Überwinden abzulassen und die Metaphysik 
sich selbst zu überlassen. 
Wenn eine Überwindung nötig bleibt, dann geht sie dasjenige 
Denken an, das sich eigens in das Ereignis einläßt, um Es aus 
ihm her auf Es zu - zu sagen. 
Es gilt unablässig, die Hindernisses zu überwinden, die ein 
solches Sagen leicht unzureichend machen. (ZS p25) 
To think being without beings means: to think being without 
regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still 
prevails in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, 
it is necessary to cease overcoming and leave metaphysics to 
itself. 
If an overcoming remains necessary, it concerns that 
thinking which properly enters into the appropriate event in 
order to say It from out of It on towards It. 
It is necessary to overcome unceasingly the obstacles that 
make such a Saying easily inadequate. (TB 24) 
The first and the third paragraphs are linked by the repetition of words. 
('vom überwinden abzulassen', 'unablässig [... ] zu überwinden'; 'to cease 
overcoming', 'to overcome unceasingly'. ) The first would indicate the need 
to leave phenomenological questioning completely and turn to poetry; the 
third states the need to maintain a continual questioning. The middle 
paragraph mentions Ereignis and the need for thinking and saying to 
belong together. It is the belonging together of questioning and poetry 
expressed in the middle paragraph which allows poetry (the first 
paragraph) and questioning (the third paragraph) to remain distinct. 
To conclude this chapter, then: it is Ereignis which names 
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Heidegger's way of thinking the temporality of language. The way is the 
incessant circling (appropriately thought) of a temporal phenomenology of 
language and language's poetic ecstatic temporality. In order to move 
towards an engagement between Heidegger's thought and Benjamin's, this 
rather methodological description will be further explored in chapter 4, 
particularly in relation to Heidegger's thinking of translation. 
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and Being (London: Vision Press, 1949), p293-315. Translation of 
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Dichtung, 33-48 
41. Martin Heidegger, Logos in Early Greek Thinking, trans. David 
Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Fransisco: Harper & Row, 1984), 
p59-78. Translated from Logos in Vorträge and Aufsätze p207-229. 
42. There is thus a continuity in Heidegger's treatment of 16yoc, once 
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and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1964): 'The central notion of 
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be seen to arise from the ecstatic temporality of the hermeneutic 
situation of phenomenology. It is thus not simply the case, as Laszlo 
Vers@nyi argues in Heidegger, Being, and Truth (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1965), that after Being and Time Heidegger changed 
the focus of phenomenological analysis away from Dasein's everydayness to 
'a more original manifestation'. He writes concerning this: 'The opposite 
of Dasein's everyday feeling and doing are the uncommon experiences of 
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the exceptional, fundamental, and all too rare insight that is vouchsafed 
to a few great men in the history of thought' (p84). This idea of being 
manifesting itself most originally to 'a few great men', is to ascribe to 
Heidegger an historicism very close to Rickert's. Heidegger's thinking of 
history from out of the hermeneutic situation will be considered in 
greater detail in Chapter 4. 
44. The old German word 'Seyn' has been rendered by the Anglo Saxon 
'beon'. Heidegger used the word 'Seyn' instead of 'Sein' at this period as 
another way of trying to counter the objectivizing of 'Sein' by stressing 
that being can only be spoken historically. 
45. Commentators have generally not taken account of the hermeneutic 
circularity of Ereignis as a way of thinking. For example, Otto Pöggeler 
in 'Being as Appropriation' (trans. by Rüdiger H. Grimm, in Heidegger and 
Modern Philosophy, ed. by Michael Murrey (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978), pp. 84-115) gives a thorough account of 
Heidegger's references to Ereignis, but ultimately sees it as another name 
for being. He writes: 'The carrying out of the ontological difference - 
the happening of truth - is thought of as the carrying out of the event 
of appropriation' (p107). In making this statement Pöggeler also over- 
looks the hermeneutic circularity between being and beings in the 
happening of the ontological difference, which will be discussed further 
in Chapter 4, in relation to Heidegger's essay Identity and Difference 
46. Martin Heidegger, ... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch... ' in Vortrage 
und Aufsätze p 187-204. Translated as '... Poetically Man Dwells::. ' in 
Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1971) p2ll-229. 
47. This situation is well expressed by Gerald L. Bruns, Heidegger's 
Estrangements: Language, Truth and Poetry in the Later Writings (London 
and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Commenting on Heidegger's 
reflection on the word 'way' (Wege, be-wegen, wegen) at the beginning of 
the lecture 'The Nature of Language'. Bruns writes: 'If one were trying 
to extract a point from this passage, it would perhaps be that the "way" 
is multiple, distributed in every direction, and that the country (Gegend) 
is just this plurality of courses, a dissemination of directions' (p142). 
48. The difference between an infinitival noun and a present participle 
noun cannot be followed in English; the present participle noun, however, 
has the connotations of the 'doing' of the action named in the infinitival 
noun. 
49. This interpretation is thus in rejection of the prevelent tendency to 
ascribe a certain 'real' existence to Ereignis. In his essay 'The 
Experience of Language', Robert Bernasconi writes concerning Ereignis. 'It 
decides what is holy and what is unholy, what is great and what is small, 
what brave and what cowardly, what lofy and what flighty, what master 
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and what slave' (p14). Against this assimilation of Ereignis to a Judeo- 
Christian idea of divinity, the interpretation of Ereignis as naming a way 
of thinking is more in line with Bernasconi's comment, in the same essay, 
that 'Ereignis is first and foremost the word of the thinker at the time 
of the end of philosophy' (p 14). 
50. Joseph J. Kockelmans seems precisely to understand Ereignis as 
existing as a ground when he writes in On the Truth of Being 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984): 'That which makes both, 
namely, being and time, what they properly are (Eigens) and makes them 
belong together is what Heidegger calls Ereignis, aboriginal and ap- 
propriating event. In other words, that mysterious "it" about which we 
have spoken is the Ereignis. And this Ereignis is ontologically prior to 
Being as well as time, because it is that which grants to both what they 
properly are' (p71). 
CHAPTER 3: BENJAMIN AND MESSIANIC ANALYSIS 
I. Introduction: Benjamin's Method as Umweg 
In an analogous fashion to the previous chapter an overview of 
Benjamin's project will be presented in order to develop an idea of 
Messianic analysis as Benjamin's way of thinking the temporality of 
language. 1 Again, this will be done by exploring how he took up the 
legacy of Kant's critical philosophy. The form of Benjamin's work would 
seem to differ so greatly from that of Heidegger, however, that it is 
necessary briefly at the outset to consider this difference, in order to 
begin to allow a more productive resonance to take the place of what 
otherwise may seem a stark opposition. This difference will also 
necessitate that an overview take a different form in the case of 
Benjamin than it did for Heidegger. This introductory section will 
concern the question of its form, in terms of the need to provide a 
theoretical grid, which underpins the presentational form of Benjamin's 
work. 
A stark opposition would seem to exist precisely between the ways in 
which Heidegger and Benjamin described the method of their thinking. In 
Chapter 2 it was shown how Heidegger's method (from the Greek 6S6S) 
was presisely a way or path (ein Weg). In the presentation of 
Heidegger's project, the trajectory of a questioning path of thinking was 
described from his early work to the later work, enabling the 'whole' of 
the project to appear as a Weg, in the complex circling of a temporal 
phenomenology and a poetic phenomenology. For Benjamin, however, 
method must be 'Umweg'2 (detour, roundabout way, circuitous route). 
Benjamin writes further: 'Darstellung als Umweg'; the presentation of a 
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work of philosophy must itself take the form of a circuitous or elliptical 
route. Within the context of the Epistemo-critical Prologue to Benjamin's 
Origin of German Tragic Drama (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels), 
from which these quotations have been taken, the meaning of his use of 
the word Umweg may be understood initially as the need to move away 
from a form of philosophical presentation which gives the appearance of 
a continuous series of arguments and which leads, at the end of the 
piece, to something which is held to be proved true. Instead, the flow of 
argument in a philosophical treatise is constantly interrupting itself: 
Verzicht auf den unabgesetzten Lauf der Intention ist sein 
erstes Kennfzeichen. Ausdauernd hebt das Denken stets von 
neuem an, umständlich geht es auf die Sache selbst zurück. 
Dies unablässige Atemholen ist die eigenste Daseinsform der 
Kontemplation. (GS 1.1.208) 
Renouncing the uninterrupted course of its intention is its 
primary characteristic. Tirelessly thinking begins anew, 
circuitously it returns to the matter in hand. This continual 
pausing for breath is the most proper form of existence of 
contemplation. (OGTD p28) 
The purpose of this chapter will be to reconstruct the thinking of 
language and time which underlies this methodology. This purpose will 
itself require justification because the notion of underlying with respect 
to an idea or a truth in relation to its presentational form will be seen 
to be precisely that with which Benjamin wishes to take issue. Such a 
justification will be considered below, together with the problems which 
ensue from treating Benjamin's textual practices in isolation from their 
theoretical basis. 3 The temporal connotations of the notion of mediation 
which separates philosophical terms such as form and content, appearance 
and essence, sign and signified, are central for Benjamin and will be 
explored in this chapter primarily in terms of his criticism of the 
Kantian a priori which separates and mediates the forms of pure 
intuition and the categories, intuition and understanding. 
Any attempt to reconstruct Benjamin's thinking of language and time. 
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must take into account the form of the 'whole' of his work. The form of 
existence of this 'whole' is the same as that of the philosophical treatise 
characterized by Benjamin in the above quotation. There appears to be 
no linear development of ideas in the chronological sequence of his 
works, nor would there seem to be a consistent explanatory terminology 
developed in his writing. While certain terms do re-occur, such as 'the 
now of recognizability' ('das Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit) and the 'messianic', 
which both appear in his early notes and essays of 1917-20 and in one of 
his last works, Uber den Begriff der Geschichte (1940),. their usage is 
almost always without explanatory context and thus their elliptical 
appearance serves to interrupt rather than clarify the argument at hand. 
These two aspects of Benjamin's work, the apparent lack of a linear 
development in the progression of his writings and the apparent lack of 
a developed philosophical terminology, need to be compared with 
Heidegger's work. Many of Heidegger's later essays were shown in 
Chapter 2 to move away from the systematicity of Being and Time into a 
form where a more fluid terminology appeared, developing out of the 
matter being treated, rather than being an interpretive terminology 
imposed upon it. The chapter also explored the way Heidegger emphasized 
that the earlier, critically questioning approach was not simply left 
behind in the 'development' of Heidegger I into Heidegger II, but rather 
was 'contained' (enthalten) in it. Since these two aspects of Heidegger's 
work are chronologically separated, giving the appearance of an earlier 
phase which stands apart from a later phase which in turn seems to have 
surpassed the former, it was necessary for an overview to run through 
the progression of Heidegger's work and thus bring them into a 
resonance with each other. In this manner, the complexity of Heidegger's 
Weg as the interaction of a critical temporal phenomenology and a poetic 
phenomenology could be made to appear in a way which did not prejudge 
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the temporality of their chronologically separate appearances, or indeed 
the temporality of the progression itself. In other words, the temporality 
of the 'whole' in relation to the parts of Heidegger's project, which was 
presented in Chapter 2, had to reflect the notion of the temporality of 
language developed within the project. In an identical fashion here, the 
temporality of the 'whole' of Benjamin's project in relation to the 
individual works, must be understood through the notion of the tempor- 
ality of language which he developed in his work. Since it is the 
purpose of this chapter to present Benjamin's thinking on time and 
language, a certain circularity is involved wherein the presentation 
presupposes the 'conclusion'. 
Such a circularity was also found in Chapter 1 in relation to Kant's 
thinking of a critical system: Kant understood his philosophical system as 
having the temporality of a organism; the possibility of perceiving an 
entity to be an organism was treated critically within the system and was 
shown to require an idea grounding its unity to be presupposed; in 
relation to the critical system itself the grounding idea was seen to be 
the transcendental unity of apperception. It was argued, however, that 
the temporality of the transcendental unity which grounded Kant's system 
was modelled uncritically on the temporality of the Newtonian object, and 
thus in opposition to the critical treatment of time within the system. In 
other words, Kant attempted to ground, thus break, the circularity of his 
project, and, as was shown in Chapter 2, Heidegger's 'starting point' was 
to argue that this circularity was not something to be avoided, but 
rather must be more thoroughly carried through. In relation to an 
approach to Benjamin's work, then, the circularity between the form of 
presentation and the idea of the temporality of language developed must 
be allowed to appear. The remainder of this introductory section will 
thus consider the form of Benjamin's work, in the light of 'Darstellung 
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als Umweg. The thinking of language and time which 'underlies' 
Benjamin's notion of presentation will then be explored in the remainder 
of the chapter. 
In the Prologue to Benjamin's Origin of German Tragic Drama, 
philosophy is characterized as being concerned with the presentation of a 
configuration of ideas. The ideas must divest the phenomena being 
treated of their 'false unity' in order that 'thus divided, they partake of 
the genuine unity of truth' (OGTD p33) Cum aufgeteilt an der echten 
(Einheit] der Wahrheit teilzuhaben' GS I. 1, p213). The ideas are not to be 
thought of as being abstracted from phenomena, rather, in a similar 
manner to Kantian pure concepts of the understanding, they determine the 
arrangement of the phenomena (OGTD p34; GS 1.1,214). However, unlike 
Kantian categories, they have an explicit temporal and linguistic existence. 
Benjamin writes for example in relation to the idea of tragedy or the 
idea of Trauerspiel, that 'idea of a form [... ] is nothing less living than 
any concrete literary work'4 ('Die Idee einer Form 1... ] ist nichts weniger 
Lebendiges als irgendeine konkrete Dichtung' GS 1.1, p230). These ideas 
which order the phenomena, must themselves be thought of an existing in 
discontinuous multiplicity: 
Das philosophische Gedandenreich entspinnt sich nicht in der 
ununterbrochenen Linienführung begrifflicher Deduktionen, 
sondern in einer Beschreibung der Ideenwelt. Ihre 
Durchführung setzt mit jeder Idee von neuem als einer 
ursprünglichen an. Denn die Ideen bilden eine unreduzierbare 
Vielheit. Als gezählte - eigentlich aber benannte - Vielheit 
sind die Ideen der Betrachtung gegeben. (GS 1.1, p223) 
The realm of philosophical thought does not develop in the 
unbroken lines of conceptual deductions, but in a description 
of the world of ideas. The implementation of such a 
description starts off with every idea anew as an original one. 
For the ideas form an irreducible multiplicty. As an 
enumerated - more properly though, named - multiplicty, the 
ideas are given to consideration. (p43) 
This quotation indicates the predominant way in which Benjamin 
understands the nature of an idea - as a name. Whilst they are also 
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described in relation to the Platonic theory of Ideas (GS 1.1,216; OGTD 
p36) and as Leibnizian monads (GS 1.1,228; OGTD p47-48), the major 
thrust of the Prologue is towards a linguistic understanding of ideas: 
Die Idee ist ein Sprachliches, und zwar im Wesen des Wortes 
jeweils dasjenige Moment, in welchem es Symbol ist. 1... 1 Wie 
die Ideen intentionslos im Benennen sich geben, so haben sie in 
philosophischer Kontemplation sich zu erneuern. In dieser 
Erneuerung stellt das ursprüngliche Vernehmen der Worte sich 
wieder her. Und so ist die Philosophie im Verlauf ihrer 
Geschichte, die so oft ein Gegenstand des Spottes gewesen ist, 
mit Grund ein Kampf um die Darstellung von einigen wenigen, 
immer wieder denselben Worten - von Ideen. (GS 1.1,216-7) 
The idea is something linguistic, indeed that moment in the 
essence of the word in which it is a symbol. [... ] Just as 
ideas give themselves intentionlessly in naming, so they have to 
be renewed in philosophical contemplation. In this renewal the 
original apprehension of the words produces itself again. And 
in this way, in the course of its history which has often been 
an object of derision, philosophy is rightly a struggle for the 
presentation of a limited number of words - of ideas - which 
always remain the same. (OGTD p36-7) 
Benjamin's understanding of ideas in relation to his thinking of symbols 
and the intentionlessness of truth will be explored below in this chapter. 
However, already it may seen that Benjamin's notion of the 'renewing' of 
the name will have certain affinities with a Heideggerian thinking of 
language and history. This becomes clearer when it is appreciated that 
immediately following the above quotation Benjamin goes on to mention the 
questionableness of inventing new philosophical terminologies, which thus 
lack historical 'objectivity' (Objektivität). The notion of a renewal of 
what Benjamin calls the Hauptprägungen of philosophy in order to 
produce an ursprünglich apprehensions of them, could equally be applied 
to Heidegger's attempts in his later work to rethink the Grundbegriffe 
of philosophy, such as Wesen ('essence') and &Xi Geu c (Wahrheit, 'truth'). 
His work in the period of Being and Time was, of course, marked by a 
proliferation of neologisms, though this was precisely before Heidegger's 
turning to focus upon language explicitly. However, to avoid the im- 
pression of a merely superficial similarity between their projects, it will 
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be necessary to explore in detail Benjamin's theory of names particularly 
in relation to his understanding of time. It will then be possible to 
allow the temporality of language which 'underlies' Heidegger's view of 
philosophy to be seen in its proximity to that which 'underlies' 
Benjamin's. 
It is Benjamin's understanding of ideas as having a linguistic 
existence as names which provides the immediate context in the Origin of 
German Tragic Drama for understanding his method as Umweg. The 
theory of names is not simply applied by Benjamin to proper names or 
philosophical terms, but also to quotations, the fragments of the early 
German Romantics and even philosophical systems themselves. In the 
context of a philosophical treatise the theory of names operates to 
interrupt and break up the appearance of a deductive flow of arguments. 
The same approach lies behind Benjamin's notion of montage, a form of 
presentation which he used in One Way Street (1926) and mentions 
specifically in convolute 'N' of the Passagenwerk. It also lies behind 
Benjamin's extensive use of quotation in the Origin of German Tragic 
Drama and the Passagenwerk, a work which was to be constituted almost 
exclusively by quotation. 5 Yet, further, the theory of names must also be 
seen to lie behind Benjamin's individual works. As was mentioned above, 
his corpus does not show a continuous progression of thinking nor a 
continuous development of a philosophical terminology, rather the 
individual works demonstrate the discontinuity of names. That is to say, 
his works show a particular independence of each other, they do not tend 
to show obvious developmental continuities with each other. This has 
lead to the individual works being treated in isolation in the critical 
literature on Benjamin, instead of being seen in relation to a 'whole'. 6 
The problematic relation of the individual works to the 'whole' of 
Benjamin's works raises precisely the 'questions of Umweg, of 
121 
philosophical presentation of a system, and of the temporality of language 
which determines his understanding of names. Yet if Benjamin's works 
are not considered with regard to their problematic relation to the 
'whole', their discontinuity is apt to be interpreted as a series of 
isolated and independent philosophical 'points', that is to say, they are 
interpreted according to a temporality of language modelled on a linear, 
homogenous series of now-points - the understanding of temporality 
which Benjamin precisely and explicitly wanted to attack. 
This misinterpretation of the temporality of Benjamin's writing leads 
to the idea that he was proposing a notion of quotation which simply 
licences the tearing of quotations from their context in a way which is 
purely destructive of their original meaning. This view neglects the way 
Benjamin's notion of quotation has its place within his understanding of 
the temporality of language, and in particular presupposes a transformed 
idea of reading, which will be explored below. If the tension between 
Benjamin's notions of presentation (Umweg, quotation, fragment), and his 
'systematic' rethinking of language and time - precisely in his rethinking 
of the temporality of the language of systematic philosophy - is lost, 
Benjamin's thinking is made to ultimately support the view of time he 
wished to attack. That is to say, Benjamin's work is made to support a 
view of language where the text has an unproblematic meaning existing 
'present' within it, and out of this meaningful context a quotation is 
torn, in order to simply make it mean something different in a different 
context. In this view of meaning, the unproblematic separation of the 
language of a text and the meaning it presents, is modelled on the same 
view of time as the Kantian a priori separation of understanding and 
intuition. Benjamin's understanding of the temporality of language 
applied particularly to the question of the meaning of a text is treated at 
greatest length in The Task of the Translator, which will be discussed in 
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Chapter 5. The misinterpretation of Benjamin's work in the use of 
Benjamin's textual practices in a way which ultimately supports a 
temporality of language at variance with his assertions about the nature 
of time, indicates that the circularity between the 'form' of Benjamin's 
work and its 'content' has been grounded. Only by providing a more 
systematic underpinning to Benjamin's view of philosophical presentation 
is it possible to maintain the tension between systematic thought and 
presentation, where this 'tension' is precisely his rethinking of the 
temporality of language. 
The misunderstanding of Benjamin's work in a way which holds it 
within a determination of time as a series of isolated now points may be 
briefly illustrated with respect to Rodolphe Gasch6's recent essay 
'Objective Diversions: On Some Kantian Themes in Benjamin's The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction:? On one level this essay 
misinterprets Benjamin by taking the Work of Art essay (1935) in 
isolation from his view of cinema developed in On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaires (1939). Gasche reads the Work of Art essay as a wholesale 
celebration of the power of cinema and the destruction of the aura of 
the traditional work of art, ignoring the way the Baudelaire essay views 
cinema as complicit with an experience of time as a linear, homogeneous 
series of now-points, and which views the aura of an object in a 
positive light. On another level, however, this oversight is illuminating 
for the misinterpretation of Benjamin's own textual practices. The 
revolutionary power of cinema proposed in the Work of Art essay can be 
understood in relation to the similarity between cinematic presentation 
and montage. The power of the camera to focus on previously hidden 
details of commonplace objects and milieus (Work of Art p236; GS 1.2,499) 
introduces discontinuities into familiar contexts, just as montage and 
quotation break up the meaningful appearance of philosophical argument. 
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To concentrate solely on this destructive, fragmenting, effect of cinema 
and montage leads ultimately only to a repetition of an understanding of 
time as a series of discontinuous, fragmented now-points. In the context 
of Gasche's essay, this leads him to remain close to Kant and to ascribe 
to Benjamin a theory of the cinema audience as an autonomous, self- 
regulating Kantian subject, distracted from the tyranny of any traditional 
form of thinking: 
Free from all domination, this collective subject, testing against 
one another the success of each individual in dealing with 
shock, reflects itself into a free, independent subject that 
gives itself the rule, as it were. (Gasche p197) 
Quite apart from the echos of la Terreur in the idea of a collective 
testing the individual for his 'success' in partaking of the revolution, 
Gasche's treatment of the essay has lead to what was shown in Chapter 1 
to be the Newtonian temporality of the transcendental ego. More import- 
antly, however, the similarity between cinema and Benjamin's textual 
practice of quotation and montage must lead to the conclusion, that to 
separate the question of presentation from Benjamin's systematic re- 
thinking of language and time, can only lead these practices to appear in 
support of a view of time as a linear, homogeneous series of now points 
- just as Benjamin suggests that cinema is complicit with this view of 
time in the Baudelaire essay. This is a determination of time which, for 
Benjamin, is peculiar to the mechanized rationality of modernity: 
Es kam der Tag, da einem neuen und dringlichen Reizbedürfnis 
der Film entsprach. Im Film kommt die chockförmige 
Wahrnehmung als formales Prinzip zur Geltung. Was am 
Fließband den Rhythmus der Produktion bestimmt, liegt beim 
Film dm der Rezeption zugrunde. (GS 1.1.630-1) 
There came a day when a new and ugent need for stimuli was 
met by the film. In a film, perception in the form of shocks 
was established as a formal principle. That which determines 
the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the basis of 
the rhythm of reception in the film. (Baudelaire p132) 
The confusion arises in the omission to differentiate between the 
temporality of language which underpins Benjamin's theory of montage as 
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constituted by discontinuous multiplicity, and the temporality which 
underpins the modern view of autonomous rationality. 9 It will be this 
difference which will allow Benjamin's rethinking of the temporality of 
language to 'blast open' the continuum of now-points which is already 
characterized by 'shock-experience', that is, by the isolation of now- 
points, and thus, it would seem, already characterized by a certain 
discontinuity. The question of the 'mediation' between that which 
'underpins' (i. e. Benjamin's temporality of language) and its presentation is 
precisely circumvented if Benjamin's rethinking of language and time is 
not treated systematically, leading to a view of Benjamin's works as 
standing in isolation as in the misinterpretation of the parts of montage. 
The purpose of the overview of Benjamin's work in this chapter must 
therefore be to provide a systematic account of his rethinking of 
language and time, in order that the question of the relation of system to 
presentation may be allowed to circle back on to Benjamin's work. lo To 
compare this situation briefly once again to that of Heidegger's work: it 
was shown in Chapter 2 how the separation between a systematic way of 
thinking and a more poetic way of thinking arising from a consideration 
of the temporality of language, took on the appearance of a chronological 
separation of the periods of his work; a separation which thus had to be 
traversed at speed in order that the temporality of this separation was 
not prejudged to be the temporality of linear, chronological time. The 
question of systematicity and presentation will be considered explicitly in 
Chapter 5, particularly in relation to the essays The Task of the 
Translator and The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism. The 
overview of the 'whole' of Benjamin's work in this chapter is a necessary 
prerequisite to an appreciation of the status of his individual works, 
such as these, in the discontinuity of their existence as names or 
fragments themselves. 
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Justification for this approach to Benjamin's work, that is, providing 
a systematic basis for a corpus which, in its 'form' and 'content' 
precisely attempts to make the notion of systematicity problematic, may 
also be found in his treatment of the work of the Frl he Romantik. The 
various forms of the works of the Athenaeum journals - consisting of 
fragments, fragmentary and elliptical pieces and critical essays - bear a 
great deal of similarity to those found in Benjamin's corpus. In the 
essay, The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism (Der Begriff 
der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik, GS 1.1,7-122), in which he 
focuses predominantly on Friedrich Schlegel's work, Benjamin poses two 
questions: 
Gegenüber dem Versuch, im Begriff des Reflexionsmediums dem 
Denken der Frühromantiker ein methodisches Gradnetz unter- 
zulegen, in das sich ihre Problemlösung wie ihre systematischen 
Positionen überhaupt einzeichnen ließen, werden sich zwei 
Fragen erheben. Die erste [... 1 lautet, ob denn die Romantiker 
überhaupt systematisch gedacht oder in ihrem Denken system- 
atische Interssen verfolgt hätten. Die zweite, warum diese 
systematischen Grundgedanken, ihr Dasein zugegeben, in so 
auffallend dunkler, ja mystifizierender Rede sich niedergelegt 
fänden. (GS 1.1,40) 
With respect to the attempt to underlay the thinking of the 
Early Romantics with a methodological grid, in the form of the 
concept of the Reflexionsmedium, in which their problem solving 
as well as their systematic positions may be marked out, two 
questions arise. The first [... 1 is whether the Romantics had 
actually thought systematically or had pursued systematic 
interests. The second, assuming they did, is why these 
systematic bases of thought were set down in such strikingly 
obscure, indeed mystifying language. 
Benjamin answers the first by citing places in Schlegel's work where he 
talks positively about the need for systematic thinking. The answer to 
the second takes up the majority of the thesis and concentrates on the 
Romantics' concern with the linguistic existence of the system (in op- 
position to Kant's unproblematic identification of a linguistic system of 
thought and the organic system of the organism). While the thesis will 
be discussed further in Chapters 5, the two questions provide a useful 
way of summarizing the issues which have been raised in this introduct- 
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ory section: was Benjamin actually interested in pursuing a systematic 
philosophy or in actually thinking systematically, and if so why was it 
presented in such a 'strikingly obscure' fashion? The first will be 
answered affirmatively in the next section by pointing to places where 
Benjamin asserts the need for the development of systematic thinking. 
The obscurity of presentation will be shown to arise from Benjamin's 
rethinking of language and time - in a similar way to Benjamin's own 
approach to the Early Romantics, the exploration of his rethinking of 
language and time will form a 'methodological grid'. ('Ein Gradnetz' is the 
German word for the geographical grid of the lines of longitude and 
latitude which map the earth). It will be a grid upon which a 
methodological Umweg can be understood as posing the question of the 
mediation of systematic 'content' and presentational 'form' in the 
difference between a linear, homogeneous temporality and messianic time. 
II: The Kantian Legacy 
By way of approaching Benjamin's thinking of the temporality of 
language, this section will deal with the general way he took up the 
legacy of Kant's work, particularly his response to its circularity. Up 
until December 1917, Benjamin had been planning to write his doctoral 
dissertation on Kant, before suddenly finding this project unsuitable and 
switching to a thesis on the Early German Romantics. In preparation for 
the Kantian thesis he wrote the essay On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy (Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie, 1917/18)11 and 
also a series of fragmentary notes. While these pieces will be used to 
understand Benjamin's rethinking of language and time, it must be 
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recognised that this taking up of the Kantian legacy by Benjamin is 
already complicated by the fact that Benjamin wrote on Kant conscious of 
the question of the nature of philosophical legacy itself. That is to say, 
that while this chapter, in its elucidation of a theoretical grid, will 
present Benjamin's reaction to the Kantian legacy in a 'standard' 
philosophical fashion (i. e. how Benjamin took up and developed questions 
and problems raised by Kant's work), for Benjamin himself this 'taking up' 
of philosophical questions could not be separated from a questioning of 
the temporal and linguistic connotations of the notion of legacy, which 
lay behind the idea of their being 'handed down'. That is, the question 
of the nature of philosophical tradition. 12 This question is intimately 
connected to Benjamin's views of language and time and for this reason a 
separation of a more 'standard' philosophical treatment of his 
understanding of language and time in response to Kant from the 
question of the nature of philosophical tradition, can only ever be 
artificially performed. While such a separation will, of course, aid 
clarity, it is necessary to bear in mind the broader question of Benjamin's 
view of tradition. To this end, the following quotation from a letter he 
wrote to Scholem in October 1917 gives an indication of Benjamin's 
concerns and also raises many aspects of his thinking, towards which this 
chapter will lead. 
In der Tat sehe ich nur die Aufgabe, wie ich sie eben 
umschrieben habe, klar vor mir, daß das Wesentliche des 
Kantischen Denkens zu erhalten sei. Worin dieses Wesentliche 
besteht und wie man sein System neugründen muß, um es 
hervortreten zu lassen, weiß ich bis heute nicht. Aber es ist 
meine Überzeugung: wer nicht in Kant das Denken der Lehre 
selbst ringen fühlt und wer daher nicht mit äußerster 
Ehrfurcht ihn mit seinem Buchstaben als ein tradendum, zu 
Überlieferndes erfaßt (wie weit man ihn auch später ' umbilden 
müsse) weiß von Philosophie garnichts. Deshalb ist auch jede 
Bemänglung seines philosophischen Stils pures Banausentum und 
profanes Geschwätz. Es ist durchaus wahr, daß in den großen 
wissenschaftlichen Schöpfungen die Kunst mitumfaßt sein muß 
(wie umgekehrt) und so ist es auch meine 
Überzeugung, daß 
Kants Prosa selbst einen Limes der hohen Kunstprosa dar- 
Stellt. 13 
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In fact I see only this task, as I have just outlined, clear 
before me - to preserve what is essential in Kantian thinking. 
What this essential element involves and how his system must be 
grounded anew in order to let it emerge, is beyond me at the 
moment. But I am convinced that whoever does not feel the 
struggle of the thinking of doctrine itself in Kant and who 
thus does not grasp his work, with the utmost respect for its 
letters, as a tradendum, as a handing on (and also later rebuilt) 
does not know anything of philosophy. For this reason, the 
faulting of his philosophical style is sheer philistinism and 
profane prattle. It is perfectly true that in great scientific 
creations, art has to be embraced with it (and vice versa) and 
thus I am also convinced that Kant's prose itself presents a 
mathematical limit of high artistic prose. 
The idea of Kant's work as 'doctrine' is initially explained in its 
reference to Benjamin's thinking of religion, which bears similarities to 
the idea of religion in the Early German Romantics; the use of the 
latinate word 'tradendum' would also seem to point in the direction of the 
Romantics' emphasis on Roman culture, in its position of taking Greek 
culture as a tradition. The reference to the 'letters' of Kantian 
philosophy indicates the interest Benjamin took in Kabbalah (a Hebrew 
word which itself means 'tradition'), and also to the distinction of 'spirit' 
and 'letter' in relation to Kant's philosophy -a distinction which, since 
Fichte's time, had been used in debates over who were the true 
successors to Kant. The idea of the need to embrace art along with 
science and vice versa is prominent in the work of the Early Romantics 
and also Goethe, and it concerns precisely the question of systematicity 
and 'artistic' presentation in relation to Kant's work. All these ideas are 
at play in Benjamin's relation to Kant, and they will be discussed 
individually at various points below 
The quotation also shows that Benjamin was thinking of the need to 
ground Kant's system anew and not simply break with any, idea of 
systematicity. While, when he wrote this letter, he did not yet know 
what form this would have to take, the fact that just two months later 
he decided against a dissertation on Kant in favour of the Early 
Romantics, indicates that it was precisely in the direction of thinking 
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through the unification of the Wissenschaftliche and art that this 
'neugrunden' lay. Further evidence that Benjamin never envisaged a break 
with systematic thinking is found in the same letter to Scholem: 
... bin ich des festen Glaubens, daß es sich im Sinne 
der 
Philosophie und damit der Lehre, zu der diese gehört, wenn sie 
sie nicht etwa sogar ausmacht, nie und nimmer um eine 
Erschütterung, einen Sturz des Kantischen Systems handeln 
kann sondern vielmehre um seine granitne Festlegung und 
universale Ausbildung. (Breife 1, p150) 
I am of the certain belief that in the field of philosophy and 
hence of the doctrine to which philosophy belongs, indeed 
which it perhaps constitutes, there can never be a shattering, 
a collapse of the Kantian system, but only its ever more firm 
establishment and universal development. 
It is the idea of an 'ever more firm establishment and universal 
development' of the Kantian system which constitutes the 'coming 
philosophy' of his Kant essay begun in November 1917. It is here that 
Benjamin links the idea of system to 'truth' (Wahrheit) -a notion with 
which he wrestled for many years at this period, and which was to be 
explored in depth in his essay on Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften and The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama. To this end he writes in the Kant 
essay: 
Je unabsehbar und kühner die Entfaltung der kommenden 
Philosophie sich ankündigt, desto tiefer muß nach Gewißheit 
ringen deren Kriterium die systematische Einheit oder die 
Wahrheit ist. (Programm GS II. 1, p158) 
The more vastly and boldly the unfolding of the coming 
philosophy announces itself, the more deeply it must struggle 
for certainty, the criterion of which is systematic unity or 
truth. (Program pl) 
The identity expressed in the phrase 'systematic unity or truth' is a key 
point in understanding the direction of Benjamin's work because his 
notion of truth will be shown to arise from a rethinking of language and 
time in relation to systematicity, in particular 
Kant's system. 
The word Entfaltung ('unfolding') was used by the Early Romantics in 
their theories of criticism (Kritik, also translated as 'critique'), a usage 
Benjamin would have been familiar with, and while he never gave any 
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clear explanation for his change in thesis topic, the use of this word is 
illuminating. The philosophy departments in which both Benjamin and 
Heidegger were educated were still very much under the influence of 
Neo-Kantianism, a diverse school of thought which had decisive influence 
on both of them. 14 For around fifty years, dispute had been rife 
amongst the various factions over which was more true to the spirit of 
Kant's work. The groups centred predominantly around various 
voluminous commentaries on Kant's First Critique, commentaries which 
painstakingly examined Kant's work almost word by word. If Benjamin had 
merely produced another Ausbildung ('development') of the Kantian system, 
even though perhaps in a kabbalistic style, it would have been simply 
assimilated to Neo-Kantianism. Yet while Neo-Kantianism embroiled itself 
in disputes over 'spirit' and 'letter', the question of how the nature of 
tradition or legacy was understood, was never raised. By turning to the 
development of Kant's work in Early German Romanticism, where the 
questions of tradition and the authority of tradition became central, 
Benjamin was precisely able to engage with and put into question the 
prevailing and unthinking way Kant was received. 
Benjamin, like Heidegger, was, however, also very much influenced by 
Neo-Kantianism. Klaus Christian Köhnke's recent book, The Rise of Neo- 
Kantianism1 s, written from the perspective of the modern analytical 
reception of Kant's work as epistemology, thus taking a resolutely 
negative stance towards all the various schools of Neo-Kantianism, makes 
clear that they were not interested in interpreting Kant's work as a 
theory of how one knows that ideas conform to an external reality. 
Rather the major thrust common to all the various coteries was to 
interpret Kant as proposing what may be called an ontology, that is, as 
exploring the nature of existence or being as such. It was this approach 
which fundamentally provided the impetus to the work of both Heidegger 
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and Benjamin in their radicalizing of Husserlian phenomenology. 16 While 
an explicit questioning of being obviously does not play the central role 
in Benjamin's work, which it does in Heidegger's, the depth of his 
questioning of language and time coming out of Neo-Kantianism means that 
their projects will be exploring essentially the same ground. In a lengthy 
fragment entitled On Perception (Über die Wahrnehmung <frl9>, GS VI, 
p33-38) Benjamin treats the opposition Kant saw between his work and 
'metaphysics', and argues instead that Kant's work is still very much a 
metaphysics. 
Kant hat eine Metaphysik der Natur geschreiben (... l; sie 
untersucht dann was zum Begriff des Daseins eines Dinges 
überhaupt oder eines besonderen gehört. (<frl9>, GS VI, 34) 
Kant wrote a metaphysics of nature i... ]; it sought then what 
belongs to the concept of the existence of a thing as such or a 
particular thing. 
For Benjamin, as for Heidegger in his early treatment of Kant, what will 
be of concern is the way Kant's investigation of the 'concept of the 
existence of a thing as such' took Newtonian science as its starting 
point. For both Benjamin and Heidegger, this led to an understanding of 
existence or being which was 'uniquely temporally limited' (Program p2; 
GS Il. 1,158). The thrust of Benjamin's response is summarized in The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama, where he writes: 
Der Seinsbegriff der philosophischen Wissenschaft ersättigt 
sich nicht am Phänomen, sondern erst an der Aufzehrung seiner 
Geschichte. (GS 1.1,228) 
The concept of being in philosophy is not satisfied with the 
phenomenon, but first by the absorbing of its history. 
(OGTD p47) 
Benjamin wishes here to reject a concept of being which is characterized 
as the idea of simple unchanging existence through time, oblivious to 
history, and rather wants a concept of being which encapsulates the 
'fore- and after-history' (OGTD p47; 'Vor- and Nachgeschichte' GS I. I. 
228) of a thing. This idea of 'fore- and after-history' will be discussed 
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in detail in Chapter S. It is clear, however, that Benjamin wants to 
inject history and time back in a concept of being. And this is precisely 
the intention outlined in The Program of the Coming Philosophy. The 
essay starts by implicitly announcing the question of linking a 'truly 
time- and eternity-conscious philosophy' C'einCel wahrhaft zeit- and 
ewigkeitsbewuBten Philosophie' GS 11.1,158) to Kant, that is, of counter- 
ing Kant's justification of a transcendental version of the limited 
Newtonian conception of time. 
In the 'Addendum' to the essay, Benjamin makes clear that there can 
be no simple appeal to the nature of existence (Dasein), but rather that 
the question of existence always has its place within the question of 
knowledge. 'Knowledge' must not be understood, however, as simply 
something existing in the knowing subject, such that the question of 
existence becomes the epistemological conundrum of scepticism or idealism. 
As will be shown, the subjection of the question of being to the question 
of knowledge has much more in common with Heidegger's idea of the her- 
meneutic circle of every questioning, which thus includes the questioning 
of being. Towards the end of the 'Addendum' Benjamin writes: 
Die Quelle des Daseins liegt nun aber in der Totalität der 
Erfahrung und erst in der Lehre stößt die Philosophie auf ein 
Absolutes, als Dasein, und damit auf jene Kontinuität im Wesen 
der Erfahrung in deren Vernachlässigung der Mangel des 
Neukantianismue zu vermuten ist. (Programm GS 11.1.170) 
The source of existence lies, however, in the totality of 
experience, and only in doctrine does philosophy encounter 
something absolute, as existence, and in so doing encounter that 
continuity in the essence of experience, in the neglect of 
which, the failing of Neo-Kantianism is to be suspected. 
(Program pll) 
It is thus in his idea of a 'concrete totality of experience, that is, [... ] 
existence' (Program p11; 'Leine] konkrete Totalität der Erfahrung, d. h. 
[... ] Dasein', GS 11.1,171; Benjamin's emphasis), that Benjamin wishes to 
differentiate his work from the Neo-Kantians'. The characterization of 
this totality of experience as a 'continuity' relates back precisely to the 
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question of the nature of Newtonian time consisting of discreet now- 
points, and to the question of the nature of the continuity of tradition. 
The Neo-Kantian schools had all taken over the Kantian emphasis upon a 
transcendental justification of science, and, in attempting to show the 
continued relevence of Kant's work in a changing scientific world-view, 
they persisted with a temporally limited concept of experience. Further, 
in their very relation to Kant's work - trying to attain to its true 
'spirit' while meticulously investigating its 'letter' - they perpetuated a 
view of philosophical legacy as consisting of an unchanging meaningful 
'content' underlying its presentational 'form' which was merely a means of 
communication. It is in opposition to this twin 'failing' of Neo- 
Kantianism, that Benjamin develops his idea of existence, the continuity of 
a totality of experience. 
The use of the term 'experience' (Erfahrung) would seem problematic 
here, suggesting as it does an experience in the mind of a conscious 
knowing subject. It is clear from the Program essay, however, that 
Benjamin wishes the term to be 'stripped of everything subjective' (p5) 
('alles Subjekthaften entkleidet' GS 11.1, p163). The concept of experience 
seems rather to indicate a fundamental medium in which different epist- 
emological 'mythologies' may be constructed. Benjamin writes in this 
respect: 
Es ist die Aufgabe der kommenden Erkenntnistheorie für die 
Erkenntnis die Sphäre totaler Neutralität in Bezug auf die 
Begriffe Objekt und Subjekt zu finden; mit andern Worten die 
autonome ureigne Sphäre der Erkenntnis auszumitteln in der 
dieser Begriff auf keine Weise mehr die Beziehung zwischen 
zwei metaphysischen Entitäten bezeichnet. (Program GS 11.1, 
163) 
It is the task of future epistemology to find for knowledge the 
sphere of total neutrality in regard to the concepts of both 
subject and object, in other words, it is to determine the 
autonomous, originally proper sphere of knowledge in which 
this concept in no way continues to designate the relation 
between two metaphysical entities. (Program p5) 
Benjamin's concept of the totality of experience is precisely this 'sphere 
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of total neutrality' in regard to subject and object. In the coming 
philosophy this new concept of experience is linked to a new concept of 
knowledge, such that any epistemology, for example the notion of 
knowledge as existing in the true relation of the ideas of a knowing 
subject to an external object, can only ever be seen as a particular 
'mythology'. It is this epistemological mythology which ultimately plays a 
central role in Kant's work: 
Es ist nämlich gar nicht zu bezweifeln daß in dem Kantischen 
Erkenntnisbegriff die wenn auch sublimierte Vorstellung eines 
individuellen leibgeistigen Ich welches mittelst der Sinne die 
Empfindungen empfangt und auf deren Grundlage sich seine 
Vorstellungen bildet die größe Rolle spielt. Diese Vorstellung 
ist jedoch Mythologie. (Programm GS 11.1,161) 
It simply cannot be doubted that the notion, sublimated though 
it may be, of an individual, living ego which receives 
sensations by means of its senses and forms its representations 
on the basis of them, plays a role of great importance in the 
Kantian concept of knowledge. This notion is, however, a 
mythology. (Program p4) 
Benjamin states that Kant's Newtonian view of experience can ultimately 
be traced back to his view of knowledge (Program p3; GS II. 1,160). It 
was shown in Chapter 1 how the unquestioned existence through time of 
the transcendental ego (the transcendental unity of apperception) as a 
Newtonian object served to circularly justify the transcendental deduction 
of Newtonian experience. Benjamin's linking of the new concept of ex- 
perience with that of knowledge will be shown to embrace this circul- 
arity, but precisely a proper circularity which avoids being grounded in 
a particular mythology (for example, an epistemology of the 'individual, 
living ego' and its correlative Newtonian conception of time). 
Benjamin goes on to give examples of other possible epistemological 
mythologies: that of animism, of insane people who identify themselves in 
part with objects of their perception, or who project their own 
sensations on to other entities, of clairvoyants, etc. It is in this regard 
that the following comment reported by Scholem, made during discussions 
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of the Program essay, should be taken entirely seriously: 
Eine Philosophie, die nicht die Möglichkeit der Weissagung aus 
dem Kaffeesatz einbezieht und explizieren kann, kann keine 
wahre sein. 
A philosophy that does not include the possibility of sooth- 
saying from coffee grounds and cannot explicate it, cannot be a 
true philosophy. ' 7 
The new concept of experience and the new concept of knowledge 
connected with it, together form a philosophy which is able to include 
more 'magical' epistemologies; that is, a philosophy which concerns a 
continuum within which any epistemological mythology is constructed. 
A knowing subjectivity such as Kant's transcendental ego is thus a 
mythology constituted within the continuum of experience. In fragment 
19 of his Kant notes, at the bottom of the page, Benjamin writes: 'Im Sein 
der Erkenntnis sein heißt Erkennen' (GS VI, 38), an elliptical formulation 
which may be translated, 'To be in the being of knowledge means to 
know'. The phrase 'the being of knowledge', when taken in conjunction 
with his discussion of existence examined above, may be seen to be a 
reference to the continuum of experience. Thus the whole phrase would 
seem to suggest that there is no prior knowing subject who, only 
subsequently, knows in one epistemological way or another, but rather 
that to be as such, as knowing in one epistemological way or another, 
means to exist in an epistemological mythology. In other words, an 
epistemological mythology does not simply befall a knowing subject, but 
rather to be as knowing means to have always already 'fallen' into an 
epistemological mythology. While the use of the word 'fallen' is rather 
question begging with respect to the similarity of Benjamin's project to 
Heidegger's work in the period of Being and Time, the similarity in 
regard to the idea of a sphere of neutrality in relation to subject and 
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object, and to other more magical epistemological mythologies is striking. 
As was shown in Chapter 2, Heidegger constructed his conception of 
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Dasein primarily in opposition to an idea of a 'worldless "I"', or 
'theoretical subject' (Being and Time H316) who 'experiences' and 'knows' a 
world which is essentially outside of it; rather Dasein exists as always 
already being-in-the-world. Heidegger goes on, however, to talk about 
'magical' ways in which Dasein may exist: 
Das Dasein versteht sich, obgleich ohne zureichende onto- 
logische Bestimmtheit, als In-der-Welt-Sein. [... 1 [Els ist nicht 
nur vorhanden, sondern hat sich, in welcher mythischen und 
magischen Auslegung auch immer, je schon verstanden. Denn 
sonst "lebt" es nicht in einem Mythos und besorgte nicht in 
Ritus und Kultus seine Magie. (Sein und Zeit H313) 
Dasein understands itself as being-in-the-world, even if it does 
so without adequate ontological definiteness. [... ] Dasein is not 
just present-at-hand but has always, indeed already, understood 
itself, however mythical or magical the interpretation which it 
gives may be. For otherwise, Dasein would never 'live' in a 
myth and would not be concerned with magic in ritual and cult. 
(Being and Time H313) 
For Heidegger, Dasein is always already thrown into a world of 
understanding. In Being and Time, the question of being, towards which, 
Dasein in its circular existence is the 'starting point', is characterized as 
the ascertaining of the a priori conditions of any ontology whatsoever 
(HID through the determination of the proper temporality of the 
hermeneutic circle beyond its restriction to a linear, homogeneous, 
Newtonian conception of time. Similarly for Benjamin, the development of 
the Kantian system consists in determining the proper a priori basis for 
any epistemological mythology precisely beyond the temporality of the 
Newtonian subjectivity, through the connection of a concrete totality of 
experience and a new concept of knowledge. 
The circularity of Kant's approach, which was discussed in Chapterl, 
was shown to be repeated by Heidegger in Chapter 2 in the idea of 
Dasein's 'circular existence', but in a way which avoided its grounding in 
Newtonian temporality. Benjamin takes up the circularity of Kant's 
project in terms of the concepts 'experience' and 'knowledge of 
experience', and their relatedness, with respect to the Kant's work. In 
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relation to Kant, 'experience' refers to the Newtonian science which Kant 
sought to provide with transcendental justification, 'knowledge' refers to 
the system of the transcendental categories and transcendental ego. It 
will be precisely in the nature of the mutually determining a priori link 
between them that the future philosophy will take root: 
Es besteht, und hier ruht der historische Keim der kommenden 
Philosophie, die tiefste Beziehung zwischen jener Erfahrung 
deren tiefere Erforschung nie und nimmer auf die 
metaphysischen Wahrheiten führen konnte und jener Theorie der 
Erkenntnis welche den logischen Ort der metaphysischen 
Forschung noch nicht ausreichend zu bestimmen vermochte. 
(Programm GS 11.1.161) 
There is - and here lies the historical seed of the coming 
philosophy -a most intimate connection between that 
experience, the deeper exploration of which could never lead to 
metaphysical truths, and that theory of knowledge, which was 
not yet able to determine sufficiently the logical place of 
metaphysical research. (Program p4) 
The term 'metaphysics' by no means has the negative connotations for 
Benjamin as it does for Heidegger. As was indicated above, fragment 19 
of his notes contains a discussion of how Kant viewed the idea of 
metaphysics, such that he constructed his project in opposition to it. 
For Benjamin, the coming philosophy was to be reached precisely in the 
envisioning of a 'future metaphysics' (Program p3; 'künftige Metaphysik' 
GS 11.1,160) through a criticism of Kant: 
Es Ist als Programmsatz der künftigen Philosophie aufzustellen 
daß [... ] nicht nur ein neuer Begriff der Erkenntnis sondern 
zugleich auch der Erfahrung aufgestellt wäre, gemäß der 
Bezeihung die Kant zwischen beiden gefunden hat. (Programm 
GS 11.1, p163) 
It is to be made a tenet of the program of the future 
philosophy that [... ] not only a new concept of knowledge 
should be established but also a new concept of experience, in 
accordance with the relationship Kant found between the two. 
(Program p6) 
This affirmation of the need for the coming philosophy to take root in 
Kant's metaphysics 'in accordance with the relationship' between a concept 
of experience and the concept of the knowledge of experience, must not 
be misunderstood. It is not an affirmation of the metaphysical view of 
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knowledge as something existing in the mind of a subject which exper- 
iences, and formed on the basis of that experience, since Benjamin spends 
a great deal of time in the Program essay attacking this view, as was 
shown above. Rather, the idea of the 'relationship' or 'most intimate 
connection' ('tiefste Beziehung') between experience and knowledge of 
experience must be seen as a reference to the circularity Kant acknow- 
ledged in his project -a relationship which may be made productive when 
freed from the 'unproductive metaphysics' (p3) ('unfruchtbar[el Meta- 
physik', GS 11.1,160) of subject and object. 
Benjamin does not further discuss the circular nature of this 
relationship between experience and knowledge of experience in the 
Program essay, except for a passing comment in a section where he is 
talking about the way a future philosophy will be concerned with a 
taxonomy of different epistemological mythologies. 
Erfahrung, so wie sie mit Bezug auf den individuellen 
leibgeistigen Menschen und dessen Bewußtsein und vielmehr als 
systematische Spezifikation der Erkenntnis gefaßt wird ist 
wiederum in allen ihren Arten bloßer Gegenstand dieser 
wirklichen Erkenntnis. (Programm GS 11.1,162) 
Experience, as it is conceived in reference to the individual, 
living human and its consciousness, instead of [my emphasis] as 
a systematic specification of knowledge, is again, in all its 
types, a mere object of this real knowledge. (Program p5) 
The idea of experience being a 'systematic specification of knowledge', 
thus reversing the unproductive metaphysical view of knowledge as 
formed on the basis of experience, points to the idea of 'circular 
existence' which Benjamin found in Kant's project. This idea is not 
explicitly developed in the Program essay, but rather is treated at length 
in fragment 19, On Perception, written in October 1917, the month in 
which he also started the Program essay. 
In the fragment. Benjamin argues that Kant's attempt to treat nature 
as determined in its existence a priori from reason, not in terms of an 
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idea of knowledge arising from experience of nature, constituted a 
metaphysics which carried a danger with it: 
In diesem Sinne wäre die Metaphysik der Natur etwa als 
apriorische Konstitution der Naturdinge auf Grund der 
Bestimmungen der Naturerkenntis überhaupt zu bezeichnen. 
Diese Bedeutung der Metaphsik könnte nun leicht zu ihrem 
gänzlichen Zusammenfallen mit dem Begriff der Erfahrung 
führen und nichts fürchtete Kant so sehr wie diesen Abgrund. 
(<fr19>, GS VI, 34) 
In this sense, the metaphysics of nature was to indicate 
something like the a priori constitution of the thing in nature, 
from a ground of the determinations of the knowledge of 
nature. This meaning of metaphysics could now easily lead to 
this ground collapsing into the concept of experience and Kant 
feared nothing so much as this abyss. 
Kant was afraid that the circularity of his method would turn his a 
priori 'Grund' for Newtonian science into an 'Abgrund, an abyss open to 
the speculative metaphysics of all comers. In order to avoid this abyss, 
(in the interests of the certainty of science and ethics, Benjamin argues), 
Kant had to keep apart experience and knowledge of experience. This is 
the separation of object and subject which the Program essay discusses, 
and in fragment 19 Benjamin explores it in terms of the separation of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic from the Transcendental Logic, that is, the 
separation of the pure forms of intuition from the Categories: 
So war von vornherein ein einheitliches erkentnistheoretisches 
Zentrum vermieden dessen allzu mächtige Gravitationskraft alle 
Erfahrung in sich hätte hineinreißen können; und anderseits 
war nun selbstverstand(lich] das Bedürfnis nach irgend einem 
Fundus apbsteriorischer Erfahrungsmöglichkeit geschaffen, d. h. 
wenn auch nicht der Zusammenhang, so doch die Kontinuität 
von Erkenntnis und Erfahrung zer[r3issen. Es ergab sich als 
Ausdruck der Trennung der Anschauungsformen von den Kate- 
gorien die sogenannte 'Materie der Emfindung' die sozusagen 
künstlich von dem belebenden Zentrum des kategorialen 
Zusammenhangs durch die Anschauungsformen in denen sie un- 
vollständig absorbiert wurde, ferngehalten wurde. So war die 
Trennung von Metaphysik und Erfahrung, das heißt nach Kants 
eigenem Sprachgebrauch von reiner Erkenntnis und Erfahrung 
durchgeführt. (<fr19>, GS VI, 34) 
In this way, a singular epistemological centre had been avoided 
from the beginning, a centre whose gravitational pull would 
have been able to suck all experience into itself; and on the 
other hand the need had now obviously been created for some 
sort of reservoir of an a posteriori possibility of experience. 
That is, the continuity of knowledge and experience, if not the 
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contexture as well, was sundered. The separation of the forms 
of intuition from the categories, is expressed in the so-called 
'material of sensation' which, so to speak, was artificially held 
at a distance from the living centre of the categorial context- 
ure by the forms of intuition (in which it was incompletely 
absorbed). In this way, the separation of metaphysics and ex- 
perience, or in Kant's words, of pure knowledge and experience 
was implemented. 
The 'reservoir of an a posteriori possibility of experience' expressed in 
the idea of 'material of sensation', constitutes the residue of the un- 
productive metaphysics Kant required to secure Newtonian science. In 
opposition to this, it is the continuity of the categorial contexture which 
unites experience and knowledge of experience, which Benjamin wishes to 
explore. He does so by first of all maintaining a difference between 
experience and knowledge of experience (they do not collapse together in 
an abyss), and secondly maintaining the hermeneutic circularity of a 
primacy of knowledge of experience to experience, but then re-figuring 
their relationship in the idea of the 'symbol': 
Für den Begriff der Erkenntnis ist nämlich die Erfahrung 
nichts außer ihr liegendes Neues, sondern nur sie selbst in 
einer andern Form, Erfahrung als Gegenstand der Erkenntnis 
ist die Eingeitliche und Kontinuierliche Mannichfaltigkeit der 
Erkenntnis. Die Erfahrung selbst kommt, so paradox dies 
klingt, in der Erkenntnis der Erfahrung garnicht vor, eben 
weil diese Erkenntnis der Erfahrung, mithin ein Erkenntnis- 
zusammenhang ist. Die Erfahrung aber ist das Symbol dieses 
Erkenntniszusammenhanges und steht mithin In einer völlig 
andern Ordnung als dieser selbst. (<fr 19>, GS VI, 36) 
For the concept of knowledge, experience is namely not 
something new lying outside of it, but only knowledge itself in 
another form. Experience as an object of knowledge is the 
unity and continuity of the manifold diversity of knowledge. 
Experience itself, however paradoxical this sounds, does not 
simply turn up in the knowledge of experience, because this 
knowledge of experience is consequently a knowledge- 
contexture. Experience is, however, the symbol of this 
knowledge-contexture and consequently stands in a completely 
different ordering to that contexture. 18 
Knowledge does not supervene experience, nor does experience simply come 
to light in the form of knowledge, rather knowledge of experience is the 
continuum or contexture of which experience is the 'symbol'. 
The concept of a symbol is, of course, capable of many different 
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meanings and interpretations, and even in Benjamin's work it is by no 
means always obvious how he wishes to understand it. In The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, the place where he discusses the 'symbol' at length 
in its traditional opposition to allegory, he is predominantly concerned to 
show how the modern (Seventeenth Century) concept of the symbol ('which 
has nothing in common with the genuine notion except the name', OGTD 
p159; 'der mit dem echten außer der Bezeichnung nichts gemein hat', GS 
1.1,336) has been understood in contradictory ways. The work does, 
however, contain clues about how Benjamin's understanding of the symbol 
is to be approached. He argues that the genuine concept is one 'which 
refers, in a so to speak imperative manner, to the unrent solidarity of 
form and content' (OGTD p160; 'der in gleichsam imperativischer Haltung 
auf eine unzertrennliche Verbundenheit von Form and Inhalt sich bezeiht', 
p336). The genuine notion is thus in opposition to the 'vulgar' ('vulg'ar) 
understanding of the concept of the symbol, in which 
die Einheit von sinnlichem und übersinnlichem Gegenstand, die 
Paradox des theologischen Symbols, wird zu einer Bezeihung von 
Erscheinung und Wesen verzerrt. (GS 1.1,336) 
the unity of the sensible and supersensible object, the paradox 
of the theological symbol, is distorted into a relationship 
between appearance and essence. (OGTD p160) 
It is clear from this quotation that Benjamin, in using the term 'symbol' 
to describe the relationship between knowledge of experience and 
experience, does not wish to thereby introduce any straightforward 
separation, as Kant had done. Further insight into the nature of 
Benjamin's understanding of the symbol must be looked for in the 
direction of the temporality which determines the nature of its unity and 
solidarity. Benjamin writes, conerning the descriptions of symbol and 
allegory given by Görres and Creuzer: 
Unter der entscheidenden Kategorie der Zeit, welche in dieses 
Gebiet der Semiotik getragen zu haben die große romantische 
Einsicht dieser Denker war, läßt das Verhältnis von Symbol und 
Allegorie eindringlich und formalhaft sich festlegen. (GS 1.1, 
342-3) 
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Within the decisive category of time, the introduction of which 
into this field of semiotics was the great romantic achievement 
of these thinkers, the relationship of symbol and allegory may 
be incisively and formally established. (p166) 
The concept of the symbol must be understood from within an under- 
standing of time. Yet it must also be remembered that in the Program 
essay, Benjamin characterized the relationship between experience and 
knowledge of experience in the idea of experience as a 'systematic 
specification' of knowledge. The idea of experience as a symbol thus 
encapsulates precisely the questions of time and language in relation to 
philosophical systematicity. A complete understanding of the notion of 
unity which constitutes Benjamin's concept of the symbol will consequently 
only be attained in the light of a fuller understanding of Benjamin's 
temporality of language. What this means, however, is that the 
hermeneutic circularity between experience and the knowledge of 
experience in the metaphysics of the coming philosophy is determined in 
its temporality of language, precisely by the investigation of language 
and time undertaken within the coming philosophy. It is this circularity 
which will ultimately account for the manner of presentation, the Umweg, 
of Benjamin's philosophy. This situation must be contrasted to Kant's 
project, where the understanding of time as generated by the three-fold 
synthesis was not reflected in the temporality of the a priori which 
linked experience and the categories, and where the understanding of 
language in the 'synthesis of recognition in a concept', in relation to the 
concept of the organism was not related with thoroughness to the 
concept of the critical system itself. The thorough circularity of 
Benjamin's project may, however, be compared to that of Heidegger's 
project, where the hermeneutic circularity of his later poetic temporal 
phenomenology, is 'sayingly' ('sagend'), in the 'proper' ('eigentlich') 
temporality of Ereignis. 
The remainder of this chapter will look at how Benjamin explicitly 
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rethought the questions of time and language. Since in Benjamin's work 
they are inextricably linked from the beginning, in contrast to the 
apparent progression in Heidegger's work, the following two sections will 
consist of only an emphasis on temporality and an emphasis on language, 
respectively. This is done for the sake of clarity in discussing his 
thinking of the temporality of language. These emphases will then be 
brought together in an initial way, in the final section. 
III: Temporality and Its Symbols 
The question of time in relation to Kant's project is broached on the 
first page of Benjamin's Program essay: 
Das Problem der Kantischen wie jeder großen Erkenntnistheorie 
hat zwei Seiten und nur der einen Seite hat er eine gültige 
Erklärung zu geben vermocht. Es war erstens die Frage nach 
der Gewißheit der Erkenntnis die bleibend ist; und es war 
zweitens die Frage nach der Dignität einer Erfahrung die 
vergänglich war. Denn das universale philosophische Interesse 
ist stets zugleich auf die zeitlose Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis 
und auf die Gewißheit einer zeitlichen Erfahrung, die als deren 
nächster wenn nicht einziger Gegenstand betrachtet wird 
gerichtet. Nur ist den Philosophen diese Erfahrung in ihrer 
gesamten Struktur nicht als eine singulär zeitliche bewußt 
gewesen und sie war es auch Kant nicht. (Programm GS 11.1, 
158) 
The problem faced by Kantian epistemology, as by every great 
epistemology, has two sides, and Kant only managed to give a 
valid explanation for one of them. First of all, there was the 
question of the certainty of knowledge that is lasting, and 
secondly, there was the question of the dignity of an 
experience that was ephemeral. For the universal philosophical 
interest is continually after both the timeless validity of 
knowledge and the certainty of a transitory experience which 
is regarded as the immediate, if not the only, object of that 
knowledge. Philosophers were simply not aware of this 
experience, in its whole structure, as singularly temporal, and 
that holds true for Kant, as well. 19 (Program p l) 
What Benjamin is proposing here is a temporal analysis of the whole 
structure of knowledge which has been commonly polarized into timeless 
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truths and the certainty of experiences happening in time. Kant, in his 
concern to provide a transcendental justification of Newtonian science, 
geared his critique to demonstrate how the pure concepts of the under- 
standing generated - via the schematism -a time series within which 
Newtonian objects could be conceptualized, and their involvement in causal 
events determined. He was thus concerned to present a transcendental 
determination of the manifold of intuition in the form suitable for the 
certainty of Newtonian science. As was shown in Chapter 1, the 'time- 
less' temporality of the a priori Categories themselves, which Kant claimed 
to have inherited directly from Aristotle, and in general the temporality 
of reason, were by no means given the same thorough treatment. Thus 
Benjamin states that Kant only treated one side of the problem. 
Yet, for Benjamin, Kant's project of showing how the most general 
laws of nature could be given a priori justification was itself only 
possible because the experience of nature, in the Enlightenment, was 
being robbed of 'dignity', that is, moving towards 'an experience or view 
of the world of the lowest order' (Program p2; 'eine der niedrigst 
stehenen Erfahrungen oder Anschauungen von der Welt', GS 11.1,159). 
Benjamin writes that only an experience 'uniquely temporally limited' (p2; 
'singulär zeitlich beschränkte', p158), and whose quintessence was the 
certainty of Newtonian science, could take such rough and tyrannical 
treatment by Kant 'without suffering' (p 2; 'ohne zu leiden', p159). 
Benjamin writes further in fragment 19: 
War nämlich früher das Symbol der Erkenntniseinheit das wir 
Erfahrung nennen ein hohes gewesen, war die frühere 
Erfahrung wenn auch in wechselnder Fülle Gott nahe und 
göttlich gewesen so ward die Erfahrung der Aufklärung in 
steigendem Maße dieser Fülle beraubt. (<frl9> GS VI, 37) 
If namely earlier, the symbol of the unity of knowledge, that we 
call experience, had been a higher one, if the earlier experience 
- though also with varying fullness - had been near God and 
divine, then in the Enlightenment, experience was robbed to an 
increasing degree of this fullness. 
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It is in the idea of the 'fullness' (die Fülle) that Benjamin wishes to 
explore the nature of experience which had become so 'uniquely temporally 
limited' in Newtonian science. In order to understand this idea it is 
necessary to look again at how Kant linked the existence of nature to his 
analysis of time. In Chapter 1 it was shown how the Schematism 
essentially operated to determine experience into a series of isolated, 
object-like, now-points, which then served to justify the conceptualization 
of experience into objects and events. To quote again from the Second 
Analogy: 
Zu aller Erfahrung und deren Möglichkeit gehört Verstand, und 
das erste, was er dazu tut, ist nicht: daß er die Vorstellung 
der Gegenstände deutlich macht, sondern daß er die Vorstellung 
eines Gegenstandes überhaupt möglich macht. Dieses geschiehet 
nun dadurch, daß er die Zeitordnung auf die Erscheinungen and 
deren Dasein überträgt. (CPR A199/B245-6) 
Understanding is required for all experience and for its 
possibility. Its primary contribution does not consist in 
making the representation of objects distinct, but in making 
the representation of an object possible at all. This it does by 
carrying the time-order over into the appearances and their 
existence. 
As this quotation makes clear, the possiblity of experience depends on the 
manifold of intuition being constructed into a determinate time-order. 
This entailed 'carrying the time-order over into the appearances and 
their existence', that is, as was explored in Chapter 1, objects are 
experienced in their existence as standing within a point of time and 
only having significance in relation to other objects through the deter- 
mination of one point of time necessarily following another. In this way 
experience is reduced to a 'Nullpunkt' (Program p2/p159) of significance, 
in that it is understood merely as the contents of the otherwise empty 
now-point which carries it, having no significance beyond that now- 
point, except insofar as that now-point itself is in a determinate time- 
order. For Benjamin, it is this experience of time which characterizes 
modernity, and Kant's work had simply crystallized out the seeds of this 
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development. Benjamin writes, for example, in the later essay On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire, using Freud's idea of an organism's need to defend 
itself from shocks: 
Vielleicht kann man die eigentümliche Leistung der Chockabwehr 
zulezt darin sehen: dem Vorfall auf Kosten der Integrität seines 
Inhalts eine exakt Zeitstelle im Bewußtsein anzuweisen. (GS 1.2, 
615) 
Perhaps the special achievement of the shock defence can be 
seen in this: that it assigns the event to an exact point of 
time in consciousness at the cost of the integrity of its 
contents. (Baudelaire p117) 
For Benjamin this carrying over of time-order into existence, is the 
form of experience conditioned by the repetition of identical operations 
in a mechanized production line. It gives rise to an idea of identity 
which is itself modelled on the flat uniformity of a linear series of now- 
points. In the Baudelaire essay, Benjamin argues that this form of 
experience creates the need to subject all aspects of life to the same 
determination, and it is in this context that he discusses the leisure time 
activities of cinema and gambling. The successive turns in a gambling 
game, which have no connection to each other, reflects the experience of 
isolated now-points. Benjamin adds a note to his discussion of gambling 
which it will be important to bear in mind in understanding his own 
view of time: 
Der Spieler satt 'meine Nummer', wie der Lebemann sagt 'mein 
Typ'. [... ] Dieser Denkungsart leistet die Wette Vorschub. Sie 
ist ein Mittel, den Ereignissen Chockcharacter zu geben, sie aus 
Erfahrungszusammenhängen herauszulösen. (GS 1.2,635, 
footnote) 
The gambler says 'my number' in the same way as a man about 
town says 'my type'. [... 1 This disposition is promoted by 
betting, which is a means for giving events the character of a 
shock, detaching them from the experience-contexture. 
(Baudelaire p 136, n. 59) 
This form of identity (i. e. the idea that the occurance of the gambler's 
lucky number will have the same consequences each time), which breaks 
events out of the continuum of experience, is precisely what needs to be 
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differentiated from the idea of identity operating in Benjamin's view of 
time, and which will ultimately give rise to a philosophy of history as 
the need 'to explode the continuum of history'20. 
Given that the modern form of identity, in the repetitions of 
gambling and the production line, is thus determined by the time-order of 
now-points which Kant's work serves to justify, it is now possible to 
understand why Benjamin stresses the importance of a reformulated 
concept of identity for the coming philosophy: 
Die Fixierung der bei Kant unbekannten Begriffes der Identität 
hat voraussichtlich in der transcendentalen Logik eine große 
Rolle zu spielen, insofern er in der Kategorientafel nichts 
steht, dennoch vermutlich den obersten Begriff der transz- 
endentallogischen ausmacht und vielleicht wahrhaft geeignet ist 
die Sphäre der Erkenntnis jenseits der Subjekt-Objekt-Termin- 
ologie autonom zu begründen. (Programm GS 11.1.167) 
The fixing of the concept of identity, unknown to Kant, likely 
has to play a great role in the transcendental logic, inasmuch 
as it does not occur in the table of categories, yet presumably 
constitutes the highest of transcendental logical concepts and 
is perhaps truely suited to founding the sphere of knowledge 
autonomously beyond the subject-object terminology. 
(Program p9) 
The new concept of identity must be the identity of the symbol, one 
which does not simply express the relation of two entities or realms 
existing otherwise in isolation from each other, such as the ideas of 
'form' and 'content', 'essence' and 'appearance'. In relation to time, the 
'contents' of a now-point must not be understood as being carried as in 
an otherwise empty 'container'. Nor must one now-point exist in 
isolation from another, its only significance for another now-point 
depending on the determination of the time-order as a necessary sequence. 
Rather, the now-point must be thought of as forming a continuum with 
those around it, breaking out of its determination into a point-like 
existence on a time-line. The 'contents' do not remain closed within their 
'container', but rather stretch out towards their past and future, their 
'fore- and after-history'. And the 'content' of experience must no longer 
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be thought of as merely filling the otherwise empty 'time-order' 
determined a priori by the knowledge of experience, but rather they also 
form a continuous unity, determining each other, so that the experience 
which is 'identified' in knowledge is seen precisely as a microcosm or 
monad of its history of identification in its idea. It is this symbolic 
unity of experience and knowledge of experience which constitutes what 
Benjamin calls fullness (FuI1e). The understanding of time as filled or 
fulfilled (erft}llte), which breaks out of its determination into a linear, 
homogeneous series of now-points, Benjamin calls the 'messianic power' 
(Theses p254; GS 1.2,694) of time. 
Benjamin's discussions about time predominantly appear either in the 
context of language or art, or in the context of a particular author or 
work being treated. It is thus impossible to explore his rethinking of 
time without broaching his linguistic concerns. 21 For example, the idea 
of the temporal continuum of experience is treated in relation to 
Baudelaire in the idea of 'correspondences'. The related idea of 'aura' is 
developed predominantly in discussions of the nature of the work of art, 
and his idea of 'non-sensuous similarity' is developed in the context of a 
theory of reading. One of the most prolonged discussions of time occurs 
in his essay on the Early German Romantics, where he distinguishes 
between time as a WerdeprozeB and time as an Erftillungsprozeß; however, 
this takes place in the context of discussing the Early Romantics' view of 
literary criticism. This relative absence of a purely philosophical or 
wissenschaftlich treatment of time, itself springs from the questioning of 
philosophical presentation, as was discussed above. The images Benjamin 
uses in his discussion of time, such as the idea of the messiah itself, can 
only be fully understood in the context of a fuller exploration of his 
understanding of language, which will be undertaken below. However, in 
order to further explore Benjamin's view of time one such image will be 
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examined which is closely connected to the idea of the 'messianic power' 
of time: the image of the shooting star. 
The image appears just twice in Benjamin's work - once early on, 
and a second time in his late Baudelaire essay (1939). The appearance of 
the shooting star image in the Baudelaire essay is significant in that, in 
the context of the essay, it not only marks the transition between a 
dicussion of the mechanized temporality of modernity and a discussion of 
the temporality of Baudelaire's 'correspondences', but it also brings 
together many ideas expressing their difference. It will, therefore, be 
worth quoting at length. After commenting that a gambler's desire to 
win is not what would be called a 'wish' (ein Wunsch), he goes on to 
write: 
Der Wunsch seinerseits gehört dagegen den Ordnungen der 
Erfahrung an. [... ] Je früher im Leben man einen Wunsch tut, 
desto größere Aussicht hat er, erfüllt zu werden. Je weiter 
ein Wunsch in die Ferne der Zeit ausgreift, desto mehr läßt 
sich für seine Erfüllung hoffen. Was aber in die Ferne der 
Zeit zurückgeleitet, ist die Erfahrung, die sie erfüllt und 
gliedert. Darum ist der erfüllte Wunsch die Krone, welche der 
Erfahrung beschieden ist. In der Symbolik der Völker dann die 
Ferne des Raumes für die Ferne der Zeiten eintreten; daher die 
Sternschnuppe, welche in die unendliche Ferne des Raumes 
stürzt, zum Symbol des erfüllten Wunsches geworden ist. Die 
Elfenbeinkugel, die da ins nächste Fach rollt, die nächste Karte, 
die zuoberst liegt, sind der wahre Gegensatz zu der Stern- 
schnuppe. Die Zeit, die in dem Augenblick enthalten ist, da das 
Licht der Sternschnuppe für einen Menschen aufblitzt, ist vom 
Stoffe derer, die von Joubert mit der ihm eigenen Sicherheit 
umrissen worden ist. "Zeit", sagt er, "wird auch in der 
Ewigkeit vorgefunden; aber es ist nicht die irdische Zeit, die 
weltliche... Diese Zeit zerstört nicht, sie vollendet nur. " Sie 
ist das Gegenstück zu der höllischen, in der sich die Existenz 
derer abspielt, die nichts, was sie in Angriff genommen haben, 
vollenden dürfen. (GS 1.2.635) 
A wish, however, belongs amongst the orderings of experience. 
[... 1 The earlier in life one makes a wish, the greater are its 
chances of becoming fulfilled. The further a wish reaches out 
into a distant time, the more it can hope for its fulfilment. 
But it is experience that leads back into the distance of time, 
that fulfils and structures time. Thus a wish fulfilled is the 
crown bestowed upon experience. In folk symbolism, distance in 
space can take the place of distance in time; that is why the 
shooting star, which plunges into the infinite distance of 
space, has become the symbol of a fulfilled wish. The ivory 
ball which rolls into the next compartment, the next card which 
comes to the top of the pack, are the true antithesis of the 
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shooting star. The time held in the instant in which the light 
of a shooting star flashes for a person, is of the kind that 
Joubert has described with his customary assurance. "Time", he 
says, "is found even in eternity; but it is not earthly, worldly 
time... It is the time which does not destroy; but only 
completes. " It is the antithesis of that hellish time, in which 
the existence is played out of those who are not allowed to 
complete anything they have started. (Baudelaire p136-7) 
In contrast to the Erlebnisse of the gambler, waiting on the next coup de 
des in a time-order of isolated now-points, the shooting star is the 
symbol of the experience-contexture, whose time completes (vollendet). 
Vollenden is the word used by the Early Romantics to describe the role of 
criticism, a process which takes place in time understood as an 
Erf1illungsprozeB, that is, a process of fulfilment as opposed to the time 
in which gambler's existence is played out, which allows of no process of 
completion. The wish is not separated from its fulfilment by 
homogeneous, empty time, rather it 'reaches out' (ausgreift) to the future 
it hopes for, structuring the continuum of its time as fulfilled time. In 
opposition to the way Newtonian science robs experience of its 'dignity' 
by carrying over into existence a time-order, which determines experience 
as 'uniquely temporally limited', the wish which reaches out beyond its 
enclosure in the now-point, is its crowning. This symbol of the shooting 
star is itself the return or reappearance of an image from Goethes 
Wahlverwandtschaften (1922). This critical essay followed shortly after 
Benjamin's dissertation on Early German Romanticism and is itself modelled 
on the Early Romantics' idea of criticism. The symbol appears at the 
climax of the essay, yet is not developed or explicitly explained, thus 
allowing its elliptical status to leave the essay essentially open-ended. 
The symbol itself is taken from Goethe's novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften 
C'The Elective Affinities, and the essay from the beginning is an implicit 
preparation for the point where Benjamin can show it -to- form the symbol 
of the whole novel. He writes: 
In [der Mahnung der Sterne] bestand als Erfahrung was längst 
als Erlebnis verweht war. Denn unter dem Symbol des Sterns 
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war einst Goethe die Hoffnung erschienen, die er für die 
Liebenden fassen mußte. Jener Satz, der, mit Hölderlin zu 
reden, die Cäsur des Werkes enthält und in dem, da die Um- 
schlungenen ihr Ende besiegeln, alles inne hält, lautet: "Die 
Hoffnung fuhr wie ein Stern, der vom Himmel fällt, über ihre 
Häupter weg". Sie gewahren sie freilich nicht und deutlicher 
konnte gesagt werden, daß die letzte Hoffnung niemals dem eine 
ist, der sie hegt, sondern jenen allein, für die sie gehegt wird. 
(GS 1.1. p199-200) 
In the testimony of the stars there existed, as experience, what 
had long been denied as Erlebnis. For under the symbol of the 
star, hope had once appeared to Goethe, which he had to seize 
for the lovers. That sentence which, read with Hölderlin in 
mind, contains the caesura of the work, and within which, since 
their embraces seal their end, everything is held, runs: "Hope 
soared away over their heads like a star falling from the sky". 
They were certainly not aware of it and it could not be more 
clearly said, that the ultimate hope is never for the one who 
cherishes it, but for those alone, for whom it is cherished. 
The purpose of the essay is certainly a rejection of the popular 
treatment of Goethe's novel, which had regarded it as affirming the 
sanctity of marriage, in the portrayal of a sequence of disastrous events 
stemming from a disregard of marriage, and a rejection of the popular 
view of the art work as simply presenting a truth in artist form. It is 
clear that, for Benjamin, both of these views are based on a view of time 
determined by Newtonian science. The essay, treating both of these views 
together, interprets the events of the novel not as a series of Erlebnisse, 
but as forming an experience-contexture, woven into a dense continuum 
of echos and reflections. 22 The 'truth' of the novel is shown to be not 
the presentation of the sanctity of marriage, but rather precisely to be 
an exploration of the inseparability and relatedness (Verwandtschaft) of 
that which is veiled (truth) and its veil (beauty). Benjamin understands 
Hölderlin's concept of the 'caesura' as containing monadically the whole of 
the work in which it is found, yet is also the symbol of an expression- 
less power which disupts its stable progression of meaning. Benjamin's 
enigmatic thoughts about hope at the end of the above quotation, only 
obtain clarification in the Theses on the Philosophy of History, written 
eighteen years later. There he describes how there is only hope for the 
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past where the historian, recognising its messianic power, rescues it and 
cherishes its hope as a caesura, or, what Benjamin calls 'the sign of a 
messianic cessation of happening' (Illuminations p263; 'das Zeichen einer 
messianischen Stillstellung des Geschehens', GS 1.2,703). 
The concepts of messianic time and the messiah are the best known 
names for the Benjamin's idea of fulfilled time, or the experience- 
contexture, and its symbol - hope or the wish. 23 This plurality of names 
is significant and will be treated in detail in relation to Benjamin's work 
on the Early Romantics in Chapter 5. However, before turning to 
consider Benjamin's understanding of language which will set the scene 
for this discussion, Benjamin's notion of messianic time will be considered 
in the way it brings together many of the issues which have been 
discussed in this section. 
The concept of the messianic appears only infrequently in Benjamin's 
work. As was stated above, the term is never expanded upon, and serves 
rather to disrupt than to clarify the context in which it appears. It can 
now be appreciated that the term itself partakes of the temporality which 
has been discussed: rather than standing within a progressive develop- 
ment of terms and ideas, it serves to create echos across Benjamin's 
corpus and between works; rather than being assigned a determinate 
meaning, it is a symbol of the relatedness of form and content in 
philosophical presentation, which no longer stand linked by a mediation 
modelled on the discontinuity of Newtonian now-points. Whilst the idea 
of the messianic appears most notably in the Theses on the Philosophy of 
History, its use there constitutes an echo with one of his earliest essays 
Trauerspiel and Tragödie (1916). It is significant also that Benjamin's 
key symbol should have its first appearance in an essay treating the dif- 
ferences of two literary forms; this is a clear indication of way the 
question of time and the question of language were, from the beginning, 
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inseparable in Benjamin's mind, as was not the case for Heidegger. 
Benjamin writes, concerning the way history is often written in the form 
of tragedy, that in this form, 
die Zeit der Geschichte ist unendlich in jeder Richtung und 
unerfüllt in jedem Augenblick. Das heißt es ist kein einzelnes 
empirisches Ereignis denkbar, das eine notwendige Bezeihung zu 
der bestimmten Zeitlage hätte, in der es vorfällt. Die Zeit ist 
für das empirische Geschehen nur eine Form, aber was 
wichtiger ist, eine als Form unerfüllte. (GS 11.1,134) 
the time of history is infinite in each direction and unfilled in 
every moment. That is, it is unthinkable that a single empirical 
event would have a necessary relation to the time-position in 
which it falls. Time, for an empirical event is only a form, but 
more importantly, an unfilled [or unfulfilled] form. 
Already in this early essay one finds a concern with the idea of time 
understood as an infinite series of empty moments. This concern is also 
clearly linked to the writing of history and to the idea that the 
historical event figured as empirical takes on the form of tragedy - 
which Benjamin analyses as a closed literary form, where the events reach 
a resolution within the work. In this way, the historical event is 
thought to stand in isolation in its point of time, interacting with other 
events only as determined by the linear progression of the time-order in 
a mechanical and causal way. It is again this idea of time determined by 
Newtonian science which Benjamin wishes to oppose: 
Denn es ist ja nicht so zu denken, daß Zeit nichts anderes sei 
als das Maß, mit dem die Dauer einer mechanischen Veränderung 
gemessen wird. Diese Zeit ist freilich eine relativ leere Form, 
deren Ausfüllung zu denken keinen Sinn bietet. Ein anders Ist 
aber die Zeit der Geschichte als die der Mechanik. [... ] [Das] 
Ist zu sagen, daß die bestimmende Kraft der historischen Zeit- 
form von keinem empirischen Geschehen völlig erfaßt und in 
keinem völlig gesammelt werden kann. Ein solches Geschehen, 
das im Sinne der Geschichte vollkommen sei, Ist vielmehr durch- 
aus ein empirisches Unbestimmtes, nämlich eine Idee. Diese Idee 
der erfüllten Zeit heißt in der Bibel als deren beherrschende 
historische Idee: die messianische Zeit. Cibid. ) 
For it is not to be thought, that time is nothing but the 
measure with which the duration of a mechanical change is 
established. This time is certainly a relatively empty form, 
whose filling in unthinkable. The time of history is, however, 
different to that of mechanics. [... 1 That is to say, the 
determining power of historical time-form cannot be fully 
understood from an empirical event and nor can it be fully 
154 
gathered up in one. Such an event which, in the field of 
history, is complete, is precisely rather empirically undeter- 
mined, namely an idea. This idea of fulfilled time is called in 
the Bible, as its dominating historical idea: messianic time. 
For Benjamin, the historical event understood as an empirical event, for 
which time is only the measure of its mechanical interactions, hides the 
messianic power of history. It is only the event understood as an idea - 
containing its own circularity of knowledge and experience - which 
allows the fulfilled time-form of that history to be understood as 
messianic time. In order to better understand this relation of the idea to 
messianic time it is now necessary to explore the second aspect of its 
characterization by Benjamin - the linguistic nature of the idea as name 
and doctrine. 
IV: Doctrine and Its temporality 
Just as Benjamin's writing on time, and the temporality of the symbol, is 
predominantly tied in with literary contexts, so his discussions of 
language appear largely in connection with temporal issues. As was 
stated above, Benjamin's thinking of the temporality of language can only 
be artificially separated into sections on each. However, in order to lay 
the ground for a fuller determination of Benjamin's thinking in the 
chapter on translation, it is necessary to move the emphasis on to his 
understanding of language and the temporality it determines (the 
temporality of language, subjective genitive). This section will consider 
Benjamin's thinking of language in the way it arises from a consideration 
of Kant's project. It will then be possible, in the final section, bringing 
language and time together in an initial way - in the idea of messianic 
analysis as reading. 
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As was shown in section II in relation to the refiguring of the 
relationship between experience and the knowledge of experience, Benjamin 
did not think that the circularity of Kant's project could be avoided. It 
was rather the case that what Kant chose as his 'starting point', the 
knowledge of experience given by Newtonian mechanics, was 'uniquely 
temporally limited' and ultimately served to ground the project in an 
unproductive metaphysics of subject and object. In Chapter 1 it was 
shown how the three-fold synthesis constructed experience according to 
the rule given by the concept in the synthesis of recognition. The 
determination of time into a linear time-order depended thus on the 
concept being held in the form determined by the Categories, which 
themselves reflected the characteristic of the Newtonian object. In that 
chapter it was shown how Kant could not, in the end, satisfactorily 
maintain his distinction between mechanism and teleology, since the limited 
'span' of time determined by the concept of the Newtonian object differed 
only 'quantitively' (or rather 'quantumly') from the 'span' over which the 
concept of an organism operated. Since it was thus the nature of the 
concept used in the three-fold synthesis which ultimately determined the 
nature of the time-order and thus existence (cf. the quotation from Kant 
in section III), a reflection on the idea of the concept itself, or rather. 
language, must form the 'starting point' for a development of the Kantian 
system. Thus Benjamin writes in the Program essay: 
Wie die Kantische Lehre selbst um ihre Prinzipien zu finden 
sich einer Wissenschaft mit Bezeihung auf die sie sie definieren 
konnte gegenüber sehen mußte, ähnlich wird es auch der 
modernen Philosophie ergehen. Die große Umbildung und 
Korrektur die an dem einseitig mathematisch-mechanisch 
orientierten Erkenntnisbegriff vorzunehmen Ist, kann nur durch 
eine Bezeihung der Erkenntnis auf die Sprache wie sie schon 
zu Kants Lebzeiten Hamann versucht hat gewonnen werden. 
(Programm GS 11.1,168) 
Just as the Kantian theory itself, in order to find its 
principles, needed to see itself in the face of a science, with 
reference to which it could define them, so will it similar for 
modern philosophy. The great restructuration and correction 
which is to be performed on the mathematically-mechanically 
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orientated concept of knowledge, can only be attained through a 
relation of knowledge to language, such as Hamann attempted in 
Kant's lifetime. (Program p9) 
This quotation again shows that Benjamin by no means wanted to avoid 
the circularity into which Kant's project entered with Newtonian science, 
but rather focus on the precise point of resonance between them: 
language - which in the First Critique, Kant attempted to limit to the 
conceptuality of Newtonian objects. 
Kant's concern to be able to purify reason so as to be able to give 
it the a priori certainty of mathematics, lead him, Benjamin argues, to 
overlook the fact that philosophical knowledge is only expressed in 
language and not numbers and formulae. Since it is language which 
ultimately constitutes the interface for the circularity of experience and 
the knowledge of experience, it is language, for Benjamin, which must 
become the centre of the coming philosophy. 
Ein in der Reflexion auf das sprachliche Wesen der Erkenntnis 
gewonnener Begriff von ihr wird einen korrespondierenden 
Erfahrungsbegriff schaffen der auch Gebiete deren wahrhafte 
systematische Einordnung Kant nicht gelungen ist umfassen 
wird. (Programm GS 11.1, p168) 
A concept of knowledge gained from reflexion on the linguistic 
nature of knowledge will create a corresponding concept of 
experience which will also encompass regions whose truly 
systematic ordering Kant did not achieve. (Program p9) 
The region Benjamin has in mind here, as not truely systematized within 
Kant's three Critiques, is religion. Benjamin's understanding of religion, 
here, is informed by Hamann, Kabbalah and Early German Romanticism. 24 
As was shown in Chapter 1, Hamann rejected Kant's attempts to maintain a 
distinction between intuition and understanding, that is, between the 
experience and the a priori concepts of knowledge. Rather, both were 
grounded in the 'spontaneity of our concepts', and this gave rise to a 
particular theological linguistic 'phenomenology' -a phenomenology in the 
sense of a particular immediacy of knowledge of experience, as opposed to 
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the mediacy of an a priori separation of knowledge of experience and 
experience. To quote again from Hamann: 
Jede Erscheinung der Natur war ein Wort, das Zeichen, Sinnbild 
und Unterpfand einer neuen geheimen, unaussprechlichen, aber 
desto innigern Vereinigung, Mitteilung und Gemeinschaft gött- 
licher Energien und Idee. Alles, was der Mensch am Anfange 
hörte, mit Augen sah, beschaute und seine Hände betasteten, 
war ein lebendiges Wort. (SH p222) 
Every phenomenon of nature was a word, the sign, image and 
pledge of a new union, communication and community of divine 
energies and ideas - secret, inexpressible, but all the more 
profound. Everything that man saw, heard, touched, was a 
living word. (The Knight of Rosenkreuz's Last Will p73; SH 
p222) 
The word Erscheinung has been translated 'phenomenon' to avoid the 
impression that what Hamann has in mind here is the experience of 
nature as simply the appearance of a hidden thing-in-itself. Hamann's 
idea of a 'new union' is similar rather to the immediacy operating in 
Heidegger's understanding of the phenomenon as a 'showing' of itself. It 
is a theological linguistic phenomenology, similar to Hamann's, which is 
found in Benjamin's On Language as Such and on the Language of Man. 
He writes for example: 
Das Dasein der Sprach erstrecht sich aber nicht nur über alle 
Gebiete menschlicher Geistesäußerung, der in irgendeinem Sinn 
immer Sprache innewohnt, sondern es erstreckt sich auf 
schlechthin alles. (GS II. 1, p40) 
The existence of language, however, is not only coextensive 
with all the areas of human mental expression in which 
language always inheres in one way or another, but rather it 
is coextensive with absolutely everything. (Illuminations p315) 
As will be seen below in regard to Benjamin's theory of reading, this 
linguistic understanding of the new concept of experience is present in 
his thinking from his very earliest notes to his last works. He also 
found such a theory of language deveolped by the Early German 
Romantics, in their idea of the absolute as a linguistic Reflexionsmedium; 
(Benjamin's analysis of this idea will be considered in Chapter 5. ) 
Both Benjamin and Hamann were drawn to Kabbalah, which also 
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develops a theological understanding of language, yet the deeper 
attraction for both was the way the nature of tradition was rethought in 
Kabbalah. It was briefly shown in Chapter 1 how Hamann's view, 'Reason 
is language, logos', was concomitant with a questioning of the relation 
between reason and tradition. For Benjamin, the reflection on the 
linguistic nature of knowledge in relation to Kant's work was concomitant 
with the need to think through the nature of a linguistic system as a 
'tradendum'. In the Program essay, Benjamin characterizes this tradendum 
as Kabbalistic 'doctrine' (Lehre). 
Benjamin had met Gershom Scholem in the summer of 1915 and was 
greatly impressed by the mystical language philosophy of Kabbalah, on 
which Scholem was working. 25 In a Kabbalist theory of reading, the very 
letters of the Torah are divine signatures and this gives rise to an 
understanding of interpretation quite different to the idea that a word 
in simply the bearer of the meaning to which it is attached. In his work 
Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism26, Scholem portrays Kabbalistic 
interpretaion as forming a subversive underside to the history of 
religious interpretation. In opposition to the common practice of 
interpreting a religious text to show how it confirms contemporary 
scientific findings, thus holding the text within the prevailing cultural 
framework of the day, the Kabbalist showed the text's ability to disrupt 
the idea that it was simply the bearer of contemporary truths by focus- 
ing instead on the very letters of the words used. 27 In this way the 
Kabbalist showed that truth was not conveyed through the language of 
the text, but rather was in the language itself. 
The distinction between that which is communicated 'through' a 
language and that which is communicated 'in' a language, forms the core 
of Benjamins essay, On Language as Such. The idea that a word is merely 
the bearer of an unchanging meaning is constructed on the idea of a 
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separation between a 'transitory' experience (the contingent use of the 
word), and a 'timeless' experience (the meaning of the word). As was 
shown in section III, it was precisely against such a separation of realms, 
modelled on the isolation of Newtonian objects, that Benjamin's rethinking 
of time was directed. It is for this reason, in the On Language as Such 
essay, that Benjamin rejects a 'sign' theory of language: 
Das menschliche Wort ist der Name der Dinge. Damit kann die 
Vorstellung nicht mehr aufkommen, die der bürgerlichen Ansicht 
der Sprache entspricht, daß das Wort zur Sache sich zufällig 
verhalte, daß es ein durch irgendwelche Konvention gesetztes 
Zeichen der Dinge (oder ihrer Erkenntnis) sei. Die Sprache 
gibt niemals bloße Zeichen. (GS 11.1,150) 
The human word is the name of things. Hence it is no longer 
conceivable, as the bourgeois view of language maintains, that 
the word has an accidental relation to its object, that it is a 
sign for things (or knowledge of them) agreed by some conven- 
tion. Language never gives mere signs. (Illuminations p324) 
As the quotation indicates, Benjamin wishes to replace a sign theory of 
language with a theory of naming. 28 It is important to bear in mind that 
his idea of naming is characterized by the temporality it determines, and 
it is this which constitutes it opposition to the sign theory. It is for 
this reason that immediately after the above quotation, Benjamin goes on 
to criticise 'mystical language theory' ('mystische Sprachtheorie'). Such a 
theory is one which proposes that the essence of a thing is simply its 
word. Such a suggestion would collapse the distinction between exper- 
ience (the thing) and knowledge of experience (its word), into a simple 
immediacy, unquestioning of the temporality of that immediacy. 29 For 
Benjamin, in the Language essay, the relation of the thing and its name is 
also constituted by an immediacy; however, this 'magic' immediacy is 
characterized by Benjamin in terms of translation. The name is the 
translation of the language of the thing into the language of the human. 
Things do not communicate themselves to man through their language, as 
if the thing were a thing-in-itself existing timelessly behind the present- 
ation of itself in language. Rather, things communicate themselves in 
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their language, and man knows them in translation and not through 
translation (which would again assert the temporality of a sign theory of 
language). It is thus the idea of translation, in its bringing together of 
an idea of reception and spontaneity, which constitutes the heart of 
Benjamin's phenomenological circle of experience and knowledge of 
experience: 
Für Empfängnis und Spontaneität zugleich, wie sie sich in die- 
ser Einzigartigkeit der Bindung nur im sprachlichen Bereich 
finden, hat aber die Sprache ihr eigenes Wort, und dieses Wort 
gilt auch von jener Emfängnis des Namelosen im Namen. Es ist 
die Übersetzung der Sprache der Dinge in die des Menschen. 
(GS 11.1.150) 
For reception and spontaneity together, which are found in 
this unique union only in the linguistic realm, language has its 
own word, and this word also applies to that reception of the 
nameless in the name. It is the translation of the language of 
things into the language of humans. (Illuminations p325) 
Translation is thus by no means a linking of two languages, whereby 
that which is communicated through one, thereby communicated through 
another. The mediacy, between the two languages (of the thing and of 
the human), enacted by translation does not partake of the Newtonian 
temporality of the sign, but rather the 'immediacy' of the symbol, that is, 
the temporality of the experience-contexture in the stretching out of 
temporality from its confinement in the limited span. This stretching 
span of temporality breaks the confinement of meaning or truth to a 
'timeless' realm, separate from its signification in a text, like the 
separation of two Newtonian now-points. 
A development of this understanding of translation, in respect of 
translation from one human language to another, is found in Benjamin's 
essay The Task of The Translator. Here again, what is of central 
importance is how the relationship or kinship (Verwandtschaft) of 
languages is manifested in translation. This kinship is explored in the 
way an original exists in a continuum of experience with its after-life, 
and, when brought together with its translation, the way both signify the 
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linguistic nature of experience-contexture, which Benjamin names 'pure 
language'. Since translation is one of Benjamin's central ways of 
thinking the temporality of language, that is, both the temporality of a 
text (for example, in the idea of its after-life) and the linguistic nature 
of the contact between 'transitory' experience and 'timeless' knowledge of 
experience, it will be dealt with at length in a chapter of its own. In 
the remainder of this section Benjamin's idea of the temporality of 
language, the linguistic nature of the phenomenological circularity of 
experience and knowledge of experience, will be explored in terms of his 
notion of doctrine. 
It was stated above that Benjamin planned to rethink the nature of 
the Kantian tradendum as doctrine. In the light of his concern to 
rethink time beyond its limitation in a Newtonian time-order, and to 
rethink language beyond the oppositions of signified and sign, meaning 
or truth and its linguistic presentation, his planned dissertation can now 
be seen to involve a complex intertwining of intentions. First of all, to 
subject Kent's project to a temporal and linguistic criticism, and secondly 
to put in question the temporal and linguistic assumptions which 
characterized the prevailing view of philosophical legacy. This second 
intention was to be fulfilled by presenting the first intention by way of 
a kabbalist reading of Kant's work. While the dissertation on Kant was 
never written (for reasons suggested above), the Program essay indicates 
that the ideas of doctrine would have provided the central link between 
the two intentions. That is, Kant's work would be read as doctrine, and 
the linguistic nature of the idea of knowledge operating in it, the pure 
concepts of the understanding, would also have been read in the same 
way. In this way a complex circularity could have been unfolded between 
the presentation of a philosophical system and the temporality of language 
of its concept of knowledge. 
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Und damit läßt sich die Forderung an die kommende Philosophie 
endlich in die Worte fassen: Auf Grund des Kantischen Systems 
einen Erkenntnisbegriff zu schaffen dem der Begriff einer 
Erfahrung korrespondiert von der die Erkenntnis Lehre ist. 
(Programm GS 11.1,168) 
And thus the demand upon the coming philosphy can finally be 
put in these words: to create on the basis of the Kantian 
system a concept of knowledge to which a concept of exper- 
ience corresponds, of which the knowledge is the doctrine. 
(Program p9-10) 
If, in the letter to Scholem, quoted above, Benjamin's intention had been 
to read Kant's work as doctrine, then in this quotation it can be seen 
that the relationship between experience and knowledge of experience is 
itself to be refigured, such that knowledge is the doctrine of experience. 
This entails a certain collapse of the distinction between a philosophical 
system and that which it treats, i. e. knowledge of experience. This 
collapse must again not be understood as the formation of a simple 
identity, or as a collapse into an 'abyss' which would allow any systematic 
philosophy to have an immediate identity with 'true' knowledge of 
existence, rather their unity must be understood from the temporal nature 
of doctrine as a linguistic continuum between form and content. 
This unity is evidenced in the prologue to the Origin of German 
Tragic Drama, where Benjamin argues that a system is not to be thought 
of as a net, catching truth which flies in from outside (OGTD p28; GS 
1.1,207). Rather, truth must be thought of as already in the' 
philosophical treatise; he writes, for example, in one of his preparatory 
notes for the Trauerspiel study: 'for there is no truth over a matter, 
rather in it', ('denn Wahrheit gibt es nicht über eine Sache, sondern in 
ihr', (fr 29>, GS VI, 50). In fragment 23 of his Kant notes, Benjamin 
rhetorically asks whether thinking is a doing C'Tetigkeit ) of something to 
something, like hammering or sewing, or rather a 'transzendentales 
Intransitivum' (GS VI, 43). This again indicates the unity of systematic 
thought and that which it treats, knowledge of experience. It is this 
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move towards a unitary and intransitive continuum which gives rise to 
Benjamin's thinking of ideas and names, and the authority of philosophical 
treatise and quotation, which will now be explored. Each must be thought 
as having not a transitive relationship to something outside of it, but 
read as the doctrinal symbol of the unity of the experience, and 
knowledge of experience, in which it exists. 
In the Epistemo-critical Prologue Benjamin encapsulates this move 
towards unity in the elliptic phrase 'Truth is the death of intention' 
(OGTD P36; 'Die Wahrheit ist der Tod der Intention', GS 1.1,216). This 
phrase is given greater specificity in fragment 27, where he writes that 
truth is the death of the 'intentio' (GS VI, 48). The idea of the 
'intentio' as the comportment of the mind towards that which is intended, 
makes clear that, for Benjamin, truth may only be found in the process 
whereby it is no longer thought to concern the need for the system to 
communicate the 'true' knowledge of experience it has captured from 
outside. 30 It is the truth read in a philosophical work which gives it 
its authority - though both terms, 'truth' and 'authority', must be 
thought in opposition to their common understanding as somehow 
'timeless'. Thus Benjamin writes: 
Diese Autorität steht vielmehr durchaus zum landläufigen 
Begriff der Sachlichkeit darum im Gegensatz, weil ihr Gelten, 
das der intentionlosen Wahrheit[, ] historisch, also durchaus 
nicht zeitlos ist, [... ]. "Zeitlosigkeit" ist also als ein Exponant 
[de]s bürgerlichen Wahrheitsbegriff zu entlarven. (<fr 29>, GS 
V, 50) 
This authority stands rather completely in opposition to the 
common concept of objectivity about a matter, because its 
validity, that of intentionless truth, is historical and thus in 
no way timeless, C... ]. "Timelessness" is thus to be revealed as 
an exponant of the bourgeois concept of truth. 
The intentionless truth of the authoritative philosophical treatise, in that 
it is read as the doctrine of the phenomenological unity and circularity 
of experience and the knowledge of experience, gives each treatise, each 
authoritative quotation, a certain individuality. They become monads 
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encapsulating their very own circularity of the experience and knowledge 
of experience, in which they exist. However, this individuality is again 
not that of the Newtonian object, since its individuality is 'historical', 
that is, the continuum of experience it encapsulates is constituted by 
fulfilled time, and not the mechanical time-order of empty, homogeneous 
time. 
The idea of rethinking the temporality' of truth and the authority of 
a philosophical work is closely parallel to Heidegger's idea of 'loosening 
up' the hardened tradition of ontology in order to reveal the history of 
the question of being (for example, Being and Time H22). There would, 
however, appear to be a clear difference (which will be considered 
further in the Conclusion), in that while Heideggerian 'destruction' 
relentlessly pursues the way being has been modelled on a 'homogeneous' 
time-order from one philosophical text to another, for Benjamin the 
question of existence appears in a tertiary position to the need to read 
philosophical texts as individual doctrinal monads. He writes, for 
example, towards the end of the addendum to the Program essay: 
Eine Erkenntnis ist metaphysisch heißt im strengen Sinne: sie 
bezeiht sich durch den Stammbegriff der Erkenntnis auf die 
konkrete Totalität der Erfahrung, d. h. aber auf Dasein. Der 
philosophische Daseinsbegriff muß sich dem religiösen 
Lehrbegriff, dieser aber dem erkenntnistheoretischen Stamm- 
begriff ausweisen. (Programm GS 11.1,170-1) 
To say that knowledge is metaphysical means in the strict 
sense: it is related through the root-concept to the concrete 
totality of experience, that is however, to existence. The 
philosophical concept of existence must answer to the religious 
concept of doctrine, but this latter to the epistemological root- 
concept. (Program pll-12) 
The idea that the concept of existence ('Dasein) must be subject to the 
concept of doctrine can be explained, in relation to Kant, in the way 
Kant's Newtonian Categories, which lead to a Newtonian time-order being 
'carried over' into the existence of a thing, must be read as doctrine. As 
was discussed above, Benjamin's Kant dissertation proposed to treat both 
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his system as doctrine and the system's concept of the knowledge of 
experience also as doctrine, thus treating it in thorough-going 
circularity. This complex doctrinal reading of Kant gives rise, in the 
Program essay, to an interpretation of the categories not as timelessly 
existing in their inheritance from Aristotle, but rather as historical 
Stammbegriffe or Urbegriffe - root-concepts or primal-concepts. 
As was stated above, the Categories in Kant's transcendental logic 
ultimately determined the nature of the concept in the three-fold 
synthesis of the manifold; in their reinterpretation as root-concepts or 
primal-concepts they perform this same function as the point of circul- 
arity between knowledge of experience and experience. This, however, is 
only one aspect of their significance. Thus Benjamin writes: 
Der erkenntnistheoretische Stamm- order Urbegriff hat eine 
doppelte Funktion. Einmal ist er es der durch seine Spezifi- 
kation, nach der allgemein logischen Begründung von Erkenntnis 
überhaupt zu den Begriffen von gesonderten Erkenntnisarten 
und damit zu besonderen Erfahrungsarten durchdringt. 
(Programm GS 11.1,170) 
The epistemological root- or primal-concept has a double 
function. First of all, it is the one which through its 
specification, in line with the general logical foundation of 
knowledge, penetrates to the concepts of specific types of 
knowledge and thus to specific types of experience. (Program 
PID 
The second and, for Benjamin, more important function of the primal- 
concept, is the one which informs the central characteristic of ideas and 
names: their multiplicitous individuality. 
The idea of the multiplicity of primal-concepts arises from the 
collapse into a linguistic-temporal continuum of Kant's attempt to maintain 
the tension between the temporality of system and that of its Newtonian 
centre. In Kant's system the twelve categories were divided into four 
groups of three, and while he to a certain extent discussed the relation 
of the categories in, each group, the relation of the groups to each other 
was certainly not treated. It would seem that they existed individually in 
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an almost additive way, such that no one group gave the true nature of 
existence, but rather only when added together in the table of categories. 
The idea of an additive list of categories gradually leading to truth, 
would be linked to the model of a Newtonian time-order. In chapter 1 it 
was also shown how the unity of the table of categories was underpined 
by the transcendental unity of apperception in the transcendental ego. 
This idea of a simple unity, again modelled on a Newtonian temporality, 
grounding and existing outside of the generation of time in the three- 
fold synthesis, was shown to ultimately ground the organic unity of the 
system itself. However, Kant was shown to be unable to satisfactorily 
maintain the distinction between the mechanical time of the Newtonian 
time-order and the teleological, stretched time of the organism. The 
temporality of the system was thus opposed to Kant's attempt to ground 
it with a unity, at its centre, modelled on Newtonian temporality. That 
is, the tabular boundary separating the Categories from the rest of the 
system was always already under strain, and similarly, the individual 
groups of Categories oppose their determination into an additive 
sequence. 
As a result of this, the categories can no longer be regarded as 
forming a unitary core within a system, but rather they break out of 
their confinement as parts of a list which 'adds up to truth', so that 
each one symbolically presents its own circle of knowledge of experience 
and experience as a doctrine. The system thus becomes constituted by the 
presentation of a non-additive multiplicity of categories, or primal- 
concepts, such that their unity within and as the system is that of 
doctrine. Benjamin presents this result in the form of a lengthy 
metaphor developed in fragment 20, written around the time of the 
Program essay. In it the relationship between a system and its primal- 
concepts (refered to here as 'cognitive elements', Erkenntnisse) is 
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pictured by the relationship between a palace and the pictures which 
hang on its walls. He writes: 
Die Aufgabe der Ontologie ist es die Erkenntnisse so mit sym- 
bolischer Intention zu laden, daß sie sich in Wahrheit oder 
Lehre verlieren, in ihr aufgehen, ohne sie doch zu begründen, 
da deren Begründung Offenbarung, Sprache ist. 
Um auf das Bild zurückzukommen: die Wände des Palastes so 
mit Bildern auszufüllen, bis die Bilder scheinen die Wände zu 
sein. 
Diese gewaltige Intention auf symbolische Schwängerung aller 
Erkenntnisse ist der Grund der Kantischen Mystik. «fr 20>, 
GS VI, 39) 
It is the task of ontology to so laden the cognitive elements 
with symbolic intention, that they lose themselves in truth or 
doctrine, dedicated to it, without thus grounding it - since its 
grounding is revelation, language. 
To return to the image: to so fill out the walls of the 
palace with images, that the images seem to be the walls. 
This powerful intention to symbolic impregnation of all 
cognitive elements is the ground of Kantian mysticism. 
This quotation again illustrates the 'collapse' together of system and the 
concept of knowledge operating within it; but again it is not a collapse 
into an abyss, but into doctrine. The 'cognitive elements' or primal- 
concepts do not gradually add up to truth, nor is their individuality that 
of isolated Newtonian objects, rather they are always threatening to break 
from their framing within the system, and to thus merge and become the 
system. Truth is not thereby simply reached as if it had the static 
nature of a Newtonian object, rather it is the movement itself in which, 
through symbolic ladening, the cognitive elements break free from their 
framing within the system. Benjamin calls this their 'inconspicuous cel- 
ebrating Dimension' C'die unscheinbar verherrlichende Dimension', ibid. ). 
Even shortly after the period of Benjamin's intensive study of Kant, 
the terms used to decribe this movement of truth change. This can now 
be understood as the need to avoid a terminology becoming fixed within a 
new system which would therefore repeat the Kantian problem of a 
separation between system and concept of knowledge, palace and pictures. 
For example, in the Origin of German Tragic Drama, this symbolic ladening 
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is called 'the act of naming' (OGTD p37; 'Benennen', GS 1.1,217). The 
primal-concepts are called ideas; they are given intentionlessly in the act 
of naming, and thus exist in 'irreducible multiplicity' (p43/223). The 
relationship of the ideas to truth is figured in a number of different 
images expressing movement: truth is 'actualized in the round dance of 
presented ideas' (p23; 'vergegenwärtigt im Reigen der dargestellten Ideen', 
GS 1.1,209); it is again not simply the 'content' covered by the 'form' of 
its presentation, such that it may be revealed by a lifting of its cover, 
rather truth shows itself 'as the burning up of the cover entering the 
circle of ideas' (p31; 'als das Aufflammen der in den Kreis der Ideen 
eintretenden Hülle', GS 1.1,211). The truth of doctrine may thus be 
crudely summarized as the movement whereby, when a system is read as 
doctrine, the cognitive elements (ideas, names) break free from their 
confinement within their systematic ordering and become themselves a 
multiplicity of intentionless doctrinal unities, each encapsulating a unity 
of experience and knowledge of experience in a linguistic, doctrinal 
continuum. 
On the basis of this understanding of the truth of linguistic 
doctrine, it is now possible to reunite this emphasis upon language with 
the emphasis of section III on the temporality of the experience- 
contexture, by looking briefly at Benjamin's notion of 'reading'. 
V" Messianic Analysis - Benjamins Theory of Reading 
The purpose of looking at Benjmin's theory of reading is not to suggest 
that there is just one way of understanding his thinking of the temp- 
orality of language. Though it is certainly a pervasive notion through- 
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out Benjamin's work, it is only one way, another being, for example, the 
idea of translation. Given his understanding of doctrine as developed in 
section IV, it can now be understood that there is no one single unifying 
thought of language and time in Benjamin's work, but only particular 
ideas - reading and translation, for example - and individual works. This 
section is thus a basis for Chapters 5, in which individual works will be 
discussed, in that it is only a particular way Benjamin's thinking of the 
temporality of language came to unity in a name. 
In his first set of notes towards the Passagenwerk, written in' 1928- 
9, the following remark appears within a discussion of the 'name': 
Der Habitus eines gelebten Lebens: das ist es, was der Name 
aufbewahrt aber auch vorzeichnet. Mit dem Begriff der Mimesis 
ist zudem schon gesagt, daß der Bereich des Namens der des 
Änlichen ist. Und da die Ähnlichkeit das Organon der 
Erfahrung ist, so besagt das: der Name kann nur in 
Erfahrungszusammenhängen erkennt werden. <Q", 24>, GS V. 2, 
p1038) 
The habitus of a lived life: it is this which the name keeps 
safe, but also maps out. That the realm of the name is that of 
the similar, is already intimated in the concept of mimesis. And 
since similarity is the organon of experience, this means the 
name can only be recognised in experience-contextures. 
The temporal nature of the experience-contexture and the linguistic 
nature of the name, are brought together here in the notions of mimesis 
and similarity. In the short essays which Benjamin dedicated to these 
notions in 1933, The Doctrine of the Similar31 (Lehre vom Ähnlichen) and 
On the Mimetic Faculty32 (Über das mimetische Vermögen), Benjamin 
develops these notions through an idea of 'reading'. 33 The fact that in 
the past primitive peoples read their fate from stars, and entrails ("'To 
read what was never written"', OMF p336; "'Was nie geschrieben wurde, 
lesen"', GS 11.1,213) is given as evidence that they not only perceived a 
similarity between human life and the stars, but also that this perception 
was rooted in a mimetic faculty. Benjamin defines this faculty as the 
'powerful compulsion to become similar' (DS p69; 'gewaltige[r] Zwang[], 
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ähnlich zu werden', GS 11.1,210), that is, as the ability of the human to 
be determined in its existence by that perceived similarity. In the 
Program essay, Benjamin discusses the epistemology of primitive peoples 
who identify themselves with sacred animals in terms of being a 
particular epistemological mythology. Since the prevailing epistemological 
mythology changes over history, the modern person no longer knows what 
made it once possible to read a similarity between a constellation of stars 
and a human life. It is necessary, therefore, to speak of 'non-sensuous 
similarity' ('unsinnlichen Ähnlichkeit') in order for the idea of similarity 
not to be limited to the sensuous similarity determined by a particular 
modern form of perception. Thus the general idea of non-sensuous 
similarity can be understood as a reformulation of Benjamin's idea of the 
experience-contexture as a sphere of complete neutrality with respect to 
the epistemological mythology of subject and object. The reading of a 
similarity consequently partakes of a particular temporality: 
Ihre [die Ähnlichkeit] Wahrnehmung ist in jedem Fall an ein 
Aufblitzen gebunden. Sie huscht vorbei, ist vielleicht wieder- 
zugewinnen, aber kann nicht eigentlich wie andere Wahrneh- 
mungen festgehalten werden. Sie bietet sich dem Auge ebenso 
flüchtig, vorübergehend wie eine Gestirnkonstellation. (Lehre 
vom Ähnlichen GS 11.1.206) 
The perception of similarity is in every case bound to a 
flashing. It slips past, can possibly be regained, but really 
cannot be held fast, unlike other perceptions. If offers itself 
to the eye as fleetingly and transitorily as a constellation of 
stars. (Doctrine of the Similar p66) 
The image of a momentary flashing is reminiscent of the temporality of 
the shooting star. In the context of the essay, the constellation is read 
by an astrologer at the moment of birth, and the flashing similarity 
which is perceived is determinant for the future life or fate of the 
infant. The perceived similarity partakes of the temporality of the wish 
or hope, that is, fulfilled time. In the context of reading in the usual 
sense, the same temporality appears: 
Alles Mimetische der Sprache kann vielmehr, der Flamme ähnlich, 
nur an einer Art von Träger in Erscheinung treten. Dieser 
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Träger ist das Semiotische. So ist der Sinnzusammenhang der 
Wörter oder Sätze der Träger, an dem erst, blizartig, die 
Ähnlichkeit in Erscheinung tritt. (Über das mimetische 
Vermögen, GS 11.1,213) 
The mimetic element of language can only rather appear, like a 
flame, in a kind of bearer. This bearer is the semiotic element. 
Thus the coherence of words or sentences is the bearer in 
which, like a flash, similarity appears. (Mimetic Faculty p335) 
The 'semiotic element' refered to here is a reference to a sign theory of 
language, which was discussed above. The image of the 'bearer' and 
'flame' is reminscent, however, of Benjamin's description of truth in the 
Origin of German Tragic Drama. It would thus seem that reading is a 
process by which truth may appear, where truth is the flaring up of the 
non-sensuous similarity which constitutes the experience-contexture, and 
which is other wise constrained to a particular epistemological mythology. 
In the case of modern societies, this constraint is the 'uniquely temporally 
limited' form of Newtonian time-order, determining the mythology of sub- 
ject and object, signified and sign. Reading can thus be understood as 
the process by which the stretched, fulfilled time of the experience- 
contexture becomes momentarily visible, breaking out of its determination 
in the now-point. Benjamin writes for example: 
Das Tempo aber, jene Schnelligkeit im Lesen oder Schreiben, 
welche von diesem Vorgang sich kaum trennen läßt, wäre dann 
gleichsam das Bemühen, die Gabe, den Geist an jenem Zeitmaß 
teilnehmen zu lassen, in welchem 
Ähnlichkeiten, flüchtig und um 
sogleich wieder zu versinken, aus dem Fluß der Dinge hervor- 
blitzen. So teilt noch das profane Lesen - will es nicht 
schlechterdings um das Verstehen kommen - mit jedem magischen 
dies: daß es einem notwendigen Tempo oder vielmehr einem 
kritischen Augenblick untersteht, welchen der Lesende um 
keinen Preis vergessen darf, will er nicht leer ausgehen. 
(Lehre vom Ähnlichen, GS 11.1,209-10) 
So speed, that swiftness in reading or writing which can 
scarcely be separated from this process, would then become as 
it were, the effort or gift of letting the mind participate in 
that measure of time in which similarities flash up fleetingly 
out of the stream of things, only in order to immediately sink 
back again. Thus even profane reading, if it is not to forsake 
understanding altogether, shares this with that magical reading: 
that it is subject to a necessary speed, or rather a critical 
moment, which the reader must not forget at any cost unless he 
wishes to go away empty. (Doctrine of the Similar p68) 
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This idea of reading has resonances both with Benjamin's last 
writings and with his early notes on Kant. His sustained interest in a 
theory of reading would seem to spring from its combination of 
receptivity and spontaneity, 'effort or gift', and thus is related to his 
interest in the notion of translation. In Konvolut 'N, his theoretical 
notes to the Passagenwerk (written in the late 1930's), the idea of 
reading is given a central role. Benjamin asserts that reality is read like 
a text, and that the reality of the Nineteenth Century is to be treated as 
the book of past events ((N 4,23, GS V. 1,580). The relation of the 'then' 
to the 'now' is also read, such that they come flashingly into constellation 
in an image. The measure of time in which the image appears is called by 
Benjamin, the 'now of recognisability' ('Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit', IN 3,13; 
GS V. 1,578). This idea will be discussed further in Chapter 5 in the 
context of a theory of knowledge of history. In Benjamin's early notes 
the idea of reading appears in the idea that 'perception is reading' 
('Wahrnehmung ist Lesen', <fr 16-18>; GS VI, 32-33). The context of 
Benjamin's discussion is the circularity of experience and knowlege of 
experience in the experience-continuum, which he calls here 'the absolute 
surface' C'die absolute Fläche', <fr 18>, GS VI, 32). In this context also, 
reading is connected with the 'now of recognisability' such that Benjamin 
writes: 
Die Handlung, wie die Wahrnehmung treten nur gebrochen, 
uneigentlich, unreal in das Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit ein. [... ] 
Sie treten gebrochen, in Symbolischen Begriffen in das Jetzt 
der Erkennbarkeit ein, denn dieses Jetzt ist von Erkennbarkeit 
ganz allein erfüllt und durchwaltet. (<fr 25>, GS VI, 46) 
Actions, such as perception, enter the now of recognizability 
only brokenly, improperly, unreally. [... ] They enter brokenly 
in symbolic concepts into the now of recognisability, for this 
now is filled and run through only by recognisability. 
The 'now of recognisability' of reading (as perception) can be seen here 
to partake of the temporality of truth: the round dance of symbolically 
laden ideas which, in their intentionless multiplicity, fragment the 
173 
perception thought of as a transitive action. Thus in reading, not only 
does the fulfilled time of the experience-contexture flare up, but also 
that which is read has its meaningful context broken, becoming a multi- 
plicity of symbols or doctrines of the doctrinal unity of experience and 
knowledge of experience. 
In conclusion, therefore, reading can thus be seen to be constituted 
by the unity of Benjamin's thinking of the temporality of language: the 
fulfilled temporality of the continuum of experience and the discontinuous 
multiplicity of ideas and names, a messianic moment which explodes the 
now-point of a linear, homogeneous time-order and a doctrine which 
makes the separation of presentational 'form' and meaningful 'content', 
into a continuum. The systematic basis of these ideas is the method- 
ological grid underpinning of Benjamin's messianic analysis, of which 
reading and translation are names, and thus symbols of the impossibility 
of ultimately separating a 'methodological grid' from methodological Umweg, 
in relation to Benjamin's work. His systematic thinking of the temporal- 
ity of language in response to Kant constitutes the Umweg of his work, 
and the treatment of Benjamin's individual works in Chapter 5 will thus 
reflect the fact that they too are both symbols in and of this path of 
thinking. 
NOTES 
1. References to Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Rolf 
Tiedmann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1977) will be given in the form 'GS' followed by volume and 
page number. 
While much has . 
been written on Benjamin's thinking of language 
(primarily on the early essay Über Sprache überhaupt, GS 1.2,140-157 and 
the translation essay, Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers, GS IV. 1,9-21) and 
time (primarily in the context' of Benjamin's theory of history and the 
text Über den Begriff der Geschichte, GS 1.2,691-704), the two are rarely 
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taken together. One of the most thorough interpretations of Benjamin's 
work of language is Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamin's Theorie der 
Sprachmagie (Frankfurt am Maim: Suhrkamp, 1980), but Benjamin's 
rethinking of time and temporality in the same period as his work on 
language is not considered. 
2. Walter Benjamin, 'Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels' in GS 1.1,202- 
430 (p. 208). Translated in The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by 
John Osborne (London: Verso, 1977), p. 28. Cited in the text as 'OGTD'. 
3. Samuel Weber, 'Lecture de Benjamin', Critique (1969), 699-712, gives a 
sympathetic interpretation of Benjamin's enigmatic and elliptical style of 
writing in the light of Derrida's work. He overlooks, however, the 
question of systematicity and assumes system is simply and straight- 
forwardly rejected. The purpose of this chapter will be to ask precisely 
the question of whether Benjamin's thinking is systematic, and if so, why 
it appears so unsystematic. 
4. This sentence is not found in the English translation. 
S. The long study of the Passagenwerk by Susan Buck-Morss, The 
Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1989), is almost completely devoid of an 
appreciation of the philosophical bases of Benjamin's later work. 
Benjamin's early, more explicitly philosophical essays are not considered, 
and her method in consciously unphilosophical: '[This book] experiments 
with an alternative hermeneutic strategy more appropriate to [Benjamin's] 
"dialectics of seeing", one that relies, rather, on the interpretive power 
of images that make conceptual points concretely, with reference to the 
world outside the text. ' (p6) This method of allowing the images to speak 
for themselves without presuppositions, yields a reading of the Passagen- 
werk guided by the thinking of the Frankfurt School. Benjamin's 
criticism of the idea of a presuppositionless approach to a text will be 
considered in Chapter 5, and in general the approach taken to Benjamin's 
work in this thesis will be opposed to taking Benjamin's images and 
expressions at face value, and rather will be concerned to raise the 
question of their systematic basis. 
6. A prime example is Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing, which 
treats Benjamin's late Passagenwerk in isolation from his early work. 
Michael Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of 
Literature Criticism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
gives an overview of Benjamin's whole work, but the narrative structure 
used by Jennings is very much developmental. Jennings argues that after 
1912 Benjamin 'steadily developed a complex theory of literary criticism, 
which as he saw in the 1930's could be adapted to the representation of 
history. ' (p40) Against this tendency to separate Benjamin's work on 
literature and his work on history, the approach used here is to 
emphasize that even the early work on language can only be understood 
in the light of his rethinking of time. 
7. Rodolphe Gasche, 'Objective Diversions: On Some Kantian Themes in 
Benjamin's The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in 
Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, ed. by Andrew 
Benjamin and Peter Osborne (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 
pp. 183-204. 
8. Walter Benjamin. 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro- 
duction' in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schoken Books, 
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1969). Translation of 'Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit', GS 1.2,431-508. And Walter Benjamin, 'Some Motifs 
in Baudelaire' in Charles Baudelaire, trans. Harry Zohn (London and New 
York, 1976), pp. 107-154. This essay will be cited in the text as simple 
Baudelaire. Translation of 'Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire', GS 1.2. 
605-653. 
9. Christoph Hering in 'Messianic Time and Materialistic Progress: 
Aspects of the Relationship between Theology and Marxism in Walter 
Benjamin's Theses on the Philosophy of History, Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology, 16(2) (1985), 205-219, also fails to make this 
distinction, which leads his, like Gasch6, into a highly Kantian reading of 
Benjamin, in terms of an assertion of the primacy of the subject in 
opposition to the "'continuum"' of time: "'Blasting" open the continuum of 
history is to replace it by one in which human beings can be subjects of 
their own history. [... 1 Subjects and masters of their lives and no longer 
in terms of the functioning of an autonomous "continuum". ' (p164) 
10. Rodolphe Gasch6 essay, 'Saturnine Vision and the Question of 
Difference: Reflections on Walter Benjamin's Theory of Language', in 
Benjamin's Ground, ed. by Rainer Nägele (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1988), pp. 83-104, gives an account of the move from the 
systematicity of the Program essay to the idea of the way language 
exceeds its limitations in a work. He thereby imposes a chronological, 
developmental structure upon Benjamin's work, away from systematicity to 
a fluid, and non-systematic thinking. The persuasiveness of such a view 
is limited, however, because of his reading of the Program essay, which 
functions as the beginning of the developmental narrative. He regards 
the essay in terms of Benjamin thinking that 'an immediate absolute 
certainty of the absolute could be cognitively apprehended' (p97). This 
reading has no support in the essay, where Benjamin clearly understands 
the idea of 'higher experience' (called 'the absolute' by Gasche) as a 
critical medium of the existence of any knowledge, a 'sphere of total 
neutrality' with regard to knower and known. 
11. Walter Benjamin, 'On the Program of the Coming Philosophy', trans. 
Mark Ritter, in Benjamin: Philosophy, History, Aesthetics, ed Gary Smith 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 1-12. Cited 
below as Program. Translation of 'Über das Programm der kommenden 
Philosophie', GS 11.1,157-171. Cited below as Programm 
12. Claude Imbert discusses this complication in the context of Benjamin's 
relation to Neo-Kantianism, in 'Le present et 1'histoire' in Walter Benjamin 
et Paris, ed. by Heinz Wismann (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1986), pp. 743-792 
13. Walter Benjamin: Briefe, ed. by Gershom Scholem and Theodor Adorno, 
2 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), I, 150. 
14. Leo Lowenthal, 'The Integrity of the Intellectual: In Memory of Walter 
Benjamin', in Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. by Gary Smith 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 247-259, 
discusses Benjamin's complex relation to Neo-Kantianism. 
15. Klaus Christian Köhnke, The Rise of Neo-Kantianism, trans 
R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991) 
16. For further detail on the clash between Neo-Kantianism and 
phenomenology, see Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, 'Neo-Kantianism and 
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Phenomenology: The Case of Emil Lask and Johannes Daubert', Kant- 
Studien (1991), 303-318 
17. Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: die Geschichte einer Freundschaft 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), p. 77. Translated as The Story of a 
Friendship, trans. Harry Zohn (Philidelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
1981), p. 59. 
18. The verb translated 'turn up', vorkommen, is difficult to translate in 
this context. It may commonly be translated as 'to appear', 'to occur', 'to 
come forward', 'to come forward into appearance', 'to come to light'. 
While the context requires that the verb have an idea of something 
coming from outside, a translation such as 'comes to appear' has been 
avoided because it would seem to introduce a philosophical complexity 
alien to the use to the word vorkommen. The rather flat expression 
'turn up' has therefore been used. 
19. The first occurence of the word zeitlich is translated 'transitory' 
since it is clearly to be understood as a synonym for vergä nglich, just as 
zeitlos is a synonym for bleibend. The second occurence is translated 
'temporal' since it indicates the singularity of an experience which covers 
both the 'lasting' and the 'ephemeral'. 
20. Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in 
Illuminations p261. This phrase in the German is: 'das Kontinuum der 
Geschichte aufzusprengen' in 'Über den Begriff der Geschichte', GS 1.2. 
701. 
21. Claude Imbert, 'Le present et 1'histoire', gives a fine, though 
schematic overview of Benjamin's thought, stressing the importance of 
following Benjamin's thinking of time into his thinking of language. 
22. For further discussion of the essay, see Michael W. Jennings, 
Dialectical Images, chapter 5 (esp. 166-167). Claude Imbert also provides a 
useful account of the essay in terms of Benjamin's playing on the 
reflections set up between the novel and the novella, 'The Wonderous 
Young Neighbours', it contains. 
23. This interpretation of fulfilled, messianic time is at odds with the 
prevailing tendency to impose upon Benjamin's idea, the uncritical notion 
of a separation of temporal realms - the realm of history and a super- 
natural realm of messianic time. Such an interpretation is given by 
Buck-Morss in The Dialectics of Seeing, where she calls them 'time 
registers': 'They remain disconnected until the act of political revolution 
cuts accross history's secular continuum and blasts humanity out of it' 











The idea of two distinct temporal realms owes much to a certain 
interpretation of Plato, which will be discussed further in the chapters 
which follow. Buck-Morss, however, gives this idea a Christian emphasis 
by her reference to 'history's secular continuum', which is then shattered 
by an act which moves humanity into a different 'time register'. Jewish 
traditions of thought about the nature of history do not predominantly 
separate 'secular' history from Heilsgeschichte. Whilst Benjamin's 
thinking appears distinctly theological in many aspects, it is important 
not to treat Benjamin's terminology as if it introduces unquestioned 
metaphysical or religious assumptions, rather his terminology and the 
style of his thinking must be taken together with the critical base of his 
thought in Kant's philosophy. 
24. These three influences are explored by Menninghaus, Walter Benjamins 
Theorie der Sprachmagie (p22-36), in relation to Benjamin's theory of the 
'magical character of language'. By not focussing on Kant, however, 
Menninghaus misses the philosophical force of a linguistic understanding 
of phenomena for Hamann (and his interpretation of Kabbelah) and the 
Early German Romantics. 
25. Wohlfarth's well known essay, 'On Some Jewish Motifs in Benjamin', 
in The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, ed. by Andrew 
Benjamin (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 157-214, provides a 
fine account of the imagery of Benjamin's early essay, On Language As 
Such, but perhaps does not focus enough on the philosophical 
consequences of Scholem's work on Kabbelah, especially for the question 
of tradition. 
26. Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1961) 
27. See also Gershom Scholem, 'Revelation and Tradition As Religious 
Categories in Judaism', in The Messianic Idea in Judaism (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 282-303. Scholem distinguishes commentary, as 
seeking to make the Torah applicable 'hic et hunc' (p296), from Kabbelah 
as the expression of the force of divinity itself (p294). 
28. Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagje, 
provides a fine overview of this essay. He sees the three main issues 
as: 1) the theory of 'magic immediacy', 2) the theory of translation, and 3) 
the theory of 'abstract language elements' (p9). He does not, however, 
consider the phenomenological implications of the essay, as will be 
suggested below and developed in Chapter 5. 
29. Yves Kobry, 'Walter Benjamin et le langage'. Revue D'Esthbtique, 1 
(1981), 171-176, picks up this point particularly, but does not relate it to 
Benjamin's rethinking of the temporality of a sign theory or 'mystical' 
theory of language. 
30. Benjamin's idea of 'intentio' must be understood in the context of a 
rethinking of the idea of intentionality in phenomenology, as will be 
shown in Chapter 5. 
31. Walter Benjamin, 'Doctrine of the Similar', trans. Knut Tarnowski, in 
New German Critique, 17(1979), 65-69. Translation of 'Lehre vom 
Ähnlichen', GS 11.1,204-210. 
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32. Walter Benjamin, 'On the Mimetic Faculty' in Reflections, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), pp. 333-336. Trans- 
lation of 'Über das mimetische Vermögen', GS 11.1,210-213. 
33. Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamin's Theorie der Sprachmagie, 
gives an interpretation of these two essays in the light of 'On Language 
As Such'. His analysis of Benjamin's work does not take account of 
Benjamin's early rethinking of time, and thus he sees Benjamin's work as 
finding a way between a sign theory of language and an onomatopoeic 
one. 
CHAPTER 4: HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION CONCERNING TRANSLATION 
I. The Place of Translation 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the term Ereignis named Heidegger's way 
of thinking: the hermeneutic movement of a thorough-going, ecstatically 
temporal, circling poetic-temporal phenomenology. It was shown that this 
way of thinking arose from the ecstatic temporal phenomenology of Being 
and Time, via a questioning of its temporality of language (objective 
genitive), that is, a questioning of the subjectivity which grounded its 
expression (Aussprechen), such that in his later work the speaking from 
out of the hermeneutic circle reflected the ecstatic temporality of poetry, 
in other words, the temporality of language (subjective genitive). This 
chapter will essentially fill out this rather formal description by 
specifying Heidegger's thinking of translation in terms of a work and its 
traditions, thought from the movement of the hermeneutic circling of 
Ereignis. This determination of translation must thus be understood 
entirely within the contours of Heidegger's thinking of the temporality 
of language as explored in Chapter 2, but also be taken as inseparable 
from Heidegger's wider thinking of interpretation and the destruction of 
the history of ontology. 2 Translation, as involving the historicity of a 
linguistic work (what Benjamin will call its fore- and after-life), will be 
shown to bring together Heidegger's thinking of both poetry and history. 
By specifying Heidegger's thinking of translation, it will thus be possible 
to assess Heidegger's proximity to Benjamin. 3 The meaning and 
significance of this proximity for a thinking of the temporality of 
language will be explored in the Conclusion. 
While Heidegger's thinking of translation only has its 'place within' 
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his thinking as a 'whole', it is nevertheless true that there is a recipro- 
city between the 'place within' and the 'whole'. As well as clarifying the 
circling of phenomenology and poetry treated in Chapter 2, a focus upon 
translation has intrinsic importance for understanding the 'whole' of 
Heidegger's work. Translation is the place of the difference of Ge-Stell 
and Ereignis, and of modernity and antiquity, and the question of whether 
these terms are in opposition will reside at this point. Derrida, for 
example, in his essay Envoi4 concerning Heidegger's treatment of 
representation and the representational thinking found in modernity, 
clearly envisages an opposition between modernity and antiquity in 
Heidegger's thought, such that ancient Greece is understood as untainted 
by representational thinking. It is through a focusing on translation 
that this may be seen to be an inadequate response to Heidegger's por- 
trayal of the difference between antiquity and modernity. The fact that 
Ge-Ste11 and Ereignis are, for Heidegger, the same, has gone unrecognised 
in Heidegger scholarship. 5 Yet by focusing on translation it will be seen 
that the difference between the two ways of thinking is not an opposit- 
ion, but rather that translation mediates their difference within the same. 
This sameness of Ge-Stell and Ereignis will be explored below in relation 
to the thinking of language which is found in each. 
A further clarifying reciprocity comes into view once it is asked 
why translation should occupy such a central role in Heidegger's work. 
The following reasons for the importance of a questioning concerning 
translation will also apply to Benjamin's concern with translation, and 
thus will specify, though in an external way, the contours of the 
convergence of their projects as a whole. The first reason is that 
within the history of theorizing about translation, translation has 
predominantly been considered in terms of identity or economy. That is, 
a translation is thought of in terms of the transfer of the meaning or 
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'spirit' of a text in one language to a work in another language. The 
recognition that a perfect transfer is unobtainable leads to an idea of 
untranslatability and to theorization of loss and gain in translation: the 
loss of meaning can be compensated for by the gain in clarity, or in 
improvement of style, or in accessability of the translated text. An idea 
of identity remains present, however, as the ideal against which losses 
and gains may be calculated, and thus which underpins the closed economy 
in which the original and translation stand. In this ideal, an entity such 
as the text's 'meaning' or 'spirit' is posited as having an existence in- 
dependent of the materiality of the original, and which can be repeated 
identically in another text in another language, at another time. Such a 
separation of realms modelled on the discontinuity of Newtonian now- 
points, and found also in Kant's a priori, has been shown in Chapters 2 
and 3 to be a focus of criticism for both Heidegger and Benjamin. Since, 
then, translation embodies a thinking of the temporality of language, in 
terms of linguistic identity accross time, it is a natural focus for the 
rethinking of time and language. 
The second reason for the importance of questioning translation for 
Heidegger and Benjamin concerns philosophy itself as a tradition of 
thinking. Philosophy conceives its roots to be in Greek philosophy, yet 
it was Roman culture, and in Latin, that conceived of Greek works as 
authorities in a way which was to determine the future of philosophy as 
a tradition, a 'handing on' and augmenting of Greek knowledge. It is 
thus that philosophy itself would seem to be rooted between the Greek 
and the Roman, where this 'between' is constituted by translation. How 
this translation, or mediation between the Greek and Latin cultures is 
understood will thus be decisive for how philosophy itself is conceived. 
It is also at this point that the question will arise of what, for 
Heidegger and Benjamin, differentiates their thinking from Hegel's idea of 
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philosophy and history of philosophy. (Hegel's work will be understood 
as the systematic application of Kant's position to history. ) Heidegger's 
sympathies would seem to lie completely with Greek culture, while 
Benjamin's seem to lie with Roman culture (via his affiliation with Early 
German Romanticism). These appearances will be brought into question 
through an investigation of the-'mediation* between the Greek and Latin, 
ie., precisely the question of translation. 
The third reason for the importance of translation for Heidegger and 
Benjamin, is particular to their status as German thinkers. Luther's 
translation of the Bible, or what he called in his Circular Letter on 
Translation (1530), Verdeutschung, is of profound importance: first, in its 
role in the formation of a German cultural identity, and secondly for 
setting in motion a tradition of theorizing about cultural identity in 
terms of translation. Concerning the first, Luther's translation coupled 
with the invention of the printing press, allowed a lingua franca to form 
from out of the diverse dialects of the German states, thus enabling a 
wider German cultural identity to emerge. Antoine Berman in his book 
Epreuve de 1"etranger: Culture et traduction dans l'Allemangne romantic6 
shows how, in the second half of the Eighteenth Century, a time of 
increasing social and political unrest in the German states, and a time 
shortly before the first appearance of the political rhetoric of nation- 
alism, many leading German writers such as Lessing. Herder and Goethe 
understood translation as forming a necessary structural role in the 
process of Bildung. Bildung was to a great extent conceived as a 
circular movement, a movement beyond one's own borders (an übersetzen) 
to experience another culture, and then to return, enriching one's own; 
and it was by way of the translation of foreign texts into German that 
this was to be achieved. Significantly, Goethe suggested that Germany 
itself had no cultural identity, except as a medium, a Weltmarkt for the 
183 
works of all other countries. 7 This concern with translation in the 
process of Bildung, taken together with Voss's translations of Homer, 
prepared the ground on which German Romanticism and German Idealism 
were to flourish. 8 To give an example which will be taken up below (and 
in relation to Benjamin): Hegel's thought of the spirit's departure from 
itself, its subsequent alienation (precisely Entfremdung), and its return to 
itself, enriched, is perhaps the pinnacle of this thinking of Bildung. 
And when Heidegger writes: 'Das Heimischwerden ist so ein Durchgang 
durch das Fremde' (H'dlderlins Hymne 'Der Ister, GA 53,60), it will be 
necessary to ask if, or how, Heidegger's thinking of translation 
differentiates his work from Hegel's. 
These three reasons, identity in relation to language, the identity of 
philosophy, and cultural or 'spiritual' identity, must be seen as informing 
the context in which Heidegger and Benjamin sought to provide an analy- 
sis of the nature of translation. This context also helps to clarify the 
statement in Heidegger's work on Hölderlin's Der Ister, which appears at 
the end of a section initiated by Heidegger's translation of Sophocles' tö 
Scivöv (as a description of the human being) by des Unheimliche: "Sage 
mir, was du vom Übersetzen hältst, and ich sage dir, wer du bist" (GA 53, 
76; 'Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you 
are'). 9 A perceived need for a questioning of translation is also very 
much in evidence in the present period. The preface and conclusion to 
Berman's book reads like a manifesto for the recent boom in 'translation 
study' or traductologie. An underlying theme here, is the idea of trans- 
lation promoting dialogue and open mindedness; concerning translation 
Berman writes: 'Elie est mise en rapport, ou elle nest rien' (p16). 
Berman's work falls back on an implicit metaphor of liberal democracy 
with the translated work as a representative of opinion entering a forum 
of discussion. There have, however, been attempts to think through the 
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nature of translation more philosophically, for example in the work of 
Andrew Benjamin and Jacques Derrida. lo Andrew Benjamin's work is much 
indebted to Derrida's, but avoids the latter's refusal to understand 
translation outside of the opposition translatable-untranslatable. 11 
Derrida's working within this opposition, together with his refusal to 
see deconstruction as a critical project which is itself a form of trans- 
lation (which would mark a belonging to a tradition which includes the 
Early German Romantics, Walter Benjamin and Heidegger), is of consider- 
able significance for understanding his work as a rethinking of the 
temporality of language. 
Section II of this chapter will discuss translation in relation to a 
rethinking of how a literary work is 'itself' to be understood, beyond its 
determination in the Ge-Ste11. The specifically hermeneutic question of 
what guides a translation, rethought in this way, will be discussed in 
section III. This separation is for clarity only - the place of translation 
for Heidegger is always that of a hermeneutic situation, and there can be 
no question of Heidegger wanting to return to the work 'itself' in some 
objective sense. 
11. Ge-Stell and the Law of Translation 
The most striking aspect of the place of translation in Heidegger's work 
is that it has no fixed place. Considering alone the importance for 
Heidegger of the translation of Greek terms, for example &). Oster, 
throughout his continual Wiederholung of Greek philosophy, it is sur- 
prising that he never wrote a text explicitly laying out his thinking on 
translation. Instead, one finds remarks scattered over many works where 
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the issue of translation arises from the discussion at hand, the longest 
being in section 1 of the Parmenides lecture course (GA 54,14-20) and in 
section 12 of the lectures on Der Ister (GA 53,74-76,79-83). One 
possible reason for this is that since his work was so thoroughly 
concerned with the question of translation in different guises, he did not 
wish to produce a definitive statement which may have been taken for a 
translation procedure. There is thus no pre-existing, sustained focus on 
translation in Heidegger's work, rather it is a case of allowing 
Heidegger's thinking act as a parabolic mirror, focusing on a single 
place, which itself becomes illuminating for the whole of his work, and 
further serves as the place of the Zwiesprache between his thinking and 
Benjamin's. 12 The place of translation in Heidegger's work must, there- 
fore, in a sense be reconstructed, and this must be done in the light of 
his thinking of the temporality of language as a whole, explored in 
Chapter 2.13 
In this section, Heidegger's thinking of translation will be considered 
in terms of what will be called the law of translation, or more precisely 
the Ge-setz as that which gathers the original and the translated text 
into a calculative economy. This clarificatory term must be taken as 
parallel to Heidegger's term Ge-Stell and as denoting of the economy of 
translation in modernity. 14 The term Ge-Stell is Heidegger's term for the 
essence of modern technology. What is being suggested, therefore, is that 
Heidegger thinks of the essence of translation in modernity in a parallel 
way to his thinking of technology. In the essay The Question Concerning 
Translation, Heidegger begins by characterising in a broad fashion how 
technology is conceived: technology is a means to an end, technology is a 
human activity (QT 4; 'ein Mittel für Zwecke', 'ein menschliches Tun', VA 
14). Heidegger remarks that these definitions are correct, but that they 
do not uncover the essence of technology. It is through the uncovering 
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of the essence of technology, that the truth of the situation may itself 
be glimpsed. In a parallel way to technology, translation in modern times 
is conceived of as a means to an end: a human activity to enable a work 
to be read by a wider audience who cannot read it in its original 
language. 15 Thus Heidegger writes in the Parmenides lecture course: 
'Zunächst fassen wir diesen Vorgang äußerlich technisch-philologisch' (GA 
54,17; 'At first we conceive of this process in an external and technico- 
philological way' 16). And in the Ister lecture he writes: 'Technisch 
gerechnet ist das Übersetzen das Ersetzen der fremden Sprache durch die 
eigene oder umgekehrt' (GA 54,80; 'Considered technologically, translation 
is the replacement of the foreign language by one's own or vice versa'). 
In this technological view of translation, language is conceived as a 
system of signs, such that the meaning signified by a text in one 
language may be accurately reproduced by signs in a different language. 1 7 
Translation is a means of transport by which the information in a text 
may gain greater circulation in the world-wide traffic of mass- 
communication. For Heidegger, this circulation is over-seen by the 
dictionary as statute book, the authority of which lays down the law 
determining good and bad translations: 
Wer entscheidet aber und wie entscheidet man über die 
Richtigkeit einer 'Übersetzung'? Unsere Kenntnis der 
Wortbedeutungen einer fremden Sprache 'beschaffen' wir uns 
aus dem 'Wörterbuch'. [... ] Die Berufung auf das Wörterbuch 
bleibt immer nur die Berufung auf eine in ihrer Art und ihren 
Grenzen meist gar nicht faßbar Auslegung einer Sprache. 
Sobald wir freilich die Sprache nur als Verkehrsmittel 
betrachten, ist das auf die Technik des Verkehrs und des 
Austausches zugeschnittene Wörterbuch 'ohne weiteres' 'in der 
Ordnung' und verbindlich. (Hdlderlins Hymne 'Der Ister' p74-5 
Who decides though, and how does one decided on the correct- 
ness of a 'translation'? For our knowledge of the word mean- 
ings in a foreign language, we 'employ' a 'dictionary'. E... ] The 
appeal to the dictionary remains always only an appeal to an 
interpretation of language, which is oblivious of its manner 
and limits. Certainly as soon as we consider language only as a 
means of transport, the dictionary (which is geared up to 
traffic and exchange) is 'in order', 'without further ado' and 
binding. 18 
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Heidegger's criticism of a simple recall to the dictionary in translation 
must not be misunderstood as a bemoaning of the lack of creativity 
amongst translators. Nor is it simply a case of campaigning for a 
hermeneutically phenomenological view of language, such as was discussed 
in Chapter 2 Cie. the word as the showing Saying which lets the 
phenomenon be). Both views would imply that the law of translation is 
something which can simply be repealed, as if it were simply a human 
construction. 
In a parallel way in The Question Concerning Technology, it is 
emphasised that the Ge-Stell is not simply a human activity, but rather it 
is that which gathers man and object into a calculative economy in which 
they stand opposite each other, mutually reflecting and re-inforcing their 
object-like statuses. 19 This reflectivity is the correlative, on a larger 
scale, to the closed reflectivity which was shown in Chapter 1 to operate 
between Kant's transcendental ego and the transcendental justification of 
Newtonian objectivity. It is for this reason that, for Heidegger, the end 
of metaphysics is technology. The Ge-setz of translation can be seen as 
the inner law of the essence of technology. It is the determination of 
language in the Ge-setz, as the means of transport of information, which 
allows entities to appear as objects denoted by words, and the human 
being to appear as a subject which has language for its use, and for 
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there to thus be a circulation of information between subject and object. 
The Ge-setz as the gathering of word and meaning into a lawful corres- 
pondence, simultaneously gathers the subject, who has the word, and the 
object, which is meant, into the Ge-Stell. 
Just as in The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger makes 
clear that it is not the case that first there are subjects and objects, 
which only subsequently befall the calculative ordering of the Ge-Stell, 
but rather it is the Ge-stell which first lets there be subjects and 
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objects, so the Ge-setz does not supervene upon 'signifier' and 'signified', 
but rather lets the signifier be as signifier and the signified be as 
signified. What is meant by this, is that Ge-Stell and Ge-setz are the 
names for a particular hermeneutic interpretation of existence; 
'particular', in that the proper Cie. ecstatically temporal) circularity of 
being has been grounded via a particular determination of the temporality 
of that circularity, in order to give rise to a simple reflectivity between 
two objects. 20 
It can now be understood that in an essay such as The Question 
Concerning Technology there are essentially two forms of circularity 
operating. Ge-Stell and Ereignis are the same, though differentiated in 
their temporality. Ge-Stell is a hermeneutic way of thinking constituted 
by the Newtonian temporality; Ereignis is a hermeneutic way of thinking 
constituted by ecstatic temporality. It is for this reason that, for 
Heidegger, Ge-Stell carries a revolutionary potential, a 'saving power'21: 
once the essence of technology is recognised as a determination of being, 
in a certain hermeneutic circularity, it becomes possible to glimpse being 
in another circularity, 'beyond' the limitation of the hermeneutic 
circularity of being to a Newtonian temporality, 'beyond' a reflectivity (of 
subject and object, ground and grounded) across a Kantian a priori 
divide. This 'beyond' is not a transition to a true revelation of being 
which has existed in a super-historical realm, independent of its man- 
ifestations in history, such that Ge-Stell would be a particular 
appearance of a timeless universal. Rather it is a 'widening' or 
'stretching' of the circularity beyond its limitation to a Newtonian 
circularity, in the way that, in Chapter 2, it was shown that the 
Newtonian now-point was only a particular, narrow determination of the 
span of ecstatic, stretched temporality. In the case of Ge-Stell it is not 
a question of simply discarding, but, rather, rethinking its circularity, so 
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also there is no question of translation being abandoned as inherently 
caught in its Ge-setz, but rather a need for rethinking it in a more 
appropriate way. Once the law of translation, which rules in Ge Stell, is 
recognised as gathering word and object, original and translation, into a 
peculiar circularity, the possiblity arises of another way of thinking 
translation where the temporality of language is thought in the proper 
temporality of Ereignis. 
Heidegger expresses the relation between Ge-Stell and Ereignis with 
particular clarity as follows: 
Das Zusammengehören von Mensch und Sein In der Weise der 
wechselseitigen Herausforderung bringt uns bestürzend näher, 
daß und wie der Mensch dem Sein vereignet, das Sein aber dem 
Menschenwesen zugeeignet ist. Im Ge-Stell waltet ein seltsames 
Vereignen und Zueignen. Es gilt, dieses Eignen, worin Mensch 
und Sein einander ge-eignet sind, schlicht zu erfahren, d. h. 
einzukehren in das, was wir Ereignis nennen. C... 1 Was wir im 
Ge-Stell als der Konstellation von Sein und Mensch durch die 
moderne technische Welt erfahren, ist ein Vorspiel dessen, was 
Er-eignis heißt. Dieses verharrt jedoch nicht notwendig in 
seinem Vorspiel. Denn im Er-eignis spricht die Möglichkeit an, 
daß es das bloße Walten des Ge-Stells in ein anfänglicheres 
Ereignen verwindet. 
The belonging together of man and being in the manner of 
mutual challenge drives home to us with startling force that 
and how man is made appropriate to being and being is 
dedicated appropriately to the essence of man. Within the Ge- 
Stell there prevails a strange making-appropriate and a strange 
dedication. We must experience simply this appropriating in 
which man and being are appropriated to each other, that is, 
we must enter into what we call Ereignis. C... 1 What we exper- 
ience in the Ge-Stell as the constellation of being and man 
through the modern world of technology is a prelude of what 
is called Er-eignis. It does not necessarily persist in its 
prelude. For in the Er-eignis the possiblity arises that it may 
overcome the mere dominance of the Ge-Stell to turn it into a 
more incipient appropriating. (The Principle of Identity p36-7) 
The first two sentences make clear that Ge-Stell itself can drive home its 
hermeneutic nature. The third sentence shows that to recognise this 
circular and mutual determination is already to enter into the way of 
thinking of Ereignis. Ge-Stell is a prelude of Ereignis, since once the 
former's circularity has been recognised, the way is open to a move from 
a 'peculiar' determination of its circularity to a more anfenglich one. 
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What, at first sight, may appear to be an opposition between Ge-Stell and 
Ereignis, is rather a change in translation: a movement or translation 
from one interpretation of translation to another. And it is in translat- 
ing Greek thought that Heidegger attempts to keep open the glimpse of 
another thinking of translation, another thinking of language and time. 
In Greek philosophy, Heidegger 'found' evidence of a way of thinking 
language and time which was not ruled by the Ge-setz of the relation of 
word and thing as a relation of two objects. 22 Rather he found an idea 
of phenomenology in the sense of a letting-be-shown of something in its 
coming to presence, as explored in Chapter 2. In the word &). fjOctoc he 
found a thinking of the movement of this coming to unconcealment which 
had not yet been limited into a reflectivity of two object-like realms. 
That is, &X Gcioc named the thinking of a more anfänglich hermeneutic 
circularity. The word anfänglich, often translated 'initial' or 'original', 
could easily suggest that Heidegger's references to the Greeks are essent- 
ially a part of a prelapsarian longing in his thought. 23 However, the 
word, for Heidegger, is linked to the need to rethink the Greek idea of 
motion. 24 What is unconcealed does not simply leave behind its concealed 
state as if they were two realms separated on the model of Newtonian 
now-points, rather the beginning persists through- the movement. The 
prefix an- is an attempt to suggest this in its ambiguity between its 
indication of a start of something (eg anbrennen, 'to catch fire') and of 
an approaching something (eg anrennen, 'to run into something'). The 
nature of this beginning which persists through the movement is well 
illustrated in Heidegger's interpretation of the concept of (püatc: 
Gewiß ist (püaswS ö8oS eiS (püaty eine Weise des Hervorkommens 
in die Anwesung, in der das Woher und Wohin und Wie der 
Anwesung dasselbe bleibt. Die (püaiS ist Gang als Aufgang zum 
Aufgehen und so allerdings ein In-sich-zurück-Gehen, zu sich, 
das ein Aufgehen bleibt. Das nur räumlich Bild des Kreises 
reicht wesenhaft nicht zu, weil dieser in sich zurückgehende 
Aufgang gerade aufgehen läßt Solches, von dem, zu dem der 
Aufgang je unterwegs ist. 
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Certainly p6acta69os sic cpüaiv is a mode of coming forth into 
the presencing in which the 'from which' and the 'to which' 
and the 'how' remain the same. (DüaiS is a progression in the 
sense of an emergence towards a going-forth, and so is a going 
back into itself, to itself, which remains a going-forth. The 
merely spatial image of a circle is essentially inadequate because 
this emergence which goes back into itself precisely lets 
something go forth, from which and to which the emergence is 
on the way. 25 
The 'merely spatial image of a circle' is inadequate because it suggests 
that cüaiS returns to itself after an alienation into a particular 'thing 
of nature'. Rather, that which cpüalS lets go-forth must be thought in a 
more hermeneutic circularity where the beginning is not simply left 
behind and then returned to, but rather where the starting point (the 
'from which') and the completion (the 'to which') stretch out towards each 
other in the phenomenological 'how' of their belonging together. 
The movement of this transition is always in danger of being covered 
over, such that the starting point and completion become separated, and 
the hermeneutic circularity becomes the circular reflectivity of two 
objects accross a divide: 
Die cp(xnS ist das sich-herstellende Wegstellen ihrer selbst, und 
deshalb gehört zu ihr ein einzigartiges Sich-zustellen von 
solchem, was durch sie erst aus einem Verfüglichen, wie z. B. 
Wasser, Licht, Luft, zu einem nur ihr Geeigneten, z. B. zu 
Nahrung and so zu Saft und Knochen wird. Mann kann dieses 
Geeignete für sich als Verfügliches nehmen und das Verfügliche 
als Stoff betrachten und die pGaic als einen 'Stoffwechsel'. 
(Vom Wesen und Begriff der Obi m; p298) 
016at; is the self-producing putting-away of itself, and 
therefore it possesses a unique self-delivering of that which, 
through it, from first being something orderable (eg water, 
light, air), becomes something appropriated for it alone (eg 
nutriment, and thus into sap or bones). One can take this 
'appropriate' for itself as the 'order-able' and consider this 
'order-able' as 'material', and therefore take (püair, as a 
'changing of material'. (On the Being and Conception of Oüai4 
p267) 
In this quotation, Heidegger is arguing that, instead of being thought 
appropriately in a hermeneutic circle of mutual appropriation of the 
'from which' and the 'to which', (p ao can be taken as the transformation 
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of one material into another. The movement appropriate to hermeneutic 
thinking thus becomes the change from one object-like state to another. 
The closure of the hermeneutic circle to a narrow reflectivity is what 
distinguishes metaphysical thinking from the thinking of Ereignis. For 
example, in Kant the realm which underpins the experience, of objects is 
no longer a basic materiality, but is the Newtonian existence of the 
transcendental subject. And in the Ge-Stell the mutual appropriateness of 
subject and object has taken hold to the extent that both, in their object- 
like status, enter into a calculative economy. In an essay such as The 
Question Concerning Technology, an interpretation of Greek thinking is 
brought in to indicate a hermeneutic way of thinking which has not been 
closed down in this way, and thus which holds open the possiblity of 
widening Ge-Stell into Er-eignis, as a properly hermeneutic way of 
thinking. Heidegger's translations and interpretations of Greek thinking 
are thus concerned with a avoidence of the reading back the Ge-setz of 
Ge-Stell into Greek thinking. It is rather a case of showing that every 
translation involves a hermeneutic interpretation of language and time, in 
precisely offering a translation which tries to show the properly 
anfänglich essence of Greek thought, and thus indicating that objectivity 
is only one form of presencing. Heidegger's translations must not, 
therefore, be taken as binding or as communicating the original meaning 
of the words as if his concerns were purely philological. Rather, their 
concern is always to bring to light the essence of Ge-Stell and its law of 
translation as a hermeneutic circularity and thus open the possiblity of a 
more authentic way of thinking. 
. 
In the translating-interpretation of a text, such as Aristotle's 
Physics, and particularly the word q)üaiS, it is a case of bringing to 
light the historical transformations which constitute the text. That is, 
of showing the way a particular interpretation of temporality determines, 
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in a hermeneutic way, the saying-showing of its language and shapes the 
historical and poetic resources which that language brings with it. This 
is a questioning of the text guided by the temporal-phenomenological 
analysis of Being and Time. And just as the questioning approach of the 
temporal analysis was seen by the later Heidegger to be guided by a 
thinking of language's own temporality (the temporality of language, 
subjective genitive), so the 'making understandable'26 of a text must show 
the way the language of a text ultimately breaks through its determin- 
ation into a particular temporality and how its Saying comes to pass in a 
more proper way. This two-fold movement of a questioning of a text's 
systematic determination of temporality and a 'listening' to its language in 
its Saying-showing is precisely the way of thinking named by Ereignis 
which was explored in Chapter 2. This way of thinking through the 
matter in question is at the heart of Heidegger's 'destructive' interpret- 
ations (Auslegungen, from auslegen, literally 'laying out') of the history 
of metaphysics. That is, they are the 'laying out' and 'making under- 
standable' of the interpretation of time and language which is being laid 
out in the text itself. Translation is not simply a special case of this 
way of this 'making understandable' (i. e. when the text is in another 
language), rather there is always already a translation operating in every 
text (and every speaking), which is precisely its interpretation of 
language and time. Heidegger's way of thinking through a text is to lay 
out this interpretation or translation which already constitutes the 
systematicity of the text. The question of whether the text is in one's 
own language or in a foreign languge is secondary to the need to lay out 
the interpretation-translation which constitutes it's systematicity, in the 
light of Ereignis, that is, a laying out of the temporality of its language 
(subjective genitive) through a questioning of the temporality of its 
language (objective genitive). 
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The 'making understandable' of a text through translation or inter- 
pretation is thus not the attempt to provide a clear and distinct or 
correct version of a text, but is rather the attempt to cross over into 
the movement of a text, in the play of the temporality of language in its 
systematicity. This is only possible when the law of translation has been 
grasped as a particular hermeneutic of language and time and thus it has 
been glimpsed that language and time can be thought in a more authentic 
way, that is, when Ereignis has been glimpsed in the form of Ge-Stell and 
its Ge-setz. Once the law of translation has been recognised as only a 
'particular'27 thinking of translation, the particular and narrow play of 
language and time in modernity, it becomes possible to enter into the play 
of a text without simply importing the modern Ge-setz. By thinking 
through a text in the light of Ereignis, the possibility is glimpsed of 
opening the present to a more authentic thinking of language and time. 
The role of the translator or interpretor is thus to avoid standing over 
above a text, interpreting it or translating it as if it were a stable 
object of analysis to which the rules of the Ge-setz could be applied, 
rather it is a case of entering into the translation which already con- 
stitutes the text, allowing it to unfold in the light of Ereignis and thus 
to keep open a glimpse of Ereignis in the Ge-Stell. If the translation, 
which is the circular, systematic togetherness of language and time 
constituting a text, is thought of as the 'word' of the poet, and also as 
the hidden situation of all speaking, a situation which shows itself in 
modernity in the form of the Ge-setz, it then becomes possible to 
understand the following consise explanation of Heidegger's, laying out 
his thinking of this translation: 
Man meint, das 'Übersetzen' sei die Übertragung einer Sprache 
in eine andere, der Fremdsprache in die Muttersprache oder 
umgekehrt. Wir verkennen jedoch, daß wir ständig auch schon 
unsere eigene Apache, die Muttersprache, in ihr eigenes Wort 
übersetzen. Sprechen und Sagen ist in sich ein Übersetzen, 
dessen Wesen keineswegs darin aufgehen kann, daß das 
übersetzende und das übersetzte Wort verschiedenen Sprachen. 
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[... ] Die Dichtung eines Dichters, die Abhandlung eines Denkers 
steht in ihrem eigenen, einmaligen, einzigen Wort. Sie zwingt 
uns, dieses Wort immer wieder so zu vernehmen, als hörten wir 
es zum ersten Mal. Diese Erstlinge des Wortes setzen uns 
jedesmal über zu einem neuen Ufer. Das sogenannte Übersetzen 
und Umschreiben folgt immer nur dem Übersetzen unseres ganzes 
Wesens in den Bereich einer gewandelten Wahrheit. Nur wenn 
wir schon diesem Übersetzen übereignet sind, sind wir in der 
Sorge des Wortes. Erst aus der so gegründeten Achtung vor 
der Sprache können wir die meist leichtere und begrenztere 
Aufgabe übernehmen, fremdes Wort in das eigene zu übersetzen. 
(Parmenides, GA 54,17-18) 
It is said that 'translating' is the transposing of one language 
into another, of the foreign language into the mother tongue, 
or vice versa. What we fail to recognise, however, is that we 
are also already constantly translating our own language, the 
mother tongue, into its own proper word. Speaking and saying 
is in itself a translation, the essence of which can by no means 
be concerned only with the case where the translating and 
translated words belong to different languages. [... ] The 
poetry of a poet or the treatise of a thinker stands in its 
own, singular, unique word. It compels us to perceive this 
word again and again as if we were hearing it for the first 
time. These newborn words carry us over in each case to a 
new shore. So-called translation and paraphrase always only 
follow upon the carrying-over of our whole essence into the 
realm of a transformed truth. Only if we are already 
appropriated over to this carrying-over are we in the care of 
the word. Only out of a respect before language, grounded in 
this way, can we assume the generally lighter and more limited 
task of translating a foreign word into our own. (Parmenidas, 
p12-13) 
The beginning of this quotation sets out the idea of the translation 
which constitutes all speaking and saying. This may now be understood 
as the way the temporality of language (objective genitive) is determined 
by the Newtonian temporality of the hermeneutic of Ge-Steil, while at the 
same time language's historicity, or the temporality of language, resists 
such a determination by showing itself in its historical and poetic 
resonences, and not just in an objective, significatory dimension. Every 
'use' of language is therefore also a showing-Saying by language in its 
ecstatic temporality, but it is a Saying which is cut-short by the limited, 
Newtonian conception of time in the Ge-Stell in which it is 'used'. The 
translation into its proper word (its showing-Saying) which constitutes 
every speaking and saying, shows itself properly in the works of those 
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thinkers and poets who listen to language's Saying and respond to it by 
letting it show itself in a way which re-opens the closed circle of signi- 
fier and signified. The word of the poet or thinker must, therefore, be 
heard not under the jurisdiction of the law of the Ge-Stell, but rather as 
bringing to light each time a singular hermeneutic circularity of the 
temporality of language of its Saying. This Saying must be heard as a 
singularity because, in its Saying, there is a rethinking of language and 
time beyond the simple repeated application of the law of word and 
correct meaning, whose Ge-setz is constituted by the temporality of a 
repetition of identical Newtonian now-points. 
The translation-into-its-proper-word which constitutes every 
speaking and saying is for the most part held within the law of Ge-Ste11. 
When, however, the work of a poet or thinker is taken as a thinking 
through of the hermeneutic circularity of the temporality of language in 
an authentic way, it must be responded to appropriately, that is in the 
light of Ereignis and not Ge-Stell. This responding to a work is a 
'making understandable' by further translation or interpretation, and thus 
an unfolding of the translation which already constitutes the work. 
Indeed, the work must be regarded as calling for this response if it is to 
be, as a work of thinking or poetry, and not just the communication of 
certain information. That is, the work must not be considered as 
existing object-like in a moment of time which is now past, rather the 
thinking through of a text in the light of Ereignis gives rise to a 
different view of its existence through time: not the handing itself on, 
unchanged, from Newtonian now-point to Newtonian now-point, but rather 
from the point of view of the translation which constitutes it and which 
it also calls for. From the point of view of the translation which 
constitutes a work, its Saying may be historically covered over by the 
imposition of a particular determination of the temporality of language, 
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thus its assimilation to that way of thinking. However, the thinking 
through of a work in the light of Ereignis can once again bring its 
translation to appearance precisely by allowing the interplay of its 
temporality of language and its language's temporality to show itself. In 
this way the glimpse of Ereignis beyond Ge-Stell is held open and thus 
also the possiblity of other ways of thinking beyond the present 
dominance of technology. This way of thinking a work's translation 
beyond its determination as the transmission of information about ideas is 
expressed by Heidegger in his lecture course on Der Ister. Since it 
contains many of the ideas which have been discussed, it is worth 
quoting at length: 
Es gibt überhaupt keine Übersetzung in dem Sinne, daß das 
Wort der einen Sprache mit dem Wort der anderen zur Deckung 
gebracht werden könnte oder auch nur dürfte. Diese 
Unmöglichkeit soll jedoch wiederum nicht dazu verleiten, die 
Übersetzung Im Sinne eines bloßen Versagens abzuwerten. Im 
Gegenteil: Die Übersetzung kann sogar Zusammenhänge ans Licht 
bringen, die in der übersetzten Sprache zwar liegen, aber nicht 
herausgelegt sind. Hieraus erkennen wir, daß jedes Übersetzen 
ein Auslegung sein muß. Zugleich gilt aber auch das 
Umgekehrte: Jede Auslegung und alles, was in ihrem Dienst 
steht, ist ein Übersetzen. Dann bewegt sich das Übersetzen 
nicht allein zwischen zwei verschiedenen Sprachen, sondern es 
gibt innerhalb derselben Sprache ein Übersetzen. Die Auslegung 
der Hymnen Hölderlins ist ein Übersetzen innerhalb unserer 
deutschen Sprache. Das gleiche gilt von der Auslegung, die z. B. 
Kants 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' order Hegels 'Phänomenologie 
des Geistes' zum Thema hat. In der Erkenntnis, daß es sich 
hier notwendig um ein Übersetzen handelt, liegt die Anerken- 
nung, daß solche 'Werke' ihrem Wesen nach übersetzungs- 
bedürftig sind. Diese Bedürftigkeit ist aber kein Mangel, 
sondern ihr innerer Vorzug. (... ] Das Auslegen als 
Übersetzen 
ist zwar ein Verständlichmachen - freilich nicht in dem Sinne, 
wie der gemeine Verstand dies meint. [... ] Verständlichmachen 
darf nie heißen, eine Dichtung und ein Denken jedem beleibigen 
Meinen und dessen Verständnis-Horizont anzugleichen; 
verständlich machen heißt, das Verständnis dafür wecken, daß 
der blinde Eigensinn der gewöhlichen Meinens gebrochen und 
verlassen werden muß, wenn die Wahrheit eines Werkes sich 
enthüllen soll. (1.181derlins Hymne 'Der Ister' p77-78) 
There is no translation in the sense that a word from one 
language could or should be brought to cover the word from 
another. This impossiblity ought not to tempt us to devalue 
translation as a complete failure. On the contrary: the trans- 
lation can even bring contextures to light which lay in the 
translated language, but not laid out. From this we see that 
every translation must be an interpretation. Straight away, 
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however, the reverse holds: every interpretation and everything 
in its service, is a translation. For the translation does not 
simply move between two different languages, but there is a 
translation inside the same language. The interpretation of 
Hölderlin's Hymns is a translation within our German language. 
The same goes for the interpretation, which for example Kant's 
'Critique of Pure Reason' or Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit' 
have for a theme. In the knowledge that it is a matter of 
translation here, lies the recognition that such 'works' are in 
need of translation according to their essence. This need is 
not a lack, but their inner distinction. [ ... ] Interpretation as 
translation is indeed a making understandable - but certainly 
not in the way common sense means it. [... ] To make 
understandable must never mean to align a piece of poetry or 
thinking with whatever opinion (and horizon of understanding 
of that opinion) one likes; to make understandable means to 
waken an understanding of the necessity for the blinding 
stubbornness of common opinion to be broken and left behind, 
if the truth of the work is to uncover itself. 28 
A work such as Kant's Critique of Pure Reason or Hegel's Phenomenology 
of Spirit, is an interpretation (Auslegung), and thus a translation, within 
the German language, but one which is not laid out (herausgelegt). Such 
works are consequently in need of translation (Ubersetzungsbediºrftig), 
that is, they require further translation in order to uncover their truth 
as the movement of the translation which constitutes them. This further 
translation is thus the laying out (Aus-legen) and reinstating of the 
translation constituting the text. The end of the quotation is again a 
reference to the way the making-understandable of a text is a breaking 
of the dominance of Ge-Stell and thus the holding open of a glimpse of 
Ereignis in which the work may stand in the truth of its unconcealment. 
For Heidegger, the translation of Greek philosophy took pre-eminent 
importance in regard to this opening up of Ge-Stell. The temporality of 
language he 'found' there was an authentic circularity in transition to a 
reflectivity of static realms (cf. above, on Heidegger's interpretation of 
(p( tS). Put in another way, truth as unconcealment, the letting-show of 
something in its coming to presence, was in transition to truth as corr- 
ectness, the accurate correspondence of a thing to its idea. Heidegger's 
relationship to Aristotle and Plato is thus marked by an ambiguity29 
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where the covering up of truth as unconcealment was already taking 
place, but where the laying out of this translation which constitutes 
their philosophy would at the same time bring to light a more authentic 
way of thinking. The disaster which Heidegger saw in the Latin trans- 
lation of Greek terms consisted precisely in the levelling of Greek 
philosophy to the idea of truth as correctness, in a translation which did 
not respond to the need of the translation constituting Greek thought. 
In particular, Plato's work became a certain Platonism of distinct and 
separate realms where the Christian doctrine of creator and creation 
could take up their respective abodes, and in which form, the ground was 
laid for metaphysics. 
Heidegger's translations of Greek philosophy aim, therefore, to bring 
to light the authentic circularity already being closed down in Greek 
philosophy in comparison to the dominance of this closure in Ge-Stell, 
and by so doing keep open the glimpse of Ereignis in Ge-Stell. This 
bringing to light of the circularity of Ge-Stell by a translation of Greek 
philosophy which shows a more authentic circularity is most clearly 
illustrated in the 1967 lecture Die Herkunft der Kunst and die 
Bestimmung des Denkens30. The lecture falls in three parts, the first 
outlines the circular essence of Greek thought, the second describes its 
restriction to the reflectivity of object and subject, and the third 
stresses the need for a step back into a retranslation of Greek thinking 
in order to move beyond this closed reflectivity. The circularity of the 
Greek experience of knowledge is presented in terms of the prior look of 
Athena, the goddess of practical wisdom, which guides the artisan: 
Wohin geht der sinnende Blick der Göttin. Auf den Grenzstein, 
auf die Grenze. Die Grenze jedoch ist nicht nur Umriß und 
Rahmen, nicht nur das, wobei etwas aufhört. Grenze meint 
jenes, wodurch etwas in sein Eigenes versammelt ist, um daraus 
in seiner Füller zu erscheinen, in die Anwesenheit hervorzu- 
kommen. Der Grenze nachsinnend hat Athene schon im Blick, 
woauf menchliches Tun erst vorblicken muß, um das so Erblickte 
in die Sichtbarkeit eines Werkes hervorzubringen. 
(Denkerfahrungen p138) 
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Towards what is the meditative look of the goddess directed? 
Towards the boundary, towards the limit. The limit is certainly 
not only the contour and setting, and not just the place where 
something stops. The limit signifies that by which something 
is gathered into what is proper to it, in order for it to 
appear in this way in all its plenitude, in order to come to 
presence. On meditating on the limit, Athena already has in 
view that towards which human action must first of all look in 
order to carry what it has seen into the visibility of a work. 
The look of Athena which keeps the end in view at the beginning and 
guides the emergence of the thing to completion, expresses a hermeneutic 
thinking vastly different to the circularity of Ge-Stell, though they 
belong together in the same. Heidegger expresses the thinking of the 
Ge-Stell as follows: 
Der Sieg der (wissenschaftlichen] Method entfaltet sich heute in 
seine äußersten Möglichkeiten als Kybernetik. Das griechische 
Wort xußspvflTrls ist der Name für den Steuermann. Die wissen- 
schaftliche Welt wird zur kybernetischen Welt. Der kybernet- 
ische Weltentwurf unterstellt vorgreifend, daß der Grungzug 
aller berechenbaren Weltvorgänge die Steuerung sei. Die 
Steuerung eines Vorgangs durch einen anderen wird vermittelt 
durch die Übermittelung einer Nachricht, durch die Information. 
Insofern der gesteuerte Vorgang seinerseits auf den ihn 
steuernden sich zurückmeldet und ihn so informiert, hat die 
Steuerung den Charakter der Rückkoppelung der Information. 
Die hin- und herlaufende Regelung der Vorgänge in ihrer 
Wechselbeziehung vollzieht sich demnach in einer Kreis- 
bewegung. (Denkerfahrungen p141) 
The victory of [scientific] method develops itself today in its 
most extreme possibilities, as cybernetic. The Greek word 
xupepvfjtrrc is the name for helmsman. The scientific world is 
becoming a cybernetic world. The cybernetic project of the 
world supposes, in its prior grasp, that the fundamental 
characteristic of all the calculable processes of the world, is 
the command. The command of one process by another is made 
possible by the transmission of information. In the extent to 
which the commanded process returns messages to the one who 
commanded it and thus informed it, the command has the 
character of the retroaction of information. The regulation in 
the two directions of the processes in mutual relation 
accomplishes itself therefore in a circular movement. 
This quotation clearly shows that the heart of Ge-Steil is the law of 
translation as the transmission of information. Heidegger's translations 
of Greek philosophy have the purpose of allowing the 'kybernetisch' 
circularity of this transmission to show itself and thus bring to light 
the possibility of a more authentic circularity. It is by now clear that 
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Heidegger's translations are not simply the transmission of information 
about the Greek world. The translation of &)i Oeta by 'Unverborgenheit' 
is not the attempt at simply a 'literal' translation, rather the way the 
Greek world is understood, and the way its translation is continued, is 
always guided in advance by the way of thinking named by Ereignis. 
Heidegger is not claiming to have access to the Greek world 'the way it 
really was'; the Wiederholung of Greek thinking is a translation which is 
always directed towards the illumination of the present. The way a work 
is held to be in need of translation is guided by the need to open up the 
possibility of a turning of Ge-Stell and the law of translation into 
Ereignis and the proper hermeneutic circularity of the temporality of 
language. At the same time, however, this idea of a translation in the 
present being guided in advance, implies a certain understanding of the 
way the past as such is seen, that is, the way the writing of history is 
undertaken from out of a hermeneutic circle. Heidegger's project of the 
destruction of the history of metaphysics is precisely a rethinking of 
how the past is to be thought in relation to the way it is 'handed on' to 
the present, and that means: how it is to be translated. Translation for 
Heidegger is always constituted by the need to rethink the hermeneutic 
way a past philosophy or work is translated in and to the present. 
Heidegger's translation of Greek philosophy can thus only be fully 
understood in relation to a rethinking of history and tradition in the 
light of Ereignis. It is this idea of the need to think translation as a 
rethinking of the nature of history which will now be explored. 
202 
III: Translation and the Temporality of Tradition 
It is of central importance in understanding Heidegger's thinking of 
translation and of the history of philosophy to appreciate that the mode 
of access to the past is thought from out of the hermeneutic situation of 
the present. 31 History, for Heidegger, must always be thought pheno- 
menologically. In Chapter 2 it was shown how the project of fundamental 
ontology began by reflection on the circularity of every mode of quest- 
ioning. Thus the phenomenon of the past shows itself always in the way 
of a certain ). 6yoS, where ). tyciv is taken to mean &c tocpatvccOact, the 
letting something be seen from what the discourse is about (Being and 
Time H. 32). In relation to translation, this means that the way a work 
shows itself for translation and is correspondingly translated, is guided 
in advance by the way its letting-be-seen. 
For Heidegger, the standard way of translating a text, is not 
sufficiently aware of its hermeneutic situation and thus translates 
unknowingly according to the prevailing horizon of opinion; pre- 
dominantly, that is, according to the Ge-setz, the law of translation. 
Only when an authentic analysis of the circle in which text and trans- 
lator stand has been undertaken, does it become possible for the text to 
show itself in terms of the hermeneutic circularity which constitutes it; 
and this showing, conversely, allows the hermeneutic situation of the 
present to remain open, beyond the objective reflectivity of original text 
and translated text (or between word and thing), of the law of trans- 
lation. Heidegger writes, for instance: 
Wo es daher nötig wird, das griechische Wort alter Sprüche zu 
Gehör bringen, kann die Übersetzung genügen, unter der Be- 
dingung freilich, daß die Erläuterung dessen, was das Wort uns 
sagt, nicht fehlt, daß sie durchdacht wird im Gesichtskreis 
unseres eigenen Erfahrens und Wissens. (Grundbegriffe, 
GA 51,16) 
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Where it becomes necessary then to listen to the Greek word of 
an ancient saying, translation can be sufficient as long as the 
explication of what the word says to us is thought through in 
the horizon of our own experience and knowledge. (Basic 
Concepts p13) 
In opposition to the tendency to denigrate the translation in favour of 
the importance of the original, Heidegger stresses the importance of 
translation when what is to be translated as been thought through from a 
proper understanding of the present: 
Auf unserem jetzigen Weg gilt es aber erst zu sehen, daß unser 
heutiges Vorstellen, solange es sich auf sich selbst verstreift, 
sich selber den Weg in den Beginn und damit in den Grundzug 
des abendländischen Denkens verlegt. Das zeigt sich schon an 
den Übersetzungen. (Was heisst Denken? p129) 
On the path we are now following, the important thing to see, 
however, is that our modern way of representational ideas, as 
long as it stubbornly holds to its way, blocks its own access to 
the beginning and thus to the fundamental characteristic of 
Western thinking. The translations alone make this point clear. 
(What is Celled Thinking? p213) 
The translation of a text which, of course, is in one way or another. 
must be ventured in the face of how beings are now, how they 
predominantly show themselves, and that means in the light of an analysis 
of Ge-SteJL From within the hermeneutic situation it is clear that there 
can be no simple appeal to an objective access to the past, free from 
interpretation; to do so would be to precisely interprete and assimilate a 
past text into the way of thinking in the Ge-SteII. Heidegger writes for 
instance, in preparation for his interpretation-translation of Parmenides: 
Dagegen wird es nötig, bei dieser Gelegenheit auf eine 
Täuschung hinzuweisen, der man immer wieder allzu leicht 
anheimfällt. Man meint nämlich, man ginge voraussetzungslos 
und objektiv auf den Spruch zu, wenn man ihn, ohne etwas zu 
ahnen order gar zu bedenken, zur Kenntnis nimmt. Man nimmt 
ihn zu der Kenntnis hinzu, die man über solche Sachen ohne 
weiteres zu besitzen meint. Aber dieses ahnungs- und 
fragenlose und anscheinend von keiner Vormeinung beschwerte 
Zur-Kenntnis-Nehmen ist die voraussetzungsvollste und vorein- 
genommenste Auslegung, die im vorliegenden Fall möglich ist. 
(Was heisst Denken? p109) 
It becomes necessary here to point out an illusion to which we 
all too easily fall victim again and again. It is that one thinks 
one is approaching [Parmenides'] saying objectively and without 
presuppositions when one takes cognizance of it without 
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suspicions or prior considerations. One adds it to the 
knowledge, which one thinks one possesses without further ado, 
of such matters. But this suspicionless and questionless taking 
into cognizance, seemingly unburdened by any prejudice, is an 
interpretation as charged with presuppositions and prejudices 
as is possible in this case. (What is Called Thinking? p176)32 
The idea of a work being constituted by a translation in the circular 
play of its temporality of language, a translation which is in need of 
further translation in the light of an analysis of the hermeneutic 
situation of the present, is clearly already a specific perspective. It is a 
perspective which has been reached, however, precisely by a phenomeno- 
logical thinking through of the circularity of every interpretation and 
questioning in terms of the temporality of that circularity, and with the 
purpose of allowing a work to show itself beyond a certain narrow 
conception of the temporality of language Cie. the Ge-setz). The further 
purpose of this approach, as was shown above, is to allow the Ge-Steil to 
be grasped as a particular determination of the hermeneutic situation 
constituted by a Newtonian temporality and thus to open the possibility 
of another way of thinking. Since, as Being and Time makes clear, this 
clarification of the hermeneutic situation of the present is guided by the 
ecstatic nature of temporality, and this means taking account of the 
thrownness of the present situation in its place in a tradition and a 
history, it can be seen that Heidegger's thinking of translation is at the 
heart of a destruction of the history of metaphysics. 33 That is, thinking 
cannot be made authentic until the philosophical terms used are traced 
back to the texts which specified them as philosophical terms, or 
determined them in ways which still influence the present, so that these 
texts may be thought through and translated in the light of the 
hermeneutic situation, and not simply taken up in an unthinking way. 
This destruction of the tradition of metaphysics is, thus, by no means an 
attempt to throw off the weight of tradition, but rather a thinking 
through of how a text hands itself on and shows itself, in the ecstatic 
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comportment of the hermeneutic circle towards the past, thus giving rise 
to a more authentic way of translation or interpretation. 34 
One of the clearest statements of Heidegger's way of taking up and 
translating the texts of Western metaphysics, through a rethinking of 
how tradition itself is understood, comes in an early text which pre-dates 
Being and Time, though shares with it an emphasis on the hermeneutic 
situation of all research, historical or otherwise. The text, entitled 
'Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der 
hermeneutischen Situation'35, was written in 1922, and while being very 
dense it is in some respects clearer than Being and Time, where 
Heidegger's style reached the pinnacle of its neologism. The beginning of 
the text stresses that the situation of interpretation is always the 
situation 'of a living present' (p358; 'eine lebendigen Gegenwart' p237). 36 
An interpretation of what informs the present must therefore be taken 
on in the face of the present, such that it 'forces the present back upon 
itself' (p360; 'die Gegenwart gerade auf sich selbst zurückstößt' p239). In 
this way a critique of history is always only a critque, of the present 
and Heidegger goes on to specify this critique as 'destruction', making 
clear that it is not an abstract philosophical exercise, but rather always 
aimed at an understanding of the situation from which it is undertaken: 
Die phänomenclogische Hermeneutik der Faktizität sieht sich 
demnach sofern sie der heutigen Situation durch die Auslegung 
zu einer radikalen Aneignungsmöglichkeit mitverhelfen will - 
und das in der Weise des konkrete Kategorien vorgebenden 
Aufmerksammachens -. darauf verweisen. die überkommene und 
herrschende Ausgelegtheit nach ihren verdeckten Motiven, 
unausdrücklichen Tendenzen und Auslegungswegen aufzulockern 
und im abbauenden Rückgang zu den ursprünglichen Motiv- 
quellen der Explikation vorzudringen. Die Hermeneutik 
bewerkstelligt ihre Aufgabe nur auf dem Wege der Destruktion. 
[... 1 Die Destruktion ist der eigentliche Weg, auf dem sich die 
Gegenwart in ihren eigenen Grundbewegtheiten begengen. muß. 
[... 1 Die lediglich schon durch den konkreten Vollzug der 
Destruktion entsprindende Kritik gilt dabei nicht der Tatsache, 
daß wir überhaupt in einer Tradition stehen, sondern dem Wie. 
(p249-250) 
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The phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity sees itself, 
insofar as it wants to help today's situation through inter- 
pretation towards a radical possiblity of appropriation (and 
this in the manner of a making attentive which first provides 
concrete categories), as called upon to loosen up the handed- 
down and dominating interpretedness in its hidden motives, 
unexpressed tendencies, and ways of interpretation; and to push 
forward in a dismantling return towards the primordial motive 
sources of explication. The hermeneutic carries out its task 
only on the path of destruction. C... ] The destruction is the 
authentic path upon which the present must encounter itself. 
C... ] Thus the critique which simply and already arises from 
the concrete actualization of the destruction does not apply to 
the bare fact that we stand within a tradition, but applies 
rather to the How. (p371) 
This description of the hermeneutic 'path of destruction' as a loosening 
up of the tradition of philosophy, is familiar from Being and Time. What 
this passage makes clear, however, is that there is no leaving of the 
hermeneutic situation in order to investigate texts the way they really 
were, but only ever a taking up of the way they are held to be handed- 
on into the hermeneutic situation, and thus a rethinking of the notion of 
tradition itself. 37 The hermeneutic situation, therefore, does not stand 
over and above history and the tradition of philosophy such that it may 
be held to investigate the past in the objective light of modernity, rather 
its 'way of destruction' arises from its very historicity, the ecstatic 
temporality of its stand within tradition and history. 
In this context, it may be understood that Heidegger's continued 
interest in, and rethinking of, Greek philosophy is not an uncritical 
extolment of the correctness of their thinking, but a destructive 
rethinking of the dominant interpretation in which they are held and in 
which they inform the basic concepts of philosophical thought. 38 This 
means that, paradoxically, Heidegger is not suggesting the need to take 
up a position in the Greek world, but essentially counselling an 'identifi- 
cation' with the Roman world. As was mentioned above, philosophy as a 
tradition of thinking emerged in the Roman world in its taking up and 
translation of Greek thinking. To a great extent the Roman world con- 
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stituted itself as being traditional, in the precise sense of both standing 
in a position of inheriting Greek texts taken as authorities (auctoritates), 
and augmention of them by authors (auctores) taking on and developing 
the insights they found there. 39 The richness and variety of Roman 
culture is evidence that its traditionality was no mere subservience to 
Greek thinking. The words auctoritas (also meaning 'source', 'guidance', 
'example') and auctor (also meaning 'originator', 'teacher', 'leader') are 
themselves related to the verbs auctare and augere, both meaning 'to 
increase' or 'to enrich'. Heidegger's disparagement of the Latin 
translations of Greek philosophical terms stems not simply from the fact 
that an interpretation was imposed through the translation (this is 
unavoidable according to Heidegger), but from the fact that the hermen- 
eutic situation in which the translations were performed was not 
thematized, and thus there was no possiblity of a translation heightening 
the questioning of that situation. Heidegger is thus proposing the 
taking up of the Roman position in its idea of an augmentative tradition- 
ality in relation to Greek thinking, but thinking it through in a more 
authentically hermeneutic way. 
In the foreword to Vortrage and Aufsätze, the book which contains 
the essays The Question Concerning Technology and Science and 
Reflection (two essays which make explicit reference to Greek thinking in 
the thinking through of Ge-StelD, and also three of the essays included 
in the volume Early Greek Thinking, it is striking that Heidegger makes 
explicit reference to 'Roman' nature of the book: 
Das Buch ist, so lange es ungelesen vorliegt, eine Zusammen- 
stellung von Vorträgen und Aufsätzen. Für den Leser könnte 
es zu einer Sammlung werden, die sich um die Vereinzelung der 
Stücke nicht mehr zu kümmern braucht. Der Leser sähe sich 
auf einen Weg gebraucht, den ein Autor vorausgegangen ist, 
der in Glücksfall als auctor ein augere, ein Gedeihenlassen aus- 
löst. (VA, Vorwort) 
This book, so long as it lies unread, is a collection of essays. 
For the reader it could become a gathering, which is no longer 
concerned with the individuality of the pieces. The reader 
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would see himself brought on a path, on which. the author has 
gone on ahead, who with luck, as auctor, triggers off an 
augere, a letting-thrive. 
While this quotation makes clear that Heidegger's usual denigration of 
Latin translations is not part of an uncritical neo-classicist awe in the 
face of Greek thinking, it is still true that Heidegger differentiates 
various 'epochs of being' in the history of metaphysics, and sees the 
Latin translations as inaugerating a new epoch of being. This idea, when 
separated from Heidegger's concern that all historical interpretation and 
translation to be carried through from out of a questioning of the 
hermeneutic situation, easily suggests that the 'of' in the phrase 'epochs 
of being' expresses a relationship between particular and universal. In 
such an interpretation a particular epoch would be the 'appearance' of 
Being in a certain period, which thus exists as a superhistorical genus. 
Heidegger, however, hears in the word 'epoch' (German: Epoche) the Greek 
enoXfj, 'to hold back', and understands it in the context of the destiny of 
being (des Geschick von Sein) and the idea of sending in the 'Es gibt 
Sein'. 40 In Chapter 2 it was argued that, for Heidegger, the 'It' which 
sends being does not name Ereignis as a timeless realm existing 
independently of what it sends, rather the 'It' names Ereignis as the 
hermeneutic path of thinking the inescapable circularity of language and 
time. 
Die Folge der Epochen im Geschick von Sein ist weder zufällig, 
noch läßt sie sich als notwndig errechnen. Gleichwohl 
bekundet sich das Schickliche im Geschick, das Gehörige im 
Zusammengehören der Epochen. (Zeit und Sein p9) 
The sequence of epochs in the destiny of being is not 
accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary. Still, what is 
appropriate shows itself in the destiny, what is appropriate 
shows itself in the belonging together of the epochs. (Time 
and Being p9)41 
The destiny of being is the belonging together of the epochs in the same, 
not as modifications of a universal genus, but rather thought of as the 
multifarious way being is only spoken from out of a determination of the 
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hermeneutic circularity of language and time, uncovered in the process of 
questioning the hermeneutic situation of the present. Heidegger writes 
for example: 
Die Rede von 'Sein' versteht diesen Namen auch nie im Sinne 
einer Gattung, unter deren leere Allgemeinheit die historisch 
vorgestellten Lehren vom Seienden als einzelne Falle gehoren. 
'Sein' spricht je und je geschicklich und deshalb durchwaltet 
von Überlieferung. (Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der 
Metaphysik p 117) 
Discourse about 'being' also never understands this name in the 
sense of a genus, an empty generality under which the histor- 
ically represented doctrines of beings are subsumed as individ- 
ual cases. 'Being' ever and always speaks as destiny, and thus 
permeated by tradition. (The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of 
Metaphysics p51) 
The idea of the destiny of being is a thinking of being in the light of a 
rethinking of the traditionality which informs the hermeneutic situation. 
By tracing back philosophical terms to the epochs which specified them as 
philosophical terms, and thinking through the understanding of being 
which determined them in the epoch's hermeneutic circularity of language 
and time, it then becomes possible to translate them in a way which does 
not simply impose on them the law of the Ge-Stell, but allows further 
questioning of it. 42 
The glimpse of Ereignis in Ge-Stell, as the recognition of Ge-Stell as 
only one way of thinking the hermeneutic circularity of language and 
time, again could easily suggest that Ge-Stell, as a sending of being, is 
only a temporary, particular appearance or distorted manifestation of 
Ereignis, understood as existing like a timeless Idea, in a certain 
interpretation of Plato. In the essay The Question Concerning 
Technology, Heidegger deals with this interpretation primarily in terms of 
a rethinking of the word 'essence' (Wesen) in the idea that 'the essence 
of technology lie Ge-Stelfl is nothing technological' (VA 38; QT 30). That 
is, Ge-Stell cannot be thought of as an essence which is individuated into 
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particular machines or practices. He then only passingly mentions that 
the way of revealing, which is the Ge-Stell, is also neither a particular 
of an even higher 'essence': 
Aber diese Weise sind nicht Arten, die nebeneinander geordnet 
unter den Begriff des Entbergens fallen. Die Entbergen ist 
jenes Geschick, das sich je und jah und allem Denken unerklär- 
bar in das hervorbringende und herausfordende Entbergen ver- 
teil und sich dem Menschen zuteilt. (VA 38) 
But these ways are not kinds that, arrayed beside one another, 
fall under the concept of revealing. Revealing is that destiny 
which ever suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking, apportions 
itself into the revealing that brings forth and challenges, and 
which allots itself to man. (QT 29) 
Heidegger clearly seems to have thought that it was enough to have pre- 
vented a Platonic divide (from a certain Platonism) being imposed on the 
'particularity' of Ge-Stell, by preventing the notion of the 'essence of 
technology' being thought Platonically. To prevent a regression to a 
Platonic interpretation of Ereignis, in a Platonism interpreted in the 
temporality of Ge-Stell, it is necessary to remember that Heidegger's 
thinking of the epochs, as multifarious ways of revealing, is thought 
from out of an authentic hermeneutic analysis of the present. It is a 
questioning of the givenness of any one way of revealing and thus is 
part of a rethinking of the traditionality with which it is handed on and 
taken up in the present. 
In Heidegger's early 'Indications' paper this questioning of the 
hermeneutic situation and its historicity in tradition is termed a 
'temporalizing safe-keeping' (p371; 'zeitigende Verwahrung', p250). This 
idea of a destructive Widerholung which constitutes an authentic 
traditionality in the light of the hermeneutic circle of the present, and 
thus brings history into an authentic safe-keeping, bears'great similarity 
to Hegel's thinking of phenomenology, and spirit's becoming certain of 
itself. 43 It is necessary only to think of how Hegel took up Kant's idea 
of the mediatedness of knowledge in the distinction of experience and the 
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a priori concepts of understanding, to see that Hegel's project is 
profoundly hermeneutic. Both Heidegger and Hegel were concerned to 
think through the 'circular existence' which Kant's work had uncovered. 
By viewing Hegel's phenomenology as a systematic application of Kant's 
thinking of the historicity of knowledge, it is possible to see how 
Heidegger's transformative taking up of Kant's legacy gives rise to a 
transformed thinking of history beyond its limitation to a Newtonian 
temporality. After Hegel's death, German Idealism as a whole fell into 
disrepute at the hands of Neo-Kantian schools which criticised what they 
saw as a teleological and determinist conception of history, being guided 
by a superhistorical Geist. Heidegger, in his work on Hegel, did not 
cease to encourage his students not to accept the 'obviousness' of such 
an interpretation. His 1930 lecture course Hegels Phänomenology des 
Geistes and the 1942 text Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung constitute 
methodical and detailed readings of Hegel. 44 
In the 1957 text, Identity and Difference45, Heidegger takes up both 
the principle of identity in relation to the question of being (that is, 
how to think of the 'same', if it is said that what is, is the same as 
itself), and the question of the difference of beings and being, explicitly 
by way of Gespräch with Hegel (p42/107). Heidegger writes for example: 
Die gemäßere Formel für den Satz der Identität A ist A sagt 
demnach nicht nur: Jedes A ist selber dasselbe, sie sagt 
vielmehr: Mit ihm selbst ist jedes A selber dasselbe. In der 
Selbigkeit liegt die Beziehung des 'mit', also eine Vermittelung, 
eine Verbindung, eine Synthesis: die Einung in eine Einheit. 
[... ] Nur eines ist zu behalten: Seit der Epoche des 
speculativen Idealismus bleibt es dem Denken untersagt, die 
Einheit der Identität als das bloße Einerlei vorzustellen und von 
der in der Einheit waltenden Vermittelung abzusehen. (Der Satz 
der Identität p87,88) 
The more fitting formulation of the principle of identity 'A is 
A' would accordingly mean not only that every A is itself the 
same; but rather that every A is itself the same with itself. 
Sameness implies the relation of the 'with', thus a mediation, a 
connection, a synthesis: the unification into a unity. [... ] Just 
one thing we must keep in mind: since the era of speculative 
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idealism, it is no longer possible for thinking to represent the 
unity of identity as mere oneness, and to disregard the 
mediation that prevails in unity. (p24-25) 
If it may be said that Hegel's Spirit is the same in all the stages of its 
manifestation, a sameness which must be gathered up and run through in 
spirit's becoming certain of itself, then it will ultimately be a question of 
how, or if, Heidegger's understanding of the 'same', in the idea of the 
sameness of the epochs and their being brought to authentic 'safekeeping' 
through the thinking of Ereignis, distances his project from Hegel's. To 
the extent that Heidegger wished to overcome the all too easy interpret- 
ation of Hegel's phenomenology, as appealing to a timeless, superhistorical 
entity, and rather wished to interpret it as a project concerned with the 
temporality of thinking, his interpretation will also throw light on his 
own thinking of history and tradition in relation to the Kantian legacy. 46 
Commenting on the notion that for Hegel, history was the self- 
externalization (ÄuBerlichkeit) of the Idea and thus must be thought 
dialectically, Heidegger writes: 
Man bleibt daher weit hinter dem eigentlichen Gedanken Hegels 
zurück, wenn man feststellt, Hegel habe in der Philosophie das 
Historische Vorstellen und das systamatische Denken zu einer 
Einheit gebracht. Denn für Hegel handelt es sich weder um 
Historie, noch um das System im Sinne eines Lehrgebäudes. 
(p110) 
We thus fall far short of Hegel's genuine thought if we state 
that Hegel has brought historiographical representation and 
systematic thinking into a unity in philosophy. For with Hegel 
it is not a question of either historiography or of system in 
the sense of a doctrinal structure. (p44) 
Rather it is the case, Heidegger explains, that for Hegel the matter of 
thinking is historical (geschichtlich), in the sense of the happening 
(Geschehen) of thinking, and in the coming to itself of thinking thinking 
itself, in its running through of the process of its dialectical happening. 
This running through of spirit's speculative development must itself be 
understood as a Gespräch with the history of thinking, and Heidegger 
goes on to discuss the difference between his own criterion for the 
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conversation with the historical tradition, and Hegel's. He writes that 
both are an entering into the force (Kraft) of earlier thinking, but that 
he himself seeks that force in what has not been thought. Heidegger's 
notion of what is 'unthought' pertains to the need to question an epoch 
concerning the way the difference between being and beings is thought 
and how this difference is thought from out of a certain hermeneutic and 
systematic circularity. He writes: 
Die Maßgabe des Ungedachten führt nicht zum Einbezug des 
vormals Gedachten in eine immer noch höhere und es über- 
holende Entwicklung und Systematik, sondern sie verlangt die 
Freilassung des überlieferten Denkens in sein noch aufgespartes 
Gewesenes. Dies durchwaltet anfänglich die Überlieferung, west 
ihr stets voraus, ohne doch eigens und als das Anfangende 
gedacht zu sein. (p114-5) 
The criterion of the unthought does not lead to the inclusion 
of previous thought into an always still higher development 
and a systematization which surpasses it. Rather, the criterion 
demands that traditional thinking be set free into its having- 
been which is still saved up. This having-been prevails 
incipiently throughout the tradition, it essences constantly in 
advance of tradition, without being thought though properly 
and as the incipiencey. (p48-9, my emphasis) 
What is so interesting about this passage is that it does more to bring 
Heidegger's way of thinking of tradition closer to Hegel's, as Heidegger 
interprets him, than differentiating them. In Hegel's work, the medi- 
atedness of subjectivity and objectivity in their hermeneutic belonging 
together in Spirit, can be thought of very much as the 'unthought' of an 
epoch. Further, for Hegel, the essence of thinking, and the force of its 
movement, is linked very clearly to the notion of essence as 'having- 
been', in his idea that: Was Wesen ist was gewesen ist. 47 
Hegel analyses the common distinction between essence and existence 
as a hierarchy where the former term is to provide a stable and 
unchanging ground of identity for what exists. However, if essence were 
wholly external to existence (understood as being-in-itself, immediate 
being), existence would have no essence, thus existence must itself be 
presupposed by essence, even though essence is the presupposition of 
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existence. Hegel understands this circularity as reflection; es: 3ence, as 
the negativity of being, is the reflection of being back into itself: 
Aber da diese Negativität dem Sein nicht äußlerlich, sondern 
seine eigene Dielektik ist, so ist seine Wahrheit, das Wesen, al--% 
das in sich gegangene oder in sich seiende Sein; seinen 
Unterschied vom unmittelbaren Sein macht jene Reflexion, sein 
Scheinen in sich selbst, aus, und sie ist die eigentümliche 
Bestimmung des Wesens selbst. (Die Wissenschaft der Logik 
p231) 
But since this negativity is not external to Being, but is its 
own dialectic, so essence, the truth of Being, is Being which 
has gone into itself, or is being in itself; its difference from 
immediate Being constitutes that reflection, its shining into 
itself, and this is the peculiar characteristic of essence itself. 
(Hegel's Logic p162)48 
Since essence is constituted via reflection, it may also be regarded as the 
subtraction of the hic et nunc from what exists. This subtraction is, for 
Hegel, nothing other than the movement of time itself, as the very heart 
of the dialectic. Time itself is the force which drives the reflection of 
what is, into itself, thus 'essence is what has been'. Though Hegel makes 
clear (on commenting on the way Wesen is used for the past tense of 
sein): 
Dieser Irregularität des Sprachgebrauchs liegt insofern eine 
richtige Anschauung vom Verhältnis des Seins zum Wesen 
zugrunde, als wir das Wesen allerdings als das vergangene Sein 
betrachten können, wobei dann nur noch zu bemerken ist, daß 
dasjenige, was vergangen ist, deshalb nicht abstrakt negiert, 
sondern nur aufgehoben und somit zugleich konserviert ist. 
(p232) 
This linguistic irregularity implies to a correct intuition of 
the relation between being and essence (since we can certainly 
regard essence as past being), only to the extent that it is 
remembered that what is past, is not thereby abstractly denied, 
but only passed over and thus at the same time conserved. 
(p163) 
It is thus the understanding of time as the force of the 'having been' 
which constitutes Hegel's dialectical thinking of tradition,. and which is 
to be brought to consciousness in thinking's thinking of its history. It 
appears, therefore, that for Hegel as well as Heidegger, it is a question 
of rethinking tradition in the having-been which prevails in it. It will 
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thus be in the understanding of this 'having-been', in the way it is 
passed over and passed on, that one must look for a difference. 
Whilst Heidegger's longer texts on Hegel are for the most part 
detailed readings, emphasizing the need to think through his work, there 
are always elements of a 'destruction' at work. There is also one shorter 
text, Hegel and die Griechen, which clearly sets out a distancing from 
Hegel. 49 Heidegger's destructive reappropriation of Hegel starts out 
from the view that Hegel's spirit in its gathering up and running 
through of its history, is a working through of the Kantian idea of the 
transcendental ego with respect to history. 
Wenn so das Bewußtsein hinsichtlich seiner eigenen relativen 
Wahrheit auf die Wahrheit als Selbstbewußtsein zurückgebracht 
werden soll, dann ist gemäß dem ganzen Ansatz Hegels damit im 
vorhinein die Basis gewonnen, von der aus erst verständlich 
gemacht und begründet werden kann, warum das so ist und sein 
muß, was man da als Grundtatsache ins Feld führt: cogito = 
cogito me cogitare. Wenn Hegel sich von vorneherein in dieser 
Dimension des Selbst hält, dann ist sein Ansatz nichts 
Geringeres als die Verwandlung und Ausgestaltung einer 
Grundabsicht der Kantischen Problemstellung, die darin zum 
Ausdruck kommt, daß die ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit der 
transcendentalen Apperzeption - das 'ich denke', das alle meine 
Vorstellungen muß begleiten können - als Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit aller Gegenständlichkeit gefaßt wird. Gerade weil 
Hegel auf die spekulative absolute 
Überwindung dieser 
Kantischen Position drängt, mußte er ihren Grundansatz 
mitübernehmen, d. h. das Bewußtsein und Ich in seiner 
Transzendenz in den Ansatz bringen. (Hegels Phänomenologie 
des Geistes, GA 32,194) 
If consciousness with regard to its own relative truth is thus 
supposed to be brought back to truth as self-consciousness, 
then, according to Hegel's approach, the basis is thus 
obtainable in advance for making intelligible and justifying why 
cogito = cogito me cogitare (which is brought up as a basic 
fact) and must be so. If Hegel from the very start keeps 
within this dimension of the self, then his starting point is 
nothing less than the transformation and working out of a 
fundamental intention of Kant's problematic, which is expressed 
as the original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception 
(the 'I think' that must accompany all my representations) as the 
condition for the possiblity of all objectivity. Precisely 
because Hegel pushes for the speculative absolute overcoming 
of the Kantian position, he had to take over its approach, that 
is, take consciousness and the ego in its transcendence, as his 
starting point. (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit p135) 
In the light of Heidegger's work on Kant discussed in Chapter 2, Hegel's 
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taking up of the Kantian position becomes problematic. Heidegger's 
'violent' interpretation of Kant was aimed at showing how Kant's analysis 
of time provided resources for undermining the interpretation of the 
transcendental ego with which Kant grounded his critique. That is, 
Heidegger tried to show how the generation of time in the transcendental 
imagination could give rise to a thinking of the ecstatic temporality of 
the self and not the ultimately Cartesian self, existing object-like in 
Newtonian time, which Kant fell back on. Like Hegel, then, Heidegger 
wished to take over Kant's position as a 'starting point', but precisely 
through a rethinking of the temporality of the 'circular existence' in 
which the Kantian ego was involved. Hegel's taking up of Kant's position 
brought with it, however, the Cartesian determination of the self, and 
this lead to two related problems when Kant's approach was applied to a 
thinking of tradition and the history of philosophy. The first is that in 
Hegel's rightly hermeneutic approach to history, the Cartesian subject is 
always projected in advance in the thinking through of a historical 
position. In Hegel and die Griechen, Heidegger shows how Hegel 
interprets Greek philosophy according to the measure of certainty 
expressed in the Cartesian self where philosophy reached firm ground. 
Previous philosophy is always a 'not yet' in comparison to this firm 
ground which has always already been found. 
Hegel erklärt: 'Mit ihm (nämlich mit Descartes) treten wir 
eigentlich in eine selbständige Philosophie ein... Hier, können 
wir sagen, sind wir zu Hause, und können wie der Schiffer 
nach langer Umherfahrt auf der ungestümen See 'Land' 
rufen;... ' (WW. XV, 328). Hegel will mit diesem Bild andeuten: 
Das 'ego cogito sum', das 'ich denke, ich bin' ist der feste 
Boden, auf dem die Philosophie sich wahrhaft und vollständig 
ansiedeln kann. In der Philosophie des Descartes wird das Ego 
zum maßgebenden subiectum, d. h. zu dem im vorhinein' Vor- 
liegenden. Dieses Subjekt wird jedoch erst dann in der rechten 
Weise, nämlich im Kantischen Sinne, transzendental und voll- 
ständig, d. h. im Sinne des spekulativen Idealismus in Besitz 
genommen, wenn die ganze Struktur und Bewegung der Subjekt- 
ivität des Subjektes entfaltet und diese in das absolute 
Sichselbstwissen gehoben ist. (p429-430) 
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Hegel explains: 'With him (that is, Descartes) we enter properly 
into an independent philosophy... Here we can say that we are 
at home, and can cry, like a sailor after long travel on the 
impetuous sea, 'land ho! ' C... ] Hegel wants to suggest with 
this image: The 'ego cogito sum', the 'I think, I am', is the firm 
soil upon which philosophy can truely and fully install itself. 
In Descartes' philosophy the ego becomes the definitive sub- 
iectum, that is, on hand in advance. This subject is taken 
possession of in the correct manner, namely transcendentally 
and completely, in the Kantian sense, that is, in the field of 
speculative Idealism, when the whole structure and movement of 
the subjectivity of the subject unfolds and this is raised into 
absolute self-knowledge. 
The problem here is not simply that Greek philosophy was conceptualized 
from out of the hermeneutic circularity of the unfolding of spirit - 
Being and Time makes clear that there can be no avoidance of the way 
every questioning is hermeneutically guided in advance - but rather that 
the hermeneutic situation was not properly questioned as to its 
temporality. The result of this is that a past epoch is measured 
according to the reflectivity of subject and representation across a 
Newtonian divide, taken up from the Kantian conception of the a priori. 
Since for Hegel the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity comes about 
through the movement of spirit, the temporality of this movement also 
takes up the Newtonian conception of time. 50 Spirit develops by 
grasping or espying the unification of oppositions in their reciprocal 
reflection; this is the heart of the movement (Gang) of spirit's gathering 
itself up and making itself concrete: Ausgang as thesis, Fortgang as 
antithesis, Übergang as synthesis and thus Rückgang to itself. The 
becoming mediated of the thesis in the move to antithesis is the force of 
time in the becoming past of what is, and while the past is not simply 
left behind but becomes the essence of what is, the movement of spirit 
remains held in a Newtonian temporality. Spirit moves from moment to 
moment without loss and with the necessity of the Newtonian time-order. 
As a consequence of this, Hegel's hermeneutic thinking of history becomes 
the treatment of the succession of spirit's manifestations which remain 
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fixed in their chronological order, with a corresponding emphasis on the 
relation of one manifestation to the next. 
In contrast, Heidegger's treatment of history remains the thinking of 
a past event in the light of the hermeneutic situation of the present, 
thus without emphasis on the connection between epochs, except where 
this has immediate bearing on the way a philosophical term is understood 
in the present. While Hegel's use of a starting point determined by a 
Newtonian understanding of time leads ultimately to an understanding of 
the time of spirit in terms of a Newtonian time-order, Heidegger is 
concerned always to illuminate the hermeneutic situation by bringing to 
light the play of the determination of time with language's proper 
temporality in a text or epoch. 
In a Kantian perspective, as was shown in Chapter 1, it was language 
in its role in the synthesis of recognition in a concept, which was to 
determine time as a Newtonian time-order and thus justify the causal 
sequence of representations. Kant's treatment of teleology fell into 
difficulty because the concept of an organism brought to light an 
experience of time beyond its determination into sequential now-points. 
And for Heidegger it is language's temporality and historicity which 
ultimately breaks open the causal sequence of epochs, and allows the 
'having been' at the heart of tradition to speak within the hermeneutic 
situation of the present, and thus break open the narrow circularity of 
the Ge-Stell and its Ge-setz of the correspondence of word and thing, as 
the reflectivity of two objects. For Heidegger, the past shows itself in 
language, and it is by the translation of the past from out of a temporal 
analysis of the Ge-setz of language in the present, that language's 
temporality can show the ecstatic temporality of the hermeneutic situation 
in its traditionality. 
Even though Heidegger's thinking of history is ultimately far 
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distanced from Hegel's. Hegel's thought still retained a fundamental 
importance for Heidegger. Modern historiography, for Heidegger, was a 
thinking of history which was blind to its hermeneutic determination 
within Ge-Stell and the Newtonian temporality of the subject. Hegel was 
the first thinker to bring this hermeneutic situation to light and think 
it through to its completion. It is only where historiography is thus 
thought through to its conclusion that the possibility arises of the 
glimpse of another thinking of history. If Hegel's experience of history 
is thought of as the supreme 'danger', and for Heidegger this always 
means the objectification of language in a Newtonian temporality, then, as 
in The Question Concerning Technology, it is only through this 'danger' 
that the 'saving power' grows: 
Nun bewegen sich aber schon jede historische Aussage und 
deren Begründung in einem Verhältnis zur Geschichte. Vor dem 
Entscheid über die historische Richtigkeit des Vorstellens 
bedarf es daher der Besinnung darauf, ob und wie die 
Geschichte erfahren wird, von woher sie in ihrem Grundzügen 
bestimmt ist. Im Hinblick auf Hegel und die Griechen heißt 
dies: Allen richtigen oder unrichtigen historischen Aussagen 
voraus geht, daß Hegel das Wesen der Geschichte aus dem Wesen 
des Seins Im Sinne der absoluten Subjectivität erfahren hat. 
Es gibt bis zur Stunde keine Erfahrung der Geschichte, die, 
philosophisch gesehen, dieser Geschichterfahrung entsprechen 
könnte. Allein die speculativ-dialectische Bestimmung der 
Geschichte bringt es nun gerade mit sich, daß es Hegel 
verwehrt blieb, die A)'Ocux und deren Walten eigens als die 
Sache des Denkens zu erblicken, und dies genau in der 
Philosophie, die 'das Reich der reinen Wahrheit' als 'das Ziel' 
der Philosophie bestimmte. (Hegel und die Griechen p440-1) 
Now every historiographical statement and its justification, 
however, already moves in a relationship to history. Before a 
decision over historiographical correctness of the represent- 
ations, reflection is needed on whether or how history is 
experienced, and from where it is determined in its fundamental 
traits. In view of Hegel and the Greeks this means that 
Hegel's having experienced the essence of history out of the 
essence of being in the sense of absolute subjectivity, goes in 
advance of all correct or incorrect historiographical statements. 
There is still no experience of history which, philosophically 
regarded, could match up to this historio-experience. Only the 
speculative-dialectic determination of history now immediately 
brings with it what was denied to Hegel: the glimpse of 
&XflOsta and its rule specifically as the matter of thinking, and 
this precisely in the philosophy which determined 'the realm of 
pure truth' as 'the goal' of philosophy. 
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The mirror play between subject and object by which spirit develops 
always already moves within &). flOcta, unconcealment, which Heidegger 
understands as the thinking of a temporal-linguistic phenomenology. That 
is, when the determination of time which governs the unfolding of spirit 
is grasped, the possibility is opened of glimpsing a more authentic 
thinking of time, and thus of allowing the language's ecstatic temporality 
to inform the traditionality of the present. However, unless historio- 
graphical representation is thought through to its completion in absolute 
subjectivity, it will always remain caught in a Gestell-like form of 
thinking where the historian or translator envisages himself standing 
over and above history which he can examine objectively with the tools 
of thinking. It is Hegel's work which brings to completion the 
hermeneutic consequences of this bending-back of thinking upon its own 
history, and thus allows Ereignis to be glimpsed beyond this completion in 
an authentic thinking of time and language. 
In the light of this importance which Heidegger attached to Hegel's 
work it can now be understood why Heidegger should have seen such an 
affinity between his own thinking and the poetic work of Hölderlin. 51 
He saw the young Hegel and Hölderlin as together thinking through the 
need to bring Kant's thinking to completion, but that ultimately Hölderlin 
could not distance himself sufficiently from language and its historicity 
in order to be able to remain with the Newtonian temporality in which 
Kant had determined it. Hölderlin may thus be thought of as moving 
beyond Hegel in much the same way as Heidegger: that is, not left behind, 
nor a moving beyond which conserves what is past in an Aufhebung, but 
by allowing time to be rethought hermeneutically from out of language's 
historicity, that is, in an authentic hermeneutic thinking of the 
temporality of language. 
The clearest indication of how Heidegger wishes to interpret 
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Hölderlin is found in the introduction to his lecture course on the hymn 
Andenken. Heidegger writes that he is not concerned to give a 'correct' 
reading of Hölderlin in the way of modern 'literary-historical' research; 
this approach regards the work as an object to be explained by contemp- 
orary conditions and facts. Through a blindness to the hermeneutic 
situation of all research, the work is thus enclosed by the thinking of 
Ge-Stell and its law: the researcher tries to elucidate the correspondences 
between Hölderlin's language and other facts, through the use of the 
conceptual tools of his research procedure. 
Wir verzichten auf den Anspruch, den historisch richtigen 
Hölderlin zu entdecken. Wir nehmen uns aber auch nicht das 
Recht, aus der Dichtung Hölderlins 'Stücke' und 'Stellen' zu- 
sammenzutragen, um mit deren Hilfe etwa das jetzige Zeitalter 
zu bestätigen und zu beleuchten und so Hölderlin 'gegenwarts- 
nah' zu machen. Der 'historisch tatsächliche' und 'richtige' 
Hölderlin und der 'gegenwartsnahe' Hölderlin sind beides gleich 
verwerfliche 'Produkt' eines Verfahrens, das im vorhinein gar 
nicht auf das hören will, was der Dichter sagt. Vielmehr nimmt 
man das gegenwärtige historische Bewußtsein und das gegen- 
wärtige 'Erleben' fur 'das Wahre' an sich und unterwirft den 
Dichter und sein Wort diesem Maßstab, der wahr sein soll, weil 
er gerade geläufig ist. (Ndlderlins Hymne 'Andenken' p4-5) 
We are giving up the claim to be discovering the historio- 
graphically correct Hölderlin. We are also though not assuming 
the right to collect together pieces and passages out of 
Hölderlin's work, and with their help uphold and illuminate the 
present age and so make Hölderlin 'relevent'. The 'historically 
factual' and 'correct' Hölderlin and the 'relevent' Hölderlin are 
both equally reprehensible 'products' of a process that from the 
start does not at all listen to what the poet says. Rather 
present historiographical consciousness and present 'life exper- 
ience' are taken as 'truth' in itself, and the poet and his word 
are subjected to this standard, which is said to be true pre- 
cisely because it is current. 
As was shown in chapter 2, Heidegger's appeal to the need to 'listen' to 
a poet may be understood as the need to allow language to speak in the 
fullness of its historical and poetic resonances and thus to be understood 
from out of an authentic circularity of language and time, and not simply 
under the rule of the Ge-setz of translation. This approach allows the 
word to be heard in its ambiguity, not in order to track down a poem's 
true content, but rather that in the word's speaking from what Heidegger 
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calls the 'spaces of its self-over-swinging' C'sich überschwingenden 
Räume'), this movement thereby names 'incipiency' ('Anfängliches', p15). 
This authentic movement of the word was termed translation ('Übersetzen') 
in the lecture courses on Parmenides and Der Ister in the Andenken 
course, the same thinking gives rise to Heidegger's word iiberdichten 
('trans-poetise'). It is this movement which constitutes Hölderlin's work 
and which is in need of further translation in order to allow it to 
unfold in the hermeneutic situation of the present and keep open the 
possiblity of its transformation. 
Wenn wir versuchen, das in Hölderlins Dichtung Gedichtete zu 
denken, dann betreiben wir nicht das Unmögliche, Hölderlins 
einstmalige 'Vorstellungswelt' und seinen Gemütszustand wieder 
herzustellen und nachzuvollziehen. Dagegen müssen wir einen 
Weg suchen, das, was den dichter selbst überdichtet, zu ahnen 
und aus diesem Ahnen ein wesentliches Wissen zu entfalten, in 
dessen Umkreise alle unsere sonstige Kenntnisse erst Wurzel 
und Stand finden. (p7-8) 
When we attempt to think the poetised in Hölderlin's poetry, we 
do not strive to produce again and comprehend the impossible: 
Hölderlin's former 'world of ideas' and his state of mind. On 
the contrary, we must seek a way to glean what transpoetises 
the poet himself, and to unfold out of this gleaning an essen- 
tial knowing, in whose circle all our remaining facts first find 
root and standing. 
The 'circle' ('Umkreis) of an 'essential knowing' which is to be unfolded 
from Hölderlin's work is precisely the circle of the way of thinking 
named by Ereignis. This circularity which constitutes the work, 
Heidegger calls the 'Gedichtetes. 52 Whilst Heidegger never explains why 
it was, that Hölderlin's work should have occupied such a unique place in 
his later work, one may surmise that it is related to Hölderlin's proximity 
to Hegel. In the lecture course on Germanien (GA 39, pp3-151), Heidegger 
briefly mentions that in thinking through the relationship between Hegel 
and Hölderlin, there must not simply be an explaining of Hölderlin's work 
from out of Hegel's system or a measuring of the influence of the poet 
on the thinker, but rather 'we must learn to experience the great conflict 
between the two' ('müssen wir lernen, den großen Widerstreit der beiden 
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zu erfahren', GA 39, p129). Hölderlin's path as poet was one of Gespräch 
with the thinker who, for Heidegger, is the pinnacle of a thorough-going 
thinking of transcendental subjectivity, and, since this dominance of 
subjectivity prevails unthinkingly in Ge-Steil, it is Hölderlin's work 
which is best placed to reopen a Gespräch with a thoughtful questioning 
of Ge-StelL 
In both Hegel and Hölderlin, Heidegger found a profound experiencing 
of history, but it is in the Widerstreit between them that it becomes 
possible to think a way beyond the determination of history in a 
Newtonian manner, a determination which ultimately led Hegel to a 
machine-like approach to the movement of traditionality. Heidegger 
writes in the lecture course on Andenken: 'Only the poet who himself 
founds history can know what poetry is and perhaps must be' ('Nur der 
seist geschichtestiftende Dichter läßt erkennen, was Dichtung ist and 
vielleicht sein muß', p3). The poet founds history in the way that each 
poem opens a circle of an authentic thinking of language and time and 
thus an authentic thinking of the ecstatic traditionality of the 
hermeneutic situation. The overarching systematicity of Hegel's project 
is broken into a multiplicity of poetic 'words', of hermeneutic circular- 
ities -a multiplicity of Gedichtete. This however must take place within 
a temporal analysis of the circularity of Ge-Stell, which predominately 
determines the hermeneutic situation. In this way temporal phenomenology 
enters into a circularity with poetry's temporality and historicity, to 
thus give rise to a temporal-poetic phenomenology; that is, a way of 
thinking named, it was argued in Chapter 2, Ereignis. 
In conclusion then, the translation of a text is the thinking through 
of the traditionality with which the text shows itself in the present, a 
thinking through it, itself opens the present to its ecstatic temporality 
and thus to a way of thinking beyond the closed Newtonian circularity of 
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Ge-Stell and its Ge-setz of translation. Translation thus thought is a 
translation into a realm beyond Ge-Stell, though not 'beyond' in the sense 
of a leaving behind, but rather a widening or opening of the hermeneutic 
situation into the authentic circularity of the temporality of language. 
In discussing Benjamin's thinking of translation in the next chapter, it 
will be seen that Benjamin follows the same path, with the same purpose. 
Notes 
1. The word 'tradition' needs to be heard in an active sense, that is, as 
a verbal substantive from the latin traditio, meaning 'to hand on' or 'to 
hand down'. 
2. In his lecture course on Der Ister (GA 53), Heidegger writes that not 
only must every translation be considered as an interpretation 
(Auslegung), but also that 'every interpretation and everything in its 
service, is a translation' (p75). This will be taken up in detail below. 
3. Eliane Escoubas has produced some interesting work on a Heidegger- 
Benjamin dialogue on the question of translation (particularly 'De Is 
traduction comme 'origine' des langues: Heidegger et Benjamin', Les Temps 
Modernes 514-515 (1989), 97-142). However, the dialogue is predominantly 
conducted by synthesising both writers into a Humboldtian energetic view 
of language. In so doing, she ignores Heidegger's injunction in The Way 
to Language about assimilating language to a higher universal, where 
Humboldt's work is mentioned specifically. A further consequence is that 
she does not, therefore, allow the very different 'languages' of the work 
of Heidegger and Benjamin to remain different, nor ask about the signif- 
icance of this difference. One other problem is the way sets up her 
reading of both Heidegger and Benjamin through an idea that for a 
language to be a language it can neither be completely untranslatable nor 
completely translatable. For Escoubas, a language which was completely 
translatable would be a 'code' and not a language. This, however, 
overlooks the way that for Heidegger, language is determined, in the Ge- 
Stell, precisely as a code, in the sense of a pure carrier of information. 
Language thus determined does not, thereby, stop being a language, rather 
it is a case of questioning the hermeneutic situation in which language 
can so appear. The use of the opposition translatable-untranslatable 
seems to have gained new currency through the work of Derrida (see the 
note below), and is foreign to the thinking of both Heidegger and 
Benjamin. A true dialogue between their work on the temporality of 
language can only take place once the place of translation in relation to 
each has been clarified. 
4. Jacques Derrida, 'Envois', in Psyche: Inventions de I'autre (Paris: 
Editions Galilee, 1987), pp109-143. 
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5. There is a lengthy treatment of Ge-Stell and Ereignis in John 
Loscerbo, Being and Technology: A Study in the Philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 249-263. Loscerbo 
concludes, however, that Ereignis 'consists in the right relation between 
Ge-Stell and Geviert, without saying what he means by 'right relation', or 
taking into account that Heidegger describes the Geviert as 'der Reigen 
des Ereignens' C'Das Ding', in Vorträge and Aufsätze p179) 
Otto Pöggeler's well known essay 'Being as Appropriation' (trans. by 
Rüdiger H. Grimm, in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. by Michael 
Murray (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 84-115), 
does not mention Heidegger's idea of Ge-Stell. He writes, for example, 
concerning the everyday way of thinking about being: 'Being and beings 
are not kept apart in such a way that the meaning of Being could become 
problematic. ' (p102) In this way, Pöggeler overlooks precisely the 
hermeneutic circularity between being and beings which is named both in 
Ge-Steil and Ereignis. 
6. Antoine Berman, Epreuve de I'etranger: Culture et traduction dans 
1'Allemange romantic (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), chapter 3. 
7. Berman p89. 
8. Berman p72-74. 
9. The striking subjectivism of this statement, particularly in the use 
the word 'wer', sets up an interesting resonance with the conception of 
Dasein in Being and Time. Dasein exists as always already outside of 
itself, and is a 'Who' and not a 'What'. In Chapter 2 it was shown that 
soon after writing Being and Time, Heidegger became dissatisfied with the 
underlying subjective ground of its hermeneutic project. Yet it could 
thus be argued that the idea of Dasein has metamorphosized into a 
thinking of ecstatic cultural identity, in the sense of a culture formed on 
the basis of the German language. It would not, of course, be any simple 
(un-mediated) notion of identity, and Heidegger precisely criticises, in 
lectures given in the same period as that on the Ister hymn, the notion 
of national identity, which he sees as merely an idea of the Cartesian ego 
en grand Yet given that the Ister lectures were given in 1942 in Nazi 
Germany, it will be necessary to ask (though it will be outside of the 
scope of this thesis) if or how Heidegger's notion of translation, as the 
mediation constitutive of his idea of the linguistic-cultural identity of 
Germany, ultimately succeeds in providing a way of thinking cultural 
identity beyond nationalism. 
10. Andrew Benjamin, Translation and the Nature of Philosophy (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1989). The following works by Derrida contain 
a particular emphasis on translation: Du droit a la philosophy (Paris: 
Editions Galil@e, 1990), particularly in section II, 'Theologie de la 
traduction', p371-394; 'Des Tours de Babel' in Difference in Translatin, ed 
Joseph F. Graham (London: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp209-248; The 
Ear of the Other, ed Christie V. McDonald, trans Peggy Kamuf (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1985). 'Des Tours de Babel' will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
11. An interesting statement of principle by Derrida on how he thinks 
of translation, and which guides his other more lengthy treatments, can 
be found in his interview with Kristeva in Positions (Paris: Les Editions 
de Minuit, 1972), and translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981): 
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In effect, the theme of a transcendental signified took shape 
within the horizon of an absolutely pure, transparent, and 
unequivocal translateability. In the limits to which it is 
possible, or at least appears possible, translation practices the 
difference between signified and signifier. But if this 
difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for 
the notion of translation we would have to substitute a notion 
of transformation: a regulated transformation of one language 
by another, of one text by another. We will never have, and in 
fact have never had, to do with some "transport" of pure 
signifieds from one language to another, or within one and the 
same language, that the signifying instrument would leave 
virgin and untouched. (p20) 
The word 'translation' is clearly complicit, for Derrida, with a metaphysics 
of a pure, transcendental meaning, floating free from any particular 
language; he thus recommends the word be given up. Derrida no where 
else suggests that there may be a different tradition of thinking about 
translation which does not move within a 'logocentric' economy. This 
leads his more lengthy treatments of translation to remain fixed within 
the opposition translatable-untranslatable. Further, by ignoring the 
possiblity of other understandings of translation, Derrida ignores the 
question of whether deconstruction may also be thought of as a form of 
translation, and thus may have affinities to other critical projects which 
precisely understand themselves as processes of translation. 
12. This procedure will indeed be the same for Benjamin, since, though 
he wrote explicitly on translation in The Task of the Translator, this 
text can only be understood as a focusing point of his thinking of the 
temporality of language. 
13. There have been several interesting such reconstructions recently: 
Parvis Emad, 'Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation: 
Essential Translation and the Unfolding of Language', in Martin 
Heidegger: Critical Assessments, ed. by Christoper Macann, 4 vols (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1992), III, pp. 57-78, and Andrzej Warminski, 
'Monstrous History: Heidegger Reading Hölderlin', Yale French Studies, 77 
(1990), 193-209. Emad's is problematic because it ultimately falls back on 
a correspondence theory of the anfänglich force of the word. He writes, 
for example: 'The most an essential translation can convey is a sense of 
'way making' [be-wegenl that occurs in strict correspondance with the 
unfolding of the language to be translated' (p70). Both writers treat 
Heidegger's understanding of translation in his later work in isolation 
from his hermeneutic considerations. The continued presence of 
hermeneutics in Heidegger's later work was shown in Chapter 2, and it 
only becomes clear by thinking through his path of thinking from, but 
never leaving behind, the hermeneutic project of Being and Time. 
14. Heidegger does actually refer to the word Ge-setz in an explanation 
of the term Ge-stell in The Principle of Identity (in Identity and 
Difference trans. Joan Stambaugh, dual language edition (New York and 
London, Harper & Row, 1969), English: 23-41 and German: 85-106). He 
writes: 
Der Name für die Versammlung des Herausforderns, das Mensch 
und Sein einander so zu-stellt, daß sie sich wechselweise 
stellen, lautet: das Ge-Stell. Man hat sich an diesem Wort- 
gebrauch gestoßen. Aber wir sagen statt 'stellen' auch 'setzen' 
und finden nichts dabei, daß wir das Wort Ge-setz gebrauchen. 
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Warum also nicht auch Ge-Stell, wenn der Blick in den Sach- 
verhalt dies verlangt? (p99) 
The name for the gathering of this challenging which delivers 
man and being over to each other such that they set each other 
mutually, is: Ge-Stell. This word use is jarring. But we say 
instead of stellen also setzen, and we do not see anything 
wrong with using the word Ge-setz. Thus why not also Ge- 
Stell if a glance into the matter calls for it? (p35; only the 
first sentence of the German is translated in the English 
version. ) 
Heidegger's term Ge-Stell is translated 'the framework' by Stambaugh (das 
Gestell is a common German word for a frame or stand); another common 
translation is 'the enframing' which is better since the prefix en- has 
connotations of 'surrounding' as in 'enmesh', but this still does not 
convey the thought of gathering together which Heidegger wishes to 
convey with the prefix Ge- (cf The Question Concerning Technology 
trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p19; Die Frage 
Nach der Technik in Vorträge and Aufsetze (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 
1954), p28). The verb setzen has usages close to that of stellen, for 
example 'to place', 'to set', 'to set up'. The modern meaning of das Gesetz 
is 'rule' or 'law'. In its older meaning it is a verbal substantive to 
setzen in its different meanings and is also related to the Middle High 
German verb gesetzen, which the Grimm Deutsches Worterbuch lists as 
festsetzen, einrichten, bestimmen ('to order', 'to arrange', 'to determine'). 
The question arises, therefore, as to why Heidegger chose Ge-Stell and 
not Ge-setz. One reason would be the link between Ge-Stell and verbs 
such as herstellen ('to produce') and vorstellen ('to represent'). Another 
could be that Heidegger wanted to mark a difference to the writers in 
German Idealism, for example Fichte and Hegel, for whom setzen was an 
played a central role. Since, however, Heidegger in the Parmenides 
lecture course envisages 'übersetzen' ('to translate') as 'übersetzen' 
(intransitive meaning: 'to cross over', transitive meaning: 'to carry or 
transport something accross'), the question of Heidegger's relation to 
German Idealism cannot be avoided. The use of Ge-setz for the essence 
of modern übersetzen allows the issues of modernity, of going accross to 
antiquity and of a relation to a Hegelian philosophy of history, to be 
brought together in Heidegger's thinking of translation. 
15. In a similar way, Benjamin opens his essay on translation by 
questioning whether a translation is meant for those who cannot 
understand the original. And in an analagous fashion, Benjamin's essay 
disposes of the view that translation is concerned with the wider 
imparting of information and argues that something else is glimpsed in 
translation properly understood. 
16. Martin Heidegger, Permenides trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard 
Rojcewicz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
p12). Concerning philology, Heidegger writes in Science and Reflection: 
Wenn die Philologie von der Sprache handelt, bearbeitet sie 
diese nach den gegenständlichen Hinsichten, die durch 
Grammatik, Etymologie und vergleichende Sprachhistorie, durch 
Stilistik und Poetik festgelegt sind. (VA 64) 
When philology deals with language, it treats it in accordance 
with the objective ways of looking at language that are 
established through grammar, etymology, and comparative 
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linguistic-history, through stylistics and poetics. (The 
Question Concerning Technology and other essays p175) 
17. Concerning a 'sign theory' of language, Heidegger writes: 
[Die Sprache] läßt beides zu: einmal, daß sie zu einem bloßen, 
von jedermann gleichförmig benutzbaren Zeichensystem 
herabgesetzt und dieses als verbindlich durchgesetzt wird; zum 
anderen, daß die Sprache in einem großen Augenblick ein 
einziges Mal Einziges sagt, das unerschöpflich bleibt, weil es 
stets anfänglich ist und deshalb unerreichbar für jeder Art von 
Nivellierung. (Was Heisst Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer 
Verlag, 1961), p168) 
Language admits of two things: One, that it be reduced to a 
mere system of signs, uniformly available to everybody, and in 
this form be enforced as binding; and two, that language at one 
great moment says one unique thing, for one time only, which 
remains inexhaustible because it is always originary, and thus 
beyond the reach of any kind of leveling. (What is Called 
Thinking'2, trans. J. Glenn Grey (New York: Harper & Row, 
1968), p191-2. 
The essence of modern translation, Ge-setz, is precisely this idea of the 
correct use of signs being 'bindingly enforced', 'verbindlich durchgesetzt'. 
Thus in relation to the understanding of the word as a name, in a 
technological way of thinking, Heidegger writes: 
Wenn wir den Sachverhalt so vorstellen, machen wir den Namen 
gleichfalls zu einem Gegenstand. Wir stellen die Bezeihung 
zwischen Namen und Ding als Zuordnung zweier Gegenstände 
vor. (Was Heisst Denken?, p84) 
If we conceive of the situation in this way, we turn the name, 
too, into an object. We represent the relation between name 
and thing as the coordination of two objects. (What is Called 
Thinking? p120) 
18. The word Verkehrsmittel, translated 'means of transport'. is a common 
German word denoting the generality of buses, cars, trams and the like. 
19. In an otherwise excellent overview of Heidegger's work on science 
and technology, Harold Alderman, 'Heidegger's Critique of Science and 
Technology', (in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. by Michael Murrey 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 35-50), 
ultimately offers a highly voluntaristic interpretation. In discussing 
'cause' as 'responsibility', in Heidegger's essay 'The Question Concerning 
Technology', Alderman writes: 'Man can either be responsible for beings in 
a way which is in harmony with the aition of physis, or he can take 
responsibility in a way which is opposed to it. ' (p44-45) 
20. It was shown in Chapter 1 that the Newtonian temporality of the a 
priori ultimately enabled the transcendental ego and the experience of 
Newtonian objects to mutually justify each other. Chapter 2 showed how 
Heidegger emphasised that this circularity could not be avoid, but rather 
how, in Being and Time, Heidegger attempted to rethink Dasein's 'circular 
existence' in a more authentic way. Further it was shown how the 
'authentic analysis' of Dasein became, in Heidegger's later work, the 
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thinking of Ereignis as a more critical hermeneutic way of thinking, but 
again constituted in its circularity by ecstatic temporality. 
21. Heidegger writes in The Question Concerning Technology. 
So Ist denn, wo das Ge-Stell herrscht, im höchsten Sinne 
Gefahr. 'Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst / Das Rettende auch. ' 1... 1 
Wenn das Wesen der Technik, das Ge-Stell, die äußerste Gefahr 
ist und wenn zugleich Hölderlins Wort Wahres sagt, dann kann 
sich die Herrschaft des Ge-Stells nicht darin erschöpfen, alles 
Leuchten jedes Entbergens, alles Scheinen der Wahrheit nur zu 
verstellen. Dann muß vielmehr gerade das Wesen der Technik 
das Wachstum des Rettenden in sich bergen. (VA p36) 
Thus, where Ge-Stell reigns, there is danger in the highest 
sense. 'But where danger is, grows / The saving power also. ' 
[... ] If the essence of technology, Ge-Stell, is the extreme 
danger, and if at the same time Hölderlin's word speaks the 
truth, then the reign of Ge-Stell cannot exhaust itself solely in 
blocking all lighting of every revealing, all appearance of 
truth. Rather, precisely the essence of technology must habour 
in itself the growth of the saving power. (QT p28) 
22. The word 'found' must be taken with caution here. As will be 
shown below, it is never a case for Heidegger of asserting an idea of 
objective access to the past, rather every 'finding' in the past is always 
hermeneutically guided in advance. 
23. Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: 
Technology, Politics, and Art (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), is unable to think beyond a modernity versus 
antiquity opposition in Heidegger's work - an interpretation which he 
takes from Derrida: 'Derrida has argued that Heidegger. did not carry out 
the deconstruction of metaphysics to its completion, because he failed top 
deconstruct the idea of a "primordial" epoch, blessed by a direct 
encounter with being. ' (p258) 'Heidegger never really abandoned what 
Derrida has described as the Platonic yearning to overcome fallenness and 
to attain authentic nearness to being' (p259). 
24. For further detail on this idea, see Thomas Sheehan, 'On Movement 
and the Destructior of Ontology', The Monist, 64(2) (1981), 534-542. 
Sheehan develops an interesting reading of Ereignis in terms of a 
rethinking of kinesis. 
25. Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen und Begriff der Obazt. Aristoteles, 
Physik B, 1 in Wegmarken GA 9, pp239-301 (p293). Translated as On the 
Being and Conception of ßbazS in Aristotle's Physics B, 1 trans. Thomas 
J. Sheehan, Man and World 9 (1976), p219-270 (263). 
26. Heidegger's word is 'Verständlichmachen', see below: Hdlderlins Hymne 
'Der Ister, GA 53,77-8. 
27. The meaning of 'particular' here, will be discussed in detail below, in 
the context of thinking it beyond its opposition to a 'timeless' universal. 
28. The sections of this quotation which have been omitted involve a 
metaphor Heidegger develops of the translation as a path leading up to 
the pinnacles in the landscape of language which works of poetry and 
thinking constitute. 
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29. For example, &1rlOsta is always the movement of its own concealment. 
That is, it is always on the way to being understood as the correct 
correspondence or agreement of two entities, separated by a static divide. 
This explains the ambiguity of Heidegger's relation to both Plato and 
Aristotle: there are reminants of an anfänglich thinking of " &). nAeta, but 
their philosophical work moves predominantly in a concealing of its 
essence. It is in the context of this ambiguous relationship that 
Heidegger's remark, to the effect that Greek philosophy must be read in 
an even more Greek way, can be understood. Heidegger discusses the 
ambiguity he finds in Aristotle in Parmenides GA 54,206-7 (In the 
English translation, p139). And concerning Plato, see for example 'Platens 
Lehre von der Wahrheit in Wegmarken GA 9, pp203-238 (231), translated 
as 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth', trans. John Barlow, in Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century: An Anthology, ed William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken 
(New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 3, pp251-270 (265). 
30. The lecture was delivered in French, in Athens, as 'La provenance de 
]'art et la destination de la pensee', and reprinted in Les Cahiers de 
]'Herne: Heidegger (Paris: Editions de l'Herne, 1983), 84-92. The German 
version, Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens 
appeared in Denkerfahrungen (Frandfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1983), pp. 135-149 
31. 'Hermeneutic situation' is the name given by Heidegger to the 
circular existence of all questioning and interpretation. He writes, for 
example, in Being and Time. 
Every interpretation has its fore-having, its fore-sight, and its 
fore-conception. If such an interpretation, as Interpretation, 
becomes an explicit task for research, then the totality of these 
'presuppositions' (which we have called the 'hermeneutic 
situation') needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand. 
(H. 232) 
And later on in Being and Time, this is discussed explicitly in terms of 
circularity; for example: 
We have indeed already shown, in analysing the structure of 
understanding in general, that what gets censured inappro- 
priately as a 'circle' belongs to the essence nd to the distinct- 
ive character of understanding as such. In spite of this, if 
the problematic of fundamental ontology is to have its 
hermeneutical Situation clarified, our investigation must now 
come back to this 'circular argument'. (H. 314) 
32. Heidegger's idea here, that an approach which is taken to be free of 
presupposition is, in fact, charged all the more implicitly with prejudice, 
is to be found in a similar formulation in an Athenaeum fragment by 
Friedrich Schlegel. The thinking of history developed by the Early 
German Romantics will be discussed at length in the next chapter. 
33. The criticism made by David Couzens Hoy in 'History, Historicity and 
Historiography in Being and Time, in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, 
ed. by Michael Murrey, is fundamentally misguided. Hoy concludes by 
criticising Being and Time for providing 'no criteria for deciding 
between conflicting historical accounts' (p349). Whilst Heidegger's linking 
of the temporality of Dasein with the historicity of world is problematic, 
it is clear, nonetheless, that Heidegger is dealing with both at an 
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ontological level, and not in terms of a regional, ontic science such as 
historiography. 
34. Charles R. Bambach, 'Phenomenological Research as Destruktion: The 
Early Heidegger's Reading of Dilthey', Philosophy Today, 37(2) (1993), 115- 
132, gives an important analysis of Heidegger's unpublished Kassel 
lectures of 1925, and the way Heidegger's understanding of the 
destruction of the history of metaphysics is developed in the light of the 
hermeneutic situation of the present. In Bambach's view, these lectures 
bring to light explicitly Heidegger's attempt to develop his view of 
tradition in opposition to both Husserl and Dilthey. 'From each side 
there was a tendency to disguise the hermeneutic situation of the 
present. ' (p119) 
35. 'Phänomenologisch Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der 
hermeneutische Situation' in Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie and 
Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften, ed Frithjof Rodi, Vol. 6 (1989). 
pp237-269. Translated as 'Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect 
to Aristotle: Indications of the Hermeneutic Situation', trans. Michael 
Baur, in Man and World 25 (1992), pp355-393. This text is of great 
importance in that it raises the possiblity of regarding Being and Time 
as constituting in its entirety, a Widerholung of Aristotle's philosophical 
approach. Much scholarship has been undertaken recently on tracing the 
correspondences between Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle in this text and 
the existential analysis in the first half of Being and Time. It needs to 
be asked, however, why Heidegger erased almost all trace of this taking 
up of Aristotle - the main focus upon Aristotle appears at the end, in 
the context of the inadequacy of his conception of time. Heidegger's 
erasure of his dependence on tradition would appear to be closely 
connected with the problematic subjectivity which grounded the 
hermeneutic circle in Being and Time. Both conspire to place Being and 
Time in the mould of Enlightenment thinking - with its concern to appear 
divorced from traditional ideas and a dependence on the role of the 
subject. To have made clear that he was taking up Aristotle's work as a 
starting point, in a way which would be circularly justified by the 
conclusion Cie the ecstatic temporality of the hermeneutic situation), would 
have immediately have given the project a certain historicity and thus 
avoided the difficulties Heidegger gets into trying to reconcile the 
temporal analysis of Dasein and the historicity of being-in-the-world. 
36. The full quotation runs: 'Die Situation der Auslegung, als der 
verstehenden Aneignung des Vergangenen, ist immmer solche einer 
lebendige Gegenwart. ' (p237; 'The situation of the interpretation, of the 
understanding appropriation of the past, is always the situation of a 
living present', p358) 
37. A profounder mis-reading, arising from an overlooking of the 
hermeneutic situation of writing history, is given by George Josoph 
Seidel, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics: An Introduction to his 
Thought (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1964). 'Only 
that which truely has been, as one might put it, can have worked its way 
into the present and then come under the consideration of the historian. 
C... ] The reconstruction of the historical past, which truely was there, 
and which therefore has worked itself into the present in its effects, 
can come under the consideration of the historian only it is was there 
for Da-sein. ' (p20) Quite apart from not specifying the difference 
between what 'was there' and what 'truely was there', it is clear that on 
Seidel's interpretation, what 'truely was there' can only be so judged if 
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its effects reach to the present, but this latter condition is precisely 
what it means for something truely to have been. 
38. Seidel's book is a prime example of a tendency to find this 
prelapsarian longing for the Greek world in Heidegger. For example: 
'Heidegger studies Parmenides and Heraclitus in an attempt to regain our 
authentic origins, such that our own thinking may be projected in an 
authentically historical manner into the future. ' (p121) And 'to get back 
to their true meaning, an authentic interpretation must point out that 
which no longer stands in the words, but which is nevertheless said in 
the words. ' (p126) 
39. An interesting overview of the meaning of tradito and words 
connected with it is given by Antoine Berman, 'Tradition - Translation - 
Traduction', in Po&sie 47 (1988), pp85-98. 
40. cf. Zeit und Sein, particularly pp8-9; Time and Being, pp8-9. 
41. Both das Schickliche and das Gehörige have a meaning approximate to 
'what is proper, fitting, becoming'. 
42. If the idea of epoches is not understood in relation to hermeneutics, 
Heidegger's thought can easily be made to defend historicism. For 
example, Siedel writes that Heidegger's work seems to explain one problem 
which had always troubled historicism: namely, how philosophers somehow 
exhibited influences from their predecessors C... ] even where there 
seemed to be no points of actual historical or textual contact. 
Heidegger's suggestion is that although thinkers are not always in 
contact with one another, they are in contact with being. ' (p l56). The 
idea of being 'in contact with being' is based on an objectification of 
being into a trans-historical ground. 
43. In the following quotation from Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy 
of History, the similarity to Heidegger's early 'Indications' paper is 
striking: 
Dies ist ebenso unsere und jedes Zeitalters Stellung und 
Tätigkeit, die Wissenschaft, welche vorhanden ist, zu fassen und 
sich ihr anzubilden, und ebendarin sie weiterzubilden und auf 
einen höheren Standpunkt zu erheben. Indem wir sie uns zu 
eigen machen, machen wir aus ihr etwas Eigenes gegen das, was 
sie vorher war. In dieser Natur des Produzierens, eine vor- 
handene geistige Welt zur Voraussetzung zu haben und sie in 
der Aneignung umzubilden, liegt es denn, daß unsere Philo- 
sophie wesentlich nur im Zusammenhange mit vorhergehender 
zur Existenz gekommen und daraus mit Notwendigkeit hervor- 
gegengen ist; und der Verlauf der Geschichte ist es, welcher 
uns nicht das Werden fremder Dinge, sondern dies unser 
Werden, das Werden unserer Wissenschaft darstellt. (Werke, 20 
vols, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), Vol 18, p22) 
This then, is the function of our own and of every age: to 
grasp the knowledge which is already existing, to make it our 
own, and in so doing to develop it further and to raise it to a 
higher level. In thus appropriating it to ourselves we make it 
into something different from what it was before. On the 
presupposition of an already existing intellectual world which 
is transformed in our appropriation of it, depends the fact 
233 
that philosophy can only arise in connection with previous 
philososphy, from which of necessity it has arisen. The course 
of history does not show us the becoming of things foreign to 
us, but the becoming of ourselves and of our own knowledge. 
(Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. E. S. Haldane and 
F. H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: 
Humanities Press, 1963), vol 1, p3-4) 
44. Martin Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, GA 32. 
Translated as Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1988). 'Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung' in Holzwege. Translated as 
'Hegel's Concept of Experience' ed. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1970). Heidegger's criticism of Hegel in Being and Time, where 
Heidegger brings in Hegel's work to illuminate his argument that one 
cannot move from an understanding of time as isolated now-points to an 
ecstatic temporality, while the latter may certainly be 'levelled off' to 
give the former, is treated by Parvis Emad, 'The Place of Hegel in 
Heidegger's Being and Time' in Research in Phenomenology 13 (1983), 
pp159-173. For a general overview of the relation between Heidegger 
and Hegel, see Denise Souche-Dagues, 'The Dialogue between Heidegger and 
Hegel' in Heidegger: Critical Assessments, 4 vols, ed. Christopher Macann 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 11,246-271. Her article does 
not, however, consider the differences in their understandings of 
temporality, which will be discussed below. 
45. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, dual language edition, 
trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1969). This 
book contains the two essays 'The Principle of Identity' (p23-41; 'Der Satz 
der Identität', p85-106) and 'The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of 
Metaphysics' (p42-74; 'Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik', 
p107-143). 
46. Alexandre Kojeve's work may be understood as an attempt to take 
Hegel's work seriously in this way. See, for example, 'The Idea of Death 
in the Philosophy of Hegel', in Hegel: Critical Assessments, II, 311-358. 
47. The necessity of understanding Hegel's view of essence through his 
view of time, is treated well in Joseph C. Flay, 'Essence and Time in 
Hegel', in Hegel: Critical Assessments, III, 389-410. 
48. Hegel, Werke, vol 8, Die Wissenschaft der Logik: Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften I. Translated as Hegel's Logic: Being Part 
One of the 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William 
Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975,3rd ed. ) The word 'Being' is 
capitalised here only so as to be able to mark the difference between 
'Sein' and 'seiende'. 
49. 'Hegel und die Griechen', in GA 9: Wegmarken, 427-444 
50. This criticism of Hegel is developed initially by Heidegger in Being 
and Time, for example: 
No detailed discussion is needed to make plain that in Hegel's 
Interpretation of time he is moving wholly in the direction of 
the way time is ordinarily understood. When he characterizes 
time in terms of the 'now', this presupposes that in its full 
structure the 'now' remains levelled off and covered up, so that 
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it can be intuited as something present-at-hand, though 
present-at-hand only 'ideally'. (H. 431) 
51. Andrzej Warminski, 'Monstrous History: Heidegger Reading Hölderlin', 
Yale French Studies, 77 (1990), 193-209, brings together Hölderlin's and 
Heidegger's thinking on translation. He gets caught up, however, in the 
metaphysics of Hölderlin's famous letter to Böhlendorf (4 Dec 1801), 
discussing the law of history in terms of that. which is one's own nature 
and that which is of a foreign nature. The Greek's own nature was 'the 
fire from heaven', that which was foreign for them was the 'clarity of 
representation' and 'Junonian sobriety'. Warminski comments that, 
however, 'what is natural for us, is what was appropriated by the 
Greeks. C... ] Our nature is Greek culture. ' (p203). The talk of different 
natures would seem based on a rather historicist standpoint, and does not 
seem helpful for understanding Heidegger's work on translation or on 
Hölderlin's poetry, precisely because the Warminski does not discuss the 
hermeneutic aspect of an understanding of Greek culture. 
52. In the next chapter it will be seen that Benjamin also develops an 
approach to Hölderlin's poetry in terms of the hermeneutic circularity of 
a poem, which he names das Gedichtete also. 
CHAPTER 5: BENJAMIN AND THE PROCESS OF TRANSLATION 
I. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, Benjamin's thinking of time and language was provided with 
methodological grid as the ground upon which his presentational Umweg 
took place. This distinction between ground and presentation was not, 
however, considered uncritically - Benjamin's thinking of symbol was 
itself seen to be principally concerned with a criticism of such divisions 
as form and content, signifier and signified. Rather it was argued that 
to ignore the task of providing Benjamin's style of thinking and writing 
with a theoretical grid would be to lose precisely the tension involved in 
the inseparability of 'form' and 'content', and thus allow Benjamin's work 
to appear complicit with the Newtonian temporality he wished to criticise. 
The theoretical underpinning concerned Benjamin's taking up of the 
Kantian legacy and the thinking through of the question of the belonging 
together of language and time. This was seen to give rise to a linguistic 
phenomenology (for example, in On Language As Such and On the 
Language of Man), which was thoroughly hermeneutic (for example, in the 
circularity of experience and the knowledge of experience), and whose 
temporality was not that of the Newtonian time-order, but that of a 
continuum ('fulfilled time' or 'messianic time'). While Benjamin's way of 
thinking out of Kant may thus be named a temporal-linguistic hermeneutic 
phenomenology, the systematicity of such a 'way' was self-reflexively 
questioned. Kant's idea of the linguistic systematicity of his work was 
modelled on the experience of things as organisms, an experience which 
involved the determination of the manifold by a concept. In chapter 1 it 
was shown that the conceptuality of the organism required a stretched 
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temporality which thus was at variance with the Newtonian temporality 
which the system itself served to justify. For Benjamin, this lead to a 
questioning of the transcendental ego's unity of apperception, which 
ultimately for Kant underpinned the unity of the critical system; a 
questioning which resulted in the fragmentation of the categories into a 
multiplicity of Urbegriffe. Benjamin understood these Urbegriffe 
linguistically as naming a multiplicity of monadically hermeneutic systems 
or ideas. It is this thinking of multiplicity which is evidenced in the 
presentational 'form' of Benjamin's way of thinking - an Umweg of 
philosophical treatises, fragments, montage and 'strikingly obscure, indeed 
mystifying language'. There is here a clear affinity to Heidegger's way 
of thinking from the systematicity of Being and Time to the occasionality 
of his later pieces, which will be explored further in the Conclusion. In 
order for this affinity to be investigated it is necessary first to clarify 
further Benjamin's thinking of the nature of the linguistic work and its 
temporality. As was the case for Heidegger, this clarification will be 
undertaken through an Auslegung of Benjamin's idea of translation. 
Benjamin's essay on translation, The Task of the Translators, in the 
way it appears to stand alone, in its ellipticism, from any longer term 
philosophical investigation or development of Benjamin's thought, is a 
prime example of Benjamin's Umweg. The essay's enigmatic nature has also 
sporned an large number of thoughtful and insightful interpretations. 2 
Many of these pieces, however, treat the essay in isolation from an 
attempt to provide Benjamin's work with a theoretical underpinning. 3 
The approach of this chapter will be to unfold the essay in the light of 
Benjamin's way of thinking detailed in Chapter 3. Conversely, and as was 
the case for the treatment of Heidegger in the previous chapter, 
Benjamin's thinking of translation will also form a focus with which to 
further illuminate his rethinking of language and time. More precisely. 
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this clarification will involve the interpretation of the translation essay 
in such a manner as to narrate a move from systematic 'way' to multi- 
farious 'Umweg' in Benjamin's phenomenology. 4 By so doing, Benjamin's 
translation essay is allowed to stand, in its ellipticism, as a symbol of the 
inseparability of 'form' and 'content' in his thinking. 
II. The Phenomenology of Language 
On finishing his dissertation on the Early German Romantics in 1919, 
Benjamin was soon occupied in finding a subject for his Habilitations- 
schrift. He writes as follows to Scholem in early 1920, concerning his 
work towards this end: 
Von dieser besteht bislang nur die Intention auf ein Thema; 
nämlich irgend eine Untersuchung, welche in den großen 
Problemkreis Wort und Begriff (Sprache und Logos) fällt, mit 
dem ich mich beschäftigen werde. Vorläufig suche ich ange- 
sichts der ungeheuen Schwierigkeiten nach Literatur, die wohl 
nur im Bereich scholastischer Schriften oder von Schriften 
über die Scholastik zu suchen ist. Wobei in der ersten mind- 
estens das Latein eine harte Nuß ist. (Briefe 1,230; 13 
January 1920) 
Of this, only the intention towards a theme exists as yet; 
namely some sort of investigation into the large circle of 
problems of word and concept (language and logos), with which 
I will occupy myself. At present, in the face of enormous 
difficulties, I am looking for literature which no doubt can 
only be sought in the realm of Scholastic writings or writings 
about the Scholastics. In the former at least, the Latin is a 
tough nut. 
It was this interest in the philosophy of language, and the linguistic 
theories of the Scholastics in particular, which was to occupy Benjamin 
throughout 1920, and which provides the immediate context for his trans- 
lation essay, which was begun in March 1921. It was to the Scholastic 
idea of intentionality, which Benjamin looked in order to find an under- 
standing language beyond a simple dualism of signifier and signified; a 
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dualism which was a parallel of the 'epistemological mythology' of subject 
and object in Kant's work, which his Program essay had attacked. Whilst 
the translation essay does not specifically mention the sign theory of 
language, as did the essay On Language As Such (1916), which described 
it as a 'bourgeois' conception of language, Benjamin's notes from 1920 
clearly show that this was still very much his focus of criticism. He 
writes for example in fragment 9: 
Das Wort ist nun eben nicht Zeichen, sondern das Bezeichnete, 
und nicht die Bedeutung, sondern das Bedeutende, was eben das 
Zeichen mangels seiner intentionalen Unmittelbarkeit nie sein 
kann. «fr 9>, GS VI, p20) 
The word is not just a sign, but the signified, and not the 
meaning, but what does the meaning, which precisely the sign, 
for the lack of its intentional immediacy, never can be. 5 
This fragment also shows how Benjamin's thinking of the 'magic im- 
mediacy' of language from the 1916 essay was, in the period of the 
translation essay, being rethought in terms of intentionality. 
The most obvious result of this criticism of a sign theory of 
language on the translation essay, is his rejection, at the very beginning 
of the essay, of certain 'technological' views of translation. Benjamin 
asks whether a translation is meant for readers who cannot understand 
the original (AU 9/TT 69), and answers that any translation that wishes 
to 'mediate' (vermitteln, intransitive) the contents of the original to a 
wider public in this way can only 'convey' (vermitteln, transitive) 
'statement' or 'information' (Aussage, Mitteilung), and thus only what is 
inessential. Nor, however, can it be understood as the attempt to convey 
something of the spirit of the original, understood as something 'un- 
fathomable, mysterious or "poetic"' (TT 70; 'das Unfaßbare, Geheimnisvolle, 
"Dichterische"', AO 9). Benjamin's rejection here of an understanding of 
translation as a certain means to a human end, is a clear parallel of 
Heidegger's rejection of the 'correct' understanding of translation. 
Concomitant with this, for Benjamin, is also a rejection of a reception 
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theory of the original artwork itself: 'Consideration of the receiver 
never proves fruitful for knowledge concerning a work of art or an art 
form' (TT 69; 'Nirgends erweist sich einem Kunstwerk oder einer Kunst- 
form gegenüber die Rücksicht auf den Aufnehmenden für deren Erkennt- 
nis fruchtbar', AÜ 9). An example of a reception theory of art would be 
Kant's 'Analytic of the Beautiful' in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgments, 
where the perception of the beautiful object brings about a free-play of 
the faculties. A reception theory of art posits a subject-object divide, 
parallel to the signifier-signified dualism underpinning the common 
understanding of translation. That is, language is seen as the bearer of 
the meaning or spirit of the original to the mind of the subject, a 
communication which, thus, may be attempted in a different language. 
Benjamin's interest in researching a scholastic view of language as a 
way of criticising a sign theory must also be understood in relation to 
the growing dominance of phenomenology and its use of an idea of 
intentionality. 7 Benjamin had been familiar with the work of Husserl 
from early on, the first mention being in 1913, concerning Husserl's 
programmatic essay 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science' ('Philosophie als 
strenge Wissenschaft', published 19108). The Program essay (1917) points 
forwards to a possible future confrontation with phenomenology in terms 
of its scholastic inheritance: 
Wie sich der psychologische Bewußtseinsbegriff zum Begriff der 
Sphäre der reinen Erkenntnis verhält bleibt ein Hauptproblem 
der Philosophie, das vielleicht nur aus der Zeit der Scholastik 
her zu restituieren ist. Hier ist der logische Ort vieler 
Probleme die die Phänomenologie neuerdings wieder aufgeworden 
hat. (Programm p163) 
How the psychological concept of consciousness is related to 
the concept of the sphere of pure knowledge remains a major 
problem of philosophy, one which perhaps can only be restored 
out of the age of Scholasticism. Here is the logical place for 
many problems that phenomenology has recently raised anew. 
(Program p5)9 
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It was Brentano who had first explicitly turned to the Scholastics and 
recovered the idea of intentionality in his work Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint. 10 He uses the term to describe mental phenomena 
as having 'intentional in-existence'. 11 Whilst Husserl took up the idea of 
intentionality from Brentano, there is no evidence in his work that 
Husserl was particularly familiar with the Scholastic use of the term, nor 
with its roots in Aristotle via the Arabic writings of Avicenna. Rather, 
there is a sense in Husserl's work that the validity of the term arises 
only from the actual success of phenomenological descriptions of reality. 
Yet conversely the significance of an idea of intentionality for Husserl 
lies precisely in the way it was able to establish philosophy's scientific 
credentials by indicating that all knowledge may be lead back to its 
original sources in immediate experience, that is, to the immediate self- 
givenness of 'the things themselves'. There is thus in Husserl's work a 
certain dismissing of philosophical tradition in order to give phenomen- 
ology the feeling of 'rigorous science', and it is perhaps this implicit 
appeal to progress, in phenomenology itself, which also lies behind 
Benjamin's concern to research and 'restore' its Scholastic heritage. 
In the context of the Program essay, however, Benjamin's central 
philosophical argument with phenomenology is the same one which lead 
Heidegger to develop his idea of Dasein as always already outside of 
itself: the idea of intentionality, as used by Husserl, structures an 
uncritical subject-object divide in which the ego intentionally directs 
itself towards objects outside of itself. Medieval thought, with its 
underlying emphasis on unity in the idea of the belonging together of 
knower and known before the face of God, would clear hold possiblities 
of moving beyond this dualism. 12 
By July, Benjamin had read Heidegger's Habititionsschrift, Die 
Kategorien- and Bedeutungslehre des buns Scotus, published 1916.13 His 
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highly negative evaluation has been quoted in the introduction to this 
thesis; Benjamin was clearly unhappy with the way the work remained 
uncritical of Husserlian phenomenology. Benjamin did not, of course, go 
on to write his Habilitationsschrift on Scholasticism. 14 However, in one 
of his fragmentary notes, dated to the end of 1920, Benjamin signals that 
his planned research was centrally to involve the work of Duns Scotus; 
he also outlines his planned approach in terms of the thinking of 
language he had developed in his work on Kant. 15 This fragment will be 
quoted at length because of its importance in a comparison with 
Heidegger's treatment of Duns Scotus, and more immediately because of the 
insight it gives into Benjamin's engagement with an idea of intentionality, 
and thus into the appearance of the idea in the translation essay. 
Wenn nach der Theorie des Duns Scotus die Hindeutungen auf 
gewissen modi essendi nach Maßgabe dessen<, > was diese 
Hindeutungen bedeuten, fundiert sind, so entsteht natürlich die 
Frage, wie sich von dem Bedeuteten irgend ein Allgemeineres 
und Formaleres als sein und also des Bedeutenden modus essendi 
irgendwie abspalten lasse<, > um als Fundament des Bedeutenden 
zu gelten. Und wie man von der völligen Correlation zwischen 
Bedeutendem und Bedeutetem hinsichtlich dieser Fundierungs- 
frage zu abstrahieren vermöge, so daß also der Zirkel ver- 
mieden wird: Das Bedeutende zielt hin auf das Bedeutete und 
beruht zugleich auf ihm. - Dieser Aufgabe ist durch die 
Betrachtung des Sprachbereichs zu lösen. 1... 1 Der Sprach- 
bereich erstreckt sich als kritisches Medium zwischen dem 
Bereich des Bedeutende<n> und dem des Bedeutete<n>. 
«fr 11>, GS VI, 22-23) 
If. in the theory of Duns Scotus, the pointings at certain modi 
essendi (which the pointings mean in their accordance with 
them) are founded, then naturally the question arises of how 
anything more general and more formal, such as being, may be 
separated from what is meant, and thus how a modus essendi 
may be separated from what does the meaning, in order to 
qualify as a fundament of what does the meaning. And how one 
is capable of abstracting from the complete correlation between 
what does the meaning and what is meant, in regard to the 
question of foundation, so that the following circle may thus 
be avoided: What-does-the-meaning aims at what-is-meant and at 
the same time is based on it. - This task is to be solved 
through the consideration of the realm of language. (... l The 
linguistic realm stretches itself as a critical medium between 
the realm of what does the meaning and the realm of what is 
meant. 
242 
The word Hindeutungen (translated 'pointings') refers to the relationship 
of intentional directedness between the Bedeutendes C'what does the 
meaning') in the mind of the knower and the Bedeutetes ('what is meant'), 
considered to be in the world external to the mind. The circle which 
Benjamin refers to is the closed reflectivity between two realms modelled 
as Newtonian objects, as was discussed in Chapter 3. Benjamin wishes to 
replace this with a properly temporalized hermeneutic situation where 
language is considered as a 'critical medium' which 'stretches' between 
subject and object. In the Program essay this medium was understood as 
the 'continuum of experience' considered linguistically, and in the trans- 
lation essay it will appear under the name of 'pure language'. In order 
to clarify the understanding of intentionality in the translation essay, 
where it appears in guise of das Gemeinte C'what is meant') and die Art 
des Meinens ('the mode of meaning', translated by Zohn as 'mode of 
intention'), in relation to the idea of pure language, it will be useful to 
briefly consider the Scholastic doctrine and its usefulness to phenomen- 
ology. 
Whilst Benjamin never mentions the works of Scholasticism in which 
he was interested, one may surmise, given his familiarity with Heidegger's 
essay, that his interest in Duns Scotus centred on the work Tractatus de 
modis significandi seu grammatica speculativa, which Heidegger focuses on 
in the second half of his essay. At the time of Heidegger's and 
Benjamin's interest in this work, it was attributed to Duns Scotus, but it 
if now generally considered to be the work of the Scotist, Thomas of 
Erfurt. There is, however, no consensus over how the Scholastic 
thinking of intention is to be understood. Up until period of high 
Scholasticism the word intentio simply had the practical meaning of 
'striving towards' or 'aiming at'. Herbert Spiegelberg, the historian of 
phenomenology, argues in his influential essay 'Der Begriff der 
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Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano and bei Husserl', that from 
Aquinas on, the idea of intentio always refered to a mental object as a 
imprint on the mind of the object outside, and never to anything act-like. 
Spiegelberg is thus able to charge the Scholastics with an always implicit 
subjectivism, which ultimately lead to Brentano's Immanenzkrise, and which 
was finally countered, in Spiegelberg's view, by Husserl's completely new 
understanding of intentionality. Ausonio Marras, on the contrary, in his 
essay 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Concept of Intentionality' regards 
Scholastic thought as unmistakably realist and argues that even in 
Aquinas' work the idea of intentio is understood not as a mental object, 
but as a mental directedness. He writes: 
The species or intentio is not that which (id quod) is directly 
or primarily known by the understanding [ ... ] but is instead 
that by means of which (id quo) the extramental object is 
known. The species is the vehicle which carries the reference 
to the non-immanent object. (p137) 
It is this latter understanding of intentio which interested Heidegger and 
Benjamin in its possibilities of opening an engagement with phenomen- 
ology. Medieval thinking of intentio after Aquinas was structured, in 
general, in a three level way, involving the modus essendi, modus 
intelligendi and the modus significandi ('mode of being', 'mode of 
understanding' and 'mode of signification'). The modus significandi was 
directed towards the modus intelligendi, which was in turn directed 
towards the object's modus essendi. Many treatises were written 
concerning these relationships; they were generally titled De modis 
significandi and the authors were generally known as modisti. 16 The 
superiority of such a three level semantics in comparison to the two level 
approach of signifier and signified, in the treatment of philosophical 
problems such as identity of referent, reference to non-existent or 
imaginary objects, and mistaken identity of a referent, became clear to 
Husserl through the work of Frege. That is, a three level semantics 
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explains in a more satisfactory manner how a single referent, such as the 
planet Venus, may be refered to by two different expressions (this will 
be of particular importance for Benjamin in the translation essay), or how 
a word, such as 'unicorn', may have meaning but no referent, or how a 
tree may be mistaken for a person in twilight. However, the decisively 
phenomenological interest in the idea of intentionality comes through the 
recognition that such an idea brings with it an emphasis on the immedia- 
cy of experience, in opposition to a sign theory. The notion of a 
signifier existing in the mind as a mental object consisting of a 'bundle 
of impressions' or an 'idea', and which is then considered by the mind to 
represent an external object, did not well explain the way we see, for 
example, not colour sensations or impressions, but coloured things. 17 Or 
to use Heidegger's favorite example, we do not hear a sound outside and 
mentally compare it with other sounds we have heard, rather we hear the 
aeroplane; that is, we hear the sound as the sound of an aeroplane. It 
was this immediacy which Benjamin sought to account for in the ling- 
uistic phenomenology of his Language As Such essay, and which he 
developed in relation to Kant into the idea of the continuum of 
experience. 
In the translation essay Benjamin develops his concern with a 
phenomenological account of intentionality by way of thinking through 
the nature of translation. After mentioning the importance of 
distinguishing between what is meant and the mode of meaning, Benjamin 
writes: 
In 'Brot' und 'pain' ist das Gemeinte zwar dasselbe, die Art, es 
zu meinen, dagegen nicht. In der Art des Meinens nämlich liegt 
es, daß beide Worte dem Deutschen und Franzosen je etwas 
Verschiedenes bedeuten, daß sie für beide nicht vertauschbar 
sind, ja sich letzten Endes auszuschließen streben; am Gemeinten 
aber, daß sie, absolute genommen, das Selbe und Identische 
bedeuten. (AÜ 14) 
While what is meant in 'Brot' and 'pain' is the same, the manner 
of meaning it, is not. It is owing to the mode of meaning that 
both words mean something different to a German and a 
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Frenchman, that these words are not interchangeable for them, 
that indeed they ultimately strive to exclude each other; as to 
what is meant, however, the two words, taken absolutely, mean 
what is the same and identical. (TT 74) 
This passage makes clear that Benjamin is making use of the fundamental 
distinction, in a phenomenological approach to language, between that 
which is meant and its mode of signification, to explain how two 
different expressions may have one and the same referent. A two level 
semantics of signifier and signified would suggest that in any context 
one signifier is replacable by another having the same signified. This is 
clearly not the case where different languages are involved. 18 The use 
Benjamin wishes to make of a distinction between what is meant and mode 
of meaning is also illustrated by his application of it to the case of 
poetry: 
Denn [Sinn] erschöpft sich nach seiner dichterischen Bedeutung 
fürs Original nicht in dem Gemeinten, sondern gewinnt diese 
dadurch, wie das Gemeinte an die Art des Meinens in dem 
bestimmten Worte gebunden ist. Man pflegt dies in der Formal 
auszudrücken, daß die Worte einen Gefühlston mit sich führen. 
(AÜ 17) 
For the sense in its poetic significance for the original is not 
limited to what is meant, but achieves it through the way in 
which what is meant is bound to the mode of meaning in the 
particular word. It is usual to express this in the formula 
that words have emotional connotations. (TT 78) 
To put this in Fregean terminology: a word has both sense and reference, 
that is, an intentional content and a referent. In certain contexts, such 
as poetry, the particular referent of a word is often not so important as 
the mode in which it is meant, and indeed may even be of negligible 
importance in comparison to it. It is in this context which Benjamin 
discusses the usual opposition between 'fidelity and freedom in 
translation' (TT 79; '[... I Treue and Freiheit der Übersetzung seit jeher 
als widerstrebende Tendenzen betrachtet wurden', AÜ 18). By this he 
means the tension between a perceived need to remain true to the 
individual words and syntactic form of the original, and the desire of the 
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translator to ignore the individual words and thus have the freedom to 
recreate the considered sense of the original. Literality (Wi rtlichkeit) 
with respect to syntax is a direct threat to the comprehensibility of the 
original, 'thus the demand for literalness cannot be derived from an 
interest in the retention of sense' (TT 78; 'Demgemäß ist die Forderung 
der Wörtlichkeit unableitbar aus dem Interesse der Erhaltung des Sinnes', 
AÜ 18). Benjamin has no desire, however, to produce a schema for 
mediating or balancing these two claims as traditionally understood. As 
was shown above, the translation essay starts with a rejection of the 
idea that a translation's purpose is the wider circulation of what an 
original communicates to a reader, that is, precisely a rejection of an idea 
of translation as the 'reproduction of sense' (TT 78; 'die Wiedergabe des 
Sinnes', AÜ 17). To this end, fidelity to literality is given absolute 
priority over the 'poetic' freedom of the translator, precisely in that the 
referentiality of a word in its Gemeintes is demolished in favor of its 
Art des Meinens. That is, in order to avoid the situation in which the 
Gemeintes is taken as what the original wants to communicate, it is 
dismissed in favour of an emphasis on the word's mode of meaning. In 
this way, and to use Benjamin's simile, the translation touches on the 
original's sense as a tangent touches a circle, before continuing on its 
straight path to infinity under the laws of fidelity (AU 20-1/TT 80). 
For Benjamin, therefore, the translation is to bring about a death of 
the intentio of the word, as was discussed in Chapter 3. That is, the 
bringing together of the modes of meaning from the different languages 
is to put in question the notion of a referent simply existing as an 
object external to the subject. Through its 'death', an intentio no longer 
structures a subject-object dualism, and instead its intentionality is 
directed towards the linguistic realm which 'stretches' between that which 
does the meaning and that which is meant. The opacity of the passage in 
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which Benjamin first introduces the ideas of Gemeintes and Art des 
Meinens, is caused by the way Benjamin's account moves seamlessly from 
the case of the words 'Brot' and 'pain' having the same referent 
(Gemeintes), to the situation of the death of the intentio which is the 
result of bringing the expressions together. That is, the referent of the 
term Gemeintes changes from the identical object-like referent of the two 
words, to the pure continuum of experience, or 'pure language'. The 
death of an intentionality to an external referent occurs in the following 
passage, which comes immediately after the discussion of the words Brot 
and pain, quoted above: 
Während dergestalt die Art des Meinens in diesen beiden Wör- 
tern einander widerstrebt, ergänzt sie sich in den beiden 
Sprachen, denen sie entstammen. Und zwar ergänzt sich in 
ihnen die Art der Meinens zum Gemeinten. Bei den einzeln, den 
unergänzten Sprachen nämlich ist ihr Gemeintes niemals in 
relativer Selbständigkeit anzutreffen, wie bei den einzelnen 
Wörtern oder Sätzen, sondern vielmehr in stetem Wandel 
begriffen, bis es aus der Harmonie all jener Arten des Meinens 
als die reine Sprache herauszutreten vermag. (AÜ 14) 
While, in this way, the modes of meaning in both these words 
conflict with each other, they complement each other in the two 
languages from which they come. And indeed, they complement 
each other in them, in regard to what is meant. In the in- 
dividual, uncomplemented languages namely, what is meant is 
never found in relative independence, as in individual words or 
sentences, rather it is in a process of constant change, until it 
is able to emerge from the harmony of all the various modes of 
meaning, as pure language. (TT 74) 
In this passage, Benjamin moves from the idea that the words Brot and 
pain have the same referent, but their modes of meaning are in conflict, 
to the idea that these conflicting modes complement each other, when 
brought together according to the concept of fidelity, with regard to a 
higher referent, the realm of pure language. In a language which is not 
regarded through its relationship with another in translation, thus 'un- 
complemented', this higher referent is understood in terms of one 
epistemological mythology or another (cf. Chapter 3), and thus 'is in a 
process of constant change'. It is only through the 'harmony' of the 
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belonging together of the modes of meaning that pure language, as the 
critical medium of all epistemological mythologies, may thus be indicated. 
This notion of 'harmony' in 'Sprachergänzung' CAÜ 18/TT 79) must 
not be misunderstood. It is clearly not a reference to an understanding 
of 'pure language' as an ideal and perfectly referential language, since it 
is reached through the death of the intentio. Benjamin rejects this 
interpretation, when he writes: 
In dieser reinen Sprache, die nichts mehr meint und nicht mehr 
ausdrückt, sondern als ausdrückloses und schöpferisches Wort 
das in allen Sprachen Gemeinte ist, trifft endlich alle Mitteil- 
ung, aller Sinn und aller Intention auf eine Schicht, in der sie 
zu erlöschen bestimmt sind. (AÜ 19) 
In this pure language - which no longer means and no longer 
expresses, rather as the expressionless and creative word, 
which is what is meant in all languages - all communication, all 
sense, and all intention finally encounter a stratum in which 
they are destined to be extinguished. (TT 80) 
Nor should the idea of 'harmony' in relation to 'pure language' be 
understood in any sense as a reference to some imagined greater language 
which existed before a 'fall' into a multiplicity of languages. 19 Benjamin 
specifically rejects this imputation of a prelapsarian longing in the idea 
of pure language in a preparatory note to the translation essay: 20 
Die Vielheit der Sprachen ist eine derartige Wesensvielheit. 
Die Lehre der Mystiker vom Verfall der wahren Sprache kann 
also wahrheitsgemäß nicht auf deren Auflösung in eine Vielheit, 
welche der ursprünglichen und gottgewollten Einheit wider- 
spräche, hinauslaufen, sondern - da die Vielheit der Sprachen 
sowenig wie die der Völker ein Verfallsprodukt, ja soweit 
davon entfernt ist es zu sein, daß gerade eben diese Vielheit 
allein deren Wesenscharakter ausspricht. C<fr 12>, GS VI, 24) 
The multiplicity of languages is a kind of essential multiplicity. 
The teaching of the mystic about the fall of the true language 
thus cannot truely concern its dissolution into a multiplicity 
which contradicts an original and divinely desired unity. 
Rather, since the multiplicity of language is as little a product 
of the fall as the multiplicity of peoples, indeed so far is it to 
be distanced from this idea, that it is precisely this multi- 
plicity which alone expresses the essential character of that 
true language. 2 i 
This reference to the essential multiplicity of the realm of pure language 
is parallel to Benjamin's emphasis on the multiplicity of ideas in The 
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Origin of German Tragic Drama, the work which constituted his 
Habilitationsschrift after his decision to give up research in the field of 
pure philosophy of language, and which was discussed in Chapter 3.22 
There it was shown how Benjamin understood truth through the 'round 
dance' of the multiplicity of ideas, thus freed from their referentiality to 
external objects (OGTD p23; GS 1.1,209). A further image which Benjamin 
used was the revealing of truth in the 'burning up' Was Aufflammen) of 
its cover in the work, as the latter enters the circle of ideas (OGTD p31; 
GS 1.1,211). This image of flame appears also in the translation essay 
for the idea of the revelation of the truth of a work in its translation: 
Wenn aber diese [unergänzte Sprachen] derart bis ans 
messianische Ende ihrer Geschichte wachsen, so ist es die 
Übersetzung, welche am ewigen Fortleben der Werke und am 
unendlichen Aufleben der Sprachen sich entzündet. (AÜ 14) 
If, however, these uncomplemented languages grow in this 
manner until the messianic end of their history, then it is the 
translation which catches fire on the eternal living-on of the 
works and the perpetual renewal of languages. (TT 74) 
This passage links the idea of the Gemeintes of uncomplemented languages 
to the complementation of language in translation, through an idea of the 
life of a work and its translation. Benjamin's references here to 'life' in 
the terms Fortleben and Aufleben, refer back to Benjamin's idea that the 
concept of life be applied to that 'of which there is history' (p71; 'wovon 
es Geschichte gibt', p11), which he introduced near the beginning of the 
essay. It is clear, then, that the truth revealed by a translation is a 
truth concerning time - the history of language and the history of the 
work. This short passage introduces, therefore, a second aspect of the 
essay, a question of time, which has not been emphasized in this section - 
in which the emphasis has been upon language. To this end, the next 
section will move towards Benjamin's understanding of time and history in 
relation to translation, just as was the case in the chapter on 
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Heidegger's view of translation. 23 These ideas will be taken up in the 
light of Benjamins doctoral dissertation on German Romanticism, written 
two years before the translation essay. The question of Benjamin's 
relation to Hegel will also need to be raised24, as was also the case for 
Heidegger. This will be considered in section IV. 
III. The Nature and History of the Art-Work 
According to Benjamin, the process of 'literal' translation, as explored 
above, transplants (verpflanzt) the original work into a higher linguistic 
realm, and it does so 'ironically' (AÜ 15/TT 75). Benjamin draws attention 
to the way the word 'ironically' brings the Romantics to mind, and writes 
that 'they, more than any others, were gifted with an insight into the 
life of literary works' (TT 76; 'Diese haben vor andern Einsicht in das 
Leben der Werke bessen', AÜ 15). This consideration of the life of a 
literary work, manifested in translation, marks a second focus in the 
translation essay, concentrating on the original work as a whole, and not 
on the translation of individual words. These two foci are intertwined 
throughout the essay, and are separated here only for clarity. This 
emphasis on the work as a whole will be explored via Kant's idea of the 
work of art, leading to an investigation of the affinity between 
Benjamin's concept of translatablity and his view of the concept of the 
criticism of the art-work in German Romanticism. 
In a long footnote to the late essay On Some Motifs in Baudelaire 
(1939), Benjamin writes that the art-work, as beautiful thing Was Schöne), 
may be defined in two ways: in its relationship to history and to nature 
(Baudelaire p140; GS 1.2,638). Understood on the basis of its historical 
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existence, the beautiful thing is an appeal to join those who admired it 
an earlier time. In this definition, the beautiful appearance (Schein) does 
not consist in there being an 'identical object' (identische Gegenstand) 
which each generation takes up independently of the last and thereby 
reaches a valuation without recourse to earlier assessments. This 
historical existence of the work, in that there is no 'identical object' 
which, in its unchanging existence, underpins the appreciation of its 
beauty, is what Benjamin calls its life or afterlife in the translation 
essay: 
Denn in seinem Fortleben, das so nicht heißen dürfte, wenn es 
nicht Wandlung und Erneuerung des Lebendigen wäre, ändert 
sich das Original. (AÜ 12) 
For in its afterlife - which could not be called that if it were 
not a transforming and renewing of something living - the 
original changes. (TT 3) 
The translation essay thus uses a 'natural' image C'life') for the historical 
existence of the work. This suggests an essential link between the 
historical definition and the second definition Benjamin gives in the 
footnote (the work's relationship to nature). 
Concerning this second definition, Benjamin writes that the beautiful 
thing can be defined as that which "'remains the same as itself in essence 
only under its covering"' (Baudelaire p140; "'wesenhaft sich selbst gleich 
nur unter der Verhüllung bleibt"', GS 1.2,638). This definition, quoted 
by Benjamin, is taken from his own essay Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften 
(GS 1.1.195), which was begun in the Summer of 1921, whilst he was 
finishing the translation essay. Benjamin develops this definition at 
length in the Goethe essay, in criticism of the ideas that beauty is the 
mere appearance of truth, or the becoming visible of truth in a form not 
proper to it, or that beauty is the covering of truth which exists 
object-like beneath it. 
Nicht Schein, nicht Hülle für ein anderes ist die Schönheit. 
Sie selbst Ist nicht Erscheinung, sondern durchaus Wesen, ein 
solches freilich, welches wesenhaft sich selbst gleich nur unter 
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der Verhüllung bleibt. [... ] Denn weder die Hülle noch der 
verhüllte Gegenstand ist das Schöne, sondern dies ist der 
Gegenstand in seiner Hülle. Enthüllt aber würde er unendlich 
unscheinbar sich erweisen. Hier gründet die uralte Anschau- 
ung, daß in der Enthüllung das Verhüllte sich verwandelt, daß 
es 'sich selbst gleich' nur unter der Verhüllung bleiben wird. 
Also wird allem Schönen gegenüber die Idee der Enthüllung zu 
der der Unenthüllbarkeit. Sie ist die Idee der Kunstkritik. Die 
Kunstkritik hat nicht die Hülle zu heben, vielmehr durch deren 
genaueste Erkenntnis als Hülle erst zur wahren Anschauung des 
Schönen sich zu erheben 1... 1: zur Anschauung des Schönen als 
Geheimnis. (... ] Weil nur das Schöne und außer ihm nichts 
verhüllend und verhüllt wesentlich zu sein vermag, liegt im 
Geheimnis der göttliche Seinsgrund der Schönheit. (Goethes 
Wahlverwandtschaften GS 1.1,195) 
Beauty is not a semblance, not a cover for something else. It 
is not an appearance, but rather thoroughly an essence, one 
certainly which remains the same as itself in essence only 
under the covering. [... ] For the beautiful thing is neither the 
cover nor the covered object, rather it is the object in its 
cover. Uncovered, it would show itself infinitely invisible. 
Here is the basis of the prehistoric view that what is covered 
changes in its uncovering, that it will remain 'the same as 
itself' only under its covering. Thus the idea of uncovering 
in relation to everything beautiful becomes the idea of un- 
uncoverability. This is the idea of art-criticism. Art-criticism 
has not to lift the cover, rather to raise itself first, through 
the most precise knowledge of the cover as cover, to the true 
view of the beautiful thing C... 1: to the view of the beautiful 
thing as a secret. C... ] Because only the beautiful thing and 
nothing else is capable of being essentially covering and 
covered, the divine ground of the being of beauty lies in this 
secret. 
This complex and enigmatic passage, itself taken from a much longer 
discussion of the essence of the art-work, can be seen, in the light of 
the later footnote in the Baudelaire essay, to concern the definition of 
the beautiful thing in relation to nature. Just as, however, its 
definition in relation to history appealed to a natural image ('life'), so 
here the definition of the beautiful thing in relation to nature is 
clarified by an appeal to art-criticism, and thus the history of the work. 
It is this essential inter-linking of the two definitions, found in the 
Baudelaire essay, which is expressed in the translation essay. That is, 
the history of a work in its translation can only be understood in 
connection with the 'nature' of the original; its life only in connection 
with its criticism and translation. Benjamin's dissertation The Concept of 
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Art-Criticism in German Romanticism (1918-19) maintains an emphasis on 
the historical definition of the work, while the essay Goethes 
Wahlverwandtschaften (1921-22) emphasizes the natural definition, and the 
translation essay, written in the period between them, elliptically presents 
the two together. 25 This intertwining of the definitions of the art- 
work in the translation essay may best be investigated by allowing the 
two essays either side of it to sketch Benjamin's view of the passage of 
Kant's legacy through Fichte, and on to the Early Romantics and Hegel. 
Though Benjamin cites the Goethe essay in connection with the 
definition of the art-work in relation to nature, the quotation would 
seem at first sight to have little to do with nature. The explanation of 
the beautiful thing as being a unity of both covering and covered, can be 
understood as parallel to Benjamin's view of symbol, as was discussed in 
Chapter 3. That is, the art-work does not consist of two distinct realms 
modelled on a Newtonian understanding of a 'Platonic' divide, such that 
its truth appears in a material realm in a distorted form, or such that it 
could be exposed by lifting its cover, its presentational form. Nor, 
however, is the idea of content simply denied. Rather, the art-work 
consists in its 'un-uncoverability'26, a unity of what is covered and what 
covers. This unity must again not be thought of as a simple identity of 
two realms, which would again be to fall back on the temporality of the 
Newtonian object, rather, as in the case of the symbol, the unity consists 
of a 'stretched' temporality. It is this appeal to the unity of the work 
of art which constitutes its relation to nature. Thus Benjamin writes a 
little further on in the Goethe essay: 
Um jener Einheit willen, die Hülle und Verhülltes in [Schönheit] 
bilden, kann sie wesentlich da allein gelten, wo die Zweiheit 
von Nacktheit und Verhüllung noch nicht besteht: in der Kunst 
und in den Erscheinungen der bloßen Natur. (Goethes 
Wahlverwandtschaften, GS 1.1,196) 
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For the sake of that unity, which the cover and what is 
covered form in beauty, they can only be essentially valid 
where the dualism of nakedness and covering does not yet 
exist: in art and in the appearances of mere nature. 
Benjamin is arguing that this relation of cover and what is covered only 
holds where they do not fall into a dualism of two realms (the realm of a 
truth which can exist independently and object-like in its nakedness, and 
the realm of its covering). And for Benjamin, this only holds for the 
unity of art-works and for the unity 'in the appearances of mere nature'. 
The context for this assertion in the Goethe essay concerns Kant's 
aesthetics. Immediately before this passage Benjamin mentions Kant's 
doctrine of beauty as a Relationscharakter, which, he states, accomplishes 
its methodological tendencies in a much higher realm than in a psycho- 
logistic reception theory of aesthetics (GS 1.1, p195-6). It is thus 
towards Kant one must turn in order to clarify the implications of this 
unity found both in art and in the appearances of nature, and to clarify 
the relationship of this unity to art-criticism. 27 
The Relationscharakter which Benjamin refers to is what Kant terms 
the 'free swing of the mental powers' (CJ p174; 'ein freie Schwung der 
Gemütskräfte', Ak V, 312) in the perception of the beautiful. In the 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant draws a problematic distinction 
between 'beauty of nature' and 'beauty of art' ('Naturschönheit' and 
'Kunstschönheit'); the latter requires, for its appreciation, a concept of 
that which is being represented, thus he writes: 
Wenn aber der Gegenstand für ein Product der Kunst gegeben 
ist und als solches für schön erklärt werden soll: so muß, weil 
Kunst immer einen Zweck in der Ursache (und deren Causalität) 
voraussetzt, zuerst ein Begriff von dem zum Grunde gelegt 
werden, was das Ding sein soll; und da die Zusammenstimmung 
des Mannigfaltigen in einem Dinge zu einer innern Bestimmung 
desselben als Zweck die Vollkommenheit des Dinges Ist, so wird 
in der Beurteilung der Kunstschönheit zugleich die Vollkommen- 
heit des Dinges in Anschlag gebracht werden müssen, wonach in 
der Beurteilung einer Naturschönheit (als einer solchen) gar 
nicht die Frage* ist. (Ak V, 311) 
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If, however, the object is given as a product of art, and is as 
such to be declared beautiful, then, seeing that art always 
presupposes an end in the cause (and its causality), a concept 
of what the thing is intended to be must first of all be laid at 
its basis. And, since the agreement, in a thing, of the manifold 
with an inner determination belonging to the thing as its end, 
is the perfection of the thing, it follows that in estimating 
beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also taken 
into account -a matter which in estimating a beauty of nature, 
as a beauty of nature, is quite irrelevant. (CJ p173) 
In estimating a beauty of nature, a concept of the thing as the knowledge 
of its end is not required, rather only the 'mere form' ('die bloße Form'). 
However, in the light of Kant's first critique, this distinction between a 
beauty of art and a beauty of nature is highly problematic. It was shown 
in Chapter 1 how the experience of an object as such, required the 
three-fold synthesis to unify the manifold in a stretched temporality 
according to a concept. Since the three-fold synthesis of the manifold in 
the transcendental unity of apperception is the root of experience as 
such, Kant cannot subsequently appeal to the presupposition of a concept 
in order to differentiate between beauty of art and beauty of nature. In 
other words, Kant cannot mark a simple distinction between the 'mere 
form' and the concept of a thing, because it is the synthesis of recog- 
nition in a concept which gives the manifold 'mere form'. 
The situation is further complicated for Kant because what gives rise 
to the feeling of pleasure in the perception of a beautiful thing is the 
'free swing of the mental powers', and this is brought about only ever 
through the form of the object. Thus Kant's attempted distinction 
between beauty of nature and beauty of art must always be subsequent to 
their unity in an idea of form: 'mere form' in one, and the form of the 
presentation of concept in the other. Kant writes, for example, 'So much 
for the beautiful representation of an object [in art], which is properly 
only the form of the presentation of a concept' (CJ p174; 'So viel von 
der schönen Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes, die eigentlich nur die Form 
der Darstellung eines Begriffs Ist', Ak V, 312). Kant tries, however, to 
256 
maintain a distinction between this presentational form and mere form by 
stating that the former is only found by the artist through long 
practise: 
Daher diese [Form] nicht gleichsam eine Sache der Eingebung, 
oder eines freien Schwunges der Gemütskräfte, sondern einer 
langsamen und gar peinlichen Nachbesserung ist, um sie dem 
Gedanken angemessen und doch der Freiheit derselben nicht 
nachteilig werden zu lassen. (Ak V, 312-3) 
Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or 
of a free swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and 
even painful process of improvement, directed to making the 
form adequate to the thought without detriment to the freedom 
of mental those powers. (CJ p174) 
In attempting to differentiate between 'mere form', which would be a 'free 
swing of the mental powers', and the presentational form of the concept 
represented in the art work, Kant ascribes to the artist a labour, in 
which thus through a series of stages, the work reaches a state of 
perfection in the adequation of form and concept. 
Ultimately Kant's attempted distinction rests on the emergence of an 
uncritical subject-object empiricism in his thinking. As the quotation 
above shows, for Kant 'the object is given as a product of art' (my 
emphasis). It is when the critical apparatus of Kant's first Critique is 
applied to this givenness, that his treatment of beauty becomes productive 
in a 'much higher realm'. Kant's distinction between 'mere form' of 
natural beauty and the perfection of the beauty of art becomes a con- 
tinuum of a series of stages in a continous labour of reflexion: 
Experience itself is generated by the running through of the manifold in 
a determination by a concept; this experience in its givenness is then 
taken as 'mere form' (beauty of nature) and subsequently further deter- 
mined by the reapplication (or reflexion) of the concept of what 'the 
thing is intended to be' (to give the form of a beauty of art); the form 
of this object is then taken in its givenness (as a product of art), as a 
subject of further reflexion through the concept, that is, a re-application 
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of the concept of what it is intended to be; through this reflexion a 
higher determination is reached in a new stage of the artistic process, 
and which is again taken as given, so that the labour of reflexion starts 
again, until perfection (Vollkommenheit) is reached. In this application of 
a critical theory of knowledge to Kant's idea of the difference between 
objects of nature and objects of art, one sees a glimpse of the complex- 
ities of Hegel's phenomenology of experience in its description of the 
labour of Geist in its attainment of the absolute concept - the 
'adequation' of form and concept. In order to understand, however, how 
Benjamin's idea of the art-work and its life in the unity of its form and 
concept (or content) is different from the Hegelian development of Kant, 
whilst also liberating Kant's 'methodological tendencies' from an uncritical 
subject-object dualism, it is necessary to investigate how he saw both 
Hegel and Early German Romanticism arising from Fichte's development of 
Kant. 
In Fichte's understanding the prevailing reception of Kant's work had 
turned Kant into a dogmatist, serving a 'beloved, superficial empiricism'. 28 
That is, the existence of things outside of the self was accepted 
uncritically, and, as was shown above, this tendency had also crept into 
Kant's third Critique. Fichte's response to this empiricist interpretation 
of the first Critique was to cut the self free of any last vestiges of a 
reliance on an uncritically posited external world by making the tran- 
scendental ego into the necessary unity of reflecting subject and 
reflected object. The ego understood in this way is not a transcendental 
object, but rather pure and free activity which exists by reason of its 
own absolute self-positing. On the basis of this activity of the self, as 
the critical unity of perceived object and transcendental apperception, 
Fichte raises his Wissenschaftslehre: 
Hierin liegt nun der ganze Stoff einer möglichen Wissenschafts- 
lehre, aber nicht diese Wissenschaft selbst. Um dises zu Stande 
zu bringen, dazu gehört noch eine, unter jenern Handlungen 
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allen nicht enthaltene Handlung des menschlichen Geistes, 
nämlich die, seine Handlungsart überhaupt zum Bewußtsein zu 
erheben. [... 1 Durch diese frei Handlung wird nun etwas, das 
schon an sich Form ist, die notwendige Handlung der 
Intelligenz, als Gehalt in eine neue Form, die Form des Wissens, 
oder des Bewußtseins aufgenommen, und demnach ist jene Handl- 
ung eine Handlung der Reflexion. ('Über den Begriff der 
Wissenschaftslehre', Sämmtliche Werke I, 71,72) 
The entire contents of a possible Wissenschaftslehre lie in this 
tie the activity of the self], but not this science itself. In 
order to create such a science, an additional act of the human 
mind is required, one not included amongst its other acts, 
namely, one which rises its own mode of acting to conscious- 
ness. E... ] By means of this free act, something which in itself 
is already form (the necessary action of the intellect) becomes 
the content of a new form (the form of knowledge or of 
consciousness); and thus this act is an act of reflexion. 
(Concerning the Concept of the 'Wissenschaftslehre' p126,127)29 
In this passage, Fichte appeals to a schema of form and content in the 
construction of his system: the form which transcendentally structures 
experience is made to become the content of a 'new form' through 
reflexion. Fichte expresses this succinctly in a formulation found in the 
first edition of the work Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, which 
is also quoted by Benjamin in his dissertation on German Romanticism: the 
'act of freedom, through which form becomes the form of form as its 
content, and turns back on itself, is called reflexion' (p123; '[Die] Handl- 
ung der Freiheit, durch welche die Form zur Form der Form als ihres 
Gehaltes wird and in sich selbst zurückkehrt, heißt Reflexion', 1,67). 
The above passage raises the question, however, which Benjamin under- 
stood as decisive for the reaction of the Early Romantics to Fichte's 
work: what prevents the 'new form', the knowledge of knowledge or the 
consciousness of consciousness, from itself becoming the subject of a 
further reflexion, and thus setting up and infinite series? Fichte avoids 
this possiblity by differentiating the self's act of reflexion from its 
other acts of knowledge, and this is brought about by appeal to intellect- 
ual intuition. This intuition, which cannot be proved to exist, but which 
everyone must discover for themselves is 'the immediate consciousness 
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that I act, and what I enact' (Science of Knowledge p38; '[Die intellectuelle 
Anschauung] ist das unmittelbare Bewußtsein, daß ich handle, and was ich 
handle', I, 463). This immediate intuition, which may be found at any 
moment of consciousness, is the intuition of the pure activity of the self, 
that is both the self's reflexion on that which is posited as the not-I 
(the 'external world') and the self's self-positing as a reflecting I. 
The notion of the intellectual intuition both functions to prevent an 
infinite regress of reflexion, and, because of the immediacy with which 
the self is able to turn back on its activity, grounds the certainty and 
systematic unity of Fichte's science. 30 For Benjamin, this central focus 
of Fichte's thought allows two different developments of Fichte's 
radicalized Kantian system to be seen: 
Fichte kennt zwei dergestalt unendlich Aktionsweisen des Ich, 
nämlich außer der Reflexion noch das Setzen. Man kann die 
Fichtesche Tathandlung förmlich als eine Kombination dieser 
beiden unendlichen Aktionsweisen des Ich auffassen, in der sie 
ihre beideseitige rein formale Nature, ihre Leerheit gegenseitig 
auszufüllen und zu bestimmen suchen: die Tathandlung ist eine 
setzende Reflexion oder ein reflektiertes Setzen, '... ein sich 
Setzen als setzend... keineswegs aber etwa ein bloßes Setzen', 
formuliert Fichte. Beide Termini besagen etwas verschiedenes, 
beide sind von großer Wichtigkeit für die Geschichte der 
Philosophie. Während der Reflexionsbegriff zur Grundlage der 
frühromantischen Philosophie wird, erscheint - nicht ohne 
Bezeihung auf den letzten - der Begriff des Setzens in seiner 
vollen Ausgestaltung in der Hegelschen Dialektic. (Der Begriff 
der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik, GS 1.1,22) 
Fichte thus recognises two infinite modes of action of the I; 
that is, besides reflexion, also positing. One can understand 
the Fichtean activity formally as a combination of these two 
infinite modes of action of the I, in which they seek to 
reciprocally fill out and determine the dual and purely formal 
nature of this combination: '... a self-positing as positing... but in 
no way some sort of mere positing', formulates Fichte. Both 
terms mean something different, both are of great importance 
for the history of philosophy. Whilst the concept of reflexion 
becomes the basis of early Romantic philosophy, the concept of 
positing appears - not without connection to the concept of 
reflexion - in its full development in the Hegelian dialectic. 
The early Romantics, in taking up the concept of reflexion from Fichte, 
were not satisfied with the way he used the idea of intellectual intuition 
to prevent the infinite regress of reflexions by allowing it to ground 
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his system as the absolute self-positing act of the I. For the Romantics, 
such a proposition and thus the form of Fichte's system as a whole, 
become the content of a further critical reflexion. Freed from its anchor 
in the self-positing ego, the process of reflection becomes an abyssal 
multiplication of an endless series of further levels of reflexion. Thus 
Benjamin writes in his dissertation: 
Die Reflexion erweitert sich schranklos, und das in der 
Reflexion geformte Denken wird zum formlosen Denken, welches 
sich auf das Absolutum richtet. (GS 1.1. p31) 
Reflexion expands itself without limit and the thinking formed 
in reflexion becomes a formless thinking, which is directed 
towards the Absolutum. 
Benjamin uses the word das Absolutum here to name the infinity of 
reflexion, which the early Romantics tried to enclose in their work. The 
suffix -tum is used in German to denote a collectivity or a quality. 
Benjamin also uses the word Reflexionsmedium for this Absolute in order 
to emphasize the idea that it is not merely a collection of a multiplicity 
of reflexions, but that it also forms a qualitatively filled medium. It is 
Benjamin's understanding of the Absolute in Early German Romanticism, as 
combining both multiplicity and continuity, which brings their work so 
close to Benjamin's own critical analysis of Kant: in Chapter 3 it was 
shown how Benjamin's idea of a critical continuum of experience was also 
thought as a multiplicity of ideas. 
Fichte's work provided the Romantics with a far more radical under- 
standing of the transcendental ego in its process of reflexion than Kant, 
and allowed its function in the limitation of reflexion and the grounding 
of his system to become clear. As was shown in Chapter 1, systematicity, 
in its analogy with organism, required, for Kant, a concept as its 'inner 
determination' and in accordance with the quotation from Kant's Third 
Critique above, the presentation of this concept as the system itself, thus 
becomes a 'beauty of art'. In this way, art is no longer something to 
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which the critical system is applied in order to account for the toil of 
the artist, rather critical philosophy itself becomes understood as art. 31 
By liberating Fichte's idea of reflexion from its anchorage in the ego, the 
form of Fichte's system becomes the content of a further reflexion, and 
thus, for the Early Romantics, is taken as a 'product of art'. For the 
Romantics then, art is taken to name the Reflexionsmedium which arises 
from Fichte's philosophy when the grounding of reflexion in the ego is 
removed. Thus Benjamin writes: 
Im frühromantischen Sinne ist der Mittelpunkt der Reflexion die 
Kunst, nicht das Ich. 1... ] Die romantische Kunstanschauung 
beruht darauf, daß im Denken des Denkens kein Ich-Bewußtsein 
verstanden wird. Die Ich-freie Reflexion Ist eine Reflexion im 
Absolutum der Kunst. (GS 1.1,39-40) 
For the Early Romantics, art is the focal point of reflexion, 
not the I. The Romantic intuition of art is based on there 
being no understanding of I-consciousness in the thinking of 
thinking. The I-free reflexion is a reflexion in the Absolutum 
of art. 
The most obvious consequence of this 'I-free reflexion' is a critical 
reflexion upon systematic thought, in that no system of thought can make 
a claim to absolute validity through an appeal to an absolute ground of 
thought, such as a transcendental ego. There is thus a certain tension 
between systematicity and the recognition of a system as an artistic 
presentation, which is expressed in Athenaeum fragment 53: 'It is equally 
fatal for the mind to have a system or not to have one. It will have to 
decide therefore to combine both' C'Es ist gleich tödlich für den Geist, ein 
System zu haben, and keins zu haben. Er wird sich also wohl entschließ- 
en, beides zu verbinden'). 32 
Any attempt to conceptualize the Absolutum, itself becomes subject to 
critical reflexion, such that concepts become artistic presentations, and 
systems themselves are seen as individual works of art. There can be no 
straight-forward artistic progression because the systematicity which 
would account for the goal, and thus give the progress its teleology. 
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itself becomes an art-work. The result of this, in the work of the 
Romantics, is that one finds a series of ironic descriptions, images and 
names for the Absolute, where 'irony' is here itself another name for the 
process of reflexion. Benjamin thus writes: 
Wenn die Kunst als das absloute Reflexionsmedium die system- 
atische Gundkonzeption der Athenäumszeit ist, so findet sich 
diese fortwährend durch andere Bezeichnungen substituiert, die 
den Anschein der verwirrenden Vielgestaltigkeit seines Denkens 
hervorrufen. Das absolut erscheint als Bildung, bald als 
Harmonie, als Genie oder Ironie, als Religion, Organisation oder 
Geschichte. (GS 1.1 p44) 
If art, as the absolute medium of reflexion, is the systematic 
conceptual foundation of the Athenaeum, it finds itself sub- 
stituted for other descriptions, which give rise to the appear- 
ance of the tangled, many-sidedness of their thought. The 
absolute appears as culture, as harmony, as genius or irony, as 
religion, organisation or history. 
And Benjamin explains this presentational form of the work of Romantics, 
in its grappling with the question of systematic thought, with great 
succinctness as follows: 
Schlegels vielfältige Bestimmungsversuche des Absoluten 
entspringen nicht allein aus einem Mangel, nicht nur aus 
Unklarheit. Ihnen liegt vielmehr eine eigentümliche positive 
Tendenz seines Denkens zugrund. In ihr findet die 1... ] Frage 
nach dem Grunde der Dunkelheit so vieler Schlegelscher 
Fragmente und gerade ihrer systematischen Intentionen ihre 
Antwort. Das Absolute war für Friedrich Schlegel in the 
Athenaeumszeit allerdings das System in der Gestalt der Kunst. 
Aber er suchte dies Absolute nicht systematisch, sondern 
vielmehr umgekehrt das System absolut zu erfassen. (GS 1.1, p45) 
Schlegel's diverse attempts to determine the absolute sprung not 
only from lack or unclarity. A far more positive tendency of 
his thought lies beneath them. In it one finds an answer to 
the question I... 1 about the ground of the obscurity of so 
many of Schlegel's fragments and also their systematic intent- 
ions. The absolute was for Friedrich Schlegel in the period of 
the Athenaeum in fact the system in the figure of art. But he 
did not seek this absolute systematically; quite to the contrary, 
he sought to grasp the system absolutely. 
Benjamin's formulation, that Schlegel 'sought to grasp the system 
absolutely', goes to the heart of Benjamin's analysis of the Early 
Romantics. A work of art or a systematic philosophy is no longer seen 
to be a stage in the critical reflexion of a transcendentally free ego, 
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such that it may be improved over time and thus become a more perfect 
presentation of thinking or conceptualization itself and thus approach 
the absolute. Rather, a work is understood as already containing the 
absolute in an intensive form, or more precisely, a work itself is, as an 
enclosing of the Absolute. 33 That is, a work is constituted by an 
infinite reflexivity between its form and content, whereas in Kant this 
reflexivity was made into a teleological progress over time. In support 
of this interpretation of the Romantics, Benjamin quotes one of Schlegel's 
fragments, as follows: 
Gebildet ist ein Werk, wenn es überall scharf begrenzt, 
innerhalb der Grenzen aber grenzenlos (... 1 ist, wenn es sich 
selbst ganz treu, überall gleich und doch uber sich selbst 
erhaben ist. (Athenaeum Fragment 297) 
A work is formed when it is sharply limited everywhere, but 
within its limits limitless [... ] when it is true to itself, 
everywhere the same and- yet sublimely beyond itself. 
From this basis, Benjamin is able to explain the Romantics' idea of art- 
criticism, in its connection with their idea of 'progressive universal 
poetry', as the destruction of the limits or boundaries of the work, such 
as to reinstate the infinite reflexion of the Absolutum. Benjamin quotes 
the well known Athenaeum fragment 116, which reads as a manifesto of 
their thinking of criticism: 
Die romantische Poesie Ist eine progressive Universalpoesie. 
Ihre Bestimmung ist nicht bloß, alle getrennte Gattungen der 
Poesie wieder zu vereinigen und die Poesie mit der Philosophie 
und Rhetorik in Beruhrung zu setzen. Sie will und soll auch 
Poesie und Prosa, Genialität und Kritik, Kunstpoesie und 
Naturpoesie bald mischen, bald verschmelzen, die Poesie lebendig 
und gesellig und das Leben und die Gesellschaft poetisch 
machen. 1... 1 Nur sie kann gleich dem Epos ein Spiegel der 
ganzen umgebenden Welt, ein Bild des Zeitalters werden. Und 
doch kann auch sie am meisten Zwischen dem Dargestellten und 
dem Darstellenden, frei von allem realen und idealen Interesse 
auf den Flugeln der poetischen Reflexion immer Wieder 
potenzieren und wie in einer endlosen Reihe von Spiegeln 
verveilfachen. 1... 1 Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im 
Werden; ja das ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, da sie ewig nur 
werden, nie vollendet sein kann. Sie kann durch keine Theorie 
erschöpft werden, und nur eine divinatorische Kritik durfte es 
wagen, ihr Ideal charakterizieren zu wollen. (Vol 1, p118) 
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Romantic poetry is a progressive universal poetry. Its mission 
is not merely to reunite all separate genres of poetry and to 
put poetry in touch with philosophy and rhetorics. It will, 
and should, now mingle and now amalgamate poetry and prose, 
genius and criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of 
nature, render poetry living and social, and life and society 
poetic. E... 1 Romantic poetry alone can, like the epic, become a 
mirror of the entire surrounding world, a picture of its age. 
And yet, it too can soar, free from all real and ideal interests, 
on the wings of poetic reflection, midway between the 
presented and the presenting. It can even exponentiate this 
reflection and multiply it as in an endless series of mirrors. 
[... 1 The Romantic type of poetry is still becoming; indeed, its 
peculiar essence is that it is always becoming and that it can 
never be completed. It cannot be exhausted by any theory, and 
only a divinatory criticism might dare to characterize its ideal. 
It is in explicating this idea of the constant becoming of 'progressive 
universal poetry' in its critical reflexion upon the boundaries of works, 
genres and disciplines (each as 'enclosures' of the Absolute), that Benjamin 
elliptically mentions in a footnote that the temporality of this becoming 
'follows from Romantic Messianism, and cannot here be justified' ('folgt 
aus dem romantischen Messianismus und kann hier nicht begründet werd- 
en', GS 1.1,92). He argues that the idea of 'progressive universal 
poetry' is easily misunderstood, if its connection with the idea of the 
Reflexionsmedium is not observed. That is, it must not be taken as 'a 
mere function of the undetermined and unending nature of the task, on 
one side, and the empty unendingness of time on the other' ('eine bloße 
Funktion der unbestimmten Unendlichkeit der Aufgabe einerseits, der 
leeren Unendlichkeit der Zeit andreseits', p91). Benjamin writes further: 
Also nicht um ein Fortschreiten ins Leere, um ein vages Immer- 
besser-dichten, sondern um stetig umfassendere Entfaltung und 
Steigerung der poetischen Formen handelt es sich. Die zeitliche 
Unendlichkeit, in der dieser Prozeß stattfinden, ist ebenfalls 
eine mediale und qualitive. (GS 1.1,93) 
It is not a question of progress into the void, of a vague 
always-getting-better-poetry, but of a constantly more 
embracing unfolding and intensification of the poetic forms. 
The temporal unendingness in which this process takes place is 
likewise a medial and qualitative one. 34 
In contrast to the process of improvement which Kant saw in the artist's 
labour of reflexion on the form of the art-work, and which Benjamin 
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characterizes here as a Werdeprozeß, the unfolding of the art-work's 
limitation of the Absolute into the Reflexionsmedium is an Erfüllungs- 
prozeß. This idea of fulfillment, in connection with an idea of a critical 
Reflexionsmedium, is parallel to the idea of fulfilled time, which Benjamin 
developed in Trauerspiel and Tragödie (1916) and its connection to his 
idea of the critical continuum of experience, explored in Chapter 3. 
The identification, which Benjamin makes between the view of temp- 
orality in the Romantic ideas of progressive universal poetry and 
criticism, and his own understanding of a stretching temporality, is the 
key point of the dissertation and marks the proximity with which 
Benjamin considered the Early Romantics' work in relation to his own. It 
is on the basis of this identification that Benjamin takes up the Romantic 
idea of criticism into view of translation. However, this interpretation 
of the temporality of progressive universal poetry, is also perhaps the 
most problematic point of the thesis. It is not clear that a 'medial and 
qualitative' temporality can be generated from an idea of unending 
reflexion, given that this latter is derived from liberating reflexion from 
its grounding in a Kantian transcendental ego. For Kant, form and 
content are held apart by his idea of the a priori, which was shown in 
Chapter 1 to be modelled on a Newtonian temporality. It would thus not 
seem possible to move to a 'medial' or 'fulfilled' temporality by making 
infinitely reflexive a starting- point which uses a temporality of isolated 
now-points. 35 That Benjamin appeals to an idea of messianism to 
underpin this rather 'violent' interpretative move, indicates that his 
dissertation constitutes a critical appropriation of the resources of Early 
Romantic thinking by liberating it from a narrow conception of temp- 
orality36. Given that Benjamin does 'find' a fulfilled temporality in the 
Romantics' work,. it is possible to see his dissertation as the immediate 
source of the ideas of the art-work and its criticism (its life and 
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afterlife), which inform the Goethe essay and the essay on translation. 
The idea of the art-work as constituted by its containment of the 
Absolutum, gives rise to a view of criticism as the unfolding of the 
work's own reflexivity. Benjamin writes as follows concerning the Early 
Romantic idea of criticism: 
Kritik ist also, ganz im Gegensatz zur heutigen Auffassung 
ihres Wesens, in ihrer zentralen Absicht nicht Beurteilen, 
sondern einerseits Vollendung, Ergänzung, Systematisierung des 
Werks, anderseits seine Auflösung im Absoluten. (GS 1.1, p78) 
Criticism is thus, completely in opposition to today's opinion of 
its essence, in its central intention not judgment, but on the 
one hand completion, fulfillment, systematization of the work, 
on the other hand its dissolution in the Absolute. 
Criticism is thus not the judgment of work by the application of external 
rules of form or morality, rather criticism is immanent to the work itself 
since the work is constituted by a limiting of the infinite reflexivity of 
the absolute and thus by its own intrinsic criticisability. The work thus 
does not exist statically in a moment of time, as does a Newtonian object, 
rather it exists as its unfolding in a fulfilled temporality. In unfolding 
itself, the work thus changes, and criticism has the power to destroy the 
work in the dissolution of its limitation of the Absolute. Benjamin's 
two-fold definition of the art-work discussed above, thus has its roots 
in his interpretation of German Romanticism. The definition in relation 
to nature is the work's containment of infinite reflexivity in the inabil- 
ity to separate its form' and content according to a Newtonian temporal- 
ity. The definition in relation to history is the work's unfolding of its 
reflexivity in fulfilled temporality. It is this two-fold understanding of 
the work which underpins Benjamin's idea of the work's translatability 
The Romantics themselves recognised that there was a form of 
translation which would have the same function as criticism, and Benjamin 
quotes Novalis in this context, in the dissertation: 
Beispiele socher vollendenden, positiven Kritik schweben Novalis 
vor, wenn er von einer gewissen Art von Übersetzungen, 
welche er mythische nennt, sagt: 'Sie stellen den reinen, 
267 
vollendeten Charakter des individuellen Kunstwerks dar 1... 1. ' 
Vielleicht denkt Novalis, indem er Kritik und Übersetzung 
einander nahe rückt, an eine mediale stetige Überführung des 
Werkes aus einer Sprache in die andere. (GS 1.1,70) 
Novalis has in mind examples of such a completing, positive 
form of criticism when he speaks of a certain variety of 
translations, which he calls mystical: 'They present the pure, 
completed character of the art-work E... ]. ' In that Novalis 
brings criticism and translation close to each other, he is 
perhaps thinking of a medial, constant transference of the 
work out of one language into another. 
In the translation essay the 'life' of a work is consitituted by its 
translatablity, such that a translation issues from its 'afterlife'. This 
idea of 'life' may now be understood as the original's reflexivity and its 
containment of the critical Reflexionsmedium in order to be, as a work. 
Its afterlife is the unfolding of its reflexivity in the temporality of the 
Erf'Ullungsprozeß. Benjamin makes reference to the Romantics' 'insight 
into the life of the literary work' (AU 15/TT 76) in the context of 
stating that a translation 'transplants' ('verpflanzt') the original 
'ironically' into a 'definitive linguistic realm' ('endgültigeren 
Sprachbereich', AÜ 15/TT 75), in so far as it cannot be displaced by a 
further translation of the translation. This may be explained by noting 
that in his dissertation, the main criticisms Benjamin levels at Schlegel 
concern instances when the latter forgets that the Absolute may only be 
grasped ironically and thus seems understand it as the objective content 
of a work (GS 1.1, p73). A translation is, therefore, misunderstand for 
Benjamin, if it is considered as having an objective content (ie. that of 
the meaning or 'life' of the original); it must, rather, always be regarded 
ironically. That is, it must be regarded formally in the way it moves the 
original into the Reflexionsmedium, understood here as pure language, by 
allowing the two 'forms' (the language of the original and that of the 
translation) to be seen"as part of the multiplicitous nature of pure 
language. 
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The Romantics understood 'progressive universal poetry' as the 
amalgamation of genres, disciplines, and other realms considered as 
bounded (eg. 'work' and 'world'), through their reflexion into the 
Absolutum. Benjamin, in the translation essay, extends this process to 
include languages. The process of translation allows languages to be 
broken free of a conception of them as a range of isolated 'forms' of 
expressing meaning and allows their multiplicity to be seen as the 
multiplicitous nature of the continuum of pure language. Pure language 
is the 'purposiveness' which governs the life of the original and its 
afterlife in translation (AU 12/TT 72). Translation, for Benjamin, thus 
allows languages to break out of their being modelled as a multiplicity of 
isolated Newtonian objects and allows their 'convergence' into a 
continuous medium to be glimpsed. 
So ist die Übersetzung zuletzt zweckmäßig für den Ausdruck 
des innersten Verhältnisses der Sprachen zueinander. Sie kann 
dieses verborgene Verhältnis selbst unmöglich offenbaren, 
unmöglich herstellen; aber darstellen, indem sie es keimhaft oder 
intensiv verwirklicht, kann sie es. (... 1 Jenes gedachte, 
innerste Verhältnis der Sprachen ist aber das einer eigentüm- 
lichen Konvergenz. (AU 12) 
Translation is thus ultimately purposeful for the expression of 
the most inner reciprocal relationship of languages. It cannot 
possibly reveal this hidden relationship itself, or produce it, 
but it can present it, by actualizing it embryonically or 
intensively. E... ] This posited, most inner relationship of 
languages is, though, that of a peculiar convergence. (TT 72) 
Whereas, for the Romantics, criticism was aimed at the 'convergance' of 
genres, styles or disciplines in the Reflexionsmedium, translation is 
concerned with the 'convergence' of languages in a Reflexionsmedium 
which is understood, specifically, as linguistic. In his dissertation 
Benjamin had particularly emphasized Schlegel's 'linguistic', understanding 
of the Absolute (GS 1.1,47) and had appealed to Novalis, who had a 
greater leaning towards a mystical or kabbalistic language theory, to 
emphasize this point above Schlegel's occasional lack of 'irony' in his 
decriptions of the Absolute. This concern to stress the linguistic nature 
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of the Absolute would seem to account for Benjamin's ranking of criticism 
below translation as a 'lesser moment in the afterlife of a work' CAÜ 
15/TT 76) in the translation essay. That is, criticism in its concern with 
genre of writing led Schlegel too easily to an idea of Absolute as itself a 
work -a work which would consist of the amalgamation of all genres in 
its prose - and thus ascribing to the Absolute an objective, Platonic 
existence (GS 1.1,90). 37 Translation, on the contrary, steers away from 
this mistake by being concerned not with genres of writing, but with 
languages themselves. It is translation which releases language from 
being the linguistic form of the work's content and allows the work to 
reflexively unfold itself into the pure language, through its own dis- 
solution, the extinguishing of its meaning. 
It was the Romantics' emphasis on form and on the multiplicity of 
forms in the continuum of the Reflexionsmedium, which enabled Benjamin 
to combine their idea of the nature of the art-work with a linguistic 
phenomenology which stressed 'mode of meaning' (or Bedeutendes, the 
'form' of Bedeutung) above 'what is meant' (or Bedeutetes, the 'content' of 
Bedeutung), and the extinguishing of the latter in translation. Benjamin's 
idiosyncratic mixing of phenomenology with the Romantics' radicalization 
of a Kantian aesthetics of the art-work, may itself be seen as a Romantic 
amalgamation of 'genres' of philosophy. However, there is a far more 
essential reason why Benjamin should have wished to link Early German 
Romanticism to phenomenology, and that is to provide the latter with a 
more critical thinking of history and tradition. 38 The phenomenological 
approach to language which Benjamin saw emerging in Husserl's work was 
profoundly ahistorical in its dismissal of traditionality and emphasis on 
the subject and its empirical experience. 39 A merely phenomenological 
account of translation would have emphasized the presence of the original 
before the translator, without an understanding of the temporality of the 
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way the translation comes after the original or the way the original is 
handed on to the present. Rather both would be collapsed into the sub- 
jectivity of the translator: 
Was damals jung, kann später abgebraucht, was damals 
gebräuchlich, später archaisch klingen. Das Wesentliche solcher 
Wandlungen wie auch der ebenso ständigen des Sinnes in der 
Subjektivität der Nachgeboren statt im eigensten Leben der 
Sprache und ihrer Werke zu suchen, hieße C... ] Grund und 
Wesen einer Sache verwechseln, strenger gesagt aber, einen der 
gewaltigsten und fruchtbarsten historischen Prozesse aus 
Unkraft des Denkens leugnen. (p13) 
What once sounded fresh, can later sound hackneyed; what was 
once current can later sound archaic. To seek that which is 
essential to such changes of connotation, along with the equally 
constant changes of meaning, in the subjectivity of later 
generations rather than in the very life of language and its 
works, would mean [... ] to confuse the ground and essence of 
a matter; or more rigorously put: to deny one of the most 
powerful and fruitful historical processes out of an impotence 
of thought. (p73) 
It is the work's translatablity which is 'essential' ('wesentlich ) to its life 
and afterlife (AU 1O/TT 71). To- seek 'that which is essential' ('das 
Wesentliche') to changes in the use of language in subjectivity, is not to 
look for the 'essence' at all, but rather for a ground which both accounts 
for the changes and provides a basis over and above language, from 
where those changes may be investigated. What Benjamin is proposing 
here, though in an veiled way, is a rethinking of Wesen as the 
temporality of language, that is, a thinking of it through the temporality 
of the life and afterlife of language, and thus not as an atemporal 
'ground', in the sense of a realm existing 'above' temporal change in a 
certain Platonic sense. 
It is precisely such a confusion of essence and ground which is 
found in Husserl's essay, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, which was 
mentioned above. Husserl was concerned to counter a certain relativism 
which Dilthey's historicism had introduced in the idea that the study of 
history destroys a belief in the universal validity of any philosophy or 
knowledge. 'It is easy to see that historicism, if consistently carried 
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through, carries over into extreme sceptical subjectivism', Husserl wrote 
(PRS 186; 'Man sieht leicht, daß der Historizismus konsequent durchge- 
führt in den extremen skeptischen Subjektivismus übergeht', PSW 43). 
Husserl's response is to repeat what was fundamentally Kant's view of 
history and tradition; in Chapter 1 it was shown how Kant's understand- 
ing of the temporality of the a priori allowed him to project the 
transcendental ego across history as an ahistorical ground for reason. 
And Husserl writes: 
Denn das Reich der Phänomenologie, als einer Wesenslehre, 
erstreckt sich vom individuellen Geiste alsbald über das ganze 
Feld des allgemeinen Geistes. (PSW 47) 
For the realm of phenomenology, as a theory of essence, extends 
immediately from the individual spirit/mind over the whole area 
of the general spirit. (PRS 188) 
For Benjamin this was simply to replace one form of historicism with 
even more insidious one. 40 Both rely on an implicit appeal to an 
atemporal realm, a realm separated from temporal change in the same way 
in which Kant's a priori was ultimately modelled on the isolation of 
Newtonian objects in the time-order. The relativism of Dilthey's view is 
based on an idea of empathy with the past, 'the way it really was'; the 
present passes away into an object-like state which the historian can 
peruse at his leisure. For Husserl, the Geist of the phenomenologist 
becomes the atemporal ground for the historical progression of essences. 
Husserl's phenomenological investigation aims thus not at essences at all, 
but at the 'ground' of these essences. From this firm ground, the 
philosophical and scientific views of the past can be entered into and 
tested according to the contemporary phenomenological intuitions of the 
mind, so that: 
wir [... ] nichts Überleifertes als Anfang gelten und uns durch 
keinen noch so großen Namen blenden lassen, vielmehr in freier 
Hingabe an die Problem selbst und die von ihnen ausgehenden 
Forderungen die Anfänge zu gewinnen suchen. (PSW 60) 
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we E... ] allow nothing traditional to pass as a beginning, nor 
allow ourselves to be dazzled by any names however great, but 
rather seek to attain the beginnings in a free dedication to the 
problems themselves and to the demands stemming from them. 
(PRS 195) 
For Benjamin, the task of the translator does not involve an attempt to 
empathize with the era to which the original belongs, in order to render 
it in all its strangeness to modern thinking; nor does the translator take 
up the experiences, concerns and problems expressed in the original and 
render them in their phenomenological equivalents for the modern mind. 
Rather. Benjamin's thinking of translation takes up the critical thinking 
of history and tradition which he found in German Romanticism. He 
found in their idea of the art-work a profound thinking of tradition 
which he could take up into his thinking of the continuum of experience, 
developed in the Kant essay, and thus which he could use to develop the 
consequences of understanding both translator (or historian) and original 
(or historical object) as existing in fulfilled, messianic time. The full 
force of Benjamin's thinking of history and tradition is not laid out in 
the translation essay, but rather only later, particularly in the texts 
Konvolut N and Über den Begriff der Geschichte ('Theses on the 
Philosophy of History'). 41 The former develops a thinking of history in 
terms of an idea of reading 'the book of the past'; but as was argued in 
Chapter 3, reading and translation may be seen as different names for 
Benjamin's thinking through the temporality of language, and thus 
Konvolut N is of central importance for understanding the consequences 
for a view of history and tradition, of Benjamin's view of translation. 
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IV. The Task of the Translator 
If, in the translation essay, it is the translation which 'catches fire' 
('sich entzündet, AO 14/TT 74) on the life of past works, then in 
Benjamin's later work it is the 'prophets gaze, which catches fire on the 
summits of the past' ([N 9,7], Smith p64; 'Seherblick, der sich an den 
Gipfeln der Vergangenheit entzündent', GS V. 1,592) and the historian 
who is able 'to fan the spark of hope in the past' (Theses p255; 'im 
Vergangenheit den Funken der Hoffnung anzufachen', GS 1.2,695). This 
transformation of the translator into the prophet/historian is not so 
much a progression in Benjamin's thinking, as his utilization of the rich 
imagery of German Romanticism for his own imagistic, and terminologically 
fluid way of thinking (which was discussed in Chapter 3). In one of the 
notes to the Theses, Benjamin makes explicit reference to Athenaeum 
fragment 80: 'The historian is a prophet facing backwards' ('Der Historik- 
er ist ein rückwärts gekehrter Prophet', GS 1.3,1237). This late refer- 
ence to the Romantics is only one of many links which could be traced 
from Benjamin's early work to the later; however, given the purposely 
fluid nature of Benjamin's terminology, no attempt will be made to trace 
the 'development' of Benjamin's thought, rather his later writings on 
history will be used to lay out the thinking of history which lies already 
in the translation essay. 
Benjamin's reference to the 'translatablity' of the original (TT 70/AO 
9) must not be misunderstood as an implicit claim that the translator has 
access to the objective nature of the work being translated. 42 What the 
translation essay does not make explicit is the particular hermeneutic 
relationship which links the original and translator, in their being 
understood through the life and afterlife of the work, and in the way 
both stand within a fulfilled temporality. It may be that Benjamin 
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thought that by linking a phenomenological approach to language to a 
Romantic idea of the life of the art-work, he could more effectively bring 
out this hermeneutical dimension from the latter, however, it is clear 
from the writings of the Romantics themselves that they did not hold to 
an idea of objective or presuppositionless access to the past. Schlegel's 
most sustained fragment on history in the Athenaeum runs as follows: 
Da man immer so sehr gegen die Hypothesen redet, so sollte man 
doch einmal versuchen, die Geschichte ohne Hypothese anzu- 
fangen. Man kann nicht sagen, daß etwas Ist, ohne zu sagen, 
was es ist. Indem man sie denkt, bezieht man Fakta schon auf 
Begriffe, und es ist doch wohl nicht einerlei, auf welche. Weiß 
man dies, so bestimmt und wählt man sich selbst unter den 
möglichen Begriffen die notwendigen, auf die man Fakta jeder 
Art bezeihen soll. Will man es nicht anerkennen, so bleibt die 
Wahl dem Instinkt, dem Zufall oder der Willkür überlassen, man 
schmeichelt sich, reine solide Empirie ganz a posteriori zu 
haben, und hat eine höchst einseitige, höchst dogmatizistische 
und transcendente Ansicht a priori. ('Athenaeum Fragment', 
No. 226) 
Since people are always so much against hypotheses, they 
should try sometime to begin studying history without one. 
It's impossible to say that a thing is, without saying what it 
is. In the very process of thinking of facts, one relates them 
to concepts, and, surely, it is not a matter of indifference to 
which. If one is aware of this, then it is possible to 
determine and choose consciously among all the possible 
concepts the necessary ones to which facts of all kinds should 
be related. If one refuses to recognize this, then the choice is 
surrendered to instinct, chance or fate; and so one flatters 
oneself that one has established a pure solid empiricism quite a 
posteriori, when what one actually has is an a priori outlook 
that's highly one-sided, dogmatic, and transcendental. 
Schlegel's idea of choosing the 'necessary' concepts by which the past is 
reconstructed in opposition to imagining an objective access to the past, 
is of great importance for understanding Benjamin's approach. Schlegel's 
interest in the writing of history was not, however, merely a marginal 
issue in relation to his literary and critical concerns. The period in 
which the Romantics wrote was marked by the influence of neoclassicalism, 
which held up the ancient world of Greece as a golden era of the purity 
and perfection of literature. The first half of the Eighteenth Century 
had seen an explosion of interest in Antiquity, lead by the historian and 
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archaeologist Winckelmann. To begin with, Antiquity was considered as a 
whole, an amalgam of the Greek and Roman cultures. The early trans- 
lations of Greek works, which were very much Germanizations, also 
tended to efface the differences between the ancient and modern 
cultures. 43 This changed with the translations of Homer by Voss in the 
late Eighteenth Century; Voss attempted to remain true to the Greek 
metrical forms and his work began an influential trend towards the 
'Greekization' of the German language, which was to include Hölderlin's 
work. Whereas before, Antiquity as a whole had been regarded as a 
cultural model, a divide now opened between the Greek and Roman, as the 
strangeness and distance of Greek culture became more apparent. It is in 
this context that the Romantics felt a greater affinity with Roman 
Culture, with its eclecticism, mixture of genres and playing with forms 
and subject matter, than with the perceived purity of Greek writings. 
Friedrich Schlegel writes for example in 1797: 'The Romans are nearer to 
us and more intelligible than the Greeks'. 44 
The Romantics developed their ideas of literature very much in 
opposition to an aesthetics which judged the present against the posited 
perfection of a golden age. Schlegel also writes in his Critical 
Fragments. 
Man sollte sich nie auf den Geist des Altertums berufen, wie 
auf eine Autorität. Es ist eine eigene Sache mit den Geistern; 
sie lassen sich nicht mit Händern greifen und dem Andern 
vorhalten. (Kritische Schriften p11) 
You should never appeal to the spirit of the ancients as if to 
an authority. It's a peculiar thing with spirits: they don't let 
themselves be grabbed by the hand and shown to others. 
The most radical rejection of the historicism which lay behind neo- 
classicalism is found in a note by Novalis: 
Erst jetzt fängt die Antike an zu entstehen, [... 1 sie Ist uns 
eigentlich nicht gegeben - sie ist nicht vorhanden - sondern 
sie soll von uns erst hervorgebracht werden. (Novalis: 
Schriften, Vol II, p640,642)45 
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Only now is antiquity coming into existence, [... 1 it is not a 
given - it is not present to hand - rather it must first be 
produced by us. 
This emphasis on the now of the writing of history or the translating of 
a text, lies implicitly in Benjamin's translation essay, though is hinted at 
explicitly in its very title which marks the essay as concerning the task 
of the translator. 
The affinity which the Romantics felt with Roman culture, in its 
position of traditionality in relation to the Greek and translation of 
Greek texts, is itself marked in their name, die Romantik (which also is a 
reference to their theory of the novel, das Roman, and its prose as the 
amalgamation of all genres), and it is significant in this regard that 
Benjamin should say of them, in one his letters dating from the period of 
his work on his dissertation, that 'certainly Romanticism is the last 
movement which once more kept tradition alive' ('freilich ist die Romantik 
die letzte Bewegung, die noch ein mal die Tradition hinüberrettete', Brife 
I, 138). This motive of rescuing tradition becomes prominent in 
Benjamin's later work; for example: 
Wovor werden die Phänomena gerettet? Nicht nur, und nicht 
sowohl vor dem Verruf und des Mißachtung in die sie geraten 
sind als vor der Katastrophe wie eine bestimmte Art ihrer 
Überlieferung, ihre 'Würdigung als Erbe' sie sehr oft darstellt. 
((N 9,4], GS V. 1, p591) 
From what are phenomena rescued? Not just and not so much 
from the ill-repute and contempt into which they have fallen, 
but from the catastophe when a certain form of tradition 
presents them so often in terms of their 'value as a legacy'. 
(Smith p63) 
And in the Theses. 
In jeder Epoche muß versucht werden, die Überlieferung von 
neuem dem Konformismus abzugewinnen, der im Begriff steht, 
sie zu überwältigen. (GS 1.2,695) 
In every epoch the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradi- 
tion away from the conformism that is about to overpower it. 
(Theses p255) 
Benjamin is here proposing a rethinking of traditionality in the face of 
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historicism, the two fundamental forms of which were discussed above. 
The first quotation above may be regarded as aiming at a Husserlian view 
of history where the past is a legacy for the phenomenologist who uses 
it to reach an intuitive certainty of the conceptuality of his own 
thinking. The second quotation aims more at Dilthey and the conformism 
that results from the idea that the historian has a presuppositionless 
access to the past in his empathy with it. It is in opposition to these 
views that Benjamin understands the task of the translator. To the 
extent which Benjamin found Romanticism to be a movement 'keeping 
tradition alive' in its self-perceived affinity to the traditionality of 
Roman culture in relation to Greek, one may regard Benjamin as asserting 
the importance of taking up once again this Roman position. In Chapter 
4 it was shown that this was also the implicit thrust of Heidegger's 
rethinking of tradition, and his concern with translating Greek 
philosophy. In order to further bring to light this parallel between 
Heidegger and Benjamin, it is necessary to specify more clearly Benjamin's 
understanding of the present in which the translator stands and of the 
way a past text is read hermeneutically from this present. 
In the context of Benjamin's linguistic phenomenology of the circu- 
larity of experience and knowledge of experience which was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the past is also understood 'linguistically': Benjamin talks of 
reading 'the book of past events' EN 4,2] (Smith p52; 'das Buch des 
Geschehenen', GS V. I. 580). In the translation essay the emphasis is upon 
the way a translation's ability to point to a messianically linguistic realm 
came from its bringing together of two languages (the original's and the 
translator's own language); in the later work, it is a messianic temp- 
orality which is brought to light in the historian's bringing together of 
a past event with the present (the historian's own time). The history 
which is thus written is thus parallel to the writing of a translation, 
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and is called by Benjamin a 'dialectical image' - though explicity an image 
which is read: 
Nur dialektische Bilder sind echt geschichtliche, d. h. nicht 
archaische Bilder. Das gelesene Bild, will sagen das Bild im 
Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit trägt im höchsten Grade den Stempel 
des kritischen, gefährlichen Moments, welcher allem Lesen 
zugrunde liegt. ((N 3,11, GS V. 1,578) 
Only dialectical images are genuinely historical images, that is, 
not archaic images. The image that is read, meaning the image 
in the now of recognisability, bears to the highest degree the 
stamp of that critical, dangerous moment that lies at the base 
of all reading. (Smith p50-1) 
The idea of translation in Benjamin's early essay has become the 'dialectic 
image' in this later work; the 'now of recognisability' names the 
hermeneutical present in which the historian/translator reads the past 
event/work. This is confirmed by two lengthy working notes to the 
Theses, titled respectively 'Das dialectische Bild' (GS 1.3,1238) and 'Das 
Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit' (GS 1.3.1237). In the former the reading of the 
past event is linked to the question of translation: 
Die historische Methode ist eine philologische, der das Buch des 
Lebens zugrunde liegt. 'Was nie geschrieben wurde, lesen' heißt 
es bei Hofmannsthal. Der Leser, an den hier zu denken Ist, Ist 
der wahre Historiker. Die Vielheit der Historien ist der 
Vielheit der Sprachen ähnlich. Universalgeschichte im heutigen 
Sinn kann immer nur eine Art von Esperanto sein. Die Idee 
der Universalgeschichte ist eine messianische. (GS 1.3,1238) 
The historical method is a philological one, based on the book 
of life. 'To read what was never written', Hofmannsthal calls 
it. The reader who is to be thought of here, is the true 
historian. The multiplicity of histories is similar to the 
multiplicity of languages. Universal history in the modern 
sense can only ever be a form of Esperanto. The idea of 
universal history is a messianic one. 
Just as the higher purpose of the translation is to allow the 'converg- 
ence' of the multiplicity of languages to be glimpsed not as a higher 
unity, but as a multiplicity constituting 'pure language', so here the 
multiplicity of histories, of 'dialectical images' of the past also points to 
that temporal-linguistic continuum. 'Pure language' is not a form of 
'Esperanto' connected to a desire for the universal communicability of the 
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original; on the contrary it is reached through the 'death of the intentio' 
and thus through the giving up of a posited referentiality to the 
objective meaning of the past text/event. 
It is essential to remember that this loss of objective reference is 
not an emphasis on subjectivity for Benjamin, which would be simply to 
move from one form of historicism to another (ie. from Dilthey's to 
Husserl's). Rather, 'pure language' or messianic 'universal history' marks 
Benjamin's attempt to think the temporality of language, in relation to the 
handing on of past texts/events to the present (the traditionality of the 
present), with a profound 'finitude'. That is, the attempt to think the 
traditionality or historicity of the present in a way which does not make 
implicit appeal to a Newtonian temporality in the separation of a 'timeless' 
realm (of the meaning of the past historical object, or of the phenomeno- 
logical subject) from the realm of 'time'. Benjamin's thinking of the 
temporality of language is the attempt to think the linguistic past 
through the idea of a temporal-linguistic continuum which stretches from 
past and present as the afterlife or after-history of the text/event in its 
fulfilled temporality. There can thus be no question of returning to the 
objective past, or of bringing the past to the subjective present, beyond 
the hermeneutic circularity in which object and subject, experience and 
knowledge of experience, exist in the temporal-linguistic continuum of 
experience. It is the dialectical images, existing in a multiplicity like the 
'ideas' in Benjamin's Origin of German . Tragic Drama, which, 
like those 
'ideas', embody individual hermeneutic circularities of experience and 
knowledge of experience; or more precisely in the context of history: the 
past event and knowledge of that event in the present. Whilst Benjamin's 
thinking through of such individual hermeneutic circularities was 
discussed at length in Chapter 3, it may now be seen that a conception of 
the present is essential in such a view. Just as in Chapter 4 It was 
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shown how Heidegger's thinking of tradition and translation had to be 
understood as fundamentally linked to his idea of the 'hermeneutic sit- 
uation' of the present, the same may also be seen to be true for Benjamin. 
The present in which the translator/historian comes to knowledge 
(Erkenntnis) of the past and writes the translation/history is the Jetzt 
der Erkennbarkeit. 
It is in the lengthy working note to the Theses, entitled 'Das Jetzt 
der Erkennbarkeit' that Benjamin draws on the Romantics' identification 
of the historian with the prophet. 
Das Wort, der Historiker sei ein rückwärts gekehrter Prophet 
kann auf zweierlei Weise verstanden werden. Die Überkommene 
meint, in eine entlegene Vergangenheit sich zurückversetzend, 
prophezeie der Historiker, was für jene noch als Zukunft zu 
gelten hatte, inzwischen aber ebenfalls zur Vergangenheit 
geworden Ist. Diese Anschauung entspricht aufs genaueste der 
geschichtlichen Einfühlungstheorie, die Fustel de Coulonges in 
den Rat gekleidet hat: Si vous voulez reivre une @poque, 
oubliez que vous savez ce qui s'est passe apres eile. - Mann 
kann das Wort aber auch ganz anders deuten und es so ver- 
standen: der Historiker wendet der eignen Zeit den Rücken, und 
sein Seherblick entzündet sich an den immer tiefer Vergangene 
hinschwindenden Gipfeln der früheren Menschgeschlechter. 
Dieser Seherblick eben Ist es, dem die eigene Zeit weit deut- 
licher gegenwärtig ist als den Zeitgenossen, die 'mit ihr Schritt 
halten'. 1... ] Genau dieser Begriff von Gegenwart ist es, der 
der Aktualität der echten Geschichtsschreibung zugrunde liegt. 
Wer in der Vergangenheit wie in einer Rumpelkammer von 
Exempeln und Analogien herumstöbert, der hat noch nicht einmal 
einen Begriff davon, wieviel in einem gegebnen Augenblick von 
ihrer Vergegenwärtigung abhängt. (GS 1.3,1237-8) 
The expression, 'the historian is a backwards facing prophet', 
can be understood in two ways. The usual one means that the 
historian, placing himself back into a remote past, prophesies 
what was still the future for it, which meantime, however, has 
become past. This view corresponds precisely to the historical 
theory of empathy, which Fustel de Coulonges dressed up in the 
following advice: 'If you want to relive an epoch, forget that 
you know what has happened since'. One can, though, also 
interprete the expression above differently: the historian turns 
his back on his own time, and his prophetic gaze sets itself 
ablaze on the peaks of earlier generations, constantly dwindling 
deeper into the past. This prophetic gaze is the one to which 
his own time is far more clearly present than his contempor- 
aries, who 'keep abreast of the times'. I ... ] It is precisely 
this 
concept of the. present, which grounds the actuality of the 
genuine writing of history. Whoever rummages around in the 
past, like in a junkroom of examples and analogies, has no idea 
of how much, in a given moment, depends on its present-ation. 
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The quotation starts with a rejection of the historicist idea of 'empathy'; 
Benjamin makes clear that the prophet/historian must not be understood 
as prophesying another, perhaps more hopeful, future of a past event, 
(and this thus flatly contradicts the interpretation of Benjamin's work 
which has become influential from Peter Szondi's work46). The prophet/ 
historian turns his back on the present, but sees it more clearly than his 
contemporaries, and understands at the same time that the past depends 
on the present, on its being made present, on its 'present-ation' 
('Vergegenwärtigen). The section which has been omitted from the above 
quotation concerns a quotation from Turgot (repeated in (N 12a, 1)) about 
the non-static nature of a subject of research, in that it has changed 
several times, in the time it takes to observe it. Again this is a 
rejection of an idea of the static, object-like nature of the past. The 
past 'itself' depends on its being made present, in other words, 'our 
coming was expected on earth' (Theses p254; 'sind wir auf der Erde 
erwartet worden', GS 1.2,694). 47 This rejection of objectivity must again 
not be taken as correlative emphasis on subjectivity or anthropocentrism, 
but rather as the expression of the necessarily hermeneutic way history 
is written in and for the present. 
Benjamin's later writings have many images for this understanding of 
history as written in a 'now of recognisability'; it is stated most plainly 
in (N 9a, 8] as follows: 'For the materialist historian, every epoch with 
which he occupies himself is only a fore-history of the one that really 
concerns him. ' (Smith p65; 'Für den materialistischen Historiker ist jede 
Epoche, mit der (er> sich beschäftigt, nur Vorgeschichte derer, um die es 
ihm selber geht', GS V. 1, p593). Just as the 'now' of the'task of the 
translator is the 'now' of his knowledge of the present state of his own 
language, so the 'now' of the historian is the 'now' of his knowledge of 
the present state of affairs. This 'now' does not presuppose an objective 
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access to the present, such as would be presupposed in a Husserlian 
phenomenology of essences. Rather, the 'now' is always the 'now' of a 
determinate 'now of recognisability', and thus belongs to the hermeneutic 
circularity of an individual dialectical image. Likewise, the past is not 
an objective or intuited past, but rather the past of a determinate 'now 
of recognisability', or what Benjamin calls the 'historischer Index' 
('historiographical index') of a past event. Further, the (multiplicity of) 
dialectical images written by the historian serve a higher 'purposiveness', 
as do translations: the bringing together of past and present in the 
hermeneutic circularity of an individual image serves to extinguish the 
'intentio' of the image to an objective realm and thus to point to the 
temporal-linguistic continuum of 'pure language' or messianic 'universal 
history'. 
Was die Bilder von den 'Wesenheiten' der Phänomenologie 
unterscheidet, das ist ihr historischer Index. [... ] Jedes Jetzt 
ist das Jetzt einer bestimmten Erkennbarkeit. In ihm ist die 
Wahrheit mit Zeit bis zum Zerspringen geladen. (Dies Zer- 
springen, nichts anders, ist der Tod der Intentio, der also mit 
der Geburt der echten historischen Zeit, der Zeit der Wahrheit, 
zusammenfällt. ) Nicht so ist es, daß das Vergangene sein Licht 
auf das Gegenwärtige oder das Gegenwärtige sein Licht auf das 
Vergange wirft, sondern Bild ist dasjenige, worin das Gewesene 
mit dem Jetzt blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation zusammentritt. 
Mit andern Worten: Bild Ist die Dialektic im Stillstand. 
((N 3,11, GS V. 1,578) 
What differentiates images from the 'essences' of phenomenology 
is their historiographical index. [... 1 Every now is the now of 
a determinate recognizability. In it, truth is loaded to the 
bursting point with time. (This bursting point is nothing 
other than the death of the intentio, which thus coincides with 
the birth of authentic historical time, the time of truth. ) It is 
not that the past casts its light on what is present or that 
what is present casts its light on what is past; rather, an 
image is that in which what-has-been enters in to a 
constellation with the now like a flash of lightning. In other 
words: an image is dialectics at a standstill. (Smith p50) 
Benjamin's image of the 'flash of lightning' was discussed in Chapter 3 as 
the way a fulfilled temporality breaks open the isolated now-point of a 
Newtonian temporality. The reference of the 'death of the intentio' makes 
clear how much Benjamin's later thinking of tradition and time is the 
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reverse side of his emphasis on language in the period of the translation 
essay. Here the 'death of the intentio' coincides with the birth of the 
'time of truth'; in the translation essay it pointed to pure language as 
the 'language of truth'; and 'truth' was discussed in Chapter 3 in terms 
of the 'round dance' of ideas in the temporal-linguistic continuum of 
experience. 
'Truth' was further understood in the translation essay in terms of 
the multiplicity of languages, and in the later work in terms of the 
multiplicity of histories constituting 'universal history'. A working note 
to the Theses poetically unites these two aspects, however: 
Die messianische Welt ist die Welt allseitiger und integraler 
Aktualität. Erst in ihr gibt es eine Universalgeschichte. Was 
sich heute so bezeichnet, kann immer nur eine Sort von 
Esperanto sein. Es kann nichts entsprechen, eh die Verwirr- 
ung, die vom Turmbau zu Babel herrüht, geschlichtet ist. Sie 
setzt die Sprache voraus, in die jeder Text einer lebenden oder 
toten ungeschmälert zu übersetzen ist. Oder besser, sie ist 
dieser Sprache selbst. Aber nicht als geschriebene sondern 
vielmehr als die festlich begangene. Dieses Fest ist gereinigt 
von aller Feier und er kennt keine Festgesänge. Seine Sprache 
ist die Idee der Prosa selbst, die von allen Menschen verstanden 
wird wie die Sprache der Vögel von Sonntagskindern. (GS 1.3, 
1239) 
The messianic world is the world of all-sided and integral 
actuality. Only in it is there a universal history. What is so 
described today can only be a form of Esperanto. Nothing can 
correspond to this universal history until the confusion, which 
stems from the Tower of Babel, is settled. It presupposes the 
language in which every text of a living or dead language can 
be translated without diminishment. Or better this universal 
history is this language itself. But not as written, rather as a 
festively observed language. This festival is purified of all 
celebration and it knows no festival songs. Its language is the 
idea of prose itself, which is understood by all people, like the 
language of the bird, by Sunday's children. 
The reference again to Esperanto makes clear that the mentions of the 
Tower of Babel and Garden of Eden are not part a longing for a higher, 
unitary language. Rather the idea of 'prose' points back to the Early 
German Romantics and their conception of prose as being constituted by 
all genres of writing. 48 If translation, in Benjamin's translation essay, 
had been understood as coinciding with the dismissing of the referent- 
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iality of the original, then the language of universal history, in to which 
'every text' can be translated without diminishment, is one into which the 
language of the original has already been gathered and thus where trans- 
lation no longer need have the function it did in the earlier essay. 
Whilst this late appearance of the idea of translation is not found in the 
Theses themselves, an equivalent idea is that found in thesis III: 'Only for 
a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments' (Theses 
p254; 'Erst der erlösten Menschheit ist ihre Vergangenheit in jedem ihrer 
Momente zitierbar geworden'. GS 1.2,694). The past becomes citable in all 
its moments only in universal history, that is, when the past already is 
as having been gathered into universal history, what Benjamin calls its 
'all-sided and integral actuality'. The idea of pure language or of 
universal history as being the higher 'purposiveness' of all translation 
and all writing of history, yet also the critical medium in which all 
'epistemological mythologies' are constructed, marks Benjamin's proximity 
to and distance from Hegel's idea of the progress of spirit towards 
sureness of itself as Absolute concept: 
[Das Wahre] ist das Werden seiner selbst, der Kreis, der sein 
Ende als seinen Zweck voraussetzt und zum Anfange hat und 
nur durch die Ausführung und sein Ende wirklich ist. 
The true is its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its 
end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only 
by being worked out to its end, is it actual. 49 
As was argued in Chapter 4, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
presents a profound working through of the Kantian position with 
respect to history and tradition. Spirit's coming to self-consciousness is 
itself a process of wresting tradition away from the 'conformism' of its 
being thought of as objectively given to the mind. Through the recog- 
nition of tradition as its own alienated reflection of itself, the 
reflectivity of subjectivity and objectivity in a particular epoch is 
glimpsed in its hermeneutic circularity and thus raised into spirit's 
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growing awareness as one of its shapes (Werke 3,38; Phenomenology p21). 
Benjamin follows Hegel more closely here than did Heidegger, since an 
essential moment of this dialectical movement of Spirit is understood 
through the extinguishing of a concept's referentiality to a posited 
objectivity. The moment of sense certainty concerns language's inability 
to denote the particular in its 'here' and 'now', since any truth of sense 
certainty is expressed in universals: 'We express what is sensuous as a 
universal; I ... ] in other words, we do not strictly say what we mean in 
this sensuous certainty' (p60; 'Als ein Allgemeines sprechen wir auch das 
Sinnliche aus; 1... ] oder wir sprechen schlechthin nicht, wie wir es in 
dieser sinnlichen Gewißheit meinen', Werke 3, p85). The Absolute is 
reached when spirit no longer has to go outside of itself, in this way, in 
referentiality: 
Das Zeil aber ist dem Wissen ebenso notwendig als die Reihe des 
Fortganges gesteckt; es Ist da, wo es nicht mehr über sich 
selbst hinauszugehen nötig hat, wo es sich selbst findet und 
der Begriff dem Gegenstande, der Gegenstand dem Begriffe 
entspricht. Der Fortgang zu diesem Ziele Ist daher auch 
unaufhaltsam, und auf keiner früheren Station Ist Befriedigung 
zu finden. (Werke 3, p74) 
But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial 
progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs 
to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where con- 
cept corresponds to object and object to concept. Hence the 
progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it 
no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations on the 
way. (Phenomenology p51) 
Hegel's startling image for this state of affairs, where spirit has 
gathered itself into Absolute knowledge and is able to cite and run 
through all its moments, is that image echoed in the quotation from 
Benjamin above: that of the feast. 
Nicht das Abstrakte oder Unwirkliche ist ihr Element und 
Inhalt, sondern das Wirkliche, sich selbst Setzende und in sich 
Lebende, das Dasein in seinem Begriffe. Es ist der Prozeß, der 
sich seine Momente erzeugt und durchläuft, und diese ganze 
Bewegung macht das Positive und seine Wahrheit aus. [... 1 Die 
Erscheinung ist das Entstehen und Vergehen, das selbst nicht 
ensteht und vergeht, sondern an ' sich ist und die Wirklichkeit 
und Bewegung des Lebens der Wahrheit ausmacht. Das Wahre 
ist so der bacchantische Taumel, as dem kein Gleid nicht 
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trunken ist; und weil jedes, indem es sich absondert, ebenso 
unmittelbar [sich] auflöst, ist er ebenso die durchsichtige und 
einfache Ruhe. (Werke 3, p46) 
Philosophy's element and content is not the abstract or non- 
actual, but the actual, that which posits itself and is alive 
within itself - existence within its own Concept. It is the 
process which begets and runs through its own moments, and 
this whole movement constitutes what is positive and its truth. 
[... ] Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not 
itself arise and pass away, but is in itself, and constitutes the 
actuality and the movement of the life of truth. The true is 
thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; 
yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the 
revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. (p27) 
Benjamin's modification of this image so that the feast is one of sobriety 
and not one of drunkenness indicates the peculiar nearness and distance 
of his work to Hegel's. In his dissertation discussed above Benjamin 
traced the different approaches of Hegel and the Early Romantics back to 
Fichte and suggested that while the Romantics took up the thinking of 
reflexion, Hegel took up the idea of the sich Setzendes. The Romantics' 
idea of the intensive reflexivity of the art-work was interpreted by 
Benjamin as existing in a fulfilled temporality, and thus while Benjamin 
does not engage explicity with Hegel at any length in his work, one may 
presume that a distance between them lies in their understanding of time. 
The self-positing of spirit as it unfolds itself, and thus comes to 
know itself, remains with a Newtonian conception of mediation which 
Hegel took from the Kantian a priori. The result is that the stages of 
spirit's development remain fixed in a Newtonian time-order and thus 
appear as a chronological progression towards 'satisfaction'. Given that 
Benjamin's later writings constantly attack the conception of progress in 
its being based on an 'empty, homogeneous' Newtonian time-order, it is 
clear that Hegel's 'Bacchanalian revel' would have seemed to be the idea of 
the Absolute as triumphalist celebration. Benjamin's image of the feast, 
for his interpretation of the Romantic Absolutum and idea of prose as a 
linguistic-temporal continuum, indicates the way it is constituted by a 
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'round dance' of ideas and not a progression. As was shown in Chapter 
3, the ideas break free from their being held in a systematic order and 
by their movement into multiplicity, bring to light that continuous multi- 
plicity in which they exist. " In one of his early Kant notes, Benjamin 
calls this their 'inconspicuous celebrating dimension'SO - for Benjamin, 
the celebration is always sober. 
Given the closeness of Benjamin's thought to Hegel's it is perhaps 
not surprising that this 'paradox' of a sober celebration should find its 
first expression in Benjamin's early essay Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich 
Hölderlin (1914-15). In this essay, Benjamin narrates a process of 
Aufhebung (GS 11.1,126) from the poem 'Dichtermut' to its later version, 
'Blödigkeit'; from the dependency on Greek mythology in the first to the 
forging of a new mythical world in the second. This developmental 
approach to the two poems is offset, however, by Benjamin's methodology, 
which is to find for each poem the 'special and unique sphere' of its 
'functional unity' ('die Funktionseinheit, GS II. 1,106), or what Benjamin 
calls 'das Gedichtete', 'the poetized'. This functional unity is, as the 
'boundedness' ('Verbundenheit) of its 'spiritual-intuitive structure' ('die 
geistig-anschauliche Struktur', p105), the truth of the poem. Benjamin 
quotes Novalis in support of this idea: 
'Jedes Kunstwerk hat ein Ideal a priori, eine Notwendigkeit bei 
sich, da zu sein. ' (Novalis) Das Gedichtete ist in seiner 
allgemeinen Form synthetische Einheit der geistigen und 
anschaulichen Ordnung. Diese Einheit erhält ihre besondere 
Gestalt als Innere Form der besonderen Schöpfung. (GS 11.1, 
105-6) 
'Every art-work has an ideal, a priori, -a necessity in itself 
to be there. ' (Novalis) The poetized is, in its general form, a 
synthetic unity of the spiritual and intuitive orders. The 
unity maintains its particular shape as the inner form of the 
particular creation. 
There can only ever be, thus, a multitude of Gedichteten, reflecting the 
multiplicity of art-works. In these notions one clearly sees an early form 
of what Benjamin later developed into his thinking of the circularity of 
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knowledge of experience and experience, and the multiplicity of such 
circularities in the 'ideas'. 51 
The two poems which Benjamin treats in the essay both concern the 
relationship of the poet to the people, and the progression which he 
finds between them concerns the way the later one expresses a Gedicht- 
etes with what Benjamin describes as a 'stretched' temporality and 
spatiality, a circularity unbroken by reference to an external mythology 
which separates the poet from the 'living': 
Die Aktivität des Dichters findet an den Lebendigen sich 
bestimmt, die Lebendigen aber bestimmen in ihrem konkreten 
Dasein C... 1 sich an dem Wesen des Dichters. Als Zeichen und 
Schrift der unendlichen Erstreckung seines Schicksals besteht 
das Volk. Dieses Schicksal selbst ist, wie später deutlich wird, 
der Gesang. (GS 11.1.116) 
The activity of the poet finds itself determined in the living, 
the living however determine themselves in their concrete 
existence [... ] in the essence of the poet. The people exist as 
sign and writing of the infinite stretching of his fate. This 
fate is, as becomes clear later, the song. 
Thus while Benjamin finds in the second poem, an Aufhebung of the first, 
it is precisely a movement into the particularity of the individual poem, 
and thus not into the unity of overarching Gedichtetes, but into a 
multiplicity constituting a linguistic-temporal continuum. It is this 
movement into a multifarious continuum and not into a systematic science 
which thus distances Benjamin from Hegel. 
In conclusion, Benjamin's thinking of translation has been shown to 
involve two aspects: the allowing of the language of the original to point 
to a 'language of truth', and its anteriority to point to a 'time of truth'. 
These two aspects belong together in Benjamin's thinking of the tempor- 
ality of language and concomitantly the thinking through of the trad- 
itionality of the present in which translator or historian writes. In 
Chapter 3, hope was discussed in its stretched temporality and thus its 
ability to break open the now-point of the Newtonian time-order; it may 
now be seen that it is the writing of the translator/historian which 
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allows hope to be read in the book of past events. Benjamin expresses 
this when he writes, at the end of the Goethe essay, 'that the ultimate 
hope never is for the one who cherishes it, but for those alone, for 
whom it is cherished' ('daß die letzte Hoffnung niemals dem eine ist, der 
sie hegt, sondern jenen allein, für die sie gehegt wird'. GS 1.1,200). 
In the following chapter, the work of Heidegger and Benjamin on the 
temporality of language will be brought together, and the significance of 
the similarities for an understanding of Kant's legacy will be discussed. 
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Since the Romantics, the view has become dominant that an art- 
work can occur in and for itself, without its connection to 
theory or morals either being grasped in its consideration or 
adequate to it through these considerings. The relative 
autonomy of the art-work in regard to art, or rather its 
merely transcendental dependency on art became the condition of 
Romantic art-criticism. The task would be to show Kent's 
aesthetics to be an essential presupposition of Romantic art- 
criticism in this sense. 
The place of Kant in the final dissertation is, however, minimal. The 
most likely explanation of this is that Fichte's radicalization of Kant's 
work brought out more clearly the elements of systematization against 
which the Romantics reacted: the grounding of the system in a form of 
transcendental ego which would prevent the development of an infinite 
regress of levels of reflexion. 
28. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, trans. Peter Heath 
and John Lachs (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), p12. Translation from Johann Gottlieb Fichte's sämmtliche Werke, 
ed. J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), vol 1,430. 
29. This text may be found in Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, trans. 
and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1988), 94-135. Benjamin quotes this passage near the beginning of his 
dissertation, GS 1.1,20. 
30. Fichte thus writes concerning the intellectual intuition of the 
activity of the self: 'All that matters to me is to be understood and 
persuasive on this point, which constitutes the basis of the whole system 
being presented here' ('Es liegt mir alles daran, über diesen Punkt, der 
die Grundlage des ganzen hier vorzutragenden Systems ausmacht, ver- 
standen zu werden, und zu überzeugen', Versuch einer neuen Darstellung 
der Wissenschaftslehre, I, 528). 
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31. Schlegel (Friedrich is meant, unless otherwise stated) writes for 
example: 
Die ganze Geschichte der modernen Poesie ist ein fortlaufender 
Kommentar zu dem kurzen Text der Philosophie: Alle Kunst soll 
Wissenschaft, und alle Wissenschaft soll Kunst werden; Poesie 
und Philosophie sollen vereinigt sein. ('Kritische Fragmente', 
No. 15, in Kritische Schriften, ed Wolfdietrich Reich (Munich: 
Carl Hanser, 1971), p22) 
The whole history of modern poetry is a commentary on the 
brief text of philosophy: all art. must become science, and all 
science art; poetry and philosophy must be reunited. 
32. Friedrich Schlegel and August Wilhem Schlegel. Athenaeum, 2 vols 
(Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1969) 
33. For further discussion of the idea of the artwork as an enclosing 
of the Absolute, see Winfried Menninghaus, 'Walter Benjamins Idee des 
Kunstwerks und seiner Kritik', pp. 425-6. 
34. It is significant for an understanding of the proximity of the 
translation essay to Benjamin's interpretation of the Romantics, that a 
similar expression to the phrase 'a constantly more embracing unfolding' 
('stetig umfassendere Entfaltung'), which appears at the key point of the 
interpretation of the temporality of the Romantics' thought, is found in 
the translation essay: 'In translations the life of the original attains its 
constantly re-newed latest and most embracing unfolding' (TT 72; 'In 
[Übersetzungen] erreicht das Leben des Originals seine stets erneute 
späteste and umfassendste Entfaltung', AÜ 11) 
35. This is essentially Heidegger's criticism of Hegel's understanding of 
time in Being and Time H. 428-436, as was discussed in Chapter 4. 
36. The question of the relationship of Benjamin's own thinking to that 
of Early German Romanticism remains a much disputed question. The 
recent edition of Studies in Romanticism 31(4) (1992) on Benjamin 
demonstrates this well. David Ferris, in his essay ("'Truth is the death 
of intention":. Benjamin's Esoteric History of Romanticism', pp. 455-480), 
writes that Benjamin's dissertation is a commentary, rather than a work 
of criticism (p455). The main purpose of Rodolph Gasch6's paper ('The 
Sober Absolute: On Benjamin and the Early Romantics', pp433-453), is to 
demonstrate that although the topics considered, such as criticism and 
translation, are the same, and their theories closely related, Benjamin's 
essay maintains a 'massive and intransigent criticism of the romantic 
conception of art and its concept of criticism', and manifests an 
'unyielding and unrelenting negative critical gesture that dominates the 
whole of the dissertation' (p452). Gasch6's attempt to sever any link 
between Benjamin's thinking and that of the Early Romantics is achieved 
at the cost of presenting Benjamin as arguing for a view of the Absolute 
as 'absolutely transcendental, radically distinguished from everything 
profane' (p452). Quite apart from the questionable nature of such an 
assertion in terms of Benjamin's own work, one of Schlegel's main 
criticisms of Fichte was directed at the latter's radical separation of the 
self-reflexive absolute ego from its representations. Gasch6's position, 
therefore, results in drawing Benjamin back towards Fichte -a proposit- 
ion which is certainly not in keeping with Benjamin's manifest criticisms 
of Fichte. This view needs to be compared with that of Irving 
Wohlfarth, 'The Politics of Prose and the Art of Awakening', in Glyph 7 
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(1980), p131-147. Wohlfarth sees a clear influence of Romantic thinking 
upon Benjamin's, to the extent of his taking certain lines of thought 
directly from them. For Wohlfarth this throws a shadow of idealism 
across Benjamin's work which fundamentally weakens its philosophical 
credibility: 
Benjamins materialism undeniably rests on idealist premises in 
as much as it varies motifs from German Romantic aesthetics. 
Idealisms can always afford to immerse themselves in the world 
because they are always sure of recuperating themselves in the 
process. (p142) 
Gasche's account is unconvincing because it makes no reference to the 
most important reason as to why Benjamin was drawn to an engagement 
with the Early German Romantics: the need for a rethinking of language 
and time in the wake of Kant's philosophy. However, this affinity 
between the projects of Benjamin and Schlegel does not mean that 
Benjamin's work has inescapably idealist presuppositions, as Wohlfarth 
concludes. It is not clear, firstly, that Schlegel's work can be labelled 
straightforwardly 'idealist', and second, the complexity of Benjamin's 
stance towards Romanticism does not allow simple lines of lineage to be 
drawn. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the dissertation must be seen as 
an implicit engagement with the traditionality with which Neo-Kantianism 
saw itself as an inheritor of Kant's work. In general the question of the 
proximity of Benjamin's thinking to the Early Romantics must rest on the 
question of his having 'found' a fulfilled temporality in their work. 
37. Benjamin ascribes this tendency of Schlegel to describe the Absolute 
as itself a work, to good motives: 
Dies Motiv war das Bestreben, den Begriff der Idee der Kunst 
vor dem Mißverständnis zu bewahren, er sei eine Abstraktion 
aus den empirisch vorgefundenen Kunstwerken. Er wollte 
diesen Begriff als eine Idee im platonischen Sinn, als ein 
npötcpov tt q>üact, als den Realgrund aller empirischen Werke 
bestimmen, und er beging die alte Vermengung von abstrakt und 
allgemein, wenn er ihn darum zu einem individuellen machen zu 
müssen glaubte. Nur in dieser Absicht bezeichnet Schlegel 
wieder und wieder mit Nachdruck die Einheit der Kunst, das 
Continuum der Formen selber als ein Werk. (GS 1.1,90) 
This motive was the effort to keep the concept of the idea of 
art from being misunderstood as an abstraction out of 
empirically given art-works. He wanted to determine this 
concept as an Idea in the Platonic sense, as a np6tepov cfi 
cpüvst, as the real ground of all empirical works. He believed 
for this reason that he had to make the concept into an 
individual work, and by so doing he fell into the old mixing of 
abstract and universal. Only with this intention did Schlegel 
again and again emphatically describe the unity of art, the 
continuum of forms, as itself a work. 
38. The importance for Benjamin of the thinking of history and 
tradition in German Romanticism, in his criticism of phenomenology and 
Neo-Kantianism is treated well by Claude Imbert, 'Le present et 1'histoire', 
in Walter Benjamin et Paris, ed Heinz Wismann (Paris: Les Editions du 
Cerf, 1986), pp. 743-792. 
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39. This was essentially Heidegger's criticism of Husserl in the Kassel 
lectures, as detail by Charles R. Bambach, 'Phenomenological Research as 
Destruktion: The Early Heidegger's Reading of Dilthey', Philosophy Today, 
37(2) (1993), 115-132. 
40. Bambach's article again confirms a similarity of development in 
Heidegger's thought, as Heidegger sought to develop his thinking of 
tradition also precisely in opposition to Husserl and Dilthey. 
41. 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in Illuminations, pp. 253-264; 
cited below as 'Theses'. Translation of 'Über den Begriff der Geschichte', 
GS 1.2,691-704. 'Konvolut N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of 
Progress]' trans. Leigh Hafrey and Richard Sieburth, in Benjamin, ed. Gary 
Smith (Chicargo and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 43- 
83; cited below as 'Smith'. Translation of 'N [Erkenntnistheoretisches, 
Theorie des Fortschritts]', GS V. 1,570-611. 
42. Nor, in the light of Benjamin's complex intertwining of phenomen- 
ological and romantic motifs, can 'translatability' be understood merely as 
a theory of the indeterminacy of language. Such a conclusion is reached 
by Barbara Kleiner, Sprache und Entfremdung: Die Proust-Übersetzungen 
Walter Benjamins innerhalb seiner Sprach- und Übersetzungstheorie (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1980). She writes: 'Resümierend läßt sich sagen, daß für 
Benjamin die Übersetzbarkeit eines Text in seiner formalen und 
semantischen Polyvalenz besteht. ' (p102) 
43. cf. Antoine Berman, L"epreuve de I'etranger, 81-2 
44. Friedrich Schlegel, 'Kritische Fragmente', No. 46: 'Die Römer sind uns 
näher und begrifflicher als die Griechen', Kritische Schriften p12. 
45. Novalis: Schriften, 4 vole, ed. Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: 
W. Kohlhammer, 1981) 
46. Peter Szondi, On Textual Understanding and Other Essays, trans. 
Harvey Mendelsohn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 
chapter 9: 'Hope in the Past: On Walter Benjamin' 
47. Christop Hering in his article 'Messianic Time and Materialistic 
Progress: Aspects of the Relationship between Theology and Marxism in 
Walter Benjamin's Theses on the Philosophy of History' (Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, 16(2) (1985), pp. 156-166), discusses 
this in the idea that the past has rights on the present. 
48. Irving Wohlfarth treats this reoccurance of the Romantic idea in 
Benjamin's later work in his article 'The Politics of Prose and the Art of 
Awakening', where he sees it as highly problematic (cf above). Arne 
Melberg in his article 'Benjamin's Reflection', MLN 107 (1992), pp. 478-498, 
also takes up Benjamin's use of an idea of prose. He sees 'prose' as a 
pseudonym for pure language, which is used to evoke the latter as a 
'pre-figurative state of language' (p497). This is again to interprete 
Benjamin's work as containing a strong prelapsarian intent, rather than 
understanding pure language as a critical medium. 
49. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), p10; cited below as 'Phenomenology'. 
Translation of G. W. F. Hegel, Theorie-Werkausgabe, 20 vols (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1970), vol 3,23: Phänomenologie des Geistes, cited as Werke 3'. 
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50. 'die unscheinbar verherrlichende Dimension', <fr 20>, GS VI, 39. 
51. Michael Jennings in his article 'Benjamin as a Reader of Hölderlin: 
The Origin of Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism', The German 
Quarterly, 56(4) (1983), pp. 544-562, also argues that the 'Gedichteten' are 
a precursor of Benjamin's 'ideas' in the Origin of German Tragic Drama. 
CONCLUSION: THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF LANGUAGE AND TIME 
1. Weg and Umweg 
It has become clear from the proceeding chapters that a substantial 
degree of concord exists between the thinking of Heidegger and Benjamin. 
This concord has appeared through an analysis of the way both thinkers 
took up the legacy of Kant's co-ordination of language and time, and 
further by investigating how, in each case, this legacy was reflected in 
their work taken as a 'whole'. For Heidegger, this necessitated an 
approach which did not separate his early and late work, but rather 
allowed the early temporal phenomenology to resonate with the later 
linguistic and poetic emphasis. In the case of Benjamin, it was seen that 
no such chronological development existed in his work, which, rather, was 
characterized from early on by a reflexivity upon the writing of 
philosophy. It was argued that this necessitated that a 'theoretical grid' 
be artificially separated out in order to allow the tension between 
theoretical 'content' and presentational 'form' to appear, thus letting 
Benjamin's work stand as a 'whole' in their inseparability. It was noted 
that Benjamin himself expected sparks to fly in the clash between his 
understanding of history and Heidegger'sl, but by allowing the question 
of translation to form a focus, illuminated by and illuminating the 'whole' 
of their work in each case, substantial agreement has again been found, 
precisely concerning the hermeneuticism and purposiveness of the handing 
on and taking up of a linguistic legacy. 
Benjamin's aversion to Heidegger's work, an aversion which is first 
found in Benjamin's reaction to Heidegger's trial lecture at Freiburg 
(1915) and thus before Heidegger's National Socialist involvements, is 
perhaps one reason why their common ground has been so little re- 
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searched. Benjamin's predicted 'entre-choc' between their work has 
predominantly become, in Benjaminian and Heideggerian literature, merely 
the indifference of one school to another, evidenced soley by the paucity 
of references one camp makes to the other. 2 Investigating Heidegger and 
Benjamin through their relation to Kant has the effect of breaking open 
the insularity of the respective schools, which otherwise are in danger 
of simply becoming dogmatic, and of laying a ground for a productive 
dialogue between them. The possibility of such a dialogue between 'parts' 
of their work, for example, detailed apraisals of their approaches to 
German Romanticism and Neo-Kantianism, Husserl and Dilthey, the nature 
of the work of art, etc, is conditional upon their work as a 'whole' being 
brought together on a possible ground of their relation. This has been 
achieved through the Kantian legacy of the question of language and time. 
This concluding chapter will explore the contours of this belonging 
together in relation to Kant's legacy, but subsequently will discuss the 
significance of this belonging together for an understanding of that 
legacy - the question of the temporality of language, a question which 
must always fall back on any answer and thus exceed its containment in 
any work. 
The few essays which have treated the relationship of Heidegger and 
Benjamin have for the most part neglected the question of the ground 
upon which such an encounter may take place. Ellane Escoubas in 'De la 
traduction comme "origine" des langues: Heidegger et Benjamin'3, provides 
an interesting account of the proximity of their views of translation, but 
the proximity is understood in terms of their assimilatability to a 
Humboldtian analysis of language. By appeal to Humboldt's 'energetic' 
view of language, Escoubas moves too quickly to an identification of 
Benjamin's and Heidegger's understanding of time in the unquestioned 
temporality implicit in Humboldt's work. Rebecca Comay's essay 'Framing 
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Redemption: Aura, Origin, Technology in Benjamin and Heidegger' and 
Christopher Fynsk's 'The Claim of History' are both concerned to show 
how Benjamin's work can fill in the 'apolitical' lacuna in Heidegger's later 
system of thought, but without making clear the ground of such a claim 
for the synthesis of their respective 'systems'. 4 Howard Caygill's essay 
'Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition's provides a- 
thorough investigation of the proximity of their views of time and 
tradition, focusing particularly on their essays on the nature of the 
work of art, but does not, however, consider their rethinking of 
language, which was shown above to be central to the question of 
tradition. Andrew Benjamin's essay 'Time and Task: Benjamin and 
Heidegger Showing the Present's is, however, clearly premised on the 
need to understand the relation of language and time in the work of both 
Heidegger and Benjamin; he finds, though, a clear distance between their 
projects. Heidegger's way of thinking is found to be an imperative to 
think 'without' metaphysics. The idea of being able to leave metaphysics 
behind in a past which is thus cut off from the present ascribes to 
Heidegger's thinking a temporality of progress structured on the 
isolation of Newtonian now-points, such that a past now-point stands in 
essential isolation from the present.? The above chapters have shown 
that Heidegger's thinking of tradition may be understood through his 
idea of ecstatic temporality thought as a 'stretching' of time in 
opposition to the discontinuities of the Newtonian time-order. 
There is, however, a profound sense of distance, though not 
opposition, between the words Weg and Umweg which have been used in 
the chapters above to characterise, respectively, the work of Heidegger 
and Benjamin, taken in each case as a whole. Heidegger's work may seem 
to constitute a path followed determinedly in the ever more radical 
questioning after a single goal, the meaning of being. Benjamin's work, 
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in contrast, seems to be an aggregate of diverse treatises, reviews and 
essays, with no clear goal in mind. These impressions have been shown 
to be misleading once their projects are taken respectively as 'wholes'. 
Heidegger's work consists of a move from the systematicity of a temporal 
phenomenology in Being and Time to a more critical approach to language 
and the occasionality and poeticism of his later essays. Yet this 'move' is 
not to be understood as the leaving behind of the early works, but 
rather Heidegger's way of thinking is to hold both together in the 
circularity of a temporal-poetic phenomenology, the way of thinking named 
by Ereignis. For Benjamin, it was necessary to make clear the theoretical 
basis which underlay his manner of thinking and writing, in terms of his 
idea of a critical medium of language and time, in order to avoid his 
Umweg being understood as a montage modelled on the discontinuities of a 
Newtonian time-order. With this approach, Umweg could thus be 
understood as the maintenance of a thorough-going circularity between a 
theoretical rethinking of language and time and the question of its 
presentational form. 
In both cases, Heidegger and Benjamin, their projects may be under- 
stood as the thinking through of the circularity of the temporality of 
language. The circularity is, in each case, that between a theoretical 
critique of temporality and a reflexion upon the language and linguistic 
presuppositions of such a critique. In order to further clarify this 
outline of the proximity of their thinking in taking up the Kant's legacy 
of the question of language and time, it will be useful to briefly survey 
the areas of agreement which have arisen in the preceding chapters. 
Chapter 1 showed how Kant recognised that the experience of an 
organism required a teleological determination of time by a concept, 
beyond the synthesis of the manifold into the time-order of Newtonian 
objectivity. Kant, however, held teleology and mechanism apart by making 
303 
teleology a principle of reason, a heuristic, though necessary, regulative 
judgment, as opposed to mechanism which was a principle of understand- 
ing and thus of the determinant synthesis of the manifold. By holding 
them apart in this way, the critical project could be validated in the 
light of Newtonian science - the very thing it sought to transcendentally 
justify. 
Chapters 2 and 3 set out how Heidegger and Benjamin took up the 
essential circularity in Kant's project between Newtonian temporality and 
its transcendental justification. For Heidegger, this idea became that of 
Dasein's 'circular existence', and for Benjamin it was understood in terms 
of the circularity of knowledge of experience and experience. In both 
cases, however, they were concerned to counter Kant's reliance on a 
Newtonian temporality which functioned to underpin a closed reflectivity 
between transcendental ego (taken as object-like) and the Newtonian 
objects of its experience. To this end, both Heidegger and Benjamin 
think time in terms of a stretching temporality, that is, where time is 
not thought of as originally a series of point-like moments, but rather 
where this Newtonian determination was only a particular, narrow 
determination of the span of a stretched 'now'. Heidegger and Benjamin 
thus essentially collapse the opposition between mechanism and teleology 
by arguing that language or conceptuality does not determine experience 
primarily into a Newtonian form, but rather according to a stretched 
temporality. By so doing they may be regarded as releasing the critical 
potential which was contained in Kant's idea of the teleological 
determination of time by the concept of organism. Chapter 1 argued that 
Kant's understanding of teleology was closer to c6Xcty, in the sense of 
the temporal 'coming to pass', and did not simply mean the possession of a 
futural orientation within a Newtonian time-order. 
Radicalizing Kant's approach in this way, language could also no 
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longer be understood through a sign theory where words simply label the 
objects given in experience. Rather, the phenomena of experience must be 
thought of as linguistically determined and to this end both Heidegger 
and Benjamin develop linguistic phenomenologies. For both, such a 
phenomenology can no longer be structured on an uncritical subject-object 
divide, rather subject and object must be thought of as standing together 
within a more critical circle of language and time. The place of this 
'circular existence' is the 'Da' of Heidegger's Dasein, which later became 
rethought as 'the opening' Was Offene) and 'the clearing' (die Lichtung), 
and is thought by Benjamin as 'the knowledge-contexture' (der Erkenntnis- 
zusammenhang) and 'the absolute surface' (die absolute Ffäche). 
Kant, by seeking to ground the circularity of his project in the a 
priority of the trancendental ego, conceived the latter as existing outside 
of the temporal experience it generated in the three-fold synthesis. In 
this way the transcendental ego could function as an atemporal ground of 
history and thus allow Reason to stand over and above tradition. In 
chapters 4 and 5, on translation, it was seen how both Heidegger and 
Benjamin wished to rethink the traditionality of the linguistic past from 
out of the place of the hermeneutic circularity of knowledge. In both 
cases the linguistic work was understood as constituted by its encapsul- 
ation of a circularity of language and time, yet a circularity which 
exceeded its linguistic containment and called for translation into the 
hermeneutic situation of the present. For both Heidegger and Benjamin, 
such translation was 'purposive', in the sense of being hermeneutically 
guided by that situation, with the aim of opening up the present from its 
narrow determination in a Newtonian time-order and the concomitant 
metaphysics of subject and object. For Heidegger, translation served to 
allow a more authentic thinking of language and time (named by Ereignis) 
to be glimpsed from out of their narrow determination in Ge-Stell. For 
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Benjamin, translation served the purpose of pointing the way to the 
'language of truth' and 'time of truth' from out of a 'uniquely temporally 
limited' experience. 
The proximity of their views of the linguistic work and its power to 
open up the hermeneutic situation of the present, is testified to in the 
significance they laid on Hölderlin's poetry and translations. This was 
understood above through the proximity of their thinking to that of 
Hegel, taken as a profoundly hermeneutic and historical working-through 
of Kant's position. In the context of Hölderlin's desire to distance 
himself from the over-arching systematicity of Hegel's Science, both 
Heidegger and Benjamin sought to understand his poetry in terms of each 
poem being constituted by a hermeneutic and systematic circularity, for 
which they both use the term das Gedichtete. Benjamin writes, for 
example: 'Das Gedichtete ist in seiner allgemeinen Form synthetische 
Einheit der geistigen and anschaulichen Ordnung. ' (GS 11.1,106; 'The 
poetized is, in its general form, a synthetic unity of the spiritual and 
intuitive orders'). And for Heidegger, to think the Gedichtetes in 
Hölderlin's poetry is 'ein wesentliches Wissen zu entfalten, in dessen 
Umkreise alle unsere sonstige Kenntnisse erst Wurzel and Stand finden' 
(GA 52,8; 'to unfold an essential knowing, in whose circle all our 
remaining [historical and biographical] facts first find root and 
standing'. ) 
It is in this context of the idea of the linguistic work being con- 
stituted by the systematization of language and time in its hermeneutic 
circle of 'knowing' (experience and knowledge of experience) that the 
difference between Weg and Umweg may be understood. Benjamin's 
thinking has a clear emphasis on the idea of the multiplicity of her- 
meneutic circularities (ideas, monads, treatises, dialectical images), such 
that the multiplicity itself functions to point to the temporal-linguistic 
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continuum of truth. Whilst one also finds the idea of a multiplicity of 
hermeneutic circularities in Heidegger's work (for example, the idea of 
regional ontologies, of 'epochs of being', and the occasionality and 
poeticism of his later essays), the emphasis is on the thorough Auslegung 
of a work in order to bring the meaning of being, which may be said In 
many ways, to illumination. 
If, however, one neglects Benjamin's thinking of a critical ground for 
Umweg, which is evidenced in the idea of temporal-linguistic continuum, 
then the idea of mere multiplicity is made to concur with a Newtonian 
determination of experience as consisting of isolated, object-like, now- 
points. 
If the idea of multiplicity is neglected in Heidegger's work, then 
being is made to become the unitary ground in a new Weg of thinking, a 
ground to which Heidegger has access in opposition to the tradition of 
philosophy which can be done without. 
Benjamin's Umweg of 'ideas' and Heidegger's Weg of 'questioning after 
being' both have the purpose of bringing to light the inescapably 
hermeneutic belonging togther of time and language: the temporality of 
language. The proximity of the projects of Heidegger and Benjamin 
points to the belonging together of Weg and Umweg in each. That is, 
each thinker must be understood in terms of an attempt to systematically 
think through the belonging together of language and time, together with 
a questioning of the claim that a linguistic work can encapsulate this 
belonging together. For both Heidegger and Benjamin this latter 
questioning leads to what seems a certain rejection of system. It must be 
emphasised again, however, that there is no simple passing beyond 
systematicity for either Heidegger or Benjamin. It is rather a rejection 
of Kant's desire to ground system in the Newtonian temporality of a 
transcendental subjectivity. Such a grounding itself forces a certain 
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object-like status upon system, such that it may be thought of as 
ensnaring and gathering the truth existing outside of it. The systematic 
thinking of the belonging together of language and time is, rather, 
always a circling which drives itself beyond its closure in a system 
thought of with a Newtonian temporality. This tension between the 
having and not having of a system is famously stated in Friedrich 
Schlegel's Athenaeum fragment 53: 'Es ist gleich tödlich für den Geist, ein 
System zu haben, and keins zu haben. Er wird sich also wohl ent- 
schließen, beides zu verbinden. ' (It is equally fatal for the mind to have a 
system or not to have one. It will have to decide therefore to combine 
both. ') It is now clear that for both Heidegger and Benjamin it is this 
combination, and the maintainence of tension between systematicity and 
system's own reflexive surpassing from the imposition of a Newtonian 
temporality, which constitutes the 'whole' of their thinking in each case. 
What, then, is the meaning of 'whole', the word which has been used 
through-out to emphasize the need to take account of both the 
'systematicity' and 'un-systematicity' in the work of Heidegger and 
Benjamin? In each case, it has been used to prevent the uncritical 
division of their work: for Heidegger, the division of early and later; 
for Benjamin the division of presentational 'form' from its theoretical 
'Gradnetz. It can now be seen that both these divisions are modelled on 
a Newtonian temporality: the simple isolation of now-points permiting the 
separation of periods in Heidegger's work, and the isolation of realms 
('form' and 'content') modelled on such now-points, in the case of 
Benjamin's work 
The word 'system', however, derives from the Greek ouvtvcrlµt, 'I put 
together', thus suggesting that to put together systematicity and un- 
systematicity as a 'whole', yields an even higher level systematicity. Such 
a higher level systematicity in the case of the work of both Heidegger 
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and Benjamin would, it would seem, turn back on itself to give a further 
un-systematicity, signalled precisely in the individuality of their 
respective systems. The belonging together of Heidegger and Benjamin in 
relation to Kant's legacy would suggest, however, a further, higher, 
systematicity, and so the regress would go on. This regress only occurs, 
however, if systematicity is caught within the opposition and subsequent 
combination of 'having a system' and 'not having a system'. This 
formulation suggests that a system is an object-like possession which the 
mind can decide to have or not. It is rather that the word 'whole', in 
the belonging together of 'systematicity' and 'un-systematicity' in the 
work of Heidegger and Benjamin, marks the rethinking of systematicity 
itself, beyond this opposition. 
The significance of bringing their work together is not in order 
that they may be synthesized into a more complete system, but rather that 
both their projects attest to the need to think systematically, but in a 
transformed sense. Kant's legacy to posterity was not simply a 
philosophical system, but rather the necessity of systematic thinking. It 
is this legacy, taken up and transformed in the work of Heidegger and 
Benjamin, which ultimately accounts for the proximity of their projects. 
In order to understand, then, the rethinking of systematicity which has 
been marked by the word 'whole' it is necessary to look again briefly at 
the question of system in Kant's work. 
11. Kant's Legacy: The Systematization of Language and Time 
As has been quoted already, Kant anticipates the question: 'what sort of a 
treasure is this that we propose to bequeath to posterity? ' (Critique of 
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Pure Reason Bxxiv). Kant's answer, as was discussed in Chapter 1, Is 
essentially that his legacy is system. The chapter went on to show how 
Kant's thinking of his system as an organised unity was modelled on the 
experience and conceptualization of organisms. This necessitated a 
teleological determination of time in the sense that the temporal 'span' of 
the experience of an organism stretches beyond the now-point in which 
the Newtonian object stands. The critical system itself was understood, 
though, as giving a transcendental justification of mechanistic science. 
That Kant was unable to resolve his opposition of mechanism and 
teleology, led to profound problems for his project. This tension is 
captured well when Kant writes: 'By a system I understand the unity of 
the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea' C'Ich verstehe aber unter 
einem Systeme die Einheit der mannigfaltigen Erkenntnisse unter einer 
Idee', A832/B860). The idea Kant has in mind, concerning the critical 
system as a whole, is the transcendental ego as the transcendental unity 
of apperception. Whilst the 'ground' for the experience of an organism 
as a systematic unity is its concept, which determines the synthesis of 
the manifold in a teleological way, in the case of the systematic unity of 
the critical project, Kant falls back on the positing of a ground with 
object-like existence, the transcendental ego. With this dis-analogy 
between organism and system the latter becomes grounded in an uncritical 
Newtonian temporality. Having now explored the way Heidegger and 
Benjamin take up the question of the belonging together of language and 
time, beyond Newtonian conceptuality and temporality, it is possible to 
allow their work to throw light on the deeper significance of Kant's 
legacy: the necessity of system 
In the Opus Postumum9 one finds formulation after formulation of 
the idea of system, as if Kant himself were struggling to come to terms 
with the legacy of his critical work. The reason for this is that Kant's 
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system had not simply concerned the systematization of empirical 
experience into a unitary framework, but had concerned, rather, the 
ground of the possibility of the systematization of experience as such. 
He had written, for example, in the first introduction to the Critique of 
Judgment. 
Wenn Philosophie das System der Vernunfterkenntnis durch Be- 
griffe ist, so wird sie schon dadurch von einer Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft hinreichend unterschieden, [... die] nicht als 
Teil zu einem solchen System gehört, sondern so gar die Idee 
desselben allererst entwurft und prüfet. 
If philosophy is the system of rational cognition through 
concepts, this characterization distinguishes it from a critique 
of pure reason. C... ] The latter does not belong to a system of 
philosophy as a part of it, but outlines and examines the very 
idea of such a system in the first place. 1O 
It is in the three-fold synthesis as the focal point of the inter-play of 
language and time in Kant's work that the necessity of systematicity lies. 
For Kant, synthesis is the focal point of the aüat&ats, the standing 
together, of language and time. As the ordering, connecting and bringing 
into relation of the manifold, synthesis is a condition of the possibility 
of experience, and it is experience as thus synthesized which gives rise 
to knowledge of experience as systematic. Thus Kant writes further on 
in the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment: 
Wir haben in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft gesehen, daß die 
gesamte Natur als der Inbegriff aller Gegenstände der 
Erfahrung, ein System nach transcendentalen Gesetzen, nämlich 
solchen, die der Verstand selbst a priori gibt [... 1 ausmache. 
Eben darum muß auch die Erfahrung, C... 1 so wie sie überhaupt 
objektiv betrachtet, möglich ist (in der Idee), ein System 
möglicher empirischen Erkenntnisse ausmachen. C... ] So weit ist 
nun Erfahrung überhaupt nach transcendentalen Gesetzen der 
Verstandes als System und nicht als bloßes Aggregat anzusehen. 
(Ak XX, 208-9) 
We saw in the Critique of Pure Reason that nature as a whole, 
as the sum total of all objects of experience, constitutes a 
system in terms of transcendental laws - those that the 
understanding itself gives a priori. C... ] That is why 
experience, too, considered objectively, ie. in the way 
experience as such is possible (in the idea) must constitute a 
system of possible empirical cognition. C... ] Experience must be 
regarded, according to transcendental laws of the 
understanding, as a system and not as a mere aggregate. (p397) 
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The Critique of Pure Reason concerns the a priority of system in that 
the systematicity of temporal experience and the systematicity of 
conceptual knowledge are shown to spring forth together from a common 
root, the transcendental synthesis. Kant's transcendental philosophy is 
thus a system of the necessity of system; his legacy is ultimately the 
claim of the necessity of system. Yet as has been shown, in order to 
give transcendental justification to Newtonian science, Kant grounded the 
transcendental synthesis in a transcendental ego with an uncritical 
Newtonian temporality. In the profound dis-analogy between Kant's view 
of his critical system and organism, it is the latter which points the way 
to a more critical reflection on the temporality of language (subjective 
genitive) of system, such that language is seen to determine the 
temporality of experience beyond the uncritical primacy of Newtonian 
temporality. 
Heidegger and Benjamin, in resolving the tension between teleology 
and mechanism in a thorough-going temporal-linguistic phenomenology, re- 
instate the circularity between language and time which had been 
grounded by Kant. Their work constitutes an understanding of the 
teleological temporality of system as a thinking of the radical finitude of 
the belonging together of language and time. That is, their work allows 
system to be thought more properly in its teleological temporality, 
understood as a stretching of time, without the imposition of an object- 
like grounding. In both, there is a move from understanding system as 
standing object-like and completed in an empty now-point which contains 
it, to an understanding of system as the hermeneutic present of a 
stretching temporality. System, thought of in its hermeneutic circularity, 
no longer stands over against the philosophical tradition as if its 
language were not handed on from that tradition, nor is it to be 
regarded as the gathering of past philosophical systems and works into 
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an absolute truth as if that past consisted of objects awaiting collection. 
Rather, system itself becomes the principle of a radical temporal-linguistic 
finitude, such that in its systematization the past is taken up, translated 
to the present, illuminating the inescapable togetherness (v(a c&o lS) of 
language and time in the hermeneutic situation of the present. 
NOTES 
1. Walter Benjamin: Briefe, II, 506. Quoted above in the Introduction. 
2. Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of 
Literary Criticism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
makes no reference to Heidegger despite being concerned with Benjamin's 
thinking of the history of literary works. Julian Roberts, Walter 
Benjamin (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), suggestively proposes, that 
'[Benjamin's] attack on "judgment" as lying at the root of language's 
degradation after the fall is obviously a close parallel to the work of 
Lask and Heidegger'. (p91) Roberts does not, however, expand upon this 
remark, and nor is it 'obvious' that a proximity between Heidegger and 
Benjamin can be conceived on this basis. Susan Buck-Morse, The 
Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1989), cites many of Benjamin's comments on 
Heidegger's work, but by reading Benjamin solely in the light of the 
Frankfurt School, she does not provide a suitable basis for understanding 
their proximity. Concerning the scholarly literature on Heidegger, there 
would appear to be no references made to Benjamin. 
3. Eliane Escoubas, 'De la traduction comme "origine" des langues: 
Heidegger et Benjamin', Les Temps Modernes, 514-515 (1989), 97-142. 
4. Rebecca Comay, 'Framing Redemption: Aura, Origin, Technology in 
Benjamin and Heidegger', in Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and 
Continental Thought, ed. by Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott and P. 
Holley Roberts (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 
139-161; Christoper Fynsk, 'The Claim of History', diacritics, 22 (1992), 
115-126. Comay writes, for example: 'Benjamin promises to provide a kind 
of historical concretion or focus to Heidegger's thinking - both a date 
and a place -a focus which, I believe, might bring out some of the 
practical resources still latent (despite everything) in the Heideggerian 
system, resources still potent for politics today' (p140). And in a similar 
vain, Fynsk: 'Would it be possible to read Heidegger's later thought on 
language in the light of Benjamin's reflections on history and thereby 
develop this later thought in more concrete, historical terms' (p116). 
There are clear indications in both of these statements that an 
implicit purpose of associating Benjamin with Heidegger is to rehabilitate 
Heidegger's thinking from any simple affiliation to Nazism. The proximity 
of their projects, yet the fact that Heidegger saw his work as being in 
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support of Nazi reform while Benjamin understood his own work as 
utterly anti-fascist, must surely give rise to more serious reflection on 
the situation of praxis than merely the desire to find in Heidegger's 
work 'latent resources' which show that he was simply mistaken about the 
political direction of his work. To argue that Heidegger was, in some 
sense, mistaken about the political resources available in his work is 
close to assigning fascism itself to a past from which we have moved on 
and now judge from the wisdom of our posterity. 
S. Howard Caygill, 'Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition', 
in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, ed. by 
Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, pp. 1-31. 
6. Andrew Benjamin, Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the 
Present', in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, ed. 
by Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, pp. 216-250 
7. Andrew Benjamin writes: 'In both instances, Heidegger and Benjamin, 
the present is to be differentiated from itself. In Heidegger's case this 
is necessary because the present is taken to be metaphysics - the "age" - 
and therefore the task involves "leaving metaphysics to itself" and thus 
to think "without" it. Here there is a differentiation that necessarily 
eschews relation. ' (p244-5) A further difficulty with Andrew Benjamin's 
view concerns the understanding of 'continuity' in relation to tradition 
and its temporality. Whilst criticising Heidegger for councelling a break, 
or discontinuity with the tradition of metaphysics, he affirms Benjamin's 
imperative concerning the need to 'blast open' the 'continuity of history'. 
The meaning of 'continuity' in relation to the Newtonian view of time, 
which is precisely characterised by a discontinuity of isolated now-points, 
and in relation to a stretched or 'fulfilled' temporality, which breaks 
open the Newtonian, object-like now-point, was discussed in Chapter 3. 
8. Heidegger's statement to this effect, in the forward to William J. 
Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. xxii/xxiii, was quoted 
above in Chapter 2. 
9. Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, in Kant's Werke: Akademie-Textausgabe, 
vol XXI and XXII. Selections translated as Opus Postumum, ed. by Eckart 
Förster, trans. by Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). Kant's series of attempts to define his system 
may be found in Ak XXI, 25-99; translation p228-256. 
10. Immanuel Kant, 'First Introduction' to the Critique of Judgment, in 
Critique of Judgment, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1987), pp. 385-441 (385). Translation of 'Erste Einleitung in die Kritik 
der Urteilskraft', Ak XX, 195-251 (195). 
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